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ABSTRACT
How can states with weak and politicized bureaucracies enforce labor and environmental
regulations? Through a study of subnational variation in Argentina, this dissertation
develops a framework to explain why bureaucrats are able to enforce regulations in some
cases and not others. The framework focuses on two factors: the strength of linkages
between bureaucrats and civil society organizations, and the level of administrative
capacity in the bureaucracy. Strong linkages can facilitate routinized resource sharing and
the construction of pro-enforcement coalitions, and administrative capacity determines
whether bureaucrats passively or strategically use societal resources. By explaining
variation in patterns of enforcement that are obscured by existing approaches, this
research opens up new possibilities for crafting strategies to strengthen regulatory
institutions. The dissertation draws on data collected during sixteen months of field
research, including over 250 semi-structured interviews and an original survey of labor
inspectors.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Theory
This dissertation examines the politics of enforcing labor and environmental
regulations in Argentina. In Argentina, as in many countries, there are strong laws to
protect workers and the environment on the books, but these laws are often violated, and
the state bureaucracies charged with enforcement are highly politicized. Weak regulatory
institutions result in concrete consequences: workers being cheated out of legally
mandated benefits, pollution being left unmitigated, and firms being left with few
incentives to invest in sustainable practices. Although institutional weaknesses are
widespread, especially in middle-income and developing countries, debates about
political economy have until recently tended to side step these problems.' Strengthening
regulatory institutions through enforcement remains a key challenge. This dissertation
explores the question: How do states with weak and politicized bureaucracies enforce
labor and environmental regulations?
Most theories, either implicitly or explicitly, argue that the creation of a strong,
autonomous bureaucracy is crucial for enforcement. A contested concept, autonomy can
be defined broadly as the ability of a bureaucracy to take actions on its own accord and to
resist the influence of organized interests.2 Although autonomy is not sufficient for
enforcement, it appears necessary because when bureaucracies are politicized (i.e. when
they can be directly influenced or captured by organized interests), resources are often
redirected for patronage and powerful actors block state action.3 Where bureaucracies
are politicized and weak-due, for instance, to inadequate budgets and limited staff-
they appear destined to fail even if there are a number of other factors, such as support
from elected leaders, in favor of implementing regulations.4 Although analysts do not
assume that bureaucracies achieve perfect autonomy, nearly all of the mechanisms that
can potentially trigger enforcement depend on high levels of corporate coherence within
the state. In short, the lesson from dominant theories is that developing strong
bureaucracies with sufficient autonomy is the path to enforcement. Therefore, in
Argentina, where almost all regulatory bureaucracies are politicized and many lack
administrative capacity, enforcement seems all but impossible.
A closer look at Argentina, however, reveals broad variation in enforcement-
across provinces, economic sectors, and time-that cannot be easily accounted for with
dominant approaches. In the province of C6rdoba, for example, the labor inspectorate
has a series of organizational failings that undermine the prospects for autonomy:
inspectors are paid low salaries, are not exclusive employees of the state, do not have
prospects of career advancement, and have not been selected through a meritocratic
1 Levitsky and Murillo 2009
2 The definition of the concept of autonomy and its relation to state capacity is contested in the literature
(for a recent review see: Soifer and vom Hau 2008). In this study, I use a relatively weak definition of
autonomy that does not make presumptions about the preferences of bureaucrats. On the relation between
autonomy and capacity, see: Skocpol 1985; Geddes 1990; Geddes 1994; Evans 1995; Carpenter 2001.
3 Geddes 1990: Grzymala-Busse 2003
4 For example: World Bank 1995; Dasgupta 2000; O'Rourke 2002; Inter-American Development Bank
2002: Inter-American Development Bank 2004; Bensusdn 2006; Goldin 2007; Anner 2008; McAllister
2008; McAllister, Van Rooij, and Kagan 2010.
process. Most conventional theories would expect the inspectorate to fail due to capture
or corruption. In contrast, however, the inspectors in C6rdoba have worked with unions
and the construction industry association to inspect construction sites regularly, punish
firms that ignore health and safety laws, and to conduct onsite training that can enable
firms to comply. C6rdoba's labor inspectorate is certainly politicized, and perhaps even
captured by unions, but that has not proven an insurmountable barrier to enforcement. In
contrast, in the neighboring province of Santa Fe, which shared all of the same
bureaucratic deficiencies and was equally permeable to unions, for many years the state
did comparatively little to enforce health and safety regulations in construction. Such
pronounced variation cannot be explained solely by examining bureaucratic autonomy.
In addition to variation across Argentine provinces, there have also been
substantial changes in enforcement over time. From the mid-1980's to 2003,
environmental officials in the northern Tucumin province took samples of water
pollution from sugar mills producing ethanol and found contaminants at levels over one
hundred times the legal limits. Until 2003, there was little if any effort either to punish
violators or to enable firms to comply. Efforts to improve compliance increased
gradually, and by 2008 the local environmental agency began taking far-reaching steps to
enforce regulations, which triggered over fifty million dollars in investments by the
industry to reduce pollution. Still, Tucumin never formed an autonomous bureaucracy.
On the contrary, the regulatory agency took on more features that should have left it open
to political interference. For instance, the officials who were hired had preexisting ties
with industry and were on short-term contracts that offered few career prospects within
the state bureaucracy. How can this variation in enfbrcement, all within the context of
weak bureaucracies, be explained?
This dissertation develops a framework to explain variation in enforcement that
does not depend primarily on the bureaucracy being autonomous. In brief, the
framework is built around the interaction of two factors: the administrative capacity of
the bureaucracy, and the strength of linkages between bureaucrats and civil society
organizations. First, even within the category of weak and politicized bureaucracies,
there are substantial differences in administrative capacity. When bureaucracies have
relatively low levels of administrative capacity, they cannot easily take enforcement
actions on their own. Second, state bureaucracies often have linkages-routinized
processes of consultation and interpersonal networks-with civil society organizations,
broadly defined to include unions, environmental groups, and industry associations.
Bureaucrats can use these linkages to extend state capacity by drawing on resources from
civil society organizations.
In combination, administrative capacity and linkages interact to result in
qualitatively different patterns of enforcement. When there are high levels of
administrative capacity but weak linkages, the resulting pattern is state-driven
enft)rcement, in which all resources are mobilized by the bureaucracy on its own. State-
driven enforcement, which is generally the only pattern recognized in the literature, is
unlikely to reach high levels where bureaucracies lack autonomy and bureaucrats need to
take steps that go against organized interests. When administrative capacity is low but
linkages are strong, the result is society-dependent enforcement, in which bureaucrats rely
on societal resources to enforce regulations. In these cases, enforcement occurs despite
the fact that the bureaucracy lacks capacity, but it is limited to places where linked-
organizations have considerable resources. By contrast, when both linkages and
administrative capacity are strong, bureaucrats use societal resources strategically to
supplement the state. This combination leads to patterns of co-produced enforcement, in
which there are high levels of enforcement, and the distribution of enforcement does not
reproduce the inequalities of civil society organization. By identifying these alternative
patterns of enforcement and their formation through combinations of administrative
capacity and linkages, this dissertation explains variation that is obscured by existing
approaches.
This study contributes directly to debates about the role of the state in the
economy and the ability of the state to uphold the rule of law. During the peak of
neoliberalism, much of the research on regulation analyzed legal reforms, not policy
implementation. For instance, in the midst of an apparent convergence towards labor
flexibility in Latin America, scholars focused almost entirely on the intense battles over
labor law reform, but selecting laws was just the beginning, not the end, of politics.5
Much less attention has been paid to the politics of enforcing regulations that are on the
books.6 Yet, the problem of enforcement has only become more critical to understanding
the political economy of regulation in Latin America. With widespread disillusionment
about neoliberal reform, a wave of elections ushered in left-oriented leaders who
promised a return of the state as a regulator.' Little is known, however, about whether or
not this political change will translate into better social or environmental protections,
especially given the condition of many enforcement bureaucracies in the region. This
dissertation shifts the focus (once again) from policy selection to implementation.
Enforcing regulation is part of a broader class of problems that arise when
institutions are weak and states are unable or unwilling to put the weight of their
administrative apparatuses behind upholding laws.8 Scholars studying such diverse areas
as human rights, crime, impartial justice, and public goods provision, highlight the
problem of building strong institutions.9 Research on labor and environmental
regulations provides an opportunity to examine the processes that promote and block
enforcement in two policy areas that share similar administrative challenges but have
very different political dynamics. Enforcing regulation in both issue areas requires
monitoring violations and taking a variety of steps to improve compliance. But, while
labor politics in Argentina is highly partisan and marked by a history of corporatist
interest group organization, environmental conflict is detached from partisan politics and
5 Bronstein 1997, Etchemendy and Palermo 1998; Levitsky and Way 1998: Cook 1998: Etchemendv 2001:
Murillo 2001, Madrid 2003; Murillo 2005; Murillo and Schrank 2005; Cook 2007; Burgess 2010.
6 In recent years, there have been some notable exceptions on which this dissertation builds: Marshall 2007
Anner 2008; Piore and Schrank 2008; Pires 2008: Schrank 2009; Ronconi 2010; Coslovskv 20 11:
Coslovsky, Pires, and Silbey 2011: Pires 2011.
Iven if there are debates of what constitutes left, there was clearly a strong shift in the beginning of the
2000s: Castabada 2006; Arditi 2008; Baker and Greene 2011.
f For example on rule of law see: O'Donnell 1993, and on weak institutions, see: Levitsky and Murillo
2005;. Levitsky and Murillo 2009.
I Helmke 2002; Brinks 2003; Chavez 2004; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006; Brinks 2008; Mainwaring and
Scully 2010
dominated by relatively unstructured pluralist interest groups. By contrasting politics and
holding constant the administrative mechanics of the task, we can draw lessons from
labor and environmental regulation in Argentina that speak to the broader problems of
governance characterized by uneven and politicized implementation.
The remainder of this introduction and theory chapter is organized as follows.
First, I review the literature on regulation and, more broadly, on bureaucracies and state
capacity. Second, I offer an alternative explanation for variation in enforcement in places
with weak bureaucracies. Third, I describe the empirical context of the dissertation-
Argentina in the period after the economic crisis of 2001. Fourth, I lay out the
subnational comparative research design employed in the study. The chapter concludes
with an overview of the dissertation, previewing the empirical analysis and outlining the
chapters that follow.
Enforcing Regulation
In order to analyze regulatory enforcement, it is helpful first to unpack what
enforcement means in practice. The regulations studied in this dissertation set out
standards that constrain the actions of firms and establish a number of rights for workers
and communities. In labor policy, these standards include the payment of minimum
wages, benefits, severance pay, and health and safety requirements.' 0 Environmental
standards include limitations on pollutant discharges to the air, water, and soil, as well as
a number of process standards for pollution management and treatment. Violations either
deny, or threaten to deny, the rights of workers to enjoy basic protections and of people to
live in a safe and clean environment. Violations also undermine the strength of
institutions that structure labor markets and balance the goals of sustainability and
economic development.
Enforcement is about the state's role in ensuring that firms meet their obligations,
rights are respected, and institutions are strong. For many analysts, enforcement
primarily occurs through deterrence; the higher the probability of detection, and the
greater the penalties, the more likely it is that rational firms will choose to comply."
Using this model, it appears simple to operationalize and measure enforcement through
the number of inspections and fines. Closer examination of regulation in practice,
however, reveals that while deterrence is important, it only captures a small portion of
what regulators do.' 2 In addition to monitoring and penalizing, these tools include
instructing firms on how to comply,13 appealing to firms' normative or identity
commitments,1 4 conciliating conflict among actors,' 5 or using some combination of these
Ihis study focuses entirely on individual, not collective, labor rights.
Becker 1968
The literature on regulation is too vast to completely review in this section. For a recent review, see:
Coslovsky. Pires, and Silbey 2011
13 Piore and Schrank 2008
1 Kelman 1981 Lee 2008
" Hawkins 1984
actions.16 Seen in this light, it becomes clear that enforcement is much more than simple
application of previously chosen policies. Rather, it becomes a process of interpreting
regulations and adapting rules to the settings in which they are applied. 17
While recognizing the complexities of regulation in practice, it is helpful for
analytic purposes to distill enforcement into a stylized process in order to better specify
the types of resources bureaucrats need. First, bureaucracies need information about
compliance and non-compliance in an economic sector. This information can be
gathered actively, by sending inspectors out to firms, or passively, by waiting for
individuals and civil society organizations to bring the information to the state. Second,
bureaucracies need to be able to process the information and craft a response that creates
incentives for firms to comply and enables them to respond to those incentives. Third,
bureaucracies need to be able to resist efforts to block enforcement by organized interests
that may have immediate costs imposed on them by regulations. Compared with firm
owners or managers for whom regulations can impose costs or constraints, the
beneficiaries of regulations are generally diffuse (as in environmental protection) or in a
position of weakness (as in labor protection). Therefore, state agencies need some way to
go against the power imbalance.' 8 If any one of these three capabilities is disrupted or
blocked, enforcement will be reduced.
Building on this analysis, we can develop a strategy for operationalizing and
measuring levels of enforcement. Most studies tend either to eschew measuring levels of
enforcement altogether (e.g. opting only for comparison of enforcement styles) or to use
only quantitative indicators of enforcement (e.g. numbers of inspectors to estimate
enforcement intensity). 19 Both approaches are problematic. Focusing only on
enforcement styles (e.g. whether regulators use penalties or instruction) ignores the
question of how much action regulators take in the first place. This oversight is
significant because one of the major problems in enforcement is that regulators are
blocked or lack the capacity to reach many places where there are violations. Using only
a small number of quantifiable indicators of enforcement levels, which are often not
contextualized, leaves out much of what regulators do in practice and can result in
tremendous measurement error (e.g. giving comprehensive inspections the same weight
as superficial ones).
In contrast to both of these approaches, I use a wide variety of data sources (e.g.
numbers of inspections and first-hand accounts of their quality) to construct context-
sensitive measures of relative enforcement levels that alleviate measurement problems.20
And to provide clarity in comparisons among many cases, I create a simple spectrum
16 Kagan and Scholz 1984; Scholz 1991; Ayers and Braithwaite 1992; Hunter and Waterman 1992;
lawkins 2002; May 2004; Gunningham, Thorton, and Kagan 2005; May 2005; Fiorino 2006; Pires 2008;
Coslovsky 2009; Locke, Amengual, and Mangla 2009
" For two more elaborate treatments of the pragmatic nature of regulation, see: Piore 2004; Coslovsky,
Pires, and Silbey 2011
18 Wilson 1980
19 For the strategy approach, see: Piore and Schrank 2008; McAllister 2010. For the broad indicator
approach, see: Anker, Chernyshev, Egger, Mehran, and Ritter 2002; Almeida and Carneiero 2005 Marshall
2007: Kus 2010; Ronconi 2010.
2 Adcock and Collier 2001
(outlined in Table 1.1) that gives precise definitions to low, medium, and high levels of
enforcement. This scale is insensitive to why the state is enforcing regulations in any
particular case. A triggers are treated the same, ranging from a union leader who has a
conflict with a manager, to a firm that wants to gain an advantage over its competitor, to
a neighborhood group that has a problem with pollution, to a bureaucratic decision based
on a technical analysis of an industry. The benefit of this approach is that it treats the act
of enforcement separately from the motivations for enforcement, allowing the two to be
analyzed independently.
Table 1.1: Levels of Enforcement
Level of Enforcement _ _ _iiior _ _Qhseedb iators
Low Regulators generate very little
A Enforcement is rare, information, if any, about
Low level of and regulators allow violations
enforcement violations to occur - There are few inspections
widely without crafting - Penalties are not credible and/or
a response regulators do not take steps to
___________ _________________ help firms comply
0Regulators generate a steady
Enforcement occurs flow of information about
Medium level consistently, and violations
of enforcement regulators resolve There are routine inspections
violations on a case-by- - Responses to violations
case basis sometimes include penalties or
Therearefewinstruction
Enforcement is intense * Regulators systematically and
and systematic; actively generate information
gregulators go beyond about violations
enforcementof case-by-case resolution There are strategically targeted
eand take broad steps to inspections
create the conditions * Responses to violations combine
for higher rates of credible penalties with other
Hih_______ compliance tools (e.g. pedagogy or publicity)
Hi hihlvlo
Approaches to Explaining Enforcement
The first place many analysts look to explain variation in enforcement is the
bureaucracy, especially features of the bureaucracy leading to autonomy. Although there
is debate in the literature about which features are most important, many studies take the
elements identified by Weber's classic analysis of bureaucracy as a starting point .2 1 First,
the bureaucracy should be meritocratic, which means that officials should be recruited
21 Gerth and Mills 1946. For an example of this approach, see Kiser and Schneider 1994; Rauch and Evans
2000;, Henderson, Hulme, Jalilian, and Phillips 2007. For other standards by which bureaucracies are
judged, see: Schneider and Heredia 2003.
through competitive exams and should have minimum levels of education. Second,
officials should also have long-term career prospects for advancement and be protected
from arbitrary firing. Third, officials should be dedicated employees of the state (without
outside employment that can potentially conflict with their official duties), and office
holding should not be a source of personal rents. Fourth, Weberian bureaucracies should
be governed by abstract, rational, hierarchical rules, that reinforce vertical relations and
make subordinates responsive to the instructions of their superiors. Beyond Weberian
prescriptions, scholars also argue that bureaucracies can, and should, have additional
sources of cohesion (at times in contradiction to hierarchical relations and formal rules),
which include professional norms and strong organizational cultures. 2 Working in
concert, the elements described above give officials strong incentives against corruption
and insulate them from political interference.
When many of these features are absent, there is an expectation that the
bureaucracies will become politicized, which exacerbates factors that work against
enforcement and disables factors that work towards enforcement. First, enforcing
regulation almost always entails going against some organized interests that experience
concentrated losses from regulations.2 Since politicized bureaucracies appear ripe to be
captured by business interests, anti-regulatory pressures should be even more potent than
they would be in places where bureaucracies are autonomous.2 4 As businesses can wield
more power, through directly lobbying or the credibly threatening to divest, enforcement
should become less likely. In short, the expectation that derives from this argument is
that in places where firms are sensitive to regulatory costs and powerful, politicized
bureaucracies should be easily blocked and enforcement should be unlikely.
Second, the problems associated with politicization and bureaucratic weakness are
seen as undermining the influence of political leaders who might favor enforcement.
Many studies of bureaucratic behavior in advanced industrial countries focus on the
26preferences of the political principals who oversee agencies. For example, regulatory
agencies, such as the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration, do
react to the preferences of politicians, increasing enforcement when the party in power is
aligned with labor unions. The responsiveness of bureaucracies to politicians is greatest
when issues are highly salient and political principals can use their powers of
appointment, oversight (hearings, investigations, etc.), and budgeting to influence the
bureaucratic action." This top-down control, however, is contingent on the ability of the
bureaucracy to resist the influence of organized interests that do not come through formal
channels of hierarchy. When hierarchical control is weak, leaders should be unable to
22 Wilson 1968; Van Maanen 1973; DiLulio 1994; Kaufman 2006; Piore and Schrank 2008. These are
similar to the "non-bureaucratic foundations of bureaucratic functioning" of Rueschemeyer and Evans
1985, p. 59 and organizational models for explaining bureaucratic performance, see: Brehm and Gates
1993; Brehm and Gates 1997.
23 Wilson 1980
2 Schneider 1998
S Hacker and Pierson 2002
26 For example: Moe 1985; Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991; Carpenter 1996
Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Carpenter 1996
direct the front-line officials who undertake the everyday tasks of enforcement.29
Supporting this view, a recent study of political control models demonstrated that when
bureaucracies lack capacity, politicians have more difficulty influencing policy
implementation, and bureaucrats have fewer incentives to comply with legislative
mandates.30 Therefore, under conditions of weak and politicized bureaucracies,
enforcement should be insensitive to changing preferences of political leaders who
formally control the bureaucracy. Instead, even when elected officials prefer
implementing regulations, bureaucrats will either lack the ability to undertake key tasks
or be easily blocked, thereby making enforcement unlikely.
Third, weak bureaucracies are also seen as eroding the prospects for productive
collaboration with civil society. Many scholars find that enforcement is much more
likely when civil society organizations demand state action.3 1 The logic of this argument
is that civil society organizations can hold regulatory agencies accountable and bring
attention to specific issues. For example, one recent analysis of labor law enforcement in
Latin America argued that "active unionism in the workplace coordinated with labor
inspections is far more efficient than relying on spot inspections or hoping that an
individual employee will have the courage and knowledge to report a violation."3 The
influence of civil society organizations, however, also appears to be contingent on
bureaucratic organization. For example, Evans argues that "internal bureaucratic
coherence should be seen as an essential precondition for the state's effective -
participation in external networks."3 Without an autonomous bureaucracy, the common
wisdom is that civil society organizations will capture the state and misdirect its
resources, undermining the possibility of effective policy implementation. Once again,
mechanisms that otherwise should lead to enforcement appear to be undermined when
bureaucracies are weak and politicized.
Success and Failure in Regulatory Enforcement
Behind most accounts of successful enforcement are bureaucracies that embody
most, if not all, of the features that promote autonomy. For example, one enforcement
bureaucracy that has many of the features described above is the French labor
inspectorate. In the French system, labor inspectors are highly qualified, enter the
bureaucracy through a merit-based exam, have a high rank relative to other civil servants,
and enjoy robust civil service protection. Moreover, they are socialized into the
inspectorate through a training program that establishes a strong organizational culture
and high levels of cohesion. By virtue of these features, the French labor inspectorate is
highly impermeable to capture, corruption, and political influence. The result is that
French labor inspectors are able to enforce labor regulations without barriers.
29 Wilson 1968
3 Huber and McCarty 2004 Congruently, one of the few studies that directly takes on the problem of
political control of the bureaucracy in Argentina, found that political control by congress of tax
administration was weak due to widespread corruption among officials in the bureaucracy. Eaton 2003
31 Sabatier 1975; Wiarda 1978; Keck and Sikkink 1998; O'Rourke 2004; Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Anner
2008: Van Lo Rooij, Benjamin, Carlos Wing-Hung 2010
32 Ibid p. 43. see also: Tendler 2006
Evans 1995 emphasis added, p. 50
34 Schrank and Piore 2007
In Latin America, the few cases in which scholars have identified broadly positive
cases of regulatory enforcement have been in places where bureaucracies also exhibit
many of the characteristics that promote autonomy. In Brazil, for instance, successful
enforcement of environmental regulations is often driven by the prosecutors of the
Ministerio Pfiblico, who are "politically independent" and governed by professional
norms.3 5 The crucial features of the Ministerio Ptiblico are similar to those of the French
inspectors: officials are selected through a rigorous and competitive exam, have
competitive salaries, are systematically socialized into the organization, and have
rewarding long-term careers. In labor law enforcement, one of the few contemporary
transitions from low to high levels of enforcement comes from the inspectorate of the
Dominican Republic. Dominican workers were left unprotected by the weak inspectorate
inherited from the Trujillo era until the late 1990s when there was a far-reaching reform
in the inspectorate. Many of the elements of the reform are by now familiar: merit-based
hiring with minimum standards for education (all new inspectors were lawyers), salaries
that are competitive with the private sector, civil service protection, and promising career
prospects.36 The argument follows that the adoption of these practices was fundamental
for improving labor law enforcement.
Notwithstanding these positive examples, many observers note that such
advanced bureaucracies are more often the exception than the rule.37 Quite simply, most
regulatory bureaucracies have organizational features that are considered antithetical to
autonomy. 38 They are neither Weberian nor professional. Rather, due to the absence of
autonomy-producing organizational structures, bureaucrats appear to be unable to resist
the influence of interest groups and meet the challenges involved in enforcement. And in
fact, political interference is commonly observed. To further compound this problem,
most regulatory bureaucracies also do not have the minimum staff necessary for the task
of enforcement.39 For example, one recent work argued, "regulatory agencies that are
charged with implementing and enforcing environmental laws are chronically
underfunded and understaffed."4  When put together, enforcement agencies that are
weak and politicized appear to be determined not to succeed. The logic of the argument
35 See: McAllister 2008; Coslovsky 2009; McAllister 2010. In Brazil, labor regulation offers another
example. The Brazilian labor inspectorate developed a bureaucracy of highly trained professionals with
strong civil service protection, who, by virtue of the strength of their organization, have been able to
effectively enforce labor regulations in many instances. See:Pires 2008; Pires 2009
S['his section draws mainly on: Murillo and Schrank 2005; Schrank 2005; Schrank 2009. Schrank argues
that the changes in the Dominican Republic depart from classic Weberian features in important ways, but
the logic of the argument still very much depends on the creation of a strong, cohesive, bureaucracy.
3 On labor, see: Castillo 1999; Goldin and Feldman 2001; Jatobi 2002; Inter-American Development Bank
2004; Bensusdn 2007; Goldin 2007; Anner 2008 On environment, see: World Bank 1995; Dasgupta 2000;
Carruthers 2001; VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001; O'Rourke 2002; Di Paola 2002a; Inter-American
Development Bank 2002; Nonna 2002; McAllister 2008; Henry 2010; McAllister, Van Rooij, and Kagan
2010
38 Such as: no merit-based awards, no long term careers, no officials without a professional status, and
weak civil service protection.
39 For example, many countries fail to meet the International Labor Organization recommendations for the
minimum number of labor inspectors, which is defined as 1 inspector for every 20,000 in the economically
active population for middle-income countries. See:ILO 2006a
4 McAllister 2008 p. 1. In labor regulation the problem is just as evident in Latin America. See: BensusAn
2006
holds that these bureaucratic failings constitute one of the central reasons why regulations
are rarely enforced, especially in middle-income and developing countries. In short,
bureaucratic weaknesses, it appears, are at the root of low levels of enforcement.
The common denominator across all of these works is that in order to explain why
regulations are, or are not, enforced, we need to examine how resources for enforcement
are generated primarily through the organization of the bureaucracy. While other factors
are clearly important-such as market conditions, the balance of power among interest
groups, and the party in power-these variables become moot when the bureaucracy is
the weakest link. Although researchers part company about which features are most
important, all agree that bureaucratic cohesion and autonomy are central for explaining
variation in enforcement. Indeed, the primacy of a depoliticized bureaucracy has become
dominant, leading to a research agenda that seeks to identify which conditions lead to a
reduction in politicization of the state. For example, scholars working on Latin America
and Eastern Europe have sought to tie party competition to the reduction in state
politicization. 4' The assumption behind this research agenda is that the path to good
government is moving towards the creation of bureaucratic autonomy.
While it is important to improve bureaucracies, we have an insufficient
understanding of why poorly organized bureaucracies, which exist in the majority of
countries, sometimes perform well. Contrary to theoretical expectations, weak
bureaucracies that appear determined to fail sometimes do enforce regulations, even if
enforcement is very uneven. Conventional theories offer few clues into where to look for
answers to the questions: Are there alternative ways to counter efforts by cost-sensitive
businesses to block enforcement? What levers of bureaucratic control might be available
to politicians interested in promoting enforcement when regulatory agencies lack internal
coherence? How can civil society organizations productively collaborate with
bureaucracies that are not autonomous? Without an understanding of these questions, we
cannot explain enforcement within the context of weak and politicized bureaucracies.
An Alternative Explanation
In contrast to dominant approaches, I identify how weak and politicized
bureaucracies are able to enforce regulations, and develop a framework to explain why
regulators act in some places and not others. Building on insights from research on state-
society relations,42 a central claim in this study is that, to explain variation, it is necessary
to examine whether, and how, bureaucrats generate resources for enforcement through
their relationships with civil society organizations (broadly defined to include labor
unions, environmental groups, neighborhood groups, and business associations). The
explanatory framework highlights the interaction of two factors: the administrative
capacity of the bureaucracy and the linkages between bureaucrats and civil society
organizations.
" See, for example: Geddes 1990; Geddes 1994; Grzymala-Busse 2003; Chavez 2004; O'Dwyer 2004
4 Mann 1993; Evans 1995; Evans 1996; Ostrom 1996; Tendler 1997; Migdal 2001; Evans 2005; Soifer
2008
Administrative Capacity
Administrative capacity depends on the bureaucracy's human resources, material
resources (cars, computers, etc.), and planning capabilities. The central conceptual
difference between administrative capacity and bureaucratic autonomy is that having
administrative capacity does not necessarily enable bureaucracies to resist political
pressure. By focusing on administrative capacity rather than autonomy, we reintroduce
features of the bureaucracy that are often left to the wayside but that are, in fact, crucially
important for understanding variation in enforcement. For example, the number of
inspectors can make a tremendous difference in the prospects for enforcement, but there
is no reason that the size of the bureaucracy should influence its autonomy. In fact, some
studies of the state use growth in the size of the bureaucracy as an indicator of
politicization and, therefore, evidence of a decline in capacity of the state to implement
policies.43 Similarly, while there is no expectation that a bureaucracy with greater access
to cars or computers would be more insulated from political influence, access to such
resources is crucial for enforcement.4 Table 1.2 below compares simplified indicators of
administrative capacity (discussed below) with those of autonomy outlined above.
Although there are some overlaps between the two, there is a clear conceptual difference
and it is possible to measure levels of capacity and levels of autonomy as two different
dimensions of a bureaucracy.
Table 1.2: Indicators ofAdministrative Capacity and Autonomy
IndicatoA nistrtie pAit Autonomy
Civil service protection X
Exclusive employment for state X
Meritocratic recruiting X
Long-term career prospects X
High salaries X X
Large staff X
Material resources (cars, X
computers, etc.)
Planning capabilities X
It is helpful to analyze administrative capacity in terms of its influence on two
enforcement tasks-gathering information and crafting a response to violations.4 The
first, and quite basic, component of administrative capacity is human resources. Simply
stated, a bureaucracy with almost no inspectors will be more constrained in its ability to
43 Presumably because a bigger bureaucracy means more patronage. See:- Grzymala-Busse 2003 p. 1 126.
4" For example, Evans and Rauch (1999) study of economic effect of bureaucratic quality uses a number of
indicators to measure the "Weberianess" of the bureaucracy, but do not include any measure of the actual
size of the bureaucracy. This measurement strategy does make sense if the main worry is politicization.
After all, bureaucrats with resources might even be better to capture than bureaucrats who are limited in
their operational abilities.
45 Administrative capacity only can influence the two of the three tasks, not resisting efforts to block
enforcement, because administrative capacity does not include autonomy.
gather information about violations on its own than one with many inspectors.
Regulators may still be able to gather information, but will likely have no choice but to
do so through civil society organizations. Second, bureaucracies need basic material
resources to function. In regulatory agencies, the weak point is almost always
transportation, which tends to have a high cost relative to other inputs. In Honduras, for
instance, labor inspectors without access to cars depended on workers who have
complaints about labor law violations to pay for their taxi fare in order to inspect the
factory.4 6 These resources directly influence the operating abilities of the bureaucracies.
Third is the capacity of the bureaucracy to construct a plan of action. A bureaucracy that
can plan operations in the short-term can take a systematic approach to enforcement.
Short-term planning capacity has important implications for the way the bureaucracy
works with civil society organizations, and ultimately the way enforcement occurs.47
In sum, administrative capacity differs among bureaucracies that lack autonomy
and influences enforcement. At the extreme, a bureaucracy with absolute no resources
will be unable to enforce regulations-quite simply the agency will become irrelevant
and societal forces will completely dominate. But administrative capacity does not have
a simple, direct, effect on levels of enforcement because weak bureaucracies can combine
their resources with those of civil society organizations.48 It is only in combination with
linkages that the effect of administrative capacity becomes clear.
State-Society Linkages
A second factor that influences enforcement is the structure of state-society
linkages, which consist of routinized processes of consultation, formal and informal
agreements, and interpersonal networks that facilitate direct interaction between
bureaucrats and civil society organizations. These ties play a central role by determining
whether or not bureaucrats can access the resources of civil society organizations.
Linkages can be contentious or collaborative; they can be strong or weak; and they can be
between bureaucrats and many civil society organizations, or just between a few select
organizations. Again, it is helpful to analyze linkages in terms of how they affect the key
tasks that bureaucrats undertake during enforcement.
First, linkages facilitate the flow of information about violations into the
bureaucracy. For example, neighborhood organizations can monitor pollution levels
from nearby firms, and linkages can help that information be transmitted to regulators.4 9
Without linkages, transmission of this information becomes much more costly and may
46 Source: Author interviews with labor inspectors in Honduras in 2006.
* Weil 2008
' We would not expect a bureaucracy that had absolute no staff to be able to enforce regulations, or any
othcr policy. For example., a large city with one police officer would not get very far in prosecuting crime.
I lowever, the threshold for administrative capacity is not very high. For instance, the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in the 1960s only thirty investigators to enforce Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. This is an very low level of administrative capacity, yet, in this case, low levels of
administrative capacity were combined with pressure from society that rendered it sufficient for
enforcement. Pedriana and Stryker 2004
49 For examples of this from the United States, Vietnam, and Brazil, see: Lemos 1998b; O'Rourke and
Macey 2003; O'Rourke 2004
simply be blocked, leaving bureaucrats to gather information on their own. Therefore,
the ultimate effect of the existence of an environmental group in aparticular community
is to a large degree contingent on the linkages that the group has with regulators. Second,
linkages can facilitate the sharing of material resources that bureaucrats need to respond
to violations. For instance, in many places there are routinized practices of unions
providing transportation for labor inspectors. Similarly, ties with business associations
can help regulators identify technical solutions that can be diffused to firms and make
widespread compliance possible. Again, access is contingent on linkages; even if unions
have cars that they can put at the disposal of labor inspectors, without linkages these
resources are likely to be out of reach.
Third, linkages between bureaucrats and civil society organizations that already
share the joint project of enforcement can provide political resources that help
bureaucrats overcome resistance by organized interests. In a weak and politicized
bureaucracy that lacks autonomy, the internal organization of the bureaucracy cannot be
counted on to prevent political interference. Violators of regulations always have a seat
at the table, and therefore an opportunity to influence bureaucrats, but beneficiaries of
enforcement often do not. Even if there is support for enforcement among
organizations in society, if bureaucrats lack linkages to those groups, it will be more
difficult for them to mobilize that support. In other words, linkages create opportunities
for building coalitions across state and society that can be used to resist efforts to block
enforcement. 2 And where the bureaucracy suffers from widespread corruption, linkages
with civil society organizations can increase transparency and raise the likelihood of
exposing inspectors who take bribes from businesses.
When linkages are established, their ultimate effect depends on the features of the
particular linked-organizations. Civil society organizations differ both in the interests
that they aggregate and the resources they have to offer the state bureaucracy. The scope
of interest aggregation of civil society organizations can be narrow or broad. For
example, environmental groups often fall into two general categories, local groups that
focus on immediate neighborhood problems, and professional groups that focus on
regional problems. Bureaucrats that have linkages to the former and not the latter will
likely gain support for enforcement in a comparably smaller range of cases. In addition,
organizations may be particularly well suited to provide some resources but not others.
Groups of neighbors that can mobilize protests around environmental issues may be
effective partners in overcoming resistance to enforcement by organized interests, but
they cannot help bureaucrats with technical know-how to craft responses to pollution
S Labor unions also manage their own lists of firms that have been inspected and need follow-up, a
practice that can supplement the organizational capacity of the bureaucracy to manage the process of
enforcement. A similar argument was made in: Anner 2008. This type of interaction is not confined to
labor unions in Latin America. See:Joshi and Moore 2004; Hardy and Howe 2009.
s" In labor regulation, workers who are the beneficiaries of enforcement often have a seat at the table, but
have relatively little power to influence the regulatory process without the support of unions or an
organization.
52 For a similar argument about coalitions of regulators and civil society, see: Lemos and Looye 2003.
5 In some cases, bureaucrats have linkages with multiple organizations with competing agendas, making
the bureaucracy an arena in which these organizations compete. However, even in these cases bureaucrats
are much more likely to be able to extend their capacity then when bureaucrats have no such linkages at all.
problems. Labor unions, neighborhood groups, professional organizations, and industry
associations all have different sets of resources that can potentially be leveraged by
bureaucrats. Therefore, the specific capacities of linked-civil society organizations need
to be taken into account when analyzing their function.
In sum, the establishment of linkages can play a critical role in enabling weak
bureaucracies to generate the three key resources for enforcement-information about
violations, capacity to craft a response to violations, and the ability to withstand efforts
by powerful actors to block enforcement. Strong linkages can also, of course, promote
capture, in which civil society organizations control how bureaucrats enforce regulations.
Moreover, the structure of linkages-i.e. which groups are included and which are left
out-is crucial for determining the ultimate enforcement outcome. Bureaucrats are often
linked with one set of groups in a way that crowds out other groups, and civil society
organizations do not always work towards socially beneficial outcomes that are
consistent with the rule of law.5 However, in places with weak and politicized
bureaucracies, linkages have the potential to make the difference between almost no
enforcement and very high levels of enforcement. Therefore, we should examine
capture's effects instead of assuming that it is universally antithetical to enforcement.
Combining Administrative Capacity and Linkages: Patterns of Enforcement
Combining administrative capacity and state-society linkages, I offer an
explanation for variation in patterns of enforcement in settings where the bureaucracy is
not autonomous. To contrast outcomes, I propose three ideal-typical patterns: state-
driven enforcement, society-dependent enforcement, and co-produced enforcement.
These ideal types bring differences in enforcement into relief and clarify the role of key
actors. Table 1.3 below shows the expected outcomes of the interaction between
low/high administrative capacity and weak/strong linkages. These two dimensions do not
capture every aspect of administrative capacity or linkages (e.g. they focus only on
strength of linkages between regulators and civil society organizations concerned with a
particular industry or community, not on the overall structure of linkages between all
groups). However, they provide a way to identify distinct pathways to enforcement and
the likely result of building either administrative capacity, linkages to civil society
organizations, or both in concert.
Table 1.3: Expected Patterns of Enforcement
Weak Linkages Strong Linkages
Low Administrative Enforcement unlikely Society-dependent
Capacity enforcement
High Administrative State-driven enforcement Co-produced enforcement
Capacity
5 Berman 1997
When the state has high levels of administrative capacity, but has weak linkages
with civil society groups, the result is state-driven enforcement. With state-driven
enforcement, our expectations converge with those commonly held in the literature;
without autonomous features or linkages to civil society, it should be difficult for the
bureaucrats to overcome resistance and sustain intense enforcement. Where enforcement
does occur, regulators should determine without consultation with civil society that a
particular industry is a priority (for either technical or political reasons), and attempt to
take action without drawing on resources from society. Therefore, state-driven
enforcement will likely be limited and susceptible to political resistance. There should be
medium levels of enforcement when there is an industry with highly salient violations
and political support from elected officials. Otherwise, enforcement levels should remain
low. There are two distinctive observable characteristics of state-driven enforcement.
First, the distribution of enforcement should not directly reflect the distribution of
resources of civil society organizations, and, second, we should observe changes in the
level of enforcement without changes in the strength of civil society organizations. State-
driven enforcement is usually the only pattern assumed in the literature, but there are two
additional patterns-society-dependent and co-produced enforcement-that are often
overlooked.
When the state has strong linkages with civil society organizations but has low
administrative capacity, enforcement occurs only where the civil society groups
themselves have high levels of resources. I label this pattern society-dependent
enforcement because bureaucrats are limited in their ability to take an active role in
determining where enforcement takes place. In politicized bureaucracies with low levels
of administrative capacity, bureaucrats lack the ability to generate their own information
about violations; often cannot effectively craft responses to violations on their own; and
do not have the ability to overcome resistance by organized interest groups. However,
bureaucrats can use civil society organizations to generate the resources they need for
enforcement. For instance, in Vietnam, despite extremely low levels of administrative
capacity, environmental regulations are enforced when bureaucrats are pushed by
community protesters who contribute resources-political and operational-to enforce
regulations at a specific factory." With low administrative capacity, bureaucrats have
little choice but to enforce only where there is social mobilization. In effect, bureaucrats
are dependent, and action by linked-civil society organizations is a necessary condition
for enforcement to occur in any particular case.
In society-dependent enforcement, the level of enforcement depends entirely on
the capabilities of the civil society organizations that have strong linkages with
bureaucrats. When linked organizations are well equipped to generate information about
violations, can help formulate a response, and are strong partners against political
interference, enforcement is likely to occur at a medium level. As a consequence,
society-dependent enforcement is likely to be limited in scope, leaving out economic
sectors or communities where linked-civil society organizations have few resources (or
there are no organizations at all). If regulators have no linkages with civil society
* O'Rourke calls this "community-driven regulation." I chose a more general term, society, rather than
community, because in some policy areas (e.g. labor regulation) the civil society actor is not a community,
but a sector-level association (e.g. a unions). O'Rourke 2004.
organizations that can help them in any particular case, they simply will not enforce, no
matter the social or economic conditions. In other words, society-dependent regulation
results in highly uneven enforcement that follows a very specific pattern based on the
landscape of linked organizations in civil society.56 For this reason, in cases of society-
dependent regulation the structure of linkages is critical, and it becomes necessary to
analyze which societal groups are included and which are left out.
When there are both high levels of administrative capacity and strong linkages,
there is likely to be what I label co-produced enforcement." This combination results in
the greatest likelihood of high levels of enforcement in the context of politicized
bureaucracies that lack autonomy. In these cases, strong linkages facilitate bureaucrats'
use of societal resources. Some barriers to enforcement-such as the lack of capacity for
monitoring compliance-can be overcome by drawing on partners in civil society. Other
barriers, such as resistance by organized interests, can be diminished by creating
coalitions between bureaucrats and civil society groups that share the objective of
enforcement. And, when the bureaucracy has high levels of administrative capacity,
regulators can strategically shift resources to places where civil society groups are weak
so that enforcement goes beyond the immediate demands of the strongest groups. This is
the chief difference between society-dependent and co-produced enforcement.
Bureaucracies with high levels of administrative capacity are not completely dependent
on linked civil society organizations, and, therefore, action by civil society organizations
is not a necessary condition. For there to be co-produced enforcement, there should be
evidence of bureaucrats taking action in places where there have been no specific
demands by linked civil society organizations.
In sum, there are multiple pathways to enforcement, either by shifting levels of
administrative capacity or by building linkages. And different combinations of
administrative capacity and linkages result in distinct patterns of enforcement. Figure 1.1
(placed at the end of this chapter) provides a diagram of the expectations that follow this
argument, highlighting how certain patterns of enforcement are more sensitive to civil
society resources than others.
Political Origins of Linkages and Administrative Capacity
The analysis above raises a number of questions. How do we account for the
development of linkages? Where do these combinations of linkages and administrative
capacity come from? Why would governments build linkages but not invest in
administrative capacity? To provide answers to these questions, it is necessary to
unpack the ways in which local politics influences the development of linkages,
administrative capacity, and therefore enforcement. The focus needs to be on the broader
political context because for low-level bureaucrats to form linkages with civil society
organizations, they need support from the hierarchy of the state bureaucracy even when
the bureaucracy has weak internal discipline. Political support is crucial because when
bureaucrats draw on civil society organizations, these organizations gain influence over
5 Silbey makes a similar argument about the organization of enforcement around responses to consumer
complaints. See: Silbey 1984
5 This builds on Ostrom 1996.
the implementation process. Low-level bureaucrats cannot simply transfer such power on
their own, even when it is the only way for them to do their jobs. In addition, promoting
or curbing linkages is one way by which political leaders can reward, control, or punish
groups while steering weak bureaucracies. There are two main mechanisms through
which civil society organizations become politically viable partners for bureaucrats to
build linkages: partisan exchange and conflict. Each mechanism results in different
strategic interactions between political leaders and civil society organizations, which, in
turn, changes the likelihood that linkages will become a substitute for investing in
administrative capacity.
One pathway through which linkages form is partisan exchange.58 In exchange
for support, elected leaders (e.g. governors, presidents, etc.) take steps to encourage
linkages with specific civil society organizations. 59 For example, when a labor union-
supported-candidate is elected, he or she can reward the unions by appointing officials
with existing ties to unions. In turn, these appointed officials encourage the development
and maintenance of linkages between labor inspectors (the low-level bureaucrats in this
case) and unions. This type of linkage formation reduces the likelihood of bureaucrats
working with the competitors of unions, such as (non-union) organizations that represent
the interests of workers without strong unions. The general mechanism at work is that of
exchange-support for preferential access-that results in strong linkages that are often
limited to a portion of the possible universe of civil society organizations.
When linkages are formed through partisan exchange, they will likely substitute
for investment in administrative capacity. The leaders of pro-enforcement groups often
want both access to the regulatory agency and investment in the agency. Under
conditions of partisan exchange, if pro-enforcement groups agitate for investment in
administrative capacity they can jeopardize their alliance that guarantees access. Faced
with this dilemma, individual civil society organizations will often select access over
administrative capacity; for favored civil society organizations, a regulatory agency with
greater capacity that is uncontrollable is not worth nearly as much as an under-resourced
agency that can be controlled. In addition, when there is a strong political alliance, it is
much less costly for politicians to cede control to civil society organizations than to
allocate scarce resources for administrative capacity. Therefore, somewhat
paradoxically, avowedly enforcement-friendly elected officials are less likely to invest in
administrative capacity.
Partisan exchange is not, however, the only way in which linkages form; an
alternative pathway is through conflict. When politicians do not have a partisan coalition
with pro-enforcement groups, appointed leaders of the bureaucracy are not tasked with
keeping select groups happy, but they need to keep conflict under their control. Often,
the success of appointed officials is related to their ability to avoid scandal. Protests,
critical media reports, and civil lawsuits remove control from the regulatory bureaucracy.
In addition, when conflict exits regulatory institutions, it increases uncertainty for
5 This analysis builds on research on partisan exchange, see: Etchemendy and Palermo 1998; Murillo
2001; Murillo 2005.
* This process functions in a similar to "stacking the deck" in favor of allied groups, but it relies on
informal practices instead of formal administrative procedures, see: McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987.
businesses and jeopardizes the future prospects of elected officials. Therefore, when civil
society organizations are able to foment conflict and gain powerful allies who can act
outside of the regulatory system, bureaucrats are more likely to be able to form linkages
with these organizations. For example, when environmental groups gain access to courts
to directly take action against polluting firms, they circumvent the regulatory system. In
these circumstances, forming linkages with environmental groups become politically
expedient because linkages channel conflict into the bureaucracy and away from the
streets and courts. As a result, low-level officials, the regulators attempting to enforce
regulations in a particular firm, can draw on the resources of environmental groups and
(potentially) expand their capacity.
When linkages form through conflict, it is unlikely that politicians will be able to
substitute linkages for investment in administrative capacity. Under conditions of
conflict, pro-enforcement groups do not risk putting an alliance in jeopardy by
demanding both greater capacity and access. They never had such an alliance in the first
place and there are few incentives for groups to moderate their demands. In addition,
when politicians do not have a strong alliance with pro-enforcement groups, the costs of
ceding control by allowing linkages to grow very strong are greater relative to the
allocation of scarce resources for investment in administration capacity. Therefore,
politicians who have relatively neutral positions with regards to enforcement (i.e. they are
neither the allies of pro-enforcement groups nor strongly against regulations) are more
likely to invest resources in administrative capacity than those who have partisan
alliances with pro-enforcement groups.
In short, the ability of civil society organizations to gain power outside the
regulatory system, either through partisan exchange or through conflict, shapes the way
in which linkages form and the likelihood of investment in administrative capacity.
These processes, of course, can happen in reverse. When politicians are elected who are
in opposition to the pro-enforcement coalition, they take steps to curb linkages with
opposing groups. And when civil society organizations are unable to credibly circumvent
the regulatory system, regulators are less likely to be able to build linkages with those
groups. In short, the power of groups outside of the regulatory system directly influence
their power within the system.
Il/ustrating the Argument
To illustrate the argument more completely, it is helpful briefly to return to one of
the cases introduced at the beginning of this chapter. In Tucuman (discussed in detail in
Chapter 7), regulators were unable to enforce environmental policies for many years. In
this case, inspectors could gather information about violations, which were mainly in
ethanol-producing sugar mills and citrus processing plants that released high
concentrations of pollutants into streams. But inspectors could do little once they were
aware of the violation of the law. Inevitably, regulators would be blocked at some stage
by firms that had the political and economic strength to prevent them from issuing fines
or shutting down operations. Regulators were exposed to the pressures of firms but
lacked linkages with environmental groups that could potentially have been their allies in
supporting enforcement.
A series of shocks beginning in 2001, which included the activation of courts and
protests against pollution, changed the relationship between regulators and environmental
groups. Bureaucrats slowly were able to establish linkages with environmental groups
that before would have been politically untenable. The bureaucracy did not, however,
become autonomous. If anything, as time went on, bureaucrats were more exposed to
outside pressures because newly hired staff had short-term contracts and no civil service
protection. Conventional theories would expect little change in enforcement because
without establishing some form of autonomy, or at least a strong enough organization to
respond to hierarchical control, there would be no way these bureaucrats could resist the
influence of powerful firms that sought to avoid enforcement. Contrary to these
expectations, enforcement increased to high levels. For the first time, regulators were
able temporarily to shut down firms that were intransigent, and regulators used
combinations of advice, sanctions, and joint problem solving to find ways to reduce
pollution.
Close examination reveals that bureaucrats were able to take such steps without
an autonomous bureaucracy by exploiting their linkages with environmental groups. For
instance, bureaucrats gave environmental groups copies of the plans that detailed firms'
promised pollution-reduction investments, allowing environmental groups to monitor
progress directly. When firms did not meet their goals, bureaucrats could leverage the
threat of social mobilization in a way that was not possible before. But the role of
linkages did not stop at providing political support. Neighborhood associations also
proved to be effective at monitoring local firms and relaying information to regulators
about illegal pollution discharges. In Tucumin, the administrative capacity of the
bureaucracy became relatively high. Regulators had their own cars to check compliance
even where there were no neighborhood groups sending them information. In effect, the
bureaucrats were not dependent on civil society, but they could still draw upon societal
resources. The result was co-produced enforcement that was at a high level.
In contrast with Tucumdn, in the province of Santa Fe environmental regulators
exhibited a different pattern of enforcement (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). During the
period of economic expansion after the crisis of 2001, environmental regulators in Santa
Fe had very low levels of administrative capacity and lacked the ability to resist efforts
by firms to block enforcement. However, in the case of one single soy and sunflower oil
processing plant in the city of Rosario, regulators were able to establish ties with a
community organization that mobilized against pollution from the plant in their
neighborhood. With linkages to this community group, regulators were able to put
pressure on the firm to comply. After a series of inspections and a number of visits to the
firm by their neighbors, regulators were able to push the plant to reduce pollution. But
enforcement was limited only to the plant in the community where regulators had
linkages. Other nearby plants were left to pollute without triggering enforcement. In
effect, the pattern resembled society-dependent enforcement, in which the state is
opportunistic and dependent on civil society.
The differences between these two provinces would be hidden by approaches that
focused primarily on the bureaucracies' approximation to a strong and autonomous ideal.
By identifying these patterns it becomes possible to explain variation and identify
alternative paths to enforcement. These two examples do not, of course, substantiate the
claims made thus far. Instead, they are a prelude of the cases that will be analyzed in the
chapters that follow.
Main Contributions of the Argument
The argument advanced in this dissertation builds on existing work on state-
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society relations and policy implementation. Many scholars have argued that
connections between the state and society potentially can contribute to policy
implementation in a variety of issue areas, including regulation.6' Yet, there are
significant limitations to dominant studies that draw on the state-society relations
approach. First, as stated above, many scholars view Weberian bureaucracies with high
levels of autonomy as an "essential precondition " for collaboration with civil society
organizations. 62 Otherwise, there is no way of avoiding capture that comes with thick
63ties. By placing so much emphasis on autonomy, politicized bureaucracies are
effectively homogenized and scholars assume that politicization always leads to
undesirable outcomes. Although strong ties between civil society organizations and
politicized bureaucracies may lead to capture, in many cases this does not block state
action. Instead of privileging autonomy, the framework outlined above opens up the
black box of the weak and politicized bureaucracy and is attentive to which organizations
gain access to the state, and how they can influence enforcement.
Also, by ignoring politicization, these theories miss the underpinnings of how
linkages between bureaucrats and civil society organizations form. This leads to the
second limitation in conventional theories; while there is often a recognition that state-
society relations are important, there have been few attempts to explain how they emerge.
Therefore, we know little about the conditions under which state-society relations lead to
positive outcomes. In contrast, the argument advanced in this dissertation provides a way
to systematically distinguish between cases where state-society relations support
enforcement and those where they do not.
This argument also builds on previous studies of regulation and the role of the
state in the market. As stated above, political science research on regulation has been
highly biased towards studies of policy choice, not implementation. Research on the
implementation process has tended to bifurcate between those studying strong and
autonomous bureaucracies and those studying failed bureaucracies.64 In the former case,
street-level agents are the locus of study because they have so much discretion that they
can determine how, and whether or not, to enforce regulations largely on their own. In
the latter case, the state is often presented as completely hollow, so that civil society
groups bypass the state and directly pressure firms. We lack theories that can explain
enforcement in the great number of countries that exist somewhere between these two
extremes-that neither have highly autonomous bureaucracies nor are practically failed
6 For example: Evans 1995; Evans 1996; Ostrom 1996; Tendler 1997; Evans 2005; Tsai 2007
61 Lam 1996; Ostrom 1996; Lemos 1998b; Lemos 1998a; Lemos and Looye 2003; Joshi and Moore 2004;
Braithwaite 2006; Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Anner 2008
62 Evans 1995 emphasis added, p. 50.
6 Geddes 1990; Ellermann 2005
64 McAllister, Van Rooij, and Kagan 2010
states. This dissertation provides such a framework by including the role that civil
society plays providing important resources, while still treating the bureaucracy as the
central actor.
A National Swing Towards Regulation of the Market in Argentina 65
The combination of a broad swing towards stronger regulatory laws, high levels
of noncompliance, weak bureaucracies, and decentralized enforcement make Argentina
an ideal setting for exploring the politics of enforcement. Once the so-called poster child
of economic liberalization, Argentina dismantled many of the state's regulatory functions
in the 1990s. However, following the economic crisis in 2001, there was an explicit
rejection of free-market policies, which intensified under the presidencies of Nestor
Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. During this period, labor unions
rebounded and took the offensive and the environmental movement reached a milestone
with its first major march on the Plaza de Mayo. National level political change brought
with it a number of reinforced regulatory laws, including the General Environmental Law
and the labor law reform in 2004.66 The era of neoliberal dominance had clearly come to
an end in Argentina.
While changing laws was relatively easy, ensuring that policy shifts resulted in
concrete changes on the ground was much more problematic. The economic crisis and
years of state retreat resulted in high levels of structural regulatory violations. For
example, one main indicator of noncompliance with labor law is the percentage of
workers who are unregistered (these workers often lack most labor law protections). The
portion of unregistered workers increased substantially in Argentina during the 1990s and
reached a peak of nearly 50% following the crisis. 67 Consequently, although the laws
were changed to strengthen protections for workers in 2004, nearly halfthe workforce
was left out. In this context, a simple change in legislation has little effect, and
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enforcement needs to play a large role in making laws matter.
State bureaucracies, however, were particularly ill equipped to confront high
levels of violations. Nearly all regulatory bureaucracies in Argentina lacked the
characteristics associated with being autonomous. In addition, years of neglect had also
left many bureaucracies with low administrative capacity, lacking fundamental resources
such as transportation, information systems, and in some cases even typewriters.
65 Chapter 2 contains a more detailed analysis of national level regulatory politics and federalism from
which this summary is drawn.
66 Most of the changes in legal frameworks have been national in scope. The vast majority of labor laws
and collective bargaining agreements cover the entire country, with provinces only making slight
adjustments with their own laws and agreements. Similarly, all provinces are required to meet minimum
standards of environmental protection, and provinces can only pass laws that "complement' national
legislation
6 Source: Data from the federal Ministry of Labor and Social Security, calculated based on national
household surveys in urban areas.
' There are not equivalent data for environmental violations, but it appears that in many provinces
environmental regulators faced a situation in which the great majority of firms violated pollution limits.
For example, in 2003, nearly every major industrial site in Tucumin grossly violated water pollution
control laws, effectively depriving residents of the province (and neighboring provinces) of their right to a
clean environment. For a broader view, and a discussion of the limitations of data, see: Di Paola 2002b
Therefore, while there was a clear national push towards a greater regulatory role of the
state, bureaucracies charged with enforcement were mostly weak and politicized. In sum,
at a national level, three conditions in the post-crisis period-strengthened laws, the key
role of enforcement in reducing high levels of violations, and weak and politicized
___ 69bureaucracies-make Argentina a particularly good context for this study.
Design of the Study
Underneath national uniformities in regulatory policy, there are high levels of
subnational variation in Argentina. These differences are driven, in part, by the
decentralized nature of enforcement-provincial governments with substantial
independence from the national government are responsible for enforcing most
regulations. 70 Exploiting decentralization, this study adopts a subnational comparative
approach that analyzes variation across and within provinces.7 1 The primary unit of
analysis in this dissertation is enforcement of a particular type of regulation (i.e. labor or
environmental), in one economic sector, in one province, at a certain point in time. For
instance, health and safety regulation in the construction sector in C6rdoba from 2003-
2009 is one distinct unit of analysis, distinguishable from other economic sectors in
C6rdoba, and from the construction sector in other provinces.
Working at this micro-level is advantageous for three main reasons. First,
enforcement is best measured in relation to specific economic sectors. One of the main
difficulties in studying enforcement is the paucity of data and the difficulties in
measurement-one cannot simply examine the text of the law, as is often the practice in
studies of regulatory reform. Quantitative indicators, such as number of inspections and
fines, often are not available. And, as stated above, using raw numbers without putting
them in context risks serious measurement biases. By examining the actions of relatively
small bureaucracies in specific economic sectors, it is possible to use accounts from the
actors involved-the firms, unions, environmental organizations, and regulators
themselves-to construct a more complete assessment of relative levels of enforcement
and of changes over time. Second, linkages between bureaucrats and civil society
organizations are often distinct for each industry. For example, each sector has its own
labor union and often its own firm association. A bureaucracy might establish strong
linkages with one union, but not another. Simply taking some average of linkages would
miss important variation. In addition, when analyzing specific civil society
69 Even though these conditions are particularly pronounced, the Argentine context is by no means an
anomaly; as described in the literature review above, many countries in Latin America, and indeed the
world, have regulatory violations that are widespread and weak bureaucracies for enforcement.
' Jurisdictions are partially shared and contested, as in the recent push by the national Ministry of Labor to
take a greater role in inspection, but the provincial governments still command the most important
enforcement agencies. On the question of Argentine federalism and the autonomy of provinces, see: Jones,
Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 2000; De Luca, Jones, and Inds Tula 2002; Eaton 2004; Gibson 2005.
7 On the subnational method, see:Locke 1995; Snyder 2001b. Scholars are increasingly examining
subnational variation in Argentina to test and develop a wide variety of theories, including: Jones,
Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 2000; Remmer and Wibbels 2000; Auyero 2001; Chavez 2004; Gibson 2005
Cleary and Stokes 2006; McDermott 2007; Gervasoni 2010b.
This is similar to the method used by Murillo (2001), only it moves down from the country level to the
provincial level.
organizations, one can identify the kinds of resources they have to offer the state (e.g. if
they have cars or people who can gather information) and determine if these resources
were, in fact, mobilized for enforcement. Therefore, the strength and function of linkages
is best measured by assessing the ties between specific organizations and the bureaucracy
at the micro, not macro, level.73
Third, examining enforcement in particular industries allows for a large number
of case comparisons, while holding constant a variety of factors that could potentially
confound the analysis. These include national level factors, such as the macroeconomic
conditions, large national events, and political and economic institutions (e.g. trade
policy). Also, examining multiple economic sectors within provinces controls for
provincial level factors, such as patterns of party competition and levels of
socioeconomic development. If provincial level factors are more important than linkages
between particular bureaucracies and civil society organizations, variation across
provinces should be greater than variation within provinces. And comparing similar
economic sectors across provinces makes it possible to contrast political, rather than
economic, variables (e.g. production systems). 74 For instance, regulators enforcing health
and safety regulation in the construction sector confront similar challenges in many
provinces, a condition which allows for comparisons across provinces that capture the
political, not technical, nature of enforcement.75
This dissertation focuses on four, of the twenty-four, Argentine provinces
C6rdoba, the Federal Capital, Santa Fe, and Tucumin-that provide a set of highly
similar and highly different contexts within which to examine enforcement.7 6 These four
provinces have diversified economies that include industrial sectors and face serious
labor and environmental challenges.77 Two provinces-C6rdoba and Santa Fe-are
broadly similar in terms of level of socio-economic development, economic structures,
partisan competition, and size. The other two provinces-the Federal Capital and
Tucumin-vary considerably between one another, and, in comparison with C6rdoba and
Santa Fe, across all of these dimensions. By including two provinces that are similar and
two that are different, it is possible to make maximal use of variation in Argentine social
and political contexts.
This strategy gets past some of the "empirical lag" in studies of state-society relations Schneider 1 998.
Snyder 200 l a
All provinces included in this study have major cities with multistory buildings under construction.,
which pose the greatest risk to worker death in the Argentine construction industry.
76 Including the Federal Capital, there are twenty-five subnational units. While technically not a province,
the Federal Capital is the equivalent of a province in many policy areas, including labor and environmental
regulation.
7I selected these provinces by coding the economies of all provinces in terms of their mixture of
industrial, commerce, and service sectors using data from the Ministry of the Interior. The four selected
provinces, and two additional provinces, Buenos Aires and Mendoza, met the criteria for mixed economic
structures. I did not choose Mendoza because it is too similar to C6rdoba and Santa Fe to provide as strong
a contrast as Tucumin or the Federal Capital, but it did not match with C6rdoba or Santa Fe in a way that
allowed for paired comparison. I did not choose the province of Buenos Aires because the regulatory
agencies in the province are highly decentralized. For example, there are forty-five delegations of the
provincial Ministry of Labor, many of which are of significant size. In the four provinces I selected, most
officials are concentrated in one or two offices, making it possible to study the entire province.
For each province, I analyze a number of cases of enforcement in two issue areas
(shown in Table 1.4 below). As stated above, labor and environmental regulations are
very similar policies, both involving the imposition of a set of rules on firms and
enforcing their compliance. The types of resources the bureaucracy must generate, the
tasks of enforcement, and the need to balance protection and economic growth are all
common to these two policy areas. However, the politics and histories of these two issue
areas are extremely different in Argentina (see Chapter 2). By including these two
policy areas, it is possible to generalize across issue areas with broadly diverse types of
interest-group organization. The details of these differences will be outlined in Chapter
2.
Table 1.4: Table of Cases
Case Policy Province -co__m__Sectorate ef e i t (Level)
I Labor C6rdoba Construction Co-produced (High)
2 Labor Cordoba Brick Society-dependent (Low)
3 Labor C6rdoba Metal Society-dependent (Medium)
4 Labor C6rdoba Shoes Society-dependent (Medium)
5.1 Labor Federal Capital Garment (TI) Low level of enforcement
5.2 Labor Federal Capital Garment (T2) Co-produced (High)
5.3 Labor Federal Capital Garment (T3) State-driven (Medium)
6.1 Labor Federal Capital Construction (TI) Co-produced (Medium)
6.2 Labor Federal Capital Construction (T2) State-driven (Medium)
7. 1 Labor Federal Capital Commercial Laundry (TI) Co-produced (Medium)
7.2 Labor Federal Capital Commercial Laundry (T2) State-driven (Low)
8 Labor Santa Fe Laundry Co-produced (Medium)
9. 1 Labor Santa Fe Metal (TI) Society-dependent (Medium)
9.2 Labor Santa Fe Metal (T2) State-driven (Medium)
10. 1 Labor Santa Fe Construction (T1) Society-dependent (Low)
10.1 Labor Santa Fe Construction (T2) State-driven (Medium)
11 Labor TucumAn Construction Society-dependent (Low)
12 Labor Tucumdn Metal Society-dependent (Medium)
13 Labor Tucumin Citrus Society-dependent (Medium)
14 Labor Tucumin Sugar Society-dependent (Low)
15 Env Federal Capital Meat Packing Co-produced (Medium)
16 Env Federal Capital Metal Co-produced (Medium)
17 Env Santa Fe Metal Low level of enforcement
18.1 Env Santa Fe Cereal Processing (TI) Low level of enforcement
18.2 Env Santa Fe Cereal Processing (T2) Society-dependent (Medium)
19.1 Env Tucumin Citrus (TI) State-driven (Low)
19.2 Env Tucumdn Citrus (T2) Co-produced (High)
20.1 Env Tucumin Sugar (T1) State-driven (Low)
20.2 Env TucumAn Sugar (T2) Co-produced (High)
21.1 Env Tucumin Meat Packing (T1) State-driven (Low)
21.2 Env TucumAn Meat Packing (T2) State-driven (Medium)
22.1 Env C6rdoba Tannery (T 1) Low level of enforcement
X This methodology builds on Lowi s argument that "policies determine politics." Lowi 1972
Case Policy Province Econici Sector Pattern of Enforcement (Level)
22.2 Env C6rdoba Tannery (T2) Society-dependent (Medium)
23 Env C6rdoba Metal Low level of enforcement
In labor regulation, I focus on the construction, metal manufacturing, garment,
commercial laundry, brick making, and industrial food processing industries.
Construction and metal working are important industries in all four provinces, and have
nationally strong unions with representation in every province.79 The additional
industries allow for contextualized comparisons of cases with similar problems and social
organization.80 For example, the garment industry in the Federal Capital and the brick
making industry in C6rdoba both are characterized by large numbers of migrant workers,
weak unions, and high levels of child labor. Although these industries have different
production practices and markets, including them in the analysis provides an opportunity
to examine how labor inspectors respond to violations in industries without strong
unions.
In environmental regulation, I focus on the metal, sugar, citrus, meat packing, and
vegetable oil industries. These industries are among the most problematic in terms of
industrial pollution in their respective provinces. Some industries, such as sugar mills
and vegetable oil processing plants, have visible impacts that provoke local mobilization
and protest. These industries provide an opportunity to compare enforcement in
communities with active neighborhood groups that have linkages with regulators, and in
those without, identifying the importance of linkages within a particular province. Other
industries, like metal plating, are dominated by small firms with locally invisible impacts
(often solvents are discharged into sewers), which thereby reduce the likelihood of
bureaucrats forming linkages with civil society organizations around these issues.
Contrasting enforcement across these industries allows for additional tests of the central
argument.
The data used in the analysis were collected during sixteen months of field
research in Argentina in 2008 and 2009. The primary source of data is over 260 in-depth
interviews that I conducted (a list of interviews is included in the appendix). 81 In each
province, I interviewed current and past heads of regulatory bureaucracies, street-level
bureaucrats, labor union leaders, industry association representatives, leaders of
environmental organizations, leaders of neighborhood organizations, and politicians.
These interviews provided first-hand accounts of interactions between the state and
diverse organizations in society, as well as accounts of enforcement in practice. 82 For
labor regulation, I complement the in-depth interviews with an original written 69-point
79 There are two major union structures in Argentina: national unions, and national federations. The former
tend to be more centralized, and the latter provide more autonomy to the provincial units.
8 Locke and Thelen 1995
1 The interviews lasted between twenty minutes and over four hours. The majority of them (1 89) were
recorded and transcribed.
82 During this time, I was also often able to directly observe regulation in practice. On three occasions, I
was able to join labor inspectors in the field, spending the day with them while they inspected worksites.
On other occasions, I sat in on meetings between government officials and firms, and on meetings among
labor unions.
survey of 166 labor inspectors in six provinces. 83 The survey allows for statistical tests of
some of the findings from the in-depth interviews and expands the geographic coverage
of the analysis beyond the four main provinces.
To supplement these data, for each province I systematically searched local
newspaper archives.8 4 These searches produced thousands of media reports that made it
possible to construct accounts of provincial politics and to triangulate interview data. I
also gathered documentary evidence-including internal audits, databases, and reports-
from regulatory bureaucracies and provincial governments. Finally, I use a variety of
national micro-data that provide an additional way to measure some of the key
variables. 8  When put together, these multiple sources of data provide a way to measure
differences in state-society relations, bureaucratic quality, and enforcement.
Overview of Dissertation
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 sets up the
provincial cases by recounting the history of labor and environmental politics in
Argentina. It shows how regulatory laws were solidified in the post-crisis period at the
national level and that the locus of enforcement politics sits at the provincial level. This
chapter also clarifies the similarities and differences of labor and environmental
regulation, specifying the types of questions that can be answered by analyzing both
issues.
In Chapter 3, I examine variation in labor regulatory enforcement in two
provinces with highly politicized bureaucracies that lack administrative capacity.
Specifically, this chapter focuses on Cordoba's wage and hour division and Tucumin's
inspectorate. Notwithstanding their serious constraints, in some industries, such as metal
manufacturing in C6rdoba and the citrus industry in Tucumin, labor inspectors were able
to enforce labor regulations. Enforcement, however, was not universal and in other
industries, such as brick-making in C6rdoba and construction in Tucumin, inspectors
have largely failed to enforce regulations. A series of common arguments-such as those
that focus on levels of socioeconomic development, the political preferences of
governors, or the characteristics of specific industries-fail to account for the observed
variation in enforcement. In contrast, the combination of low levels of administrative
capacity and strong inspector-union linkages explain the particular pattern of
enforcement. The chapter concludes by highlighting the tensions inherent in society-
dependent enforcement revealed in these cases.
13 The four case study provinces, plus two additional provinces Corrientes and Santa Cruz that provide
variation in the political party in power (Corrientes was governed by the center-right UCR and Santa Cruz
by the labor-based PJ), level of socio-economic development (Corrientes was one poorest provinces, Santa
Cruz one of the richest), and region (Corrientes is in the North, Santa Cruz in Patagonia). An original and
translation of the full survey is in the appendix.
84 The primary newspaper archives I employed are: C6rdoba: , La Voz Del Interior, La Manana de
Ordoba; Federal Capital: Clarin, La Naci6n, Pdgina/]2; Tucumdn: La Gaceta de Tucumdn; Santa Fe: La
Capital, El Litoral.
8S Such as rates of labor violations from the Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de
Hogares).
Chapter 4 turns to two cases that differ in economic structure, party politics, and
interest organization, but still have similar patterns of enforcement. I begin by
contrasting health and safety regulation in C6rdoba's construction industry with the cases
in the previous chapter. First, I show how C6rdoba's health and safety division enforced
labor regulations in the construction industry in a way that reached high levels by
combining penalties with on-site trainings for workers and managers. Although
inspectors collaborated with unions, enforcement was not dependent on societal resources
and went beyond union demands. I then show how these high levels of enforcement can
be explained through the combination of greater administrative capacity in the health and
safety division complemented by strong linkages among inspectors, union leaders, and
the local industry association.
The second half of the chapter examines labor inspection in the Federal Capital of
Buenos Aires focusing on the garment industry. Following the economic crisis, there
was a boom in garment production, but little enforcement and violations became extreme.
I analyze the series of events that followed a tragic fire in a garment workshop, which
made this industry highly salient and enabled inspectors to form linkages with a
community organization. The community organization sent workers to "infiltrate"
garment workshops and passed information about violations to inspectors, thus enabling
regulators to target their actions. The inspectors, who had substantial levels of
administrative capacity, undertook extensive campaigns that shut down hundreds of
illegal workshops. I trace the pattern of enforcement, which was similar to that in
C6rdoba's construction industry, to a combination of strong linkages and high levels of
administrative capacity. These two cases demonstrate that, notwithstanding the stark
differences across provinces and industries, a common set of factors leads to high levels
of enforcement.
Chapter 5 explores the questions: Why do some regulatory agencies establish
linkages with unions? Why do some agencies have greater administrative capacity than
others? I begin by analyzing a cross-section of administrative capacity and linkages.
Using a statistical analysis of the survey data from labor inspectors, I establish a clear
connection between partisanship of governors and inspector-union linkages. However, I
find no such connection between partisanship and administrative capacity. To explore
the mechanisms behind these relationships, I examine attempts at reform to alter either
linkages, administrative capacity, or both. The main case of the chapter is the province of
Santa Fe. For twenty-five years, linkages served as a substitute for administrative
capacity in Santa Fe. But when a governor from the Socialist party was elected without
broad union support in 2007, everything changed. The new governor was unwilling to
placate the unions by giving them control over inspection, but he still supported
enforcement. Consequently, the governor took steps to curb linkages and invested in
extensive reforms that improve administrative capacity. I then use the case of the
construction industry to illustrate the consequences of this change on enforcement. As
comparative cases, I then contrast Santa Fe with C6rdoba and Tucumin, which exhibit
the very same mechanisms at different periods of time. The chapter concludes arguing
that linkage formation and investment in administrative capacity can be explained
through the nature of partisan exchange.
Chapters 6 and 7 turn to environmental regulation, thereby pushing the scope
conditions of the analysis beyond corporatist labor politics. In Chapter 6, I analyze
enforcement in Santa Fe and C6rdoba. In both of these provinces, routine enforcement
dispersed across industries is at a very low levels, but there are peaks of state action in
response to local protests against specific firms. I explain the variation across these cases
by examining the processes though which regulators are enabled through linkages with
small community organizations but constrained with very low levels of administrative
capacity. In Chapter 7, I focus on efforts to control industrial pollution from the
sugar/ethanol and citrus industries in Tucuman. This case, which was summarized
above, traces the processes by which enforcement changed radically in Tucuman.
In the conclusion, I systematically compare the cases from all provinces in both
issue areas and contrast the central argument of this dissertation with common
alternatives. The chapter goes on to place the provincial cases in comparative context,
showing that the patterns identified in this dissertation are not only the product of specific
features of Argentine politics. I then summarize the main contributions of the analysis to
debates in state-society relations and regulation.
Figure ].1.: Diagram of Argument with Expected Levels of Enforcement
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Chapter 2: National Regulatory Politics and Institutions
"Dios estd en todas partes, pero atiende en Buenos Aires" 8 6
"God is everywhere, but His office is in Buenos Aires."
Labor and environmental regulation in Argentina is the product of national
policies and local enforcers. This chapter sets the stage for the provincial-level case
studies, examining the history of national regulatory politics. The focus of the analysis is
on the legacies that the development of these policies had for enforcement in the post-
crisis period. For each issue area, I recount the origins of laws that were put into place to
address labor and environmental concerns and identify the period in which interests were
organized around each issue area. The sequences of regulatory adoption and processes of
interest organization had far-reaching implications for the structure of politics years after
they were complete. The primary goal of this chapter is not to explain national regulatory
politics, but to place the provincial-level case studies in the following chapters into their
broader political context.
Examining national level regulatory politics also elaborates the basis for the
subnational methodology introduced in Chapter 1. First, the provincial-level
comparisons employed in this dissertation depend on provinces having substantial
variation in enforcement, yet similarities in the rules that they are enforcing. Recounting
the political struggles over federalism in regulation will demonstrate that this was, with
few exceptions, the case in Argentina in the post-crisis period. Second, studying both
labor and environmental regulation allows for comparisons of policies with some
similarities and many differences. On the one hand, the distinct structures of interest
organization in these two policy areas resulted in very different types of politics. On the
other hand, both labor and environmental regulations have been consistently stronger on
the books than in practice-especially in the post-crisis period. The chapter is divided
into two main sections, which address labor and environmental politics, in turn.
Labor Institutions
Argentina's labor laws, along with the nascent state apparatus to implement them,
were created during the period of social unrest that occurred before labor unions were
fully incorporated into the political system.87 As early as 1905, laws were established
that prohibited factory work on Sundays and limited excessive work hours.88 In 1907,
Argentina became the first Latin American country to establish a labor inspection
service. Labor administration was a federal affair from the beginning; many
provinces-including Cordoba (1914) and Santa Fe (1923)-established their own labor
offices to enforce legislation, and the federal government maintained jurisdiction only
T Iraditional Argentine saying.
Collier and Collier 2002
Vasquez Vialard and Julio Navarro 1990
Poblete-Troncoso 1935
over the Federal Capital and a few provinces.90 The federal nature of enforcement was
one of the few attributes of the initial period of adoption that had a lasting imprint on
Argentine labor institutions.
The ascent of Juan Domingo Per6n in 1943 as Secretary of Labor, and later as
president, radically transformed labor politics, administration, unions, and law. First,
Per6n furthered the development of labor regulations that improved working conditions
and increased wages. 91 Crucially, he also expanded enforcement and constructed labor
courts that would consistently rule in favor of workers. Not only did these regulations
have a short term effect of increasing worker welfare, they also formed a template for
relatively strong labor laws that have, for the most part, persisted in Argentina.
Second, Per6n made a series of changes to labor administration that enabled him
to implement labor policies at a wide scale. In 1943, he removed control of labor
administration and inspection from the provinces and created seventeen geographic zones
for labor administration that were under the federal government's control. In addition, as
president, Peron gave his union allies key positions in the Ministry of Labor and he
stressed in his statements that the Ministry of Labor was "their" ministry. 9 2 These two
actions foreshadowed the politics of labor administration in the years to come; struggles
over jurisdiction continued throughout Argentina's history, resulting in five more
transfers of jurisdiction between the provinces and the federal government over the next
forty years,93 and politicians used appointments in labor administration continually to
reward union allies.
Third, Per6n used his position as Secretary of Labor to enact a series of policies
that strengthened labor unions and laid down the blueprint for labor organization that
persists to this day. While in the 1943, approximately 20% of urban workers were
organized, by 1953 43% of all salaried workers were in a union; in absolute numbers,
total union membership increased from 520,000 to 2.3 million between 1946 and 195 .9'
Unions were structured in a highly centralized, corporatist, fashion. The principal
elements of this corporatist structure included: the designation of only one legally
recognized union that can collectively bargain for each economic sector; collective
bargaining agreements that cover all workers in the sector regardless of whether they are
in a union; and giving power to the federal Ministry of Labor to oversee union elections.
Unions were organized into confederations at the national and provincial level. 95 At both
levels, the dominant central became the General Labor Confederation (CGT,
9(- Ibid.
91 Doyon 1975; Buchanan 1985; James 1988; Torre 1989; McGuire 1997
92 Buchanan 1985
9 Palomino, Gonzilaz, and Garro 2005
94 James 1988 pp. 9-10
. There are confederations of unions across industry, and within industry structures. Within each industry.
there are two main forms of organization. One is a "union", such as the construction workers' union
UOCRA, which is one organization. Another is a federation, such as the sugar workers' union FOTIA,
which groups together individual unions at a lower level. There are significant formal organizational
differences between these two structures. For example, in federations, the unions budget is controlled at
the local level, and in unions, the budget is set in Buenos Aires.
Confederacidn General del Trabajo), although there were almost always rival factions. 96
In addition to factions among unions, there were, from the beginning, elements of the
labor movement that existed completely outside of the formal union structures, but these
elements were consistently marginalized. The dominant unions of the labor movement
have maintained the corporatist and hierarchical structure created by Per6n through this
day.
Fourth, Per6n's support of workers gained him the loyalty of many workers and
union leaders, creating the foundations for the partisan alliance between Peronism and the
labor movement, which had far-reaching influence on Argentine labor politics. 97 Under
Per6n, the corporatist union structures and the Ministry of Labor were used to aid, and to
control, the labor movement.98 Union leaders who were politically loyal were approved
by the state and given power, while those who were not had their unions declared illegal
and were replaced. The complex relationship between Per6n and the unions evolved into
a partisan alliance between the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the labor unions
that was never institutionalized. 99 The PJ's main base of support was from the labor
movement, but, unlike working class parties in other countries, there were no formal
structures to give union leaders power within the PJ. Just like the corporatist structure of
labor unions, the partisan alliance between unions and the PJ also had a lasting legacy on
labor politics.
Return to Democracy: Defeated Reforms, Weakened Institutions
The years following the return to democracy marked another crucial period of
change for labor market institutions, politics, and administration. The literature on labor
politics in Argentina during this period has focused largely on accounts of legislative
reform, collective bargaining, and privatization. Unions were weakened in the 1980s
and 1990s, initially due to the oppression they suffered during the military regime, and
later due to structural changes in the economy. 4 In addition, the PJ began to rely more
on clientelism than on mobilizing labor unions, diminishing the place of organized labor
in the party. 0 2
Despite reduced union strength and an international convergence towards
liberalization, organized labor was surprisingly able to prevent some far-reaching labor
law reforms. Between 1983 and 2002, many proposals designed to weaken the position
of workers were either blocked or short lived. When presidents attempted changes to
labor law, they were often met by large union-led protests. A series of thirteen general
strikes occurred during the administration of Alfonsin. Although unions only organized
9 For example, in Cordoba there are two CGTs that are aligned around the metal workers' union and auto
workers union, which have been rivals since the 1950s. See: Brennan 1994
9 Icvitsky and Way 1998; Murillo 2001; Levitsky 2003
9 See: Collier and Collier 1979: Buchanan 1985; Collier and Collier 2002
99 This relationship between the PJ and the unions has been analyzed extensive. See: James 1988; McGuire
1997: Levitsky 2003
""'The politics of labor law reforms in this period have been described in detail in the literature. See:
Etchemendy and Palermo 1998; Cook 1998; Etchemendy 2001; Murillo 2001; Etchemendy 2004; Murillo
2005: Murillo and Schrank 2005; Cook 2007
"1 Palomino 2005
Levitsky 2003
one general strike in response to the deregulatory policies of Menem's first
administration (1989-1995), by the end of Menem's second term (1995-1999) organized
labor had won back many legal protections for workers. President De la Rua (1999-
2001) was able to get a labor reform bill passed, but the passage of the bill was mired
with corruption. By the time the turbulent period of reforms ended and the economy
began to recover in 2004, most legal protections for workers had been restored.
Notwithstanding the attenuated affects of neoliberalism on formal labor laws, two
related developments significantly weakened both labor administration and labor market
institutions. First, under Alfonsin in the 1980s, labor inspection was decentralized and
nearly all provinces passed laws that made the provincial government the sole authority
to administer labor matters in the provincial territory.1 03 Decentralization had two
immediate consequences, it moved the locus of political conflict over labor inspection to
the provincial level, and it created tremendous variation in the quality of inspection
across the country. While political contestation over labor laws was structured around
cleavages between national organizations of labor and capital, questions over
decentralization were more matters of federalism than of labor politics. Once the
governors won control (again) over enforcement, provincial-level politics, which are
partially independent from national level trends, became the dominant drivers of labor
enforcement.
Many provinces were, however, simply unprepared to take on the task of labor
inspection and the national government did not provide adequate resources to support the
provinces or reduce levels of heterogeneity in enforcement across the country. An ILO
mission to study labor inspection in 1989 concluded that inspectors lacked training, often
had double employment in jobs that created conflicts of interest, lacked job security in
ways that reduced their independence, and were insufficient in number to meet their
objectives. 0 4 In short, notwithstanding the success that national unions had preventing
many labor law reforms under Alfonsin, they were unable (or unwilling) to protect labor
law enforcement, and overall inspection declined.
In the 1990s, the federal government regained additional formal authority over
labor administration and inspection, but not to the same degree as in earlier periods. By
virtue of the 1994 constitutional reform, the federal Ministry of Labor had the ability to
oversee Argentina's compliance with ILO Convention 81, which meant it could take
action when provincial labor inspectorates failed.10 5 The Ministry of Labor did not,
however, exercise this power-not only did it allow provinces to violate Convention 81
without intervening, but Argentina even fell short of meeting basic information collection
and reporting requirements of the convention (e.g. not sending an annual report between
1987 and 1997).106 In practice, the federal Ministry of Labor primarily served as a
Vasquez Vialard and Julio Navarro 1990
1 A 1989
] 110 1997 Interview: B64, Department of Labor Inspection, Province of Buenos Aires Ministry of
Labor, Buenos Aires, 3/4/2008
1T6 technically, the Ministry of Labor could intervene in provinces if they failed to comply with the
convention. Almost all provinces were in some violation of the convention, but the Ministry of Labor
never intervened.
coordinator of provinces and enforcer of labor law in inter-provincial areas (such as ports,
long-range transportation, and in the Federal Capital). 107 By the end of the 1990s the
ILO's evaluation of Argentina's ability to implement labor laws was highly negative:
The Committee notes that... the Latin American Confederation of Labour
Inspectors alleges the absence of inspection services in several provinces
of the country,... the absence of correspondence between the remuneration
of labour inspectors and that of other civil servants having lower or equal
responsibilities..., the absence of adequate training of labour inspectors
/br the per/ormance of their duties..., the inadequacy of the number of
inspectors, of the fequency of inspection visits..., and non-reimbursement
of/traveling expenses to labour inspectors..., It also alleges that the
Superintendency of Risks at Work is not performing its functions efficiently
and does not take into consideration prevention of accidents. 108
In addition to inspection, structures that existed at the federal level for labor
administration languished during the 1990s. The federal Ministry of Labor lost the task
collecting social security payments in 1996, thereby further reducing its power.109 In
addition, the Ministry of Labor's National Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety
(Direcci6n Nacional de Saludy Seguridad en el Trabajo) was replaced with the
Superintendency of Risks at Work (Superintendencia de Riesgos del Trabajo, SRT).
Instead of directly regulating health and safety conditions, the SRT oversaw privatized
health and safety insurance organizations and provided minimal support for provincial
inspectorates." 0 In sum, the 1980s and 1990s had two important legacies for labor
administration in Argentina: decentralization and an overall decline in administrative
capacity.
A second, and related, major development of the 1980s and 1990s was a decline
in compliance with labor laws, which lead to a reduction in the strength of labor market
institutions. One of the main indicators of labor law compliance, and the one that is most
often used by officials in Argentina, is the percentage of workers who are unregistered
with social security (en negro). Workers who are unregistered are less likely to benefit
from most labor regulations, such as being paid salaries that comply with provisions in
collective bargaining agreements, enjoying legally mandated benefits (e.g. vacation
time), receiving legally mandated severance pay, and working in safe conditions. An
official at the federal Ministry of Labor summed up the differences between registered
and unregistered workers, stating: "We have two universes. the universe offormal labor
in which we are almost first world, and informal work in which we are practically
Bangladesh.""' In 1990, household surveys found that approximately 25% of workers
were unregistered. This number grew dramatically, reaching 36% by 1997, and 44% in
10 Cornejo 2007
108 ILO 2000
109 Palomino, Gonzilaz, and Garro 2005. Structures were put into places to coordinate provincial efforts,
most importantly the Federal Labor Council (CFT, Consejo Federal del Trabajo). The CFT, however, did
not harmonize labor administration across provinces beyond setting a standard scale for fines.
") Beccaria and Galin 2002
Interview: B53, Senior Official, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
9/4/2008
2002 following the economic crisis."i 2 These changes signified a tremendous decline in
the portion of employment relations that were actually structured by labor market
institutions. In addition to declines in compliance with individual worker protections,
collective labor market institutions, such as wage bargaining, also broke down." 3 With
these fracturing institutions, a new unemployed workers movement threatened to displace
traditional unions." 4
In sum, during the 1980s and 1990s, formal changes to labor market institutions
were only marginal, but these institutions became extremely weak and failed to structure
employment relations in much of the economy. The success of unions in fighting off
attempts at legislative reform at the national level did not translate to labor inspection.
The center of conflict over inspection moved to the provincial level and, as I will show in
Chapter 5, preserving labor inspection capacity was not always unions' top priority. By
the start of the 2000s, the Argentine state had little ability to respond to the challenges of
weakened institutions. Moreover, labor unions were diminished both in their capacity to
mobilize and in their place in the PJ. "5 Combined with the economic crisis of 2001 that
triggered high levels of unemployment, these factors rendered Argentine labor market
institutions utterly dismantled in practice.
Challenges After the Economic Crisis of 2001
The period of economic growth after the economic crisis of 2001 marked another
major shift in labor politics. At the outset of the recovery, there was a strong backlash
against Menem-style neoliberalism and a renewed effort to increase the state's role as a
regulator of the market. President N6stor Kirchner (2003-2007) selected Carlos Tomada,
a prominent labor lawyer and adviser to the CGT for many years, to lead the Ministry of
Labor (MTESS).116 In 2004, under Kirchner, a new labor law was passed that restored
many worker protections that had been lost under De la Rua's reform. Collective
bargaining also restarted during this period, with agreements once again being negotiated
at the national level. Helped by their alliance with Kirchner and the high levels of
economic growth, unions also regained some of the strength that they lost in the 1990s
and the unemployed workers' movement petered out. "7 Despite these advances, the
recovery of labor market institutions in the post-crisis period was challenged by high
levels of labor law violations, which prevented many workers from seeing the benefits of
strengthened regulations.
112 Source: Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo, y Seguridad Social
113 Etchemendy and Collier 2007
"1 Garay 2007
115 Unions did manage to keep politics in place that allowed the survive, These included control over
lucrative social welfare and health funds called obras sociales.
116 There were a number of changes in the name of the Ministry of Labor over the years. From 1971-1999 it
was the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. From 1999-2002, it was the Ministerio de Trabajo,
Enpleo y Formaci6n de Recursos Humanos, In 2002, it became the Ministerio de Trabajo, Empeio y
Seguridad Social, or MTESS.
1"7 Etchemendy and Collier 2007
From his position as Minister of Labor, Tomada attempted to "recuperate the
capacity of the state to govern" the labor market and reduce violations of labor laws. 118
Accordingly, Tomada included a provision in the proposed 2004 labor law reform to re-
centralize labor inspection, giving the federal MTESS control over inspection once again.
Senior officials in the MTESS recognized that enforcement was going to be key to
completing the recovery of labor institutions and had little faith that the provinces would
undertake this effort. The labor inspection provision, however, turned into one of the
most controversial parts of the labor law reform. The issue was framed around questions
of federalism and provincial governors did not want to give up the power they had over
labor enforcement. Tomada lost the battle, and the proposed law was modified by
Congress to prevent the MTESS from gaining power over inspection. "9
Despite this setback, the Tomada moved ahead with an alternative effort to
increase the federal government's role in enforcement. Although the MTESS did not
have jurisdiction to enforce all aspects of labor law, it did have the ability to enforce
worker registration with the social security system. Leveraging federal jurisdiction over
social security, Tomada created the National Plan for Regularization of Work (PNRT
Plan Nacional de Regularizaci6n del Trabajo), which evolved into a massive effort to
register workers.' 2 0 The PNRT was uncontroversial except for its encroachment on
provincial autonomy, which was resented by many involved in labor administration in the
provinces. The CGT and the main business association, the Industrial Union of
Argentina that had been in the center of battles of labor law reforms, were mostly neutral
when it came to the creation of the PNRT. 2 1
The PNRT involved deploying inspectors throughout the country to enforce social
security registration. There was substantial investment in the administrative capacity to
make the PNRT possible. The MTESS increased its staff dedicated to enforcement
tenfold by hiring 400 new "labor inspectors." The MTESS attempted to ensure that all
new inspectors were "professionals", mostly lawyers and accountants. Many of
inspectors, however, were still in university and had yet to receive their formal degrees.
Even though they would compare unfavorably to inspectors in other countries (e.g.
Brazil), they had more training than their predecessors. In addition, the MTESS mustered
ample material resources and equipped the inspectors with computing systems that linked
in the national tax collection agency. With this new capability, the MTESS conducted
over 100,000 inspections a year, dramatically increasing the state's presence.m
Tomada, Carlos. "La recuperaci6n del trabajo y de sus instituciones rectoras", Revista de Trabajo .No. 4,
Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Buenos Aires, 2007. p. 76.
119 C/arin "Policia del Trabajo, el centro de la discordia de la nueva ley laboral" 02/22/04; Pdgina/12
-'Apuradas y problemas para la reforma laboral" 02/23/04; "El martes, Diputados tratarn de aprobar la
nueva reforma laboral" 02/26/04
1 Interestingly, Tomada did not chose to spend large sums of money to finance provincial inspection.
This could have been an alterantive to building the PNRT.
121 Interview: B58, Political and Social Department, Argentine Industrial Union, Buenos Aires, 4/9/2008
122 Internal data provided by the MTESS. Interviews: B06, Senior Official, Department of Labor
Inspection, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires, 3/13/08 & 2/26/09; B51,
Senior Official Department of Labor Inspection, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security,
Buenos Aires, 4/8/2008
While the Tomada and other senior officials publically portrayed the PNRT as full
labor inspection, the program only covered a very small part of labor law. For many
skeptics in the labor movement and in provincial governments, the program was seen as
"tax collection" and people involved in inspection emphatically stated that the staff were
not truly labor inspectors.123 Most importantly, inspectors from the MTESS could not
enforce many aspects of labor law that were commonly violated, such as non-payment of
wages, illegal overtime, unsafe working conditions, violations of the terms of collective
bargaining agreements. 2 4 Inspectors only used fines to remedy violations of worker
registration; there was absolutely no space for pedagogy and limited follow-up. In
addition, inspectors had absolutely no formal discretion and did not work regularly with
labor union leaders. 2 5 Despite the fact that the PNRT was limited, it was evidence that
federal government was serious about strengthening institutions.
Although there were hardly any funds given to provincial governments for
inspection, there were also clear signals from Tomada encouraging provinces to improve
their inspection services. For instance, in Tucumin, Tomada openly criticized the
governor for the lack of action in response to problems with worker registration (as
described in Chapter 5). In addition, the MTESS convened annual national workshops
around health and safety (Semana Argentina de la Saludy Seguridad en el Trabajo)
starting in 2003. At these workshops, provincial governments compared their efforts in
labor inspection, competing to have the most advanced program.126 Through these, and
many other similar actions, there was change on the part of the federal government
making labor law enforcement a new priority.
In sum, in the period of economic growth starting in 2003, labor laws were made
more protective, collective bargaining restarted, the unions gained regained some of their
lost strength, and trends in labor administration by the federal government turned towards
more enforcement. Notwithstanding these shifts, non-compliance with labor laws and
collective bargaining agreements remained extremely high. And with decentralization of
labor inspection, the primary part of the state that needed to respond to many of these
institutional weaknesses, was in the hands of provincial governments. Some provinces,
such as Chaco in the northeast and Neuquen in the south, did not hire new inspectors.
Other provinces, as different as the underdeveloped La Rioja in the northwest and the
affluent Santa Cruz in Patagonia, nearly doubled the sizes of their labor inspectorates. 2 7
123 Based on scores of interviews with labor leaders, many of whom used the adjective recaudatorio (in a
pejorative way) to describe the PNRT. Interview: B64, Department of Labor Inspection, Province of
Buenos Aires Ministry of Labor, Buenos Aires, 3/4/2008
12' Based on interviews with labor inspectors and officials working in the program. Inspectors: six in the
Federal Capital, three in Tucumin, seven in C6rdoba, one in Santa Fe. Heads of the regional MTESS
offices of: C6rdoba, the Federal Capital, La Pampa, Mendoza, and Tucuman.
I ", Based on interviews with dozens of union leaders in Cordoba, Corrientes, Santa Fe, Tucumnn, and the
lederal Capital. Senior officials in the MTESS claim that they do work with unions, but there was
consensus among all union leaders interviewed that this claim is based on a few isolated experiences, not a
general pattern.
1 16 Author's observation of the 2008 Semana A rgentina de la Saludy Seguridad en el Trabajo in Buenos
Aires.
127 Data collected by the author from the provincial governments. La Rioja increased from 10 inspectors in
2003 to 19 in 2008. Santa Cruz increased from 16 in 2003 to 32 in 2008. Interview: CH05, Chaco Labor
Subsecretariat, Resistencia, Chaco, 9/10/2008
Beyond the differences in administrative capacity, provincial governments varied
tremendously in their willingness to work with unions and other civil society
organizations to spur enforcement. These provincial responses to weakness in labor
market institutions are the subject Chapters 3 through 5. Before moving to the
provincial-level case studies of labor regulation, we first turn to the trajectory of
environmental regulatory institutions.
Environmental Institutions
Although labor issues clearly occupy the dominant place in Argentine history, the
first environmental law was passed in 1891, before any major labor laws had been
established.128 For most of the twentieth century, legislation related to environmental
issues focused on national parks and managing specific types of natural resources
(mining, water, land, etc.), instead of addressing the environment in an integrated
fashion.129 This changed when international attention turned to environmental issues in
the early 1970s, and Argentina began to take the first steps towards creating
comprehensive environmental policies. Per6n launched the first environmental agency,
the Secretariat of Natural Resources and the Human Environment (Secretaria de
Recursos Naturalesy Ambiente Humano), in 1973, under the Ministry of Economy. This
agency, however, only lasted two years and was dismantled by the military dictatorship
in 1975.130
Environmental policy continued to be characterized by uneven development over
the next thirty years. During the 1970s and 1980s, Argentina became a signatory to many
international environmental agreements and established additional laws governing
specific environmental issues, such as creating protected natural areas, wildlife protection
statutes, and policies for the recuperation of soils."' In addition, a number of provincial
governments established environmental laws and clauses in their constitutions. For
instance, soon after the return to democracy, C6rdoba created a Subsecretariat of
Environmental Management and passed a General Environmental Law in 1985,
regulating a broad range of activities. Notwithstanding these policy measures, there
were few efforts by the state to enforce environmental laws and regulations. Laws were
largely not obeyed and institutions to manage environmental issues in Argentina were
born weak.133
The 1990s was a period of further development of formal environmental
institutions, with an "explosion" of new legislation regulating environmental issues at the
beginning of the decade.'4 4 For example, the hazardous waste law (passed in 1992) was
the first national environmental law that went beyond management of natural
121 The first environmental law (2.797) mandated that household and industrial wastewater should be
treated before being released into the water. Devia, Coria, Flores, Lamas, Nonna, and Villanueva 2008.
129 For example: Law 13273 "Ley de defensa de la riqueza forestall", 1948. See: Hopkins 1995; Ibid.
1"" Hochstetler 2003
"31 Hopkins 1995; Acufia 1999
132 Interview: C23, Former Official, C6rdoba Environmental Protection Agency, C6rdoba, 6/3/2009
133 Brailovsky and Foguelman 1991 Chapter 6
"4 Coria, Devia, Iamas, Nonna, and Villanueva 1998 p. 118
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resources. In 1991, President Carlos Sanl Menem recreated the national environmental
agency, the Secretariat of Natural Resources and Environment (Secretaria de Recursos
Naturales y Ambiente).136 Although not a full ministry, the Secretariat of Natural
Resources and Environment reported directly to the president, placing it near the top of
the hierarchy of government agencies. In addition, the Federal Environmental Council
(Consejo Federal de Medio Ambiente) was established to serve as a space for dialogue
and exchange among provincial and federal environmental agencies. This was the first
real effort to coordinate across levels of government and overcome the barriers of
federalism.
Another critically important development that occurred during the 1990s was the
inclusion of an environmental clause (Article 41) in the 1994 constitution. 137 Beyond the
symbolic significance of enshrining the right to a healthy environment in the constitution,
it provided the basis for the federal government to establish minimum environmental
standards that apply to all provinces, thereby creating the conditions for future legislation
that could address the barriers of federalism.' 3 8 Although Article 41 gave greater policy
making power to the federal government, a separate provision, Article 124, gave
provincial governments "original dominion" over natural resources. Thus, while the
federal government could pass laws, the provincial governments remained responsible for
their implementation. The constitution also empowered individuals (and groups) to bring
lawsuits on behalf of collective damages created by environmental degradation (Article
43). Although far from complete, these policies were evidence of progress in developing
a legislative framework for environmental regulation during the 1990s.
While environmental laws progressed on paper in the 1990s, implementing these
laws was another question entirely. For example, when the federal hazardous waste law
was adopted, the Secretariat of Natural Resources and the Environment did not have any
staff trained to enforce the law and, even more crucially, there was no facility in
Argentina that could receive and process the waste in a way that met the legal
standards. 139 Despite the creation of the Secretariat of Natural Resources and
Environment under Menem, by the late 1990s there were still few efforts by the federal
government to enforce environmental regulations. 4 0 Studies that found improvement in
3 Di Paola 2002a
Hopkins (1995, p. 68) argues that Menem acted primarily in response to an oil spill in Chubut that had
very high levels of saliency.
13 Article 41 of the 1994 constitution states: "All inhabitants are entitled to the right to a healthy and
balanced environment fit for human development in order that productive activities shall meet present
needs without endangering those offuture generations; and shall have the duty to preserve it. As a first
prioritv, environmental damage shall bring about the obligation to repair it according to law. The
authorities shall provide for the protection of this right, the rational use of natural resources, the
preservation of the natural and cultural heritage and of the biological diversity, and shall also provide for
environmental information and education. The Nation shall regulate the minimum protection standards,
and the provinces those necessary to reinforce them, without altering their localjurisdictions. The entry
into the national territory of present or potential dangerous wastes, and of radioactive ones, is forbidden."138 Sabsay and Di Paola 2002
139 World Bank 1995 p. 68; Coria, Devia, Lamas, Nonna, and Villanueva 1998p. 275
1 For example, between 1997-1999 the Environmental Secretariat averaged identifying 110 violations of
the hazardous waste law each year. This is an extremely low number considering the thousands of facilities
the environment during this period claimed that they happened despite of, not because of,
environmental policies.14 1 One of the key barriers to implementation was an unclear
demarcation of authority; the federal, provincial, and municipal governments all had
jurisdiction over different parts of environmental legislation, and no one level of
government took responsibility for enforcing regulations. 142 The consensus among
observers was that opaque jurisdictional divisions led to chaos and the inadequate efforts
to implement policies at a national level.
Moreover, the federal agency was plagued by corruption at the highest levels.
The Secretary of Environment under Menem, Maria Julia Alsogaray, used much of her
time in government to enrich herself.143 One scheme, for which she was later found
guilty, involved a series of fraudulent contracts that she used to redirect money away
from addressing environmental contamination in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.
With such high profile corruption and an overall lack of results, nearly all observers
concluded that the national government did not take a strong role in strengthening
environmental institutions during the 1990s. At the end of the decade, in 1999, the
Secretariat of Natural Resources and Environment was lowered in rank and moved to the
Ministry of Social Development.14 5 Staff were scattered in the new Ministry and many
well-trained officials left the state, further degrading the federal government's ability to
implement policies.14 6 In short, the federal government was ill-equipped to translate
environmental policies into practices.
Notwithstanding these failures, there were some pockets of development in
administering environmental regulations at the end of the 1990s. One of the few
initiatives touted by officials as successful was the Cleaner Production Program (PPL,
Plan de Produccidn Mcis Limpia). In September 1999, officials from the Department of
Technology, Processes and Environmental Services (Direcci6n de Tecnologia, Procesos
y Servicios Ambientales), joined the Industrial Union of Argentina (Union Industrial
Argentina, UIA) and the Argentine Council for International Relations to organize a
seminar in green-upgrading in industry.147 The meeting brought together international
experts, governmental officials, firms and environmental groups to lay the groundwork
that manage hazardous waste. Source: Data Direcci6n de Infracciones Ambientales, Environmental
Secreatriat. See also: Reboratti 2008
' Chudnovsky, Cap, Trigo, and Rubin 1999
d World Bank 1995; Bertonatti and Corcuera 2000: Di Paola 2002a; Nonna 2002
13 She was convicted for corruption involving privatization of the telephone company Entel and for various
actions as Secretary of the Environment. On her arrest and conviction: Pdgina/12 "Coleccionista de
juicios" 08/08/03; "Maria Julia estd a punto de mudarse" 08/08/03 "Una prueba de que el dinero no hace la
felicidad" 05/22/04
14 In 1998, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) gave a 250 million dollar loan to Argentina to
clean up the Riachuelo. Investigations of Alsogaray revealed that much of this money was effectively
embezzled through fraudulent contracts. As a result, Argentina was fined 6 million dollars by the IDB.
Pigina 12 "La Plata es lo de Menos" 01/03/00; "Amenazan con denunciar al Estado por la contaminaci6n
del Riachuelo" 12/05/03; "Riachuelos de ligrimas" 08/16/03.
14Hochstetler 2003
146 Espach 2009 p. 67
147 Direcci6n de Tecnologia, Procesos y Servicios Ambientales, de la Secretaria de Recursos Naturales y
Desarrollo Sustentable, Secretaria de Ambiente y Desarollo Sustentable. "Seminario Internacional Sobre
Producci6n Limpia. " Buenos Aires, 1999.
for a series of projects in provinces, supported by the federal government, to help firms
adopt cleaner production practices. The first pilot program began in the province of Salta
in 2000 and then expanded to Tucumin in 2002 (Chapter 7). 14 These projects created
spaces for collaboration between industry and regulators to identify technological
processes and managerial programs that would improve environmental and economic
performance. Although PPL did not bolster the punitive side of enforcement, it became
one of the primary ways in which the federal government could foster improvement in
industries through collaborative efforts.
The most important legislative barriers to environmental regulation in Argentina
were finally overcome when, using the power given to the federal government by the
1994 constitution, Congress passed laws mandating minimum environmental standards
(presupuestos minimos) in 2002. While not ending debates over federalism, the minimum
standards marked a turning point by formally establishing a floor of environmental
regulations that was applicable in the entire country.149 These laws included the first
General Environmental Law of Argentina, as well as a series of laws addressing specific
issues, including managing industrial waste, PCBs, water, public information, and
household waste. 150 Passed during the height of the economic crisis, implementation of
this legislation would be defined by the post-crisis period.
In sum, by the end of 2002 there was significant development in environmental
regulations that applied to the entire nation, but by all accounts regulations were widely
not respected and there were high levels of variation across the provinces in their
enforcement capabilities. Responses of the federal government, and most provincial
governments, to the institutional weakness were few and scattered. In this context of
weak regulatory institutions, there would be serious challenges to enforcement in the
period of growth that began in 2003. Before addressing this period, it is helpful to
examine the development of the environmental movement.
The Environmental Movement
The environmental movement took shape in Argentina primarily after the return
to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. Before this period, there had been some
organizations dedicated to wildlife protection and nature, but they were not templates for
most of the organizations that would follow (and eventually become the primary
protagonists). According to one of the early leaders of the movement, only "after the
fill qf the military government and the beginning of democracy, "was there a "boom"
148 Interview: B28, Federal Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development, Buenos Aires,
9/22/2008
149 Schiffrin 2005
S) Devia, Coria, Flores, Lamas, Nonna, and Villanueva 2008. After this initial burst, additional minimum
standards laws were gradually adopted, including a law to protect native forests and a controversial law
assed in 2010 to protect glacial areas.
Some early organizations were: Asociaci6n Ornitol6gica del Plata founded in 1916 and Asociacion de
Amigos de los Parques Nacionales founded in the 1940s. The first environmental NGO to focus on both
conservation and social issues, Fundaci6n V ida Silvestre Argentina formed in 1977, was the only nmjor
organization founded during the military dictatorship. Aguilar 2002 See also: La Ntaci6n "25 a5os en favor
del medio ambiente" 12/22/02
and a "spectacular emergence of NGOs."i5 2 There are no good estimates of the exact
number of environmental organizations that became active in Argentina, but there was
clearly a "boom" with hundreds, if not thousands of organizations, being founded across
the country. 5 Unlike other countries in the region, such as Brazil and Bolivia,
environmental issues in Argentina did not draw large amounts of international attention
and, as a result, there is little question that the protagonists were primarily domestic. 5 4
The patchwork of environmental organizations grew to be extremely heterogeneous in
their bases of support, modes of action, and organizational structures.15 5
For analytical purposes, it is helpful to identify two ideal-types of environmental
organizations around which many groups cluster. One type is the professional
organization, which tends to have staff (or members) who are highly educated elites.
Professional environmental organizations have the capability to take cases to court and
conduct scientific analyses of environmental problems. These organizations were behind
many of the laws described above. One example is the Environmental and Natural
Resources Foundation (Fundaci6n Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, FARN), founded in
1985, which has played an important role in the development of Argentine environmental
policy and jurisprudence. Based in the Federal Capital, FARN, has a paid staff of
professionals, a board of directors, and a number of volunteers (who are often college or
law students from the United States). 156 To support its activities, FARN raises money
from members, international organizations, and foundations, such as the Ford Foundation
and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. One of FARN's key roles has been in
lobbying Congress for stronger environmental legislation at the national level and
conducting legal research to inform the policy. In addition, FARN has continually run
courses in environmental law, training students along with judges and government
officials. Starting in 1994, FARN published an environmental law supplement to the
periodical La Ley, which in its first year reached over 10,000 lawyers throughout the
country. Finally, FARN gives legal aid to groups that take environmental issues to court
through its legal clinic. Combined, this repertoire has made FARN a formidable player in
Argentine environmental politics at the national level.
A second ideal-type of environmental organization is the small, neighborhood,
group that becomes involved in environmental issues at the local level. Neighborhood
organizations are often not primarily concerned with environmental issues, but rather
become engaged with environmental problems in response to a pressing matter in their
community. These groups lack the human and financial capital of the professional
"2 Interview: C24, Environmental Defense Foundation, C6rdoba, 3/5/2009
3 Data from a survey of civil society associations conducted in 2004 indicated that 5% of the
approximately 100,000 civil society organizations report working on environmental issues. See: Luna and
Cecconi 2004
While recent accounts of environmental movements in Latin America have gone to length to correct
dominant accounts that focused only on international actors, there are no such debates about the Argentine
movement. See: Steinberg 2001, Hochstetler and Keck 2007
1 This is ty pical of Latin America. See: Christen, Herculano, Hoschstetler, Prell, Price, and Robberts
1998
1 Its staff include high influential figures in the Argentine legal community. For example, in a poll
conducted of lawyers to determine candidates to the Supreme Court in 2003, FARN's former director,
Daniel Alberto Sabsay, was the favorite. La Naci6n "Sabsay y Kemelmajer, preferidos" 07/06/03
organizations and they must depend on government actors, such as Defensores del
Pueblo, or professional environmental organizations to take cases to court. Some groups
also lack formal organizational structures and fashion themselves as "self-convening"
(autoconvocados), implying that they have no institutional interests (e.g. they do not need
to raise money to perpetuate themselves and will disband when the problem is solved).
Despite their organizational weaknesses, neighborhood groups often have greater
capacity to mobilize protests than professional environmental organizations, and they
also tend to have more legitimacy in the eyes of politicians and courts. As a result, while
neighborhood groups are not at the forefront of policy research or lobbying Congress,
they have played a key role in demanding implementation of environmental regulations
in the courts and the streets.
The La Boca Neighborhood Association (Asociaci6n Vecinos La Boca), also in
the Federal Capital, is an example of a small, neighborhood, environmental organization.
When it was founded in 1997, the La Boca Neighborhood Association did not organize
around environmental issues.15 7 Instead, the primary concerns of its founders were
typical issues of a working class urban neighborhood: crime, education, and public
health. These issues, as a leader from the association explained, led them to taking on
problems of environmental contamination in the Riachuelo River:
"The area by the Riachuelo River was a beachhead for criminals because,
just as the river was degraded, the properties by the river were degraded
and criminals occupied and lived in them. The hospital was collapsing
due to its proximity to the river... The schools are in the same
neighborhood, and with their closeness to the river they were run down.
Everything was happening in the riverfront, making it the center [qf the
problems]. We said: 'Enough. We are going to get ourselves involved in
this [problem]. Enough with working on individual issues.' It was this
way that we started working on environmental issues." 1
The La Boca Neighborhood Association had an extremely small budget, with
approximately twenty members who paid dues of three dollars per month. 5 9 Yet, they
were surprisingly effective in promoting implementation of environmental laws in the
Riachuelo. After years of campaigning with little success, in 2005 the Association came
in contact with the Defensores del Pueblo of the Federal Capital and Nation, as well as a
number of professional environmental organizations (including FARN). With their help,
a case from the community made it all the way to the Supreme Court. In a landmark
decision, the court ordered regulators from the federal Environmental Secretariat, the
province of Buenos Aires, and the Federal Capital to take action to clean up the
watershed of the Riachuelo.160 In the effort to enforce regulations that followed, the La
Boca Neighborhood Association was a key societal actor. Although not many
organizations make it to the Supreme Court, the La Boca Neighborhood Association is
m The Association was founded in 1997, but it was not until 2000 that it registered to get personaria
juridical, which enables organizations to take cases to court.
1 Interview: B24, "La Boca" Neighborhood Association, Buenos Aires, 10/4/2008159 Ibid.
16(1 Pdgina/12 "Un fallo para salvar el Riachuelo" 06/21/06
typical in terms of its small size, limited resources, local focus, and its ability to gain
allies with technical expertise.
Notwithstanding the substantial differences between professional organizations,
like FARN, and neighborhood organizations, like the La Boca Neighborhood
Association, there are a number of general features of the environmental movement that
stand in contrast with the labor movement in Argentina. First, environmental groups are
not corporatist, but instead are highly pluralistic; in any given locality, or around any
given issue, multiple environmental groups can be active, and there is no state regulatory
agency that determines which organization can represent a particular issue (as the
Ministry of Labor does for unions). The only type of government oversight of
environmental organizations is not mandatory or onerous-many groups apply for legal
incorporation (personaria juridica) to have standing in court.
Second, environmental groups do not have a formal hierarchical confederation
like the CGT. When environmental organizations collaborate, they are most often
structured by relatively horizontal partnerships, federations, and networks. At the
national level, there a number of networks of organizations that have waxed and waned in
importance over the years, such as the National Network for Ecological Action (Red
Nacional de Accidn Ecologista), formed in 1984.161 At the provincial level, there are
addition federations, such as the Federation of Environmental Non-governmental
Organizations of Tucuman, (Federaci6n de Organizaciones Ambientales No
Gubernamentales de Tucuman) which formed in 1987 to bring together professional
associations and environmental groups. These environmental federations lack the
hierarchy of provincial labor CGTs, creating more space for a disagreement, but also
limiting the possibilities of collective action at a large scale.
Third, environmental organizations formed without any attachment to a particular
political party, and most organizations have gone out of their way to avoid partisan
alliances. When the movement began to take shape in the 1980s, environmental issues
were not a central cleavage point in electoral politics. None of the major political parties
in Argentina had (or have) a reputation for being more pro-environmental than the others.
There is Green Party, founded in 2006 by the former Minister of Environment of the
Federal Capital, but it is extremely small and includes only a handful of active
politicians. 16 Unlike labor unions, most environmental organizations tend to cautiously
guard their independence and avoid entanglement with any political party. 163 The extent
to which they have directly engaged electoral politics, it has been to invite candidates of
all parties to either clearly state their positions or sign a statement that they are committed
to environmental issues, as groups did in Santa Fe and C6rdoba.
In sum, the environmental movement largely formed during the 1980s and 1990s.
It is highly pluralistic and heterogeneous, with largely unregulated organizations ranging
in size, capabilities, and structure. These organizations largely did not align with any one
party nor played a major role in electoral politics. Rather, they used a variety of tactics to
161 Interview: C24, Environmental Defense Foundation, C6rdoba, 3/5/2009
162 Interview: B44, Green Party, Buenos Aires, 10/9/2008
1 Based on interviews with scores of leaders from environmental organizations in 2008 and 2009.
promote environmental protection-some groups took to the courts and the streets, while
others conducted studies, lobbied the government, and provided legal support. When
compared with labor unions, this structure would lead to a very different set of
opportunities and constraints for the environmental movement to engage in struggles over
enforcement.
Environmental Politics During the Post-Crisis Boom
Environmental politics in the post-crisis period was heavily shaped by a
controversy surrounding the construction of a paper mill in Uruguay, which led to the
largest protests to date in Argentina over industrial contamination. A combination of
Finnish and Spanish multinational companies, with financial support from the World
Bank's International Finance Corporation (among others), embarked on plans to build a
large paper milling complex dubbed "Botnia" in the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos, just
across the River Parani from the Argentine city of Gualeguaychn in Entre Rios province.
In response to the threat of water contamination from the mill, a series of community
organizations formed, eventually leading to the Gualeguaychn Environmental Assembly
(Asamblea Ambiental de Gualeguaychfi), which mobilized massive protests that took the
Argentine environmental movement to new levels.164
In April of 2005, an estimated 40,000 people marched on the international bridge
connecting Argentina and Uruguay to protest the paper mill.165 The marches continued
and the bridge was blockaded for periods of time by protesters-some lasting more than
forty days-cutting off one of the most important land routes between Argentina and
Uruguay. The protesters generated so much attention that in May 2006, President Nestor
Kirchner held a rally in Gualeguaychn to support the Gualeguaycho Environmental
Assembly, which was attended by nineteen governors, all of Kirchner's cabinet, and
35,000 people.' 66 And in December 2007, the first major protests about environmental
contamination reached the symbolically important Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires.
Botnia moved environmental issues from the margins to the center of the political
agenda. The implications of this protest for domestic environmental politics were
influenced, however, by the international nature of the conflict; the source of the
contamination was not under the jurisdiction of Argentina, but in Uruguay. As a result,
the Argentine government had to negotiate with Uruguay, the World Bank, and the
multinationals to stop the development. Legal battles were played out in international
courts, where Argentina argued that Uruguay violated treaties that governed the Rio de la
Plata. The Argentine state did not, however, have to build the capacity to directly enforce
regulations and did not have to adjudicate the conflict in its own courts. This meant that
the most immediate policy response of the government was diplomacy. However, many
players involved in environmental politics were aware that if the movement turned
164 For a journalistic account, see: Toller, Ver6nica. Danos Colaterales: Papeleras, Contaminaci6n Y
Resistencia en el Rio Uruguay, Editorial Marea, Buenos Aires, 2009.
165 Pdgina/12 "Una marcha rioplatense" 05/02/05
166 Pdgina/12 ""Es una cuesti6n ambiental que ataie a todo el pais"" 05/06/06. Days later, during a photo
session of heads of state attending the European Union-Latin American summit in Vienna, the queen of the
carnival in Gualeguaycho surprised the delegation in her carnival costume with a sign protesting Botnia.
Pigina/12 "Mueva, mueva, mueva, no a las papeleras" 05/12/06
inwards towards Argentine firms, such as the paper mills on the very same river, it could
create a major problem for N6stor Kirchner's government.
To stave off this possibility, Kirchner replaced the Secretary of Environment,
Atilio Savino,167 with Romina Picolotti, a lawyer who was representing the assembly of
residents of Gualeguaychn in international tribunals in the Hague. 16 Picolotti was the
president of the Center for Human Rights and Environment (CEDAH, Centro de
Derechos Humanos y Ambiente), which she co-founded in 1999 after working in a
Washington D.C. as a human rights lawyer. Although Picolotti had become a key figure
in the Botnia conflict, she was somewhat unknown in the broader Argentine
environmental movement and in national politics. If Kirchner wanted to co-opt the
environmental movement through Picolotti, he was mistaken; she maintained support of
the principal groups involved in the Botnia conflict, but most major environmental
organizations saw her as an outsider and never endorsed her.169
Picolotti's two-year tenure as Secretary of Environment was marked by
controversy and, ultimately, it ended with her being forced to resign amidst accusations
of corruption and mismanagement.170 The international conflict over Botnia continued,
mostly outside of the primary competency of Picolotti. Instead, she became a highly
visible figure as the Environmental Secretariat confronted a series of domestic
challenges. Of these, one of the most salient was contamination in the Matanza-
Riachuelo watershed. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that the
government of the province of Buenos Aires and the Federal Capital had failed to
implement environmental policies and forced them to create a plan to clean up the
watershed and the industry that polluted it. In response, the federal and provincial
governments created an inter-jurisdictional initiative called the Matanza-Riachuelo
Watershed Authority (ACUMAR, Autoridad de Cuenca Matanza Riachuelo), which led
to the development of greater enforcement by the Environmental Secretariat for
enforcement in that watershed.171 The Environmental Secretariat did not, however,
develop the capacity to act in a wider array of regulatory arenas outside of the Matanza-
Riachuelo Watershed. By the time Picolotti was forced out at the end of 2008, the federal
government played a larger role in supporting environmental causes publicly, but still did
1 Atilio Savino was not supported by environmental organizations when he was appointed and had an
extremely quiet three year tenure in which he barely had a presence in policy debates. Pdgina/12 "Medio
Ambiente" 09/12/03; "L a Deuda Ambiental" 07/06/06
Pdgina 12 "Vos hac6 lo que tengas que hacer"" 06/28/06; "Desde una ONG a La Haya" 06/28/06. La
acion "Kirchner nombro a una nueva secretaria de Medio Ambiente" 07/17/06. La Nacidn Llega al
Gobierno una enemiga de las papeleras" 07/28/06.
169 Interviews with multiple environmental organizations. See also: La Naci6n "Algunos asambleistas
respaldaron a Picolotti y otros celebraron su salida" 12/03/08S-La a.Vcidn "De defensora de los asambleistas, a cuestionada por su gesti6n" 12/02/08; Pdgina/12 "No le
quedo) ni un cuarto de ambiente" 12/03/08; "La secretaria antiBotnia" 12/03/08; Ambiente caldeado"
12/03/08. C/arin- Al final, la Presidenta echo a la secretaria de Ambiente" 12/03/08.
- Inspections by the Environmental Secretariat increased from an average of approximately 100 per year
from 2003-2005, to 464 in 2007 598 in 2005. Source: Response of Environmental Secretariat to
information request from researcher.
not have the administrative capacity or jurisdiction to take broad steps that could
strengthen environmental institutions nationally.m17
In sum, at the national level the post-crisis period was marked by high level
conflicts and one of the most visible Secretaries of the Environment in Argentine history,
two developments that increase the saliency of environmental contamination and its
potential political consequences. As I will show in Chapters 6 and 7, in some cases this
national attention put additional pressure on the provinces, setting the precedent that
courts could indeed order the government to enforce environmental regulations and
showing that mobilization around environmental issues could reach massive scales.
Moreover, these changes created opportunities for provincial regulators to take advantage
of programs that were developed by the Environmental Secretariat, like the Program for
Cleaner Production. How these forces played out, however, was determined primarily by
local politics, bureaucracies, and environmental organizations, which will be addressed in
the coming chapters.
Conclusion
This chapter has recounted the history of labor and environmental policy in
Argentina at the national level. The primary objective of this discussion was to set the
stage for the provincial-level case studies, which are the central component of this
dissertation. In addition, this chapter has highlighted the differences and similarities
between the two policy areas. On the one hand, there are clearly many important
differences between labor and environmental regulation. One obvious difference is the
trajectory of regulatory policy-environmental regulation began much later but was more
linear than labor regulation. Another important difference is in the organization of
interests; the unions, environmental groups, and other civil society organizations that
engage with the state around issues of enforcing regulations were strongly shaped by
political forces at work during the times in which they were founded. Comparing labor
politics (with its centralized, partisan, corporatist interest organization ) to environmental
politics (with its plural, decentralized, non-partisan interest organization) will provide an
opportunity to test whether or not the theory advanced in this dissertation can travel
across policies with different types of politics
On the other hand, this analysis identified three primary commonalities across
issue areas, which make comparisons of labor and environmental enforcement during the
post-crisis period meaningful. First, both labor and environmental laws became more
protective at a national scale in the period after the economic crisis. Second, and related,
these regulations were routinely not followed. In other words, labor and environmental
institutions formally outlined a series of standards and ways in which conflict around
regulatory issues should be structured, but they were often ignored in practice. Third, the
federal structure of Argentina made it impossible for the national swing towards greater
state regulation to be translated directly to the provinces in both issue areas. The federal
m Picolotti was replaced by Homero Bilboni, who had a much lower profile. Bilboni was fired in 2010.
presumably for failing to manage the clean up in the Riachuelo. He was replaced by Juan Jos6 Mussi in
2010. who was known primarily for his loyalty to President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, not his
credentials in environmental issues. La Nacidn "La Presidenta sum6 a Mussi al Gabinete" 12/29/10
government did take a more active role in promoting enforcement-both through its own
programs (e.g. the PNRT and ACUMAR) and with high profile cabinet officials (i.e.
Tomada and Picolotti) who put pressure on provincial governments. Nevertheless, the
provinces remained the primary loci of struggles over enforcement. Therefore, to
understand the politics of enforcement, it is necessary to shift the level of analysis down
to the provincial level and examine specific industries, which is the task of the remainder
of the dissertation.
Chapter 3: Enforcement with Unions in the Driver's Seat
Enforcing labor regulations is particularly challenging in places where regulatory
agencies are politicized and have highly limited resources. This chapter analyzes
enforcement by two regulatory agencies that faced many bureaucratic shortfalls: the wage
hour division of C6rdoba's labor inspectorate (STC) and Tucumin's labor inspectorate
(TST). These agencies suffered from a combination of low levels of capacity and a high
degree of politicization. Both agencies were staffed with patronage employees who were
appointed for their political connections, not their merit. Moreover, both had limited
numbers of inspectors with no reliable access to transportation and, in some cases, not
even paper to write up inspection reports. In short, nearly all of the organizational
features associated with capable bureaucracies were missing, making enforcement appear
highly unlikely in both provinces.
Notwithstanding these serious constraints, in some industries, such as metal
manufacturing in C6rdoba and the citrus industry in Tucumain, labor inspectors were able
to enforce labor regulations. Enforcement, however, was not universal and in other
industries, such as brick-making in C6rdoba and construction in Tucumin, inspectors
have largely failed to enforce regulations. This chapter addresses the puzzles that arise
from the uneven enforcement in C6rdoba and Tucumin. How are inspectors able to
enforce regulations at all with such substandard bureaucratic organization? What
explains variation in enforcement across industries in this context?
C6rdoba and Tucumin are a useful context to explore these questions for a
number of reasons. On the one hand, C6rdoba and Tucumin have a number of
similarities. They both are dominated politically by the labor-based PJ party, which has
controlled the legislatures and held the governor's seat in both provinces, and had
political alliances with the main labor confederations.1 73 Therefore, both provinces have
similar top-down political pressure with regard to enforcing labor regulations. In
addition, the regulatory agencies in both provinces were highly politicized in the period
after the crisis. Neither had merit based hiring or promotion, senior staff were invariably
appointees (not people who worked their way up through the bureaucracy), and there was
no association of inspectors to create a set of professional norms for regulators. In sum,
two factors that are often seen as influencing enforcement-political control from above
and bureaucratic autonomy-are held constant in these cases, thereby allowing for
analysis of other possible factors.
1 In C6rdoba, governors from the PJ were in power from 1999 through 2011 and the PJ block in the
provincial legislature controlled 57% of the seats from 2003 to 2007 and 53% from 2007-2011. In
Tucumin, the governors were also from the PJ from 1999 through 2011 and the PJ held 65% of the seats in
the Camara de Diputados from 2003 to 2007, and 55% from 2007-201 1.
Tbcile 3.1. Indicators oft Socioeconomic Development in C6rdoba and Tucumanm
Indicator C6rdoba Tucumdn
Average Income $6,256 $4,475
Taxes Collected (per capita) $183 $135
Education (completed high school or greater) 36% 30%
% Below Poverty Line 5.9% 10.8%
% Households without sanitation services 11% 27%
On the other hand, there are key differences between these two provinces. Most
notably, C6rdoba has substantially higher levels of socio-economic development than
Tucumin. People in C6rdoba have higher income, are better educated, and more have
escaped poverty than in Tucumin (see Table 3.1). C6rdoba is part of the more
economically developed central Cuyo region of Argentina and has been highly
industrialized for many years, while Tucuman is part of the Northwestern region that has
historically been poorest and most underdeveloped in Argentina. This difference allows
for a test of how important socioeconomic conditions are in determining levels of
regulatory enforcement, as is often suggested in the literature.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section details the
patterns of enforcement in the two provinces. It begins with the number and distribution
of inspections, placing these two agencies in comparative context with other regulatory
agencies. Then it examines the ways in which regulators respond to violations in four
specific industries. A close examination of the actions by inspectors in these two
provinces reveals that there is enforcement, but that it varies tremendously across
industries and has serious limitations.
The second section of the chapter uses this variation to evaluate conventional
accounts of enforcement and presents an alternative explanation. First, as suggested
above, if socioeconomic differences are the most important factors, enforcement should
be at a much lower level in Tucumin than in C6rdoba. Second, if enforcement is driven
by technocratic planning based on how many violations there are in an industry,
enforcement efforts should reflect the industry's propensity for violating labor laws.
Third, if enforcement is driven primarily by market forces, there should be a close
relationship between firm exposure to competition in international markets and the
actions of labor inspectors. These explanations, however, cannot easily account for the
observed variation in enforcement across industries in these two provinces.
As an alternative, I argue that variation in these cases can be best explained by the
interaction of low levels of administrative capacity, which constrain inspectors, and
linkages between labor inspectors and labor unions, which enable inspectors. In
1 Data: Income (US dollars) and education from EPH for 2009. Taxes collected (US dollars) from the
Ministry of Interior for 2006. Percent below poverty line from Ministry of Interior 2007. Households
without sanitation services from the census 2001.
combination, the similarities in these two key variables explain why these regulatory
agencies, in otherwise very different provinces, exhibit the same pattern of enforcement.
The chapter concludes by highlighting the trade-offs in the society-dependent pattern of
enforcement in Cordoba's wage and hour division and in Tucumin. In the short-term, the
very mechanisms that make enforcement possible in some industries undermine the
possibility of enforcement in other industries. The longer-term influence of this pattern
of enforcement on the state will be analyzed in Chapter 5.
Enforcement
To analyze enforcement it is necessary to measure whether and when regulators
undertake a series of key tasks. Do regulators conduct inspections to gather information,
craft responses to the violations that they identify, and overcome resistance from
reluctant firms? In both provinces, there is evidence that regulators do gather information
through over 10,000 inspections a year.' 7 5 Put in comparative context, the inspection rate
in C6rdoba and Tucumin is greater than other countries, even some that have reputations
for having relatively strong labor inspectorates (see Figure 1 below).17 6 For example, the
STC and TST both conduct many more inspections on a per capita basis than the French
inspectorate, which is held as a model in international circles (e.g. the ILO
recommendations for the size of the labor inspectorate are based on the French system).
Of course, inspections per capita is only a very crude indicator of state action, but it
suggests that both C6rdoba and Tucumin are able to at least make contact with a number
of firms and workers to gather information at a level that is comparable to other
countnes.
"5 For Tucuman, Interview Ti 2, Senior Official, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 10/27/2008 &
11/12/2008; For C6rdoba, see Table 3.2. The data for C6rdoba only include the Capital.
"76 For a comparison of labor inspectorates in the region, see: Jatob 2002
Figure 3.1: Inspections Per Capita in Comparative Context 77
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Table 3.2: Wage and Hour Inspections in C6rdoba (Capital District) in 2007 & 2008' 7
Year Inspections Inspection Programmed Individual Number of
Requested by Inspections Claims Infractions
Unions
2007 10,078 8,098 1,872 89 1,606
2008 9,279 6,131 2,893 314 2,473
There is also evidence that the instances of non-compliance identified during
these inspections generate concrete responses in C6rdoba and Tucumin. First, inspectors
find a substantial number of violations during these inspections. For example, in
C6rdoba inspections resulted in over 2,000 infractions in 2008 (there is no precise
information for Tucumin). Infractions trigger a process by which labor inspectors
negotiate a plan for firms to come into compliance or apply a fine to the firm. In many
cases, inspections can result in individual workers gaining legally mandated protections
they had been denied. An official at the STC provided an illustration of this process with
an inspection at an auto mechanic shop:
m Inspections per capita are used instead of per worker because of the large uncertainty in estimates of the
number of workers in Argentine provinces. Federal Capital and C6rdoba data are for is 2007, the TucumAn
data are for 2008. The Chilean data are for approximates for the 2000s and are from Figuera Valenzuela
2005. The Dominican data are from the Secretaria de Estado de Trabajo for 2006. The Mexican figure is
an average from 2001-2006 of the number of visits Federal inspectors conducted. Source: Romero Gudiho
2008. The Spanish data are from the Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigraci6n de Espana, Memoria 2007. The
French data are from the ILO.
1 8 Source: Secretaria de Trabajo, C6rdoba.
0.01 0.012
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"One time we did an inspection at a workshop that maintained vehicles,
trailers, trucks, buses... We went into the worksite, [where] we saw two or
three people, but with many vehicles. There was no way that only these
workers were maintaining all of these cars... There was also a big bus in
the shop and the inspector asked the employers to open it. The people
didn't want to do it, and the inspector forced it open tofind eighteen
workers inside; the managers had hidden the workers. The inspector took
the names of the workers... In the end, we registered half the workers
[and]... they had a happy ending. "'9
In this case, inspectors were not deterred by the reluctant employers and a significant
portion of the workers gained the legal protection associated with being registered,
including health insurance, legally mandated vacation time, social security protection,
and the right to collect severance pay. This same type of action is repeated hundreds of
times by inspectors in both provinces as they go about their tasks of gathering
information about violations and crafting responses. In short, this evidence suggests that
there is at least some enforcement in C6rdoba and Tucumin.
To better understand enforcement, however, we need to go beyond its mere
existence. Which firms get inspected? Who decides where to conduct inspections?
Which workers are included or left out of the regulatory system? In order to answer these
questions, we must unpack the pattern of enforcement in these provinces. Using data
from the survey of inspectors, the tables below show the industries where enforcement is
concentrated, along with an indicator of which unions request the most inspections.
These data indicate a very strong relationship between union demands and enforcement;
the correlation between unions that make requests and inspections is high (0.92 in
C6rdoba and 0.94 in Tucumin),'80 and there are only few exceptions of sectors that are
inspected but do not have many union requests.18' Thus, the allocation of enforcement
(in terms of which industries are inspected the most) appears to be nearly a direct
reproduction of the distribution of union requests.
'9 Interview: C45, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/19/2008180 The one exception is the domestic worker sector in Tucumdn, which has received many inspections
despite the fact that there is no strong union providing resources. In this case, the labor inspectors worked
at the behest of another government agency, the Tax Department, that triggered enforcement. Sources:
Interview: T 11, Province of Tucumin Tax Department, Tucumdn, 4/17/2009. La Gaceta de Tucumdn
"Comienzan los controles contra el empleo domestico informal" 09/07/06; "Fueron regularizadas 1.800
empleadas domdsticas en la provincia" 09/09/06; "Arrancan los controles sorpresivos de las casas"
09/11/06; "MultarAn desde hoy a quienes empleen domdsticas en negro" 09/11/06; "Mis controlcs por el
personal domestico" 09/13/06.
"" For nearly half the inspectors, the sectors that inspectors said are regulated the most perfectly
corresponded with the unions that request the most inspections.
Table 3.3: Sector Distribution of inspections and Union Requests in Cordoba's Wage
and Hour Division'82
Sector W c etr r Wi nons Difr e Between
inspected theinxost' est theaast Inspectioi*S and
Commercial 21% 20% 1%
Construction 17% 17% 0%
Restaurants 11% 6% 5%
Metal 10% 15% -5%
Gas Stations 7% 7% 0%
Shoes 6% 7% -1%
Cleaning 4% 2% 2%
Health Clinic 4% 5% -1%
Hair Cutting 3% 2% 0%
Private Security 3% 2% 1%
Transportation 3% 7% -5%
Table 3.4: Sector Distribution of Inspections and Union Requests in Tucumdn
Sector Which sectors are Which Unions Difference Between
inspected the most? req4est themist ocin and
Commercial 22% 22% 0%
Construction 16% 17% -1%
Metal 12% 9% +3%
Transport/Trucking 10% 11% -1%
Citrus/Agriculture 9% 12% -3%
Restaurants /Hotels 7% 9% -2%
Domestic Workers 4% 0% +4%
Sugar 4% 4% 0%
Bakery 3% 2% -1%
The ratio of programmed (or planned) inspections to complaint-driven inspections
provides evidence that unions also select which firms are inspected (not just which
industry). Inspections can be programmed, meaning that the inspection target was
decided upon by officials in the inspectorate, or they can be driven by complaints from
outside the bureaucracy (including complaints from individuals, unions, and other types
or social organizations). In both provinces a low percentage, under 20%, of inspections
are programmed.183 Therefore, the inspectors themselves only select a small portion of
the firms that are visited. The great majority of inspections, 80%, in both provinces are
driven by complaints. Nearly all of these complaints are from union leaders, not
82 Based on questions: 16 and 19. See Appendix for full text of the survey.
m For C6rdoba: Author's analysis of internal data from C6rdoba Labor Secretariat. For Tucumin:
Interviews: T56, Inspector, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumdn, 11/6/2008; T12, Senior Official,
Tucumdn Labor Secretariat, Tucumdn, 10/27/2008 & 11/12/2008
individual workers or non-union civil society organizations. For instance, in 2008 in
C6rdoba, only 3% of inspections were at the request of individuals. In sum, not only is
the distribution of enforcement skewed towards industries with active unions, but in both
provinces enforcement occurs largely in firms that union leaders select.
The allocation of inspection described above contrasts sharply with other
countries. For example, in the Dominican Republic the percentage of programmed
inspections is over 60% and the great majority of the complaints are by individual
workers, not unions. 184 The high ratio of programmed inspections was result of a
political decision by top officials and has enabled inspectors to take action to protect
workers, such as those in the sugar plantations, who have difficulty lodging
complaints. 185 The French labor inspectors also differ substantially from the practices in
C6rdoba and Tucumin. The French inspectors gather information from a variety of
sources, including individual complaints, consultation with unions, and journalists. Once
they have this information, regulators allocate inspections in a way that they believe
would have the strongest influence on working conditions, which often does not directly
reflect the distribution of the demands that they receive. 186 As a result, the industries that
are inspected are not necessarily those with the most active unions.
In sum, in both C6rdoba's wage and hour division and Tucumin's TST,
inspectors appear to be undertaking the key steps of enforcement in some cases, but their
actions are very uneven and distorted towards industries with unions that make many
requests. The remainder of this section examines four industries-brick-making and
metal manufacturing in C6rdoba, citrus and construction in Tucumdn-that vary
considerably in their levels of enforcement. These industry cases provide an opportunity
to identify the processes that underlie why there is enforcement in a particular industry
and to evaluate the ability of conventional explanations to account for variation in these
provinces.
Brick-Making Industry in C6rdoba
The production of bricks in C6rdoba is a highly marginalized activity. The basic
technology and method of production is rudimentary-workers form mud into bricks and
bake them in relatively small kilns. The brick kilns are concentrated in the area around
the periphery of the metropolitan area of the city of C6rdoba. In total, there are
approximately 700 worksites that employ workers from approximately 4,000 families.18 7
These worksites range from just a handful of workers to larger operations of over forty
workers. The labor is unskilled and a high proportion of workers (over 50%) are
migrants, mainly from Bolivia and Peru. The primary market for the bricks is the local
construction industry, which was booming in the period after the economic crisis, thus
creating a spike in demand for bricks. The brick-making industry does not export or
compete with imports and it is largely immobile, therefore there is little threat that
production could be moved in response to enforcement.
SSource: "Memoria 2006", Secretaria de Estado de Trabajo de la Repiblica Dominicana, Santo
Domingo. See also: Schrank 2009
15 Ibid., Amengual 2010
186 Piore and Schrank 2008
187 La Voz del Interior "Intensificarin controles en los cortaderos" 11/08/08
Labor violations in the brick-making industry are pervasive and severe by all
measures. First, estimates of labor informality in the sector are extremely high. In 2006,
a survey of workers in the sector found that 96% where informal, which means that
nearly all workers are denied their legally mandated benefits, such as social security, and
stand little chance of collecting severance pay. 18 The rate of informality in brick-making
is much higher than the provincial average of 39% in 2006.189 In addition, many of the
workers, 65% according to a survey conducted by the STC, are unregistered immigrants.
There have also been accusations that workers are tricked by traffickers and then are
forced to labor long hours to pay off debts incurred during migration.' 90 The
combination of labor informality and many unregistered migrants make these workers
especially vulnerable to abuses by employers.
Second, wages in the industry are often not paid according to the collective
bargaining agreement. In 2007, a labor inspector summed up wages in the industry,
stating: "On the brick-making worksites, they treat the horses better than the
workers... The employers get 95% of the profits, they spend 3% or 4% on the animals,
and 1% or 2% on the workers."191 These practices are violations of labor law. For
instance, on some worksites laborers are paid $3 for each thousand bricks, instead of the
$20 mandated by the collective bargaining agreement (the bricks are then sold
approximately $100 per thousand on the local market).192 There are also widespread
reports of workers being denied their wages, including one incident when a worker
demanded to be paid and was chased off a worksite by an employer with a gun.193
Third, health and safety conditions on the worksites are well below standards.
Workers are not given basic safety equipment (gloves, boots, etc.), which is required by
the collective bargaining agreement. In addition, workers live in encampments on the
worksites in substandard conditions, often lacking basic services such as potable water,
sewage, and electricity.194 Fourth, as a result of whole families living and working in the
industry, child labor is often a problem. An article in a local newspaper described a
worksite found within the city of C6rdoba in 2008:
7he labor inspector from the STC could not believe what he saw: children
who were two or three years old covered in dirt, hidden with their dogs in
holes left behind by piles of recently baked bricks. No adults were nearby.
Other children, less than three feet tall, ran after one another in a pool of
"8 The STC even conducted a study of working conditions in the brick-making and horticultural worksites
surrounding the city of C6rdoba Pizaro 2008. La Voz del Interior "Flojos de papeles" 12/24/06.
189 Author's calculations based on the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
190 La Voz del Interior "Investigaci6n por bolivianos esclavizados" 10/20/07, "Patrones o traficantes?"
09/09/07.
191 La Voz del Interior ""A los caballos los tratan major"" 9/09/07
1 La Foz del Interior "El otro lado del "boom" inmobiliario" 4/16/06 "Intensificardn controles en los
cortaderos" 11/08/08. There were further increases in the salary negotiated in 2009, but there is no
indication that those changes did translated to increase pay. Ministerio De Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad
Social Secretaria De Trabajo Resoluci6n No 894/2009 Registros No 800/2009, No 801/2009 y No
802/2009, Buenos Aires 21/7/2009.
m La Voz de/ Interior "Investigan nuevas denuncias por maltrato a bolivianos" 06/15/06
L91'la o1 z del Interior "Buscan normalizar situaci6n de inmigrantes" 04/21/06
water that is used to knead the mud in one of the first stages of the
production process. It was that same green and smelly pool where, two
weeks earlier at 5 PM, Gilda Valdivia Mendoza, who was only six years
old, was found dead floating in the water.9 5
In sum, this industry is easily one of the most precarious in C6rdoba. Rules and
regulations, both laws and the collective bargaining agreements, have failed to protect
workers or structure employment relations. These violations are no secret. If there was a
rational planning process for enforcement that prioritized industries based on need or
opportunities for improvement, there is little doubt that brick-makers would be near the
top of the list.
Notwithstanding the clear need, enforcement levels have remained relatively low
in the brick-making industry for the entire period after the economic crisis. Officials in
the STC have been aware of the problems in the brick-making sector for years.' 9 6 More
recently, there were a number of incidents that could have potentially triggered
enforcement, but there were few sustained efforts in the industry. In 2006, the Cordob6s
newspaper La Voz del Interior ran a series of investigative articles about migrant
Bolivian workers in the brick-making sector, bringing widespread awareness of the
issue.197 At the same time, the Center for Bolivian Residents of Cordoba (Centro de
Residentes Bolivianos en Cdrdoba), which organized the Bolivian community since the
1950s,198 took the plight of the brick-makers to a variety of government agencies seeking
assistance.199
As a result of a new interest in protecting migrant Bolivians, the brick-makers
became well-known to leaders of the STC. A senior official from the time recalled:
" They put the issue of 'those poor migrant Bolivian workers' in fashion, but this wasni't
even the case because the Bolivians weren't unique; the brick-makers were exploiting
children... Paraguayans, and Argentines, whoever was working."200 In response to these
problems, the provincial government created a formal structure, called the Permanent
Roundtable of Dialogue for the Rights of Immigrants, to coordinate the efforts of related
agencies and civil society organizations. The Permanent Roundtable was convened by
the Defnsor del Pueblo and included the STC, the national Ministry of Labor, the
Ministry of Security, the National Department of Immigration, the Department of Human
Rights, the Bolivian Consulate, the Center for Bolivian Residents of C6rdoba, and the
195 La Voz del Interior "Clausuran por primera vez un cortadero" 11/07/08
196 At least since 1998, when the problems were discussed in an annual report about labor regulation.
Source: Annual communication from Governor Mestre to the legislature of C6rdoba, A rchivo del Poder
Legislativo, C6rdoba 1998.
197 Ibid.. This media coverage was spurred on by the fire in a Buenos Aires garment workshop that killed a
family of workers (discussed in detail in the following chapter). The tragedy in Buenos Aires focused
national attention on the problems of migrants workers and spurred debate about similarly situated workers
in C6rdoba. As evidence that these newspaper reports generated attention, the reporter who wrote the
articles, Edgardo Litvinoff ,was a finalist in 2007 for an award from the Inter American Press Association.
19X Ortiz 2002
199 Defcnsor del Pueblo de la Provincia de Cordoba, "Informe Anual 2006"
200 Interview: C04, Former Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/1 1/2009
Pro-Bolivia Foundation.'
The first step of the Permanent Roundtable was to diagnose the problem by
gathering information through inspections and a survey of workers, which verified the
extremely high levels of violations among both migrants and Argentine nationals. In
addition, the Center for Bolivian Residents gave the STC a list of firms that were
violating labor laws. Using this information, the STC proceeded to conduct a series of
inspections to put pressure on a few employers and to try to regularize the workers.
Officials from the STC, however, never formed long lasting ties with the leaders from the
Center for Bolivian Residents and the enforcement campaign did not get further than a
few worksites. The head of the STC at the time concluded that even after these changes
more needed to be done" to have an impact in the brick-making industry. By 2007,
the ironically-named "Permanent" Roundtable was dissolved. The attempt to formally
institutionalize ties between inspectors and civil society organizations failed. There were
few additional inspections in the sector and enforcement essentially ground to a halt.
In 2008, there was another series of changes that could have, once again,
increased enforcement in the sector. The first shift was the appointment of a new
Secretary of Labor, Omar Sereno, who made child labor a priority.203 With support from
Governor Schiaretti, he created a child labor committee called COPRETI,204 which
effectively replaced the Permanent Roundtable as a forum to connect the STC to other
government agencies and civil society organizations around issues related to the brick-
making industry. In 2009, the STC formally presented a plan to combat child labor that
highlighted the need to focus on the problematic brick-making industry.
At the same time, a second change occurred in the union that represents brick-
markers, UORLA.205 Until 2008, UORLA's leadership had not pushed for enforcement.
This changed when the provincial leadership of UORLA was dismissed by the central
union office (in Buenos Aires) and a new head was appointed. The new union leadership
was more active and helped officials from the STC, but UORLA lacked resources to
provide the inspectors.20 6 For example, in 2009 UORLA could count only 200 workers
207as affiliates, giving them a relatively small network from which to gather information.
Furthermore, with less than 10% of workers registered, the dues that UORLA could
collect were very limited, thereby reducing the union's capacity. In sum, starting in 2008
there were two factors working towards enforcement in the brick-making industry
officials who exercised political control over the bureaucracy had made the brick-makers
21H Defensor del Pueblo de la Provincia de Cordoba, "Informe Anual 2006".
- - Interview: C04, Former Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/11/2009
203 Interview: C45, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/19/2008. La Voz del Interior
"Comisi6n provincial para eliminar el trabajo infantil" 04/10/08-, "Hallan a nihos que trabajan en
cortaderos" 06/12/08
204 Comisi6n Provincial de Prevenci6n y Erradicaci6n del Trabajo Infantil
2u5 Uni6n Obrera Ladrillera de la Repblica Argentina
206 Interview: C42, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/9/2009
, La V oz del Interior "Cortaderos de ladrillos, tumba para 5 nihlos" 12/09/09
a formal priority and new union leadership. 20 8
The combined top-down decisions and the more active union only resulted in a
modest increase in enforcement efforts for a short time. When in 2008 two more children
died by drowning in the worksite of brick-makers, 209 the STC began sending inspectors to
conduct operations in brick-making sites once again.2 10 For the first time, an inspection
resulted in the closing of a worksite with child laborers and atrocious conditions.m Yet,
enforcement was not sustained in the long-run and the brick-makers were quickly pushed
aside by demands on the STC to focus on other industries. The inspectors never closed
more than a handful of brick-making sites and inspection operations quickly came to an
end. In the second half of 2008, there were an average of 1.8 inspections a month in the
brick-making industry, which constituted only 0.2% of all inspections conducted by the
STC. In the survey of inspectors conducted in 2009, not one inspector listed brick-
makers as being part of the top five most inspected sectors.m According to officials at
the STC, the lack of union resources in the brick-making industry limited what the STC
could do, even after a policy decision was made to focus on child labor.2 13 Ultimately,
the appointment of an official who prioritized child labor and a change in union
leadership only resulted in a small increase in enforcement for a short time.
The failures in the brick-making industry are particularly striking because of the
extreme violations combined with the fact that the issue was so salient in the press and
among leaders of the STC. In this case, awareness and decisions by top officials to focus
on the industry did not translate into enforcement. Civil society organizations, the Center
for Bolivian Migrants and UORLA, both failed to spur on enforcement. The Center for
Bolivian Migrants was unable to maintain ties with inspectors and UORLA, which had
ties to inspectors, did not have resources. Ultimately, there was a lack of routine
information gathering about specific worksites through inspections or through civil
society organizations that regulators could use to monitor the industry, and regulators
only crafted sporadic responses to the violations that they found. In sum, enforcement
can be coded as low (see Chapter 1, Table 1.1 for definitions of the different levels of
enforcement). Without controls, working conditions have not improved in the industry.
Levels of informality remained extremely high and children kept dying on brick-making
sites throughout 2009. A leader from the union UORLA said at the end of 2009 that
"without a state policy, without an open space for discussion that brings together all of
the actors in the sector, without control and without penalties against the people who
violated the law, this [problem] is not going to be solved."2 14
108 Interviews: C42, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/9/2009: C44, Senior Official.
Cordoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 6/26/2008.
9 La Voz del Interior "Ladrilleros reclaman por muerte de dos nenas" 11/1 1/08
La V oz del Interior "Intensificardn controles en los cortaderos" 11 /08/08
La V oz del Interior "Clausuran por primera vez un cortadero" 11/7/08
See Table 3.3: Sector Distribution of Inspections and Union Requests in Cordoba's Wage and Hour
Division
Interviews: C22, Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 06/23/08 & 03/05/09 &
03/07/09; and C42, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 3/9/2009
La lVoz del Interior "Cortaderos de ladrillos, tumba para 5 nifios" 12/09/09
Metal in Cordoba
The metal industry in C6rdoba contrasts sharply with brick-makers in many ways,
most notably in its relatively lower levels of violations and higher levels of enforcement.
The metal sector is made up of 1,800 firms, small and large, that manufacture parts for
farm machinery and others industries. There are certainly violations of labor laws in
the metal industry, but they are significantly less extreme and less prevalent than in the
brick-making sector. Approximately 30% of workers are informal (unregistered) in the
metal industry, lower than the provincial average and much lower than in brick-
making. 2 16 Some of the main problems in the industry are violations of the collective
bargaining agreement and the use of subcontracting to avoid contract obligations.217
After the reactivation of the economy, with high growth in the sector, the metal union,
UOM'S,218 made large gains in collective bargaining. 2 19 Part of the challenge of
enforcement is making sure employers respect the agreements. However, compared to
the brick-making industry, a bureaucratic planning process that prioritized industries
based on violations would find the metal workers are clearly in less need of enforcement.
Even though the metal industry is not the place of the most egregious (or the
highest rates of) violations, it is one of the sectors in which the STC concentrates
enforcement. The STC gathers ample information about violations through a high rate of
inspections. For instance, in 2008, on average, there were 28 inspections per month in
the metal industry (in contrast with the 1.8 inspections per month in the brick-making
industry)."2 2 " With less than 2% of the workers in the province, the metal industry
accounts for nearly 10% of the inspections. Moreover, inspectors collect detailed
information about the firms to target inspections from UOM, which has a group of nine
leaders who regularly check compliance in the metal workshops. UOM also conducts its
own operations-for example, in 2004, the union completed a series of checks for
informality that involved over 1,400 workers. UOM leaders also identify inspection
targets using their network of approximately 200 delegates, 16,000 affiliates, anonymous
complaints to their toll-free number, and through discussions with workers when they
come to UOM's health clinic and pharmacy. In addition, inspectors can count on UOM
to provide transportation for inspections, intelligence during inspections, and follow-up
215 According to the Economic Census of 2004 there were 1,877 localities.
216 Using the household survey EPH to construct an estimate of informality rates reveals rates of around
30% in 2008-09 (N= 194 households in which people reported working in the sector). Even if this is an
underestimate by ten percentage points, the informality rate would be much lower than in brick-making.
2m Interviews: C46, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009
~ L nion Obrera Metalurgica de la Republica Argentina
219 These national level agreements (which were at the same level of other powerful unions) increased
salary in the order of 16% in 2007, 28% in 2008, and 18% in 2009 (after a tough fight with industry).
Sources: Pdgina 12 "L a UOM cerr6 por el 16,5" 05/04/07; La Naci6n "Metalnrgicos y mecinicos lograron
aumentos salariales de casi un 30%" 05/27/08; Pdgina 12 "Se firm6 el nltimo gran acuerdo salarial"
08/06/09. Interview: B4 1, L awyer, Metal Industry Association of Argentina (ADMIRA), Buenos Aires,
2/18/2009
Author's analysis of data from the STC.
Percentage of workers based on the 2001 Argentine census. "Cuadro 9.24 Total Pais. Poblaci6n
ocupada de 1 4 anlos o mas por provincia segun rama de actividad econ6mica."
after the inspection to see if the firm complies. 2  In short, inspectors have relatively
large amounts of information about violations in the metal industry in comparison with
other industries in C6rdoba.
Once they find violations, inspectors respond to firms that fail to comply using a
variety of tools. In most cases, the inspectors use a combination of "coercion" through
fines, "persuasion", and negotiation. Often they will give firms a period of time,
approximately a month, to come into compliance. This means registering workers who
are informal so that they gain full employment protections and back pay. It also means
ensuring that employers respect the collective bargaining agreement. Negotiations over
the terms in which the firm will comply almost always involve union leaders, even at
times the powerful head of UOM who is also a member of the provincial legislature.
This political support helps inspectors overcome opposition from firms. In addition, to
protect workers who give them information about violations, inspectors cast their net
widely and investigate broad problems in firms instead of singling out the worker who
alerted the inspectors to a problem. For instance, if a worker brings an inspector's
attention to a problem, the inspector will check a cluster of firms (including the
problematic one) to make it impossible for the employer to seek retribution.
In sum, enforcement is at a medium level in the metal industry in C6rdoba-
clearly much higher level than in the brick-making industry, but still a lower level than in
other cases (discussed in the next chapter). Union leaders would certainly like more state
action in their industry and they are quick to complain about the poor condition of the
STC. But in comparison with other industries in C6rdoba, metal is doing relatively well.
There is also evidence that, aided by enforcement, levels of informality dropped in the
metal industry form their peak during the crisis. For example, according to surveys
conducted by union leaders, 52% of workers were unregistered at the beginning of 2004,
but by the end of the year this number had dropped to 40%. Although there are many
factors that influence compliance, the union leadership attributed this reduction to the
joint inspections of UOM with the STC.
In some ways, greater enforcement in the metal industry than in the brick-making
industry is surprising. First, there is clearly less of a need for state intervention on behalf
of workers in the metal industry, in which infractions are relatively minor, than in the
brick-making industry. Second, firms in the metal industry compete in a market that
extends beyond C6rdoba, unlike the brick-making industry. Metal firms have been under
particular stress in the 2000s because they have been losing ground to their chief
competitors in Brazil.m As regulations increase costs, the industry can be expected to
push back on enforcement. In addition, firms have a strong organization 22 6 that has had
- Interviews: C07, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009; C46, Metal Workers' Union
(UO0M), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009. In addition, La Voz del Interior "La reactivaci6n tambien sum6 nuevas
afiliaciones a los gremios" 10/16/06
m Interviews: C38, Inspector, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 7/18/2008; C43, Inspector, C6rdoba
Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/25/2008; C07, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009
224 La 1V'oz del Interior "Acci6n de la UOM por trabajo en negro" 12/17/2004. These estimates align with
survey data from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
225 Interview: C37, C6rdoba Metal Components Industry Association, C6rdoba, 7/15/2008
226 ('Cimara de Industriales Metal rgicos y Componentes de C6rdoba.
enough political weight to gain key cabinet appointments in the provincial government.
In contrast, the brick-makers association was not influential and scored no major
appointments. All of these factors point to the likelihood that the costs of enforcement
for the STC should be much greater in the metal manufacturing industry than in the
brick-making industry. Yet, these differences clearly did not determine the enforcement
levels. Before exploring possible explanations for this variation, it is helpful to turn to
two cases from Tucumin.
, 227Citrus Industry in Tucuman
One of the most important industries in Tucumin's economy, by employment and
revenue, is the citrus industry. Tucumin is home to lemon growers, "packing" facilities
that process fresh lemons for export, and industrial plants that transform lemons into a
number of commodities (e.g. essential oils and frozen pulp) for export. The industry took
off in the 1990s, driven mainly by the growth in demand from European markets.
Between 1992 and 2007, employment in the industry quadrupled in size, reaching
approximately 30,000 workers.2 2 8 By 2007, citrus accounted for over half of the
province's exports.22 9 Workers in this industry are divided among field laborers, workers
in fresh fruit packing facilities, and industrial workers in citrus processing facilities.
Although conditions differ among these sub-sectors, towards the end of the 1990s, labor
law violations were rampant throughout the industry. There were extremely high levels
of informality-the majority of workers were denied benefits-and poor conditions,
evidenced by the fact that workers were transported to the fields in trucks "like cattle."230
The citrus workers union, UATRE, was largely subdued and did not fight strongly for
labor law enforcement or wage increases.23 1 Enforcement levels from the TST were also
extremely low. Quite simply, during the 1990s regulators did little to reduce widespread
violations.
Low levels of enforcement appear to be especially likely in this case due to two
reasons. First, the industry is labor intensive and exports cost-sensitive commodities.
These market conditions should give firms strong incentives to avoid compliance when
doing so will reduce costs. Second, the industry is well organized in the Tucumin Citrus
Association (ATC).232 The ATC, which includes all of the citrus growers, fresh fruit
packing plants and citrus processing plants, has been a strong advocate for the industry.
For example, the ATC convinced the government to lobby countries to open up their
markets to fresh lemons from Argentina. 233 With a cost-sensitive, labor intensive, and
2-7I am grateful to Sutti Ortiz for her insightful comments on labor issues in the citrus sector of Tucuman.
Between 1992 and 2007, employment in the citrus industry increased four fold. Gobierno de TucumAn,
Censo Citricola Provincial 2006.
In 2007 and 2008, citrus sectors accounted for 51% and 53% (respectively) of the value of all exports.
Source: Tucuman Ministry of Production
3 Interviews: T51, Union of Agricultural and Rural Workers (UATRE), TucumAn, 4/15/2009; T12, Senior
Official, Tucuman Labor Secretariat, TucumAn, 10/27/2008 & 11/12/2008
231 Multiple interviews. See also:Aparicio, Ortiz, and Tadeo 2008
' Asociaci6n Tucumdna del Citrus
233 Interview: T09, Tucumin Citrus Association, Tucumin, 10/28/2008. Additional evidence of their
strength comes from their independence. The ATC was part of the FET (Federacidn Economica de
Tucumdn), but separated from it after the industry became large enough to focus more on its own interests
without needing the support of the FET. Instead, the ATC is associated with the substantially weaker UIT
highly organized industry, political pressure against enforcement that could increase
labor costs should be strong.
When the economy began to reactivate, there were a number of changes in the
industry. First, the union began to fight hard for wage increases in collective bargaining
and for the inclusion of citrus workers in the "inter-harvest" program, in which the
government provides payments to workers between harvests. The inter-harvest program
gave UATRE and workers extra incentives for registration-only registered workers
could benefit from the inter-harvest payment. At first, the number of inter-harvest
beneficiaries was small, but it increased substantially over time. In 2006, the Secretary of
Labor Roberto Jimenez noted that in the citrus sector "there are not as many problems
[with enforcement] because the workers are aware of the need to be registered."2 3 4
Second, as UATRE became more active, it developed resources that labor inspectors
could use-transportation and staff with money gained through the union social fund.
UATRE also organized political action by putting forward candidates in local elections.
For further evidence of UATRE's political weight, its secretary general became the head
of the union confederation CGT-Tucumin, beating out the powerful secretary general of
the transport union UTA (who also became Secretary of Labor in 2004) who was vying
235for the position. In sum, there was greater activity and significant organizational and
political resources in UATRE.
During this time, enforcement increased dramatically in the citrus sector. First,
the TST dedicated a number of inspectors just to the citrus sector, sending them out
regularly to conduct inspections. Although exact figures are unavailable, the survey of
inspectors indicates that the citrus industry accounted for approximately one tenth of all
inspections (see Table 3.4 above). The TST also gathered information through UATRE's
network of sixty delegates in packing firms, as well as from union representatives
working in UATRE's social fund (who control compliance with union dues). Also,
UATRE has a constant stream of workers through their Tucumin headquarters seeking a
variety of services that the union offers, generating another flow of intelligence.
Combined, these sources created an influx of information about working conditions, and
the citrus sector became one of the top industries in which inspections were
concentrated.236 Second, inspectors were able to issue fines and pushed firms to
formalize their workers. To avoid problems of corruption and any pushback from
industry, the union leaders kept photocopies of all inspection records in order to ensure
that the inspections resulted in compliance (and not a bribe to the inspector).237
Enforcement in this industry has not been able to completely escape corruption, but close
observers all agree that union oversight has resulted in lower levels of corruption than in
other industries. In short, in the period after the crisis, the TST was able to gain
information about violations and respond in a way that was consistent with recognized
enforcement practices and robust to political interference.
( Union Industria de Tucumdn), the regional organization of the powerful national industry confederation
IA.
11 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "En Tucumin, 112.000 empleados estAn en negro" 04/02/2006.
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Interview: T55, Inspector, TucumAn Labor Secretariat, Tucuman, 11/1 1/2008. See also: Table 5
2 Interview: T5 l, Union of Agricultural and Rural Workers (UATRE), TucumAn, 4/15/2009
In sum, even with many factors working against enforcement in the citrus
industry, in the period after the economic crisis enforcement changed from being low to
medium levels. Compared with C6rdoba's brick-making industry, levels of enforcement
in Tucuman's citrus industry were clearly greater. There is also evidence that
enforcement has contributed to improving working conditions in this sector. From the
view of those most closely involved with inspection, enforcement efforts have
contributed to significant changes in compliance in industry. Precise data are not
collected at the industry level, but by all accounts, levels of informality have dropped
precipitously in the packing plants. Union leaders estimate that in 2001, there were very
few workers registered in the citrus sector and receiving the inter-harvest benefit, and that
they increased dramatically from 1,000 in 2002, to 3,000 by 2003, and in 2008 estimates
were 18,000. By 2009, approximately 27,000 workers were registered and receiving
benefits of the union's social fund. And in 2009, nearly all workers in the packing plants
were registered, which is a feat for any sector in Argentina, let alone an agro-industrial
sector. 2 38 Even if these estimates are inflated, and market pressures from European
buyers contributed to improving levels of compliance,239 they are congruent with the
conclusion that there has been enforcement of labor regulations in a context with an
extremely weak and politicized bureaucracy.
Construction in Tucumin
The construction industry in Tucuman offers a sharp contrast to the citrus
industry. Construction consistently has one of the highest workplace accident rates of
any sector in Argentina, making it a priority for regulators throughout the country, and
Tucuman is no different.240 The constantly shifting nature of construction sites make
them challenging for inspectors-a site that is safe one day can completely change during
the next phase of construction and pose significant hazards to workers. After the
economic crisis of 2001, the construction industry in Tucuman exploded; in May 2005,
there were 6,600 workers registered in construction in Tucumin, by May 2008 this
number reached 15,800. Tucuman is no exception to the high levels of violations of
labor laws in this industry. As the industry grew, accidents increased-two reported
242deaths in 2004, and five in 2005, and six in 2007. These numbers, which only include
registered workers, likely understate the magnitude of the problem. In short, the
construction sector is widely understood to be one of the most problematic health and
safety industries in the province.
38 Interview: T5 1, Union of Agricultural and Rural Workers (UATRE), TucumAn, 4/15/2009
239 In order to export fresh lemons, the most lucrative segment of the citrus sector, Tucuman's firms have to
meet European phvtosanitary standards. They also had some incentives from European buyers to comply
with local legislation. Ultimately, in order to compete in the fresh fruit market, firms had to undertake a
number of work organization changes and upgrade production methods to increase quality. These changes
had positive effects on labor compliance, which complemented the increasingly stringent state
enforcement. Ortiz and Aparicio 2006b; Ortiz and Aparicio 2006a; Ortiz and Aparicio 2007; Ibid..
h only higher sector is mining. Source. Superintendencia de Riesgos del Trabajo 2004
These numbers greatly underestimate the total employment in the sector because the majority of workers
were unregistered. Data Source: IERIC "Cantidad de Trabajadores Registrados en la Construccion por
Provincia. Argentina. Serie Mensual. Julio 2002/2003/2004 - Enero 2005 - Mayo 2008"
2 Data Source: Superintendencia de Reisgos de Trabajo
Notwithstanding the concentration of man violations in the construction
industry, enforcement levels remained very low.2 With only three health and safety
inspectors, there is no way for the TST on its own to keep up with the rapid turnover in
hundreds of construction projects. As a result, the great majority of worksites go
uninspected. In addition, the construction union, UOCRA, in Tucumin does not have its
own health and safety specialists to provide regulators with information (as in the case in
other provinces, such as the Federal Capital and C6rdoba). Unlike UATRE in the citrus
industry, UOCRA does not have its own union-"inspectors" who actively control sites to
supplement the TST. UOCRA's network of delegates is also relatively small, with sixty
delegates the union does not even have one delegate per large worksite and the union has
244no delegates in many smaller construction sites. Even though UOCRA has the
political strength necessary to access inspectors-it is one of the main leaders of the
provincial CGT-the union is unable to generate high quality information. UOCRA
gives inspectors long lists of worksites that might have issues from UOCRA, but there are
inadequacies, as a health and safety inspector explains:
UOCRA, to date, is asking me on average 500 inspections a month. I have
three inspectors who aren't completely dedicated to UOCRA ... For the
operational capacity that I have, it is impossible to comply with this
demand... Therejbre, if you want to evaluate impact in the construction
sector... it is very limited. Yes, it is certain that each time an inspector
goes to a worksite they gain some benefits for the worker, a pair qf boots,
gloves, a helmet... and we can get the firm to incorporate a system [of
health and safety]. But I have 500 requests a month from UOCRA and the
result is that I only have the operating capacity to do... 16 inspections a
month.24
The only reason that inspectors are able to get out at all is because "UOCRA gives us the
carsfr the work of the inspector"246 and if the inspectors need to work late UOCRA
"pays them, gives them a car, gives them lunch, and dinner."24 7 There are, however, still
serious barriers to information gathering because UOCRA simply does not have enough
resources to make up for the TST's deficits. In sum, inability of the TST to collect
intelligence about violations in the construction industry is evidence of relatively low
levels of enforcement.
Second, the TST struggles to react to the violations that they do find in ways that
can improve compliance. Unlike other provinces that have tripartite commissions
through which inspectors work with the industry association and UOCRA to find
solutions to recurring problems in the industry, in Tucuman there is no such coordination.
Even on a case-by-case basis, regulators often lack the ability to conduct follow-up
2m3 Data on Table 3.4 above indicate that the construction industry is inspected at a relatively high rate
compared with other industries, but these inspections are mainly around wage and hour violations, not
health and safety.
244 Interview: T06, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), TucumAn, 4/14/2009
215 Interview: T39, Senior Official, Tucumdn Labor Secretariat, Tucumdn, 4/17/2009
246 Interview: T39, Senior Official, TucumAn Labor Secretariat, Tucumdn, 4/17/2009
2Y Interview: T06, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Tucumin, 4/14/2009
inspections when they find violations. For instance, one inspector explains that "after
having done an inspection and suspending a part of a worksite, I am unable to go back
and check [on their progress] because I am too busy [with new inspections]." 248
addition, corruption is a constant problem in the industry. Inspectors on their own often
do not resist employers who offer bribes instead of actions that will lead to compliance.
For example, in one incident an inspector went to a worksite and asked for a bribe in
order to avoid an inspection that was planned for the following day.24 9 One of the main
strategies of senior officials in the TST to avoid corruption is to use union leaders who
accompany inspections for oversight. 5  In the construction industry, however, UOCRA
lacks the staff to always follow inspectors (in contrast with the citrus workers' union that
has ample staff to follow inspections).2 There are reports of widespread bribe taking by
inspectors, further reducing enforcement levels.
The problems of enforcement in the construction industry were brought into sharp
focus when a serious accident killed three workers on a construction site in March 2007.
The accident stirred up social unrest as relatives of the victims threw stones at police,
bringing the issue of construction safety immediately to the attention of the media.2 12
UOCRA had requested an inspection of the site a week before, but the TST still had not
visited it.25 3 The Secretary of Labor explained to the local newspaper that "there are
many construction sites and there aren't enough personnel to conduct the inspections."25
The issue was soon picked up by the feeble opposition party, spurred on by the fact that
the owner of the construction company was a cousin of the governor, Jose Alperovich 2 5 5
Notwithstanding this public accident and scandal, which was of a magnitude that
triggered serious regulatory responses in other cases, there were few changes to
enforcement in Tucumin's construction industry.256
In sum, based on the available data and the assessment of those involved most
directly with the construction industry-UOCRA, the industry associations, and the
TST-enforcement is at a low level.m There is also no evidence that violations were
reduced in the period after the economic crisis. For these reasons, enforcement in
construction contrasts sharply with the citrus industry in Tucumin and the metal industry
in C6rdoba. This outcome is somewhat surprising considering the fact that the
construction industry is not very mobile (firms cannot shift production just because of
enforcement) and the industry is not very well organized. There are two industry
-1 Interview: T45, Inspector, Tucuman Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 10/31/2008
249 Interview: T06, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Tucumhn, 4/14/2009
2 Interview: T12, Senior Official, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, TucumAn, 10/27/2008 & 11/12/2008
251 Interview: T06, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Tucumdn, 4/14/20092 5 2 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Un muro se derrumb6 y caus6 una tragedia" 03/22/07
25 3La Gaceta de Tucumin "Dos de las tres victimas trabajaban en negro" 03/24/07
254 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Ediles le quitan responsabilidad al municiplo" 03/23/07.
2 5 5La Gaceta de Tucumin "Aseguran que el Estado debe controlar las obras" 03/24/07.
256 in 2009, TST attempted to hire more health and safety inspectors, but the process was continually
delayed.
Interviews: T48, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), Tucumin, 10/29/2008; T53, Tucumdn
Construction Association, Tucumsn, 11/4/2008; T06, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina
(JOCRA), Tucuman, 4/14/2009; T39, Senior Official, TucumAn Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 4/17/2009.
associations that divide employers' voice and actively compete against one another.25 s
One industry association, the Tucumin Construction Associations (CCT),2 59 is tied to the
local Economic Federation of Tucuman (FET), 260 while the other is a local branch of the
261national Argentine Construction Association (CAC). Still, even with a comparably
less organized industry that cannot easily relocate, enforcement levels remained low.
Explaining Enforcement
The industry cases and the overall data on inspection in C6rdoba and Tucumin
reveal that in these two provinces with highly different levels of socioeconomic
development there is a similar pattern of enforcement. Variation in enforcement across
these cases is difficult to explain with most conventional approaches. One possible
explanation for enforcement focuses on technocratic decision-making processes. Quite
simply, regulators allocate enforcement to industries with serious problems. If this was
the case, enforcement levels should have been relatively high in the violation-prevalent
Cordoba brick-making and Tucumin construction industries. Yet, these industries had
low levels of enforcement compared with industries that had many fewer violations.
Another possibility is that levels of enforcement are mainly in response to market
conditions and anxieties about maintaining industry competitiveness. Concern for
footloose firms could make regulators focus not on the need for enforcement, but on the
desire to avoid the so-called "race to the bottom." If this were the case, levels of
enforcement should have been relatively low in the C6rdoba metal and Tucumin citrus
industries, which compete in regional and global markets. Instead, enforcement was
relatively high in these industries and low in the brick-making and construction industries
that could not easily relocate.
The remainder of this chapter develops an alternative explanation that can account
for variation in enforcement in these cases. The first section focuses on the levels of
administrative capacity in the two agencies, which constrain regulators. The second
section focuses on the linkages between the state and civil society organizations, which
structure both the ways in which regulators gain resources for enforcement and the way
enforcement is allocated. The combination of two factors-low levels of administrative
capacity and strong linkages only with unions-explain why, in these otherwise different
provinces, there is the same pattern of enforcement.
Administrative Capacity
To explain why enforcement is so uneven and apparently unrelated to socio-
economic development, need, or market conditions, it is first necessary to examine
administrative capacity of the regulatory bureaucracies. Administrative capacity, as
described in Chapter 1, is a function of the human resources, material resources (cars,
computers, etc.), and planning capabilities of the bureaucracy. The scarcity of these
resources in C6rdoba's wage and hour division and in Tucumin's inspectorate helps
Interview: T48, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), TucumAn, 10/29/2008
9 C'imara de Construcci6n de Tucumon
SFederaci6n Economica de Tucumdn
C61 inara Argentina de la Construcci6n
account for why regulators are unable to enforce when there are no viable partners
outside of the state from which to draw resources.
C(rdoba 's Wage and Hour Division
The STC's wage and hour division has relatively low levels of administrative
capacity, which limited the ability of officials to deploy enforcement resources without
the aid of organizations outside of the state. The wage and hour division had
approximately 50 inspectors, which puts it in range of the ILO recommendations for
inspectors per worker and at a medium level compared with other Argentine provinces,
but the number of inspectors is only one component of administrative capacity.262 A
major limitation of the STC has been inspector salaries, which are so low that most
inspectors have second jobs. In 2008, for example, inspectors were paid between $477
and $636 per month.263 Some inspector pay has even been off the books, prompting
inspectors to complain: "How are we supposed to give afine to afirm that pays workers
off the books when we also are paid off the books?"264 In a sympathetic comment, a
union leader noted that "it is very difficult for the inspectors... what they are paid is not
sufficieni ... it is somewhat ironic. "265 The low pay creates a need for inspectors to work
secondary jobs in the afternoons, which is tolerated by senior officials as long as it is not
266in direct conflict with their official duties. As a result, while there are a medium
number of inspectors on staff, the amount of actual hours that they are paid by the
province to work is limited, reducing their capacity for enforcement.
In addition, the quality of inspector training is relatively low. The inspectors, who
are almost universally patronage hires, have relatively low levels of education. 267 There
is no minimum educational requirement to be an inspector; only 10% of wage and hour
inspectors have completed university and 4% of inspectors only went to elementary
school. 2 68 These levels of educational attainment fail to meet the MERCOSUR standards
that all inspectors should have university degrees by 2010 and are extremely low in
international comparative context. 269 For example, in the Dominican Republic all wage
and hour inspectors are lawyers and in Brazil all inspectors have college degrees and 34%
have graduate degrees.27 0 The uneven quality of inspectors' training further reduces the
capabilities of the STC to enforce labor regulations.
Limited material resources and the organizational capacity to plan inspections
also prevent the STC from taking up enforcement campaigns on its own. There are
extremely short supplies for transportation to inspect sites-in 2008 there were only two
262 There are approximately 35,000 economically active workers per inspector in the province (including
health and safety).
'63 Interview: C3 1, Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 7/17/2008
264 La Voz del Interior "Sueldos en negro, en la cartera que debe evitarlos" 06/18/05
26z Interview: C07, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009
'66 Interview: C3 1, Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 7/17/200816 Interview: C38, Inspector, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 7/18/2008
26" To put the education levels into context, MERCOSUR countries agreed that all labor inspectors should
have completed university MERCOSUR 2006.
269 Ibid.
1 Pires 2009; Schrank 2009
cars for all of the inspectors-which limits the ability of the inspectorate to take action
without borrowing the transportation of unions (or other government agencies). 2 71 The
wage and hour division was "technologically very bad" with no information management
system that would allow it to assess which firms have been inspected, and what was the
result.2 7 2 The combination of limited transportation resources and no information
management system has prevented active enforcement campaigns. For instance, a senior
official explains that "we haven't done many inspections in agriculture because we didn't
have cars, and the union did not come. ,2m3 Despite some efforts, the STC's wage and
hour division has been unable to institute long- or medium-term planning processes to
prioritize enforcement and has undertaken few programmatic inspection campaigns.2 74 A
senior official described the resources he is missing, stating: "To design and undertake a
concentrated inspection operation, we need three very basic tools: people, cars, and a
computer. Nothing more than that."275
The low level of administrative capacity in the wage and hour division helps
explain why the STC failed to enforce regulation in industries in which there was clearly
a need for enforcement, such as in the brick-making industry. Quite simply, on its own,
the wage and hour division does not have the ability to gather information about
violations and organize a response that could bring firms into compliance. Given these
substantial limitations, it is not surprising that even when appointed officials made child
labor a priority, the inspectorate could not effectively react and increase enforcement
levels in the brick-making industry. The highly constrained inspectors cannot directly
reproduce political demands or social need for enforcement. Rather, they need to gain
resources from outside the state to react to any demands. Before turning to linkages,
however, it is helpful to examine Tucumin's administrative capacity.
Tucumcdn's Labor Inspectorate
Tucumin's labor inspectorate has even lower levels of administrative capacity
than the STC's wage and hour division, highly constraining its ability to act without
support from organizations outside of the state. The bureaucracy operates without basic
technology-there are no computers and inspectors compete for access to manual
typewriters to write reports.276 For a period of time, the TST regional division in the city
of Concepci6n even lost its office space and had to operate out of borrowed space in the
21 interview: C22, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 06/23/08 & 03/05/09 & 03/07/09
2 information management, until very recently, entailed inspectors writing the number of inspections they
conducted in the month on the wall, and marking whether or not they resulted in a violation. In the middle
of 2009, steps were taken to modernize the system, but there was still no concrete changes.
273 Interview: C22, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 06/23/08 & 03/05/09 & 03/07/09
24 Interviews: C22 & C45, Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/19/2008. The inspection
campaigns that do exist are generally short bursts that occur in reaction to a crisis or a lull in union
demands. For example, during January vacations, union demand for inspections decreases and there is a
spike of short-term employment in the tourism sector of the province. Taking advantage of the opportunity
created by fewer union requests, the wage and hour division conducted a campaign in the tourism industry
in 2009 for one month. They found high levels of violations of worker registration laws-as expected-but
they were unable to follow-up systematically with inspections after the campaign to bring firms into
compliance.
2 Interview: C22, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 06/23/08 & 03/05/09 & 03/07/09
26 Multiple interviews with inspectors in 2008 and 2009.
sugar workers' union regional headquarters.277 The TST has no system for monitoring
which firms have been inspected in the past or planning enforcement campaigns in the
medium-term. Even short-term planning is hampered by organizational failures. For
example, the head of inspection attempted to give the inspectors a list of firms to check in
a given week, but they were unable to execute and the practice of weekly planning
quickly stopped.278 Inspectors also lack access to transportation (there is only one car,
and it is often not available to inspectors) and basic supplies, such as paper and pens, are
in short supply.
In terms of human resources, the TST has deficiencies in the quantity and quality
of inspectors. As of 2009, the TST had only 18 inspectors, considerably lower in per
capita terms than in other provinces, and below internationally recognized standards. 27 9
More important than their number, the quality of the inspectors is extremely low.
Inspectors were mainly selected by virtue of their political connections to Peronist
280
activists or their connections to unions, not because of their education or merit. Only
one inspector completed university studies, and nearly a third of the inspectors only
completed primary education. Finally, like in C6rdoba, inspectors have low salaries of
$528 dollars per month, and most have additional jobs outside of the state to supplement
their income. 28 Consequently, the TST is limited in deploying inspectors beyond the
morning hours.
The capacity of the TST is further eroded by pervasive corruption problems,
which have reached such high levels that corruption has reduced the ability of senior
282
officials at the TST to use inspectors without support from others. Inspectors are
widely held to be corrupt by those who interact most closely with them (unions, firms,
and government officials) and multiple times between 2002 and 2009 inspectors were
publically exposed for graft.283 Among various schemes, inspectors are accused of taking
bribes from businesses to tip them off about inspections before they occur, charging
workers for free paperwork, and conducting inspections after hours in which they collect
the fine for themselves on the spot and do not report it to the central office. One
inspector, just months after commenting during an interview that there are "many
temptatioPs, the businesses will ojer bribes equal to my monthly salaty," was arrested
for soliciting a bribe from a farmer.284 A senior official at the TST describes the
inspectors plainly as "criminals,"285 And after one inspector was arrested for soliciting a
2 La Gaceta de Tucumdin "Se inicia la mudanza de Trabajo" 08/02/02
2I Interview: T56, Inspector, Tucuman Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/6/2008
29 There are approximately 80,000 people in the province for each inspector, which translates to about one
inspector per 40,000 economically active workers. The ILO's recommendation is that there should be
1/20,000 workers in "transition economies" but under the 1/40,000 workers in "developing countries": ILO
2006b.
28u Multiple interviews with inspectors and officials in 2008 and 2009
281 One even runs a business of training and certifying soccer referees from his desk in the TST.
282 Interview: T12, Senior Official, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumdn, 10/27/2008 & 11/12/2008
283 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Funcionario detenido por presunto soborno" 05/22/02; "Filmaron y grabaron el
presunto soborno" 05/23/02; "El ex funcionario Ibarra fue condenado por pedir coimas" 05/03/03; "Neme y
Cabral asumen" 09/20/02; Pocas Palabras 10/26/02
281 Interview: T55, Inspector, Tucuman Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, I 1/11/2008; La Gaceta de Tucunith
"Los empleados sospechados de pedir coimas no declararon aon" 03/02/09
281 Interview. T 12, Senior Official, Tucumen Labor Secretariat, Tucuman, 10/27/2008 & 11/12/2008
bribe, the Secretary of Labor acknowledged widespread corruption in the local
286
newspaper.
The inspectors claim that the corruption accusations are unjustified and meant to
disarm them by "making the inspectors look corrupt so that workers will not come to us
to askfor help."287 Whether justified or not, the corruption accusations clearly have this
effect within the organization of the TST, and senior officials are reluctant to send
inspectors out without supervision by union leaders. Even though there is occasional
collusion between corrupt inspectors and union leaders, senior officials in the TST (as
well as union leaders), find that the presence of a union leader during inspections is a way
to reduce the opportunities for inspectors to solicit bribes from employers. For example,
one union leader noted that: "ihe quality ofthe inspection depends on the union leader.
1 you leave the inspector alone, he will do all kinds of things."288
In addition to corruption, conflict between inspectors (who enjoy considerable
civil service protection) and senior officials has further eroded administrative capacity.
The conflict stemmed from a series of corruption crackdowns and failed reforms, in
which senior officials attempted to replace all of the existing inspectors. The inspectors,
defended by their public sector union, resisted these efforts by effectively refusing to
cooperate with the Secretary of Labor.289 In 2008, tensions in the bureaucracy came to a
head when an inspector was accused of soliciting a bribe from a businessman and
arrested in a sting operation. 290 The governor signed a decree transferring all inspectors
out of their positions to other parts of the provincial bureaucracy, but the decree was
fought by the public sector union, which won an injunction from a judge. 29 1 To protest,
the inspectors occupied the TST, blocked roads, and went on strike-actions that resulted
in violent confrontations with the police.29 2 Also, to directly attack the governor,
inspectors leaked an embarrassing report to the political opposition that showed that a
worker in the governor's home was unregistered (informal)-undermining the governor's
credibility on labor compliance issues.293
Combined, deficiencies in material resources, human capital, planning capability,
as well as pervasive organizational conflict and corruption, result in extremely limited
administrative capacity. Consequently, the TST is so constrained that it is almost
impossible for officials to undertake many of the basic tasks of enforcement on their own.
The TST cannot generate its own information about violations, craft its own responses, or
withstand the actions of interest groups that might want to block enforcement by bribing
2 86 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "En Trabajo hay inspectores que son "ciegos y sordos" 07/27/09
287 Interview: T58, Inspector, Tucumidn Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/11/2008
288 Interview: T51, Union of Agricultural and Rural Workers (UATRE), Tucuma4n, 4/15/2009
289 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Beneficia a las patronales inescrupulosas" 05/03/08
2 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Acusado de cobrar una coima" 07/24/08; "Detienen a un inspector acusado de
cobrar coima" 07/24/08; "Un arresto reaviva el conflicto laboral en Trabajo" 07/25/08; Encontraron en su
carpeta billetes marcados 07/27/08
291 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Un arresto reaviva el conflicto laboral en Trabajo" 07/25/08
292 Interview. T 12, Senior Official, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucum n, 10/27/2008 & 11/1 2/2008
293 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "El gobernador habria tenido una empleada en negro" 08/01/08; "Cano
cuestion6 el doble discurso del mandatario" 08/01/08; "Trabaja en casa hace 29 anos v ests en blanco"
08/02/08. Interview: T58, Inspector, TucumAn Labor Secretariat, Tucuman, 11 / 11/2008
inspectors. These failings help explain why, just like in C6rdoba, enforcement simply
does not occur in industries where unions lack resources to supplement state capacity,
like the construction industry.
Inspector-Union Linkages
Given their constraints, it is surprising that regulators in C6rdoba's wage and hour
division and Tucumin's inspectorate are able to enforce labor laws at all. To explain
enforcement, it is necessary to examine the relationship between state regulators and civil
society organizations. Inspectors can draw on resources from civil society organizations
only when they have linkages, which consist of routinized processes of consultation,
formal and informal agreements, and interpersonal networks that put bureaucrats into
direct contact with actors in society. The structure of linkages helps explain why
enforcement is at a much higher level in some industries than others under conditions of
low levels of administrative capacity.
In both C6rdoba and Tucumin, labor inspectors have formed strong linkages with
labor unions, and only with labor unions. In both inspectorates, information sharing
among inspectors and union leaders is built into the very way work is organized in the
bureaucracy. Each day inspectors wait for leaders of labor unions before making
decisions about where to conduct inspections.294 The labor inspectors are open to
working with nearly all unions that are able to generate lists of violators. In a typical
month in C6rdoba, over thirty different unions request inspections in the wage and hour
division.2 During the act of inspection, inspectors rely heavily on union leaders, who
act as "auxiliaries"296 by gathering information from workers, directing inspectors
towards violations, and providing information about the collective bargaining
agreements.297 For example, employers sometimes hide unregistered (informal) workers
when inspectors come, often in precarious places like water tanks, but the union leaders
usually know the number of workers (and possible hiding places) in advance and help the
inspectors discover the workers.
In other provinces, these practices of information sharing are largely forbidden by
informal rules in the inspectorate. For example, in the Federal Capital under the Macri
administration, unions could not communicate with street-level inspectors to ask for
investigations of specific firms, but instead union leaders had to go through a filter in the
central dispatch and some unions signed written agreements with the regulators about the
number of inspections for which they can ask.298 In addition, during inspections in the
Federal Capital, union leaders are not allowed to gather information from workers and
299
sometimes are encouraged to wait outside while the inspection takes place. In sum, in
2 Multiple interviewNs, including: C38, Inspector, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 7/18/2008; C43,
Inspector, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/25/2008; T56, Inspector, Tucumin Labor Secretariat.
Tucumnn, 11 /6/2008: 1'58, Inspector, Tucuman Labor Secretariat, Tucuman, 11/11/2008
2* Source: Internal data provided by the STC.
296 InterView: C43, Inspector, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/25/2008
2 Interview: C33, Garment Workers' Union (SOIVA), C6rdoba, 6/25/2008
298 InterView: B22, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 9/15/2008
299 Interviews: B16, Inspector, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/14/2008; B23,
Inspector, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/14/2008
C6rdoba and Tucumin, there are comparatively widespread practices of communication
between inspectors and unions, which help account for how regulators gather information
about violation in some industries even though they lack capacity to do so on their own.
In addition to sharing information, the sharing of material resources is a crucial
attribute of inspector-union linkages. In both C6rdoba and Tucumin, all major unions
provide transportation for labor inspectors, making up for a key scarce resource in the
state. Inspectors also regularly draw on unions for travel costs, and, at times, even paper
to write up the inspection report.300 For example, a union leader from the food sector in
C6rdoba recounts the resources he needs in order to collaborate with the inspectors on an
enforcement campaign in his sector: "we need money... to pay for their food, for
breakfast, and for the cars to bring the inspectors to the sites."30' These practices contrast
strongly with other provinces that lack such linkages. For example, in the province of
Corrientes, inspectors could not access union resources, including transportation.30 2 In
this case, when inspectors lacked transport, enforcement simply did not occur.
In C6rdoba and Tucumin, the inspectors' dependence on material resources from
unions can, at times, lead unions to effectively capture the inspectors. In both provinces,
inspectors are compensated directly by the unions for their work in a number of informal
ways. A UATRE-Tucumin leader describes how they subsidize the inspectors: "When
the inspector comes with us, they do not have any type of cost. We give them breakfast,
lunch, and a soda in the afternoon" 303 In some cases, these subsidies include under the
table payments by unions to inspectors (and the heads of inspection) to supplement their
salaries and perks (e.g. free vacations for inspectors in the union campground). 30 4
Powerful unions, such as the restaurant and hotel workers' union in C6rdoba ,305 have
been able to "adopt the inspectors, and they have them, and they use them fom Monday
,306 
f /
to Friday." In some cases, these ties are so strong that it becomes unclear whether the
inspector works primarily for the union, or primarily for the state.307 While this practice
undermines the ability of senior officials in the inspectorates to control their staff, it
provides a key subsidy that enables enforcement in cases where the regulatory agency
lacks the capacity to pay inspectors for the time they need to do their jobs. When union
interests align with the regulator's responsibility to implement labor laws, capture leads
to enforcement.
Inspector-union linkages in both provinces also provide a way for inspectors to
draw on the political support of unions during enforcement. As described above, union
leaders directly observe the inspection process and oversee how the inspector exercises
his discretion. In Tucumin, for example, where there are problems of firms bribing
Interview: T56, Inspector, Tucuman Labor Secretariat, TucumAn, 11/6/2008
3(0 Interview: C03, Union of Pastry, Pizza, and Alfajor Workers, C6rdoba, 7/16/2008.
3 This was during the administration of Governor Arturo Colombi (2005-2009) of the UCR. IntervieXw:
CR02. Senior Official, Corrientes labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/11/2008
3 Interview: T51, Union of Agricultural and Rural Workers (UATRE), Tucumiin. 4/15/2009
3 This is based on multiple interviews with the unions, inspectors, and other observers.
3 Interview: C05, Uni6n de Trabajadores del Turismo, Hoteleros y Gastron6micos de la Repoblica
Argentina, Cordoba (UTHGRA), C6rdoba 7/15/2008
306 Interview: C3 1, Senior official, Secretaria de Trabajo de C6rdoba, C6rdoba 7/17/2008
307 Ibid.
inspectors, many unions follow through after inspections to ensure that reports are not
"lost" along the way. 308 And after violations are found, inspectors coordinate with unions
when setting times for the hearings in which the firm and the inspector negotiate how to
resolve violations. Consequently, the union can put its weight behind the inspector and
push for strong enforcement even if a powerful firm resists. These practices are an
additional way in which inspector-union linkages create the opportunity for greater
enforcement in particular industries.
Although inspectors in C6rdoba and Tucumin have strong linkages with unions,
they do not have linkages with other organizations in society. In Tucumin, for example,
there are well over 2,000 civil society organizations, over two-thirds of which either work
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on social assistance, issues related to workers, or vulnerable groups. Yet, labor
inspectors do not interact with these organizations in any routine fashion. In addition,
industry associations, which in some cases have an interest in working with regulators in
enforcement, do not work closely with the TST. While the TST is highly permeable to
unions, non-union groups do not have the linkages that they would need to offer their
resources to inspectors.
In C6rdoba, the failure of enforcement in the brick-making industry is a striking
consequence of the lack of linkages between inspectors and civil society organizations
that are not unions. As described above, the union in this industry did not have sufficient
resources to offer the STC to make enforcement possible, but there were other
organizations in society that did have such resources, notably the Center for Bolivian
Residents. Yet, collaboration between the Center for Bolivian Residents and inspectors
was short lived and strong linkages never formed. There was an open conflict between
the Center for Bolivian Residents and the union. Leaders of the Center for Bolivian
Residents said that the Center was doing the work that the union should be doing because
the union was "absent", and the union leaders accused the head of the Center of being
complicit with the bosses on the brick-making sites (who were often Bolivian
themselves).' Within the hallways of the STC, the union clearly won this conflict and
maintained linkages with inspectors, while the Center did not. As a result, the resources
of the Center were not fully used by inspectors and the union lacked resources, which
explains why enforcement stayed at a low level.
In sum, inspectors in both C6rdoba and Tucumin have strong linkages with
unions, but not with other types of organizations. These linkages have been built into the
fabric of the organization of the inspectorate. Many of the practices that underlie them
are, as the head of labor inspection in C6rdoba described, "not written down rules" but
"uses and customs."m,, Still, they are not only condoned in both provinces, but they are
3 lInterview: T06, Secretario General de Seccional TucumAn, UOCRA, TucumAn 4/14/2009
3 Luna and Cecconi 2004
3 Interviewxs: T 12, Secretaria de Trabajo de Tucaman, Director Provincial, Tucumin 10/27/2008 &
I 1/1 2/2008; T48, C imara Argentina de la Construcci6n, TucumAn 10/29/2008
311 La 1 Oz del Interior "Cruce entre un abogado y el gremio" 11/08/08
31I2 nterview: C42, Director de la Direccion de Jurisdicci6n de Fiscalizaci6n y Politicas, Secretaria de
Trabajo de C6rdoba, Cordoba 3/9/2009. There are a number of formal regulations that support inspector-
union linkages, such as a legal provision that unions can observe inspections. However, drawing on
encouraged by the leadership of the bureaucracy, even when they appear to be on the
edge of legality (in terms of under the table payments to inspectors by unions). By virtue
of strong linkages with unions, inspectors have access to more information, material
resources, and political backing than they would have otherwise. The ability of
inspectors to mobilize these resources explains why, under conditions of low
administrative capacity, enforcement still occurs. And the structure of the linkages that
limit inspectors to drawing on unions, explains why there is such a robust relationship
between union resources and enforcement. This particular pathway to enforcement
comes at a cost. Depending on unions makes enforcement highly unlikely in industries
and firms with weak unions-leaving out some of the very workers who would benefit
most from state intervention.
Conclusion: Society-Dependent Enforcement
The cases of C6rdoba's wage and hour division and the Tucumin inspectorate
demonstrate how enforcement, although limited, is possible even where regulatory
bureaucracies are far from the ideal. Even though both the STC and TST lacked many of
the bureaucratic features that are often described as prerequisites for effective states, they
still managed to enforce labor regulations. This chapter began with an analysis of
aggregate data on inspection on both provinces. These data-such as the low percentage
of programmed inspections and the tight correlation between inspected industries and
union demands-suggested that union resources appear necessary for enforcement.
The chapter then explored a series of industry cases, summarized in Table 3.6
below, that identified union strength as the principal factor that differentiates low and
medium levels of enforcement. In C6rdoba's metal industry and Tucumin's citrus
industry enforcement is made possible largely by strong unions. In both of these cases,
unions had dedicated staff who channeled complaints through the inspectorate and could
supplement the inspectors' material resources. However, notwithstanding the strength of
the unions, enforcement remained at only a medium level-quite simply the lack of
administrative capacity and in the state prevented enforcement becoming systematic
enough to reach high levels.
In C6rdoba's brick-making industry, modest increases in enforcement occurred
after the local branch of the union was "intervened" by the national union and became
more active, but these were not sufficient to push enforcement above low levels. In
Tucumin's construction industry, even though the labor union was strong politically, it
never was able to provide enough resources to make up for the TST's deficits. Two
additional cases included in the appendix, shoe-making in C6rdoba and metal
manufacturing in Tucumin, also conform with the pattern of union action being tied
directly to enforcement levels. In these two cases, union strength was insufficient to
make up for more of the state's deficits, and enforcement never surpassed a medium
level.
comparative evidence from other provinces, it is clear that the way this formal rule is interpreted and put
into practice varies tremendously across provinces.
Table 3.6: Summary of Cases
Province Sector Union Strength Enforcement Level
C6rdoba Brick-Making Low Low
Tucuman Construction Medium Low
C6rdoba Show Manufacturing Medium Medium
TucumAn Metal Medium Medium
C6rdoba Metal High Medium
Tucuman Citrus High Medium
To explain the overall pattern of enforcement, the analysis focused on the
interaction between levels of administrative capacity and the structure of inspector-
society linkages. Low levels of administrative capacity account for why regulators are
largely unable to enforce on their own, and strong inspector-union linkages account for
how regulators are able to overcome their limitations when they can draw on unions. The
combination of these two factors results in a pattern of enforcement in which the
resources that unions provide to inspectors has a direct impact on levels of
enforcement.3 1 3 The theory does not, however, precisely predict every outcome; it
cannot, for example, explain the difference between enforcement levels in the
construction and metal industries of Tucumin. There are also, of course, other factors
that influence enforcement levels-for these two industries, the sheer number of
construction sites compared with metal shops combined with the differences within the
TST (health and safety inspection that was even weaker than wage and hour inspection)
can account for these differences. In spite of this limitation, the argument advanced in
this dissertation can help explain much of the systematic variation in the cases of
C6rdoba and Tucumdn, which would be missed by most conventional approaches. In
addition, the analysis points to the key mechanisms of weak bureaucracies leveraging
resources from society.
Furthermore, this framework helps identify a portion of the trade-offs of society-
dependent enforcement (consequences for the long-term development of the state will be
analyzed in Chapter 5). On the one hand, unions provide the basic inputs that make
enforcement possible; with the help of unions, inspectors are able to reach workers who
would otherwise be left unprotected given the limited levels of administrative capacity.
On the other hand, the trade-off is that inspectors are dependent on unions and unable to
get to workers without strong union advocates; industries with weak unions, and firms
that are not the target of particular unions, are largely left out. This is a substantial
limitation, which is recognized by those most involved in labor inspection. A senior
official at the STC described this trade-off, stating:
m In these cases, understanding the structure of state-society linkages, which limits civil society
participation in enforcement only to unions, also helps account for why resources from other civil society
organizations, such at the Center for Bolivian Residents, remained largely out of reach of inspectors.
The unions are natural collaborators in what we do. We cannot leave
them on the outside. The union is the one that knows the place that we go,
what problems there are, how the sector works, and all the rest. But, we
have to control the relationship so the inspectors don't believe that they
are employees of the unions. There exists a certain difficulty with the
unions....A deformation... because wage and hour inspection is very
delegated to the initiative of the unions. When the inspector is a
permanent agent of the unions, it prevents inspections at the initiative of
the state ...I don't worry how much the unions use the inspection, it seems
good to me that they use them, and that they use them well. What I worry
about is that the excessive relation of inspection depending on the unions
impedes the STC from creating a plan that is based on a map of non-
registered work, offraudulent firms, and of child labor. That is to say, the
workers that the unions aren't going to see. 4
This quote implies a counterfactual: if regulators only had greater administrative capacity
enforcement could be broader and go beyond the immediate demands of linked civil
society organizations. Is this possible without a bureaucracy that has high levels of
autonomy? To explore this question, the following chapter examines two additional
cases, one in C6rdoba's health and safety division and one in the Federal Capital, in
which administrative capacity is greater.
3 Interview: C45, Secretario de Trabajo, Secretaria de Trabajo de C6rdoba, C6rdoba 6/19/2008
Chapter 3 Appendix
Additional Case Summary: Metal in Tucumdn
Tucumin is the home to a cluster of approximately 220 metal firms that have
survived the decimation of industry in the province during the 1990s. There are six large
firms with over 300 employees and a number of micro-enterprises that together account
for nearly 100 million dollars of Tucumin's exports, making metal the second most
important export sector.3 1 5 The Tucumin section of the metal workers' union UOM 316
has approximately 2,200 affiliates and occupies key positions in the faction of the unions
that supports the governor.3 7 The workers in the sector have consistently high levels of
informality, with over 50% of the workers unregistered. In addition, with wage increases
in the national metal collective bargaining agreement, there are widespread practices of
workers being placed in lower categories than their work corresponds to, thereby
cheating them out of wages.318
Inspectors draw heavily on UOM for resources for inspection in the sectors-in
fact despite UOM's relatively small size, it is one of the largest collaborators of the
inspectorate-and as a result firms in the sector are inspected. 319 Like UATRE, UOM
has a network of 52 delegates in the firms that can provide information about violations,
and two leaders that can go with the inspectors. As a leader from UOM describes, they
are limited in their inspection activity by their resources:
"We do inspections for the serious problems. We have many firms that
are not complying with the law, but we can't go to all of them. We have
firms that are not paying the workers benefits and union dues...we do
in.spections in these firms so that they will come to conciliation. "320
Also, like UATRE, UOM tries to avoid inspectors going to firms on their own, without
union supervision, because they have had problems of corruption. "When the inspections
are programmed, we can 't guarantee anything."32 With fewer resources, UOM is more
limited than UATRE in its ability to enable the TST to enforce regulations in its sector,
but it still ensures that there is at least routine enforcement in many of the firms. And
when there was public pressure from UOM in the form of a complaint to local media
about the high levels of informality in 2007, in responses the TST conducted an
inspection operation with UOM, which resulted in a short-term increase in
m Data from 2007. Metal has had extremely high growth after the crisis; the value of exports from this
industry doubled between 2003 and 2007. Source: Direcci6n de Desarrollo Productivo para la Exportaci6n
Ministerio de Desarrollo Productivo de TucumAn.
316 Uni6n Obrera Maetalurgica de la Republica Argentina
31 Interview: T57, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), TucumAn, 4/21/2009
3 La Gaceta de Tucundn "La UOM denuncia que hay grand informalidad en las metalnrgica" 05/20/07.
" Interview: T58, Inspector, Tucuman Labor Secretariat, Tucuman, 11/11/2008. Also see data from the
surveV.
lnterview\x: T57, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), TucumAn, 4/21/2009
Ibid.
enforcement.n2 By all accounts, enforcement has occurred at medium levels and has
helped workers in individual cases, but it has not been effective in systematically
reducing violations.
Additional Case Summary: Shoe Making in C6rdoba
The shoe making industry is made up of approximately 180 firms with between
20 and 50 employees, as well as a number of completely informal shops in people's
homes. The industry has widespread violations of labor laws, including high rates of
informality and non-payment of wages during downturns.323 It would be extremely
difficult for the wage and hour inspectors to enforce regulations on their own in this
sector-they simply do not have the capability to identify violators or craft systematic
responses to the violations that they do find. However, by drawing on the shoe sector
union, UTICRA, inspectors can find the resources they need for enforcement. Through
the union's contact with 980 members and delegates, the union car, and a staff member
dedicated to helping workers with labor problems, UTICRA regularly enables STC
inspectors. Although enforcement is far from perfect in the sector, according to the union
leaders "working conditions have improved... through inspection, and follow-up ith the
firms."32 4 In short, using the coding introduced above, there is a medium level of
enforcement in the shoe making sector in C6rdoba.
322 La Gaceta de Tucumin "La UOM denuncia que hay gran informalidad en las metalnrgicas" 05/20/07;
"Inician inspecciones por trabajo en negro en empresas metalmec nicas" 06/04/07.
323 Interview: Cl 2, C6rdoba Leather Industry Association, C6rdoba, 3/5/2009
3 Interview: C14, Shoe Workers' Union, C6rdoba, 7/16/2008
Chapter 4: Co-produced Enforcement
The previous chapter examined cases in which enforcement was constrained by
low levels of administrative capacity. This chapter turns to two cases in which regulatory
agencies have greater levels of capacity, assessing whether this difference can shift the
pattern of enforcement. The analysis focuses on only two industries: C6rdoba's
construction industry, which was regulated by the health and safety division of the
C6rdoba Labor Secretariat (STC 325), and the garment industry of the Federal Capital,
which was regulated by the national Ministry of Labor 326 (MTESS) and Federal Capital's
labor inspectorate (STBA 327). A variety of factors, including a concentration of low-
wage workers, labor intensive production, and market volatility, result in high levels of
labor law violations in these industries. Both industries are highly sensitive to labor
costs, giving employers strong incentives to resist regulations when they result in
increased costs. To complicate matters for regulators, in both of these industries
worksites are scattered and often change location. In short, they are prime examples of
the types of industries that are politically and technically difficult for regulators to
control.
To confront these challenges, in both cases regulators took far-reaching steps to
enforce labor regulations. Inspectors collected extensive information about firms that
violated labor laws by drawing on their societal partners and by using planned inspection
operations. Regulators shut down worksites that posed immediate risks to workers and
used other methods, such as training and publicity, to address the underlying factors
leading to violations. In these cases, enforcement was not limited to firms where unions
were active, but went beyond immediate civil society demands to reach otherwise
unprotected workers. These outcomes contrast sharply with the cases analyzed in the
previous chapter, in which enforcement either did not occur at all, or occurred only when
unions requested, and provided resources for, inspections.
Using these cases, this chapter explores the factors that enabled labor inspectors
to enforce regulations broadly and at levels much higher than the industries discussed in
the previous chapter. Despite their similar outcomes, the cases differ substantially across
many dimensions that could potentially influence enforcement: C6rdoba had a PJ
governor with an historic alliance with labor unions, the Federal Capital did not when the
STBA was enforcing labor laws; construction workers were represented by a strong
union, garment workers were not; the construction industry was not exposed to
international competition, while the garment industry competed with imports. In sum,
there were many political and economic differences that could have possibly lead to
divergent enforcement outcomes. However, these factors were not decisive and
enforcement patterns in both cases were very similar. Comparing these substantially
different cases helps identify the factors that explain common outcomes. This chapter
will show how the combination of strong linkages between regulators and civil society
organizations-in one case a union, and in another case a community organization-and
32 Secretaria de Trabajo de C6rdoba
326 Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo, y Seguridad Social
327 Subsecretaria de Trabajo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
substantial administrative capacity enabled regulators to achieve high levels of
enforcement.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part analyzes enforcement in
C6rdoba's construction industry, where enforcement was at a higher level than in the
construction industries of any of the other provinces analyzed in this dissertation. This
section traces the high levels of enforcement back to events in the late 1980s, when a
crisis in the industry laid the groundwork for high levels of administrative capacity and
strong linkages between inspectors, the union, and industry. The second part turns to the
Federal Capital's garment industry. Examining changes in enforcement-from low
levels before 2006, to an intense two-year period of high levels, and back down to
medium levels-reveals how political shifts operate to influence enforcement. The
chapter concludes by offering an explanation for the commonalities between the two
cases and by contrasting them with those of the previous chapter.
Construction in Cordoba
During the commodity boom that followed the economic crisis in 2001, the
number of construction workers in C6rdoba increased rapidly-from 1,600 registered
workers in 2004 to 20,000 in 2005, and up to nearly 30,000 by 2008. The rebound in
the residential and commercial construction industry was driven by new investors who
had profited from soaring agricultural exports. These investors challenged the traditional,
integrated, construction firms by creating new firms that relied heavily on subcontracting
and that were dissolved when projects were completed. 329 The combination of rapid
expansion of the industry and new, unstable, firms brought a sharp increase in the risk of
accidents that challenged regulators.330 Ensuring that this increased risk did not translate
into more workplace accidents is primarily the responsibility of the health and safety
division of C6rdoba's Labor Secretariat (STC), called CYMAT,m which operates
independently from the wage and hour division discussed in the previous chapter.
CYMAT enforces health and safety laws in all of C6rdoba's industries, but its primary
focus is on construction due to its high rate of workplace accidents and large size.m2
By all measures, CYMAT has met the increase of workplace risks in the sector
with as much, if not more, enforcement than any of the other provinces in Argentina. In
contrast with the cases discussed in the previous chapter, CYMAT inspectors are able to
gain a substantially large and constant flow of information about working conditions in
the construction industry. One source of intelligence for inspectors is the construction
328 Data provided by the Instituto de Estadistica y Registro de la Industria de la Construcci6n (IER I C).
The numbers only include workers registered in the obra social of UOCRA. Given the high levels of
informality in this sector, there were likely twice the number of workers.
329 By the account of industry leaders, new firms that were created lacked the experience and commitment
to address health and safety issues. They would mitigate the risks of accidents by insulating investors
through layers of subcontracting, instead of through investment in prevention. Interview: C 15., Argentine
Construction Association (CAC), Cordoba, 3/3/2009
Interview: C32, Health and Safety Specialist, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA).
Cordoba, 06/20/08 & 03/09/09
SC ondiciones y Medio Anbiente de Trabajo
332 The only higher sector is mining. Source: Superintendencia de Riesgos del Trabajo 2004.
union (UOCRA), which passes on tips about unsafe worksites. However, unlike the
cases analyzed in the previous chapter, CYMAT does not rely entirely on union requests.
A senior official in the inspectorate explained that, in the construction industry, he does
not wait for the union because "if I had to wait fbr UOCRA to accompany the inspections,
iwe would only do 1,000 inspections [a year]. "m3 Instead, CYMAT took the initiative
and conducted well over 2,000 inspections a year in the industry.
Nearly all of CYMAT's inspections are programmed internally, which is
evidence of an enforcement stance that goes beyond responses to union complaints.
When there is a new construction site planned above a minimum size, CYMAT
regulators routinely conduct an initial inspection of the worksite to ensure that
construction plans include health and safety considerations. Inspectors also conduct joint
campaigns with the municipal government, which is in charge of safety external to
construction sites (e.g. people in the street nearby and surrounding buildings). 33
Moreover, CYMAT receives tips about worksites that have had accidents by the national
Superintendent of Workplace Risks (Superintendcia de Riesgos de Trabajo) and from the
wage and hours inspectors.336 Using this confluence of information sources, regulators
put together programmed inspection campaigns that both responded to immediate risks
and was preventative. These practices contrast sharply with the wage and hour division
of the STC, in which only 20% of inspections were programmed. In addition, when
compared with other provinces, there was a substantially higher level of information
gathering. For example, in the city Rosario of the neighboring province of Santa Fe,
approximately the same size as C6rdoba and with a similar construction boom, in 2006
health and safety inspectors reached only 30 worksites a month (the Cordoba inspectors
average 190 a month).337
A second indicator of high enforcement levels is the existence of credible
penalties. In the construction industry, suspensions of unsafe workshops are the most
important penalties because they impose immediate and high costs (unlike fines, which
can be appealed and often do not reach large sums). A business leader observed that
"ihen the inspectors shut down a worksite, it causes a lot ofpain" for the construction
338firm in terms of lost time and money. CYMAT inspectors have the ability to
unilaterally shut down, or suspend, operations, and the inspectors do exercise this power.
In 2004, for example, accidents began to increase and the construction union, UOCRA,
publicly criticized CYMAT for not being tough enough on violators. 339 The inspectors
responded by drastically increasing suspensions of activity on construction sites that
violated norms in a way that posed an immediate danger to workers. Prior to the
criticism by UOCRA, inspections resulted in suspensions 1.6% of the time, the month
3 Interview: C22, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 06/23/08 & 03/05/09 & 03/07/09
3Interview: C22, Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 06/23/08 & 03/05/09 & 03/07/09
3mh La l del Interior Para prevenir accidentes habra control de obras" 04/02/2009.
336 Interview: C36, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 7/14/2008
3 lnterviews: S41, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Rosario, 5/13/2009. La Capital
-FEn un ano, 6 albaiiles muertos y 10 heridos" 03/13/2006; "Cuestionan a empresas que no cuidan a obreros
de la construcci6n" 11/01/2006.
3 The firms are required to continue paying workers in these cases, and by all indications they often do.
Interview: C 15, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), C6rdoba, 3/3/2009
m3 La I 'oz del Interior ""'La seguridad laboral se relaj6"" 3/9/04
afterwards this number shot up to 19%.340 After this incident, inspectors adjusted to
mixing penalties with other approaches. Between February 2007 and February 2009,
inspections resulted in partial closures of construction sites 10% of the time, and full
suspensions 4% of the time.34' To put these rates in comparative context with other
provinces, in 2008 in the Federal Capital, inspections resulted in a closure only 1% of the
time. Also, inspectors in the Federal Capital were much more reluctant to unilaterally
stop worksites.342
Penalties are rarely enough to improve compliance on their own, especially for
health and safety standards. A third indicator of enforcement levels is the degree to which
regulators enable firms to comply. When CYMAT inspectors find problems that do not
pose an immediate risk, they offer advice to construction managers and workers on how
to comply. For example, on one construction site, health and safety inspectors instructed
managers on methods for identifying conditions that lead to workers falling from high
floors of unfinished buildings and showed them simple ways to reduce accidents (e.g.
putting plywood barriers around open elevator shafts to prevent workers from falling).
These steps helped managers and workers anticipate coming changes in the worksite that
create new risks.34 3 Beyond providing instruction during inspections, CYMAT has also
systematically taken preventative steps to reduce accidents that go beyond inspection. A
senior official in the STC described one of these initiatives:
We have designed training days in the worksites. That's to say... we ask
or permissionfrom the firm-either UOCRA asks or I ask. Then
representatives of the STC and UOCRA go, and on the day of the training,
the firm changes the work schedule so that we can meet with all of the
workers and managers. Two of my inspectors talk specifically about what
workers are doing (on the site) and what health and safety measures they
should take in a practical way. 344
For close observers, including union leaders, these in situ trainings are a "valuable" way
of reducing accidents in the long run and addressing the root causes of violations. 34 ' The
mixture of actions in C6rdoba-penalties with real teeth and instruction-flexibly
applied is a textbook example of best practices in regulation.346 No other province
included in this study has developed a similar program in the construction sector (up until
2009).
In sum, there is ample evidence that CYMAT was actively implementing labor
34 Author's analysis of internal inspection data provided by the STC. The average was taken for the year
before the public criticism.
3.H Source: Database of inspections from the STC.
312 Interview: B07, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/1/2008
m Interviews: C35, Health and Safety Inspector, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/24/2008 and C36,
C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 7/14/2008. In addition, I observed health and safety inspections of
construction sites during which inspectors interacted with managers from firms.
3 Interview: C22, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 06/23/08 & 03/05/09 & 03/07/09
3 Interview: C32, Health and Safety Specialist, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA),
Cordoba, 06/20/08 & 03/09/09
346 See for example: Ayers and Braithwaite 1992; Pires 2008
regulations in the construction industry. CYMAT also appeared to have an effect on
safety in the industry (even though there are clearly multiple factors that ultimately
determine compliance levels). Most notably, there has not been an increase in accidents
as the number of workers has increased substantially, which union leaders and officials
view as an indicator of successful enforcement.347 While there were most certainly
limitations to enforcement in this industry-union leaders have not reached their goal of
eliminating accidental deaths and inspectors would prefer to have more resources to
conduct even more inspections-the relative level enforcement is high when compared
with other cases (for definitions of low, medium, and high levels of enforcement, see the
Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). In addition, the pattern of enforcement in C6rdoba's
construction industry was distinct from the cases analyzed in the previous chapter,
regulators clearly took actions that went beyond reacting to UOCRA's daily demands.34 8
Explaining Enforcement in C6rdoba's Construction Industry
Why was enforcement so different in the case of C6rdoba construction compared
with the cases analyzed in the previous chapter? A close examination of the way in
which enforcement became possible points to a particular combination of inspectors
using linkages with unions and high levels of administrative capacity. Like the wage and
hour inspectors analyzed in the previous chapter, CYMAT inspectors have access to
union cars, information, and political support. The head of health and safety inspection
describes CYMAT's relationship with the unions stating, "We complement one another.
When the unions have a problem, we advise them... and they... come with the cars... which
they put at our service so we can complete our objectives and conduct inspections." 349
In the construction industry, CYMAT inspectors can draw on the particularly
strong construction union, which boasts a health and safety specialist who works full time
with a staff dedicated to conducting their own controls of construction sites. UOCRA in
C6rdoba can gather information in a sophisticated way (much more so than in Tucumin
or Santa Fe), and, at times, resolve health and safety problems on its own. UOCRA's
leaders actively work to build and maintain their relationship with the inspectors. For
example, the union hosts a barbecue (parrilla) with inspectors a few times a year to
"integrate " and "unite" the inspectors with UOCRA around common goals. 3 '0 The
union's health and safety leader describes how they work with inspectors: "When there is
a particular zone that has high risks, we go together. Or when we hear that things are
messed up in a certain place, we work together," otherwise they take care of the problem
3 Interview: C32, Health and Safety Specialist, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA),
Cordoba, 06/20/08 & 03/09/09. Data on accidents are notoriously bad. The best estimate comes from
combining employment data from the Obra Social del Personal de la Construcci6n and deaths in the
industry from the STC and SRT. Using these numbers, it appears that deaths have fallen per-thousand
workers (in 2002, there were 3.6 deaths per 1,000 workers, while in 2007 there were only 0.3).
3 In addition, looking beyond the construction industry, CYMAT inspectors carve out resources to address
industries with weak unions. For example, CYMAT has inspectors who are dedicated to other industries
and they actively seek out unions in high-risk industries that do not come looking for inspections, such as
mining.
349 Interview: C44, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/26/2008
35 Interview: C32, Health and Safety Specialist, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA),
C6rdoba, 06/20/08 & 03/09/09
themselves.3 5 1 In short, UOCRA provides key resources for inspectors in difficult cases,
which can also reduce inspectors' workload by responding to less complex violations.
Given the role of unions in labor regulation in C6rdoba broadly (described in the
previous chapter), strong inspector-union linkages are not surprising in the construction
industry and they alone cannot explain higher levels of enforcement. Two attributes,
however, distinguish enforcement in the construction industry from the cases discussed
up to this point: linkages between the labor inspectorate and the industry association, and
the administrative capacity of CYMAT. To understand these differences, it is necessary
to briefly examine their development in the late 1980s when the STC was being re-
established after the return to democracy (which will be analyzed in more depth in
Chapter 5). In the 1980s, C6rdoba was governed by the Radical Party, which did not
have an alliance with the main unions. In 1987, UOCRA started to take an aggressive
stance against workplace accidents, which leaders began to see as preventable.
According to the head of health and safety for UOCRA at the time, union leaders took
steps to "punish the government, the firms, and the industry association" for the lack of
safe working conditions. As a result of the "crisis" generated by this action, "the
governmentfelt pressure" to do something about accidents.m
The provincial Minister of Labor at this time was a labor lawyer, Jorge Sappia,
who had existing ties to many labor unions but was also seen by business leaders as a fair
actor.m In response to the crisis generated by workplace accidents and UOCRA's
protest, the Minister of Labor created a special division dedicated to health and safety
(CYMAT) and "called for the social actors to get together in conversation and
meeting."354 These meetings involved officials from the STC, UOCRA, and the industry
association (Comara Argentina de la Construcci6n, or CAC), and eventually led to the
formation of a formal consultative Commission (the "Four-Part" Commissionm3 5 ).
Through the Commission, the provincial Minister of Labor, CAC, and UOCRA worked
together to develop a legal reform to the outdated national health and safety legislation
that governed the construction industry. More importantly for the implementation of
health and safety laws, the Commission created an institutionalized basis for dialogue
among key actors.
The Commission waned in importance in the deregulatory 1990s, but it provided
a means through which regulators could develop linkages with the firm association in the
years of economic growth after the crisis. Following the reactivation of the economy in
2003, the Commission grew to include representatives from the City of C6rdoba (that
gives building permits), the professional association of architects, the workplace accident
35, Ibid
32 Interview: C17, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), C6rdoba, 7/15/2008
3 Interviews: Cl 5, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), C6rdoba, 3/3/2009; C 13, Industrial Union
of C6rdoba, C6rdoba, 6/19/2008; CO 1, Former Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba,
06/18/08 & 03/10/09
3" Interview: C17. Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Cordoba, 7/15/2008
35 "Four-Part" because it included employers, employees, provincial regulators and a variety of other
actors, such as professional associations and city government officials. The Commission focuses on
C6rdoba Capital, but there is a also a similar commission in another city. La Voz del Interior "Por mns
seguridad para obreros de la construcci6n" 06/18/03.
insurance industry, and the core members from the STC, UOCRA, and the CAC. It
became a space for dialogue and regular communication around health and safety issues.
For instance, the Commission worked with local universities that train architects in order
to improve education about safety in construction. This effort, advocated by inspectors
and UOCRA, showed architects how to incorporate worker well-being into the planning
of projects from the very beginning. In effect, the Commission formed the basis of
additional linkages between CYMAT, the industry association, and a variety of other
organizations.
When the former provincial Minister of Labor created a specialized health
division in the 1980s, he also laid the foundation for greater administrative capacity years
later. Despite the ups and downs of reform in the STC, which lost capacity in the 1990s
and then gradually built it back up after 1999, CYMAT was somewhat protected as an
independent division that maintained its capacity. In the period after the crisis, the
administrative capacity of CYMAT was at a relatively high level compared to other
inspectorates in Argentina, including the wage and hour division of the STC.
First, CYMAT had a computer system that gave it the basic ability to plan
inspections and keep systematic records of its actions. This capability, although quite
elementary, was fundamental for the inspectorate to identify firms to inspect, monitor
rates of violations in industries, and keep track of the actions of inspectors.356 Second,
CYMAT inspectors have had priority access to material resources (e.g. cars), which
enabled inspectors to take action even when there are no immediate resources available
from the unions. There were still shortages of cars and the inspectors used unions for
transport, but they were not nearly as dependent as in the other cases. Third, the health
and safety inspectors had greater levels of expertise than wage and hour inspectors; all
nine health and safety inspectors had technical training as health and safety specialists.
This expertise equipped the inspectors to identify violations and craft responses on their
own without having to wait for union leaders to indicate which situations constitute
violations of labor law.
In total, these rather simple features enabled CYMAT to actively enforce
regulations-inspectors did not have to depend on unions for resources, but could
mobilize their own resources when enforcement was merited. This feature distinguishes
CYMAT from groups of inspectors discussed in the previous chapter-the wage and hour
division in C6rdoba and the Tucumin inspectorate-both of which lacked basic resources
and had little choice but to depend on unions. For example, the senior officials at the
STC, who oversee both the wage and hour division and CYMAT, attempted to induce
more state-initiated enforcement throughout the inspectorate. In the wage and hour
division, however, officials were constrained by low levels of administrative capacity and
unable to take actions without union resources. They "worried' about "excessive
dependence" on unions that "prevent the STC from creating a plan" in the wage and hour
division.357 In CYMAT, no such constraint existed, allowing inspections to occur
broadly in the sector.
3 Interview: C36, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 7/14/2008
3 Interview: C45, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/19/2008
The greater administrative capacity in CYMAT also altered the strategy of its
union allies. A leader from UOCRA explained how he gives the inspectors leeway to
conduct inspections on their own: "the inspectors have a list of construction sites that
comes from above. We know that they have to progress in making it through this list Qf
sites, so we don't call them except when we know that there is a problem." 35" This
approach by UOCRA differs substantially from that of the unions analyzed in the
previous chapter. Union leaders in Tucumin, for example, are skeptical of allowing
inspectors to work on their own because the inspectors have such little training that
"w'hen the inspections are programmed, we can't guarantee anything."359 Consequently,
union leaders in Tucumin work hard to control the way inspections take place and do not
support efforts of the inspectorate to collect information on its own. The contrasts
between these cases suggest that administrative capacity changes the way in which
inspector-union linkages function; there is less of a need for unions to invest the
resources necessary to capture regulators when regulators themselves are apt to
implement policies in a way that benefits union members.
High levels of administrative capacity did not, however, make CYMAT a
professional, Weberian, or autonomous bureaucracy. Indeed, CYMAT lacked many of
the features scholars find are necessary for autonomy. Although inspectors had civil
service protection, they also had relatively low salaries that required them to have jobs in
the private sector as health and safety consultants (clearly in conflict with their duties as
360enforcers). In addition, although they had expertise, they gained their positions
through patronage, not through a merit-based process.361 And there is little chance of a
long-term career of merit-based promotion within the state, thereby reducing incentives
for loyalty to the bureaucracy. In this way, the organization of CYMAT inspectors does
not resemble that of their equivalents in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, who are
insulated from political interference by the organizational strength of their
bureaucracies.362 Even though CYMAT does not satisfy many of the tests that theories of
state capacity hold as important, there is still a substantial difference between the
administrative capacity in CYMAT and that of other inspectorates in Argentina.
In sum, there were three important features of health and safety enforcement in
C6rdoba's construction industry that account for the relatively high levels of
enforcement. First, CYMAT inspectors had strong linkages with the construction union
UOCRA, and UOCRA had resources to offer the inspectors. Second, the officials at the
CYMAT had institutionalized linkages with the industry association through the
Commission. Third, CYMAT had relatively high levels of administrative capacity.
These last two attributes distinguish this case from those cases analyzed up until this
point. The next section turns to a case that also reached high levels of enforcement,
358 Interview: C32, Health and Safety Specialist, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA),
C6rdoba, 06/20/08 & 03/09/09
359 Interview: T5T57, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), Tucumdn, 4/21/2009
36' Interview: C40, Health and Safety Inspector, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/24/2008
161 Multiple interviews with labor inspectors. For example, when the Bank of C6rdoba was privatized,
politically connected civil servants who previously worked in the bank were transferred as health and safety
inspectors to avoid laying them off. La Voz del Interior "25 ex bancarios ya dependen de la Secretari a de
Trabajo" 09/15/04.
362 Ibid.; Schrank 2009
providing an opportunity to examine whether similar factors can explain enforcement in a
context that differs in terms of industry, local politics, and societal organization.
Clandestine Garment Workshops in the Federal Capital
Garment manufacturing in the Federal Capital also accelerated rapidly during the
period of economic growth after the devaluation in 2001. Between 2002 and 2006 there
was a 70% increase in activity in the sector nationally, much of it concentrated in the
Federal Capital.3 63 By 2007, the industry had reached nearly 6 billion dollars in
production, the great majority of which was for the domestic market (external sales
364
accounted for only 80 million dollars). Although they do not export, domestic
producers do compete with imports, which account for 25% of consumption. An integral
part of the industry is a vast network of small home-based workshops that operate
through a system of outsourcing and piecework for local and foreign apparel brands; 74%
of producers have fewer than five employees and 23% have between 6 and 40
365
employees. It is impossible to know the precise number of workers and workshops,
but officials estimated that in 2009 there were between 3,000 and 3,500 workshops in the
Federal Capital.366
Work in this sector is regulated by the general law of labor contracts (that is,
when there is a worker who is employed by a workshop owner) and a special law of
367home-based work that sets the terms of putting out piecework. A commission of
unions, industry associations, and the federal Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social
Security (MTESS) sets the piece rates for wages in the industry. This bargaining
structure gives the sector a degree of flexibility that goes beyond the general Argentine
system of collective bargaining, but problems of compliance have rendered the details of
formal rules (and any flexibility built into them) moot.
By all measures, the garment industry in the Federal Capital has extremely high
levels of labor violations. The factors that contribute to poor working conditions in all
garment industries-relatively low skilled workers, highly fluctuating demand, and low
levels of investment368-are amplified in the Federal Capital by the large number of
undocumented migrant workers. The migrants, who are mostly from Bolivia, for the
most part do not have legal status in Argentina (many are brought to Buenos Aries in
human trafficking networks and have to repay their debt once they arrive). 369 Their
illegal status makes them especially vulnerable because workers believe (erroneously)
that they will be deported if they complain to government authorities about labor
conditions-a belief cultivated by workshop owners, themselves often Bolivian
3 Centro de Estudios para la Producci6n. "Las marcas como motor del crecimiento de las exportaciones
en el sector indumentaria" 2007.
364 Source: C~mara Industrial Argentina de la Indumentaria
36S Source: Fundaci6n el Otro 2007.
366 Clarin 'Am genes de Los talleres clandestinos, una forma de esclavitud moderna", 4/12/09
S1.aw 12.713
368 Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond, and Weil 1999; Piore 2004
3 La .Naci6n "Una ruta clandestina: de Bolivia a Retiro" 04/01/06; Pdgina/12 "Una cimara oculta para
comprobar c6mo opera la trata de personas" 05/05/07.
migrants. 37 Descriptions of working conditions in the industry were staggering. In 2008,
industry leaders estimated that nearly 80% of workers were informal (unregistered).m
An inspection operation in 2006 checking 13,000 workers found that 1,600 were in
conditions that approximated "slavery" and, in total, worker advocates estimated that
25,000 Bolivian migrants were "reduced to slavery in clandestine workshops". 3 7 2
An investigation from the Defensor del Pueblom3 described conditions in two
workshops in the Parque Avellaneda neighborhood. They produced various garment
products for domestic brand name apparel companies; one had twenty-one machines and
twenty-five employees, the other had fifteen machines and twelve employees. The
workers, who were undocumented migrants, lived in the workshops in crowded
conditions, which were illegally operated in buildings that were not approved (or safe) for
factories. The workshops violated nearly every labor law: they did not meet basic health
and safety standards, there was no legal payroll, working days began at seven in the
morning and lasted until past midnight with only short breaks for meals, salaries were
only 100 dollars per month, and workers were denied all legally mandated benefits.
When the workers' children returned from school, they were locked in small, unsafe
rooms with exposed wires. The workshop owners bribed local police for protection,
threatened workers that if they went to officials, the owners would be arrested and
deported. Workshop owners also kept the workers' passports under their control to
prevent escape. Workers who were fired were denied their last payment and tossed out in
the street. The bosses would then travel to Bolivia to look for new workers, tricking them
with false promises and then trafficking them to Buenos Aires.
Unfortunately, the workshops described above were hardly unique; thousands of
small factories spread out in wide swaths of the city had similar conditions.37  And in
2006, the safety risks were brought into horrific view when a fire killed a family that was
living in a garment workshop.376 Responding to these extreme violations of labor (and
other) laws posed a formidable challenge to regulators. Workshops were hidden in
residential buildings, constantly moving around, and workers were reluctant to come
forward with complaints. Once they discovered violations, regulators had the
complicated task of ensuring that displaced workers did not wind up in more dire
Interview: B 11, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 &
02/1 7/09
3' La Nacidn "Talleres clandestinos: el negocio de la explotaci6n" 05/11/08
m La Vaci6n "Ain quedan 25.000 bolivianos que trabajan como esclavos" 10/16/06
m The Defensor del Pueblo is a mix between an ombudsman and a public prosecutor.
37 Court filings from the Defensor del Pueblo against Juan Carlos Salazar Nina in case N' 15803/05, 2005.
315 Interviews: B46, La Alameda Foundation, Buenos Aires, 2/23/2009; Bi 1, Senior Official, Federal
Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 & 02/17/09; B20, Lawyer, Argentine Human Rights
League, Buenos Aires, 3/25/2009; B13, Defensor del Pueblo, Buenos Aires, 2/26/2009. See also: Lieutier
2010 and various media reports, including: La Nacidn "Descubren que hay "esclavos" bolivianos en dos
talleres" 10/28/05; "Denuncian que hay casos de esclavitud" 11/18/05; "El drama de vivir como esclavos"
04/01/06; "Clausuraron otros once talleres textiles" 04/05/06; "Nueva denuncia por trabajo esclavo en
talleres textiles" 04/27/06; Au''n quedan 25.000 bolivianos que trabajan como esclavos" 10/16/06;
Ptigina/12 "Centro clandestino, esta vez de confecci6n" 03/31/07; Clarin "Imdgenes de los talleres
clandestinos, una forma de esclavitud moderna" 04/12/09.
6 Pdgina/12 "El infierno del trabajo esclavo" 3/31/06. La Naci6n "Mueren seis personas en un incendio"
3/31/06.
circumstances on the streets. This meant finding workers housing, employment, and
helping them with immigration issues. Enforcement also entailed confronting a powerful
industry that was reliant on low wage workers in factories located near the largest retail
centers of the country. Tracing the response of regulators to these challenges provides a
way to identify drivers and barriers to enforcement.
Dormant Regulators
Before 2006, jurisdiction for enforcing labor regulations in the garment industry
was primarily under the national MTESS.377 Even though officials from the MTESS
were aware of the problem in the workshops, especially after the Defensor del Pueblo
began to file cases against employers in 2005, enforcement levels were very low. First,
the MTESS collected little information about working conditions in the industry.
Inspection intensity in the industry was low; in 2005, for example, 1.4% of all inspections
in the Federal Capital were in the garment industry, including larger factories that are not
the main violators.3 78 In addition, inspectors from the MTESS did not have systematic
ways of gathering information through unions and neighborhood organizations. The
MTESS attempted to enforce regulations in the garment industry largely on its own. For
example, a senior official described the way intelligence gathering functioned in this
sector: "One has to go to all places, crossing the city looking... where garments are
coming in and out, where there is fabric in the garbage... or where you hear sewing
machines. All of this is intelligence work old style."37 These actions are highly
inefficient compared with using civil society organizations and workers who know
exactly where factories are located in their communities.
Second, the MTESS took few steps with the information it had, such as shutting
down workshops or publicizing enforcement in the industry in order to put pressure on
brand name firms that sourced from clandestine workshops. Characterizing enforcement
in this period, the Defensor del Pueblo issued a report stating that "the applicable law,
12.713 'home-based work', has not provided adequate protection jor workers because an
inspection mechanism to enjorce compliance does not exist. " 380 In short, notwithstanding
a clear need for state intervention, enforcement levels were low before 2006.381
Why were there such low levels of enforcement? Examining the characteristics of
the MTESS does not provide any easy explanations. On the one hand, the MTESS had
comparatively high levels of administrative capacity relative to other labor inspectorates
m The divided jurisdiction had its roots in the incomplete transfer of power from the national government
to the Federal Capital in 1999, by which the STBA gained jurisdiction over labor inspection for all laws
except the enforcement of "putting-out" agreements, which are the norm in the garment workshops. Until
2006, jurisdiction over the primary law regulating garment workshops stayed with the MTESS.
S)ata provided by the Ministry of Labor. The total were 324 inspections in the entire garment industry
and over 20.000 in Federal Capital.
3Interview. B06, Senior Official, Department of Labor Inspection, Ministry of Labor, Employment and
Social Security, Buenos Aires, 3/13/08 & 2/26/09
38) Evidence submitted by the Defensor Del Pueblo in the case N 15803/05.
381 For its part, the STBA did not undertake major campaigns in the industry either, but this was primarily
due to the jurisdictional division. There was debate within the bureaucracy about whether enforcement in
the workshops would violate the mandate of the STBA and result in jurisdictional conflict. Interview: B66,
Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/24/2009. See also:Ibid.
in Argentina. Beginning 2003, the MTESS had invested heavily in labor inspection
aimed at the registration of workers (as described in Chapter 2), hiring hundreds of new
inspectors, nearly 70 of whom were responsible for the Federal Capital. Inspectors at the
MTESS were largely young professionals, trained (or in training) as lawyers or
accountants, who had ample resources at their disposal (computer systems, access to
transportation, and a relatively large budget).3 82 The MTESS had more resources than
any provincial inspectorate at the time and, with this capacity, conducted 20,000
inspections in the Federal Capital during 2005 (across all industries). In short, when
employment (and violations) in the garment industry began to increase dramatically, the
MTESS had relatively high levels of administrative capacity and could have potentially
responded.
On the other hand, the MTESS lacked many organizational features that are
considered necessary for bureaucratic quality. There were no meritocratic exams for
hiring inspectors. Nearly all inspectors held short-term contracts that could be terminated
at any time, leaving them exposed to political pressures (in violation of the ILO
Convention 81 on labor inspection to which Argentina is a signatory). 3 83 In addition,
long-term career prospects were dim for inspectors and turnover very high; most
inspectors were hired when they were still in university and most left after just a few
years when they completed their degrees. 3 84 In short, the MTESS had high levels of
administrative capacity, but lacked many of the organizational features that are often
associated with an autonomous or coherent bureaucracy.385
In addition, it is unclear whether or not the structure or strength of civil society
organizations can account for the lack of enforcement. There were two civil society
organizations that could have potentially worked with the MTESS to address the problem
of the garment workshops before 2006. One was the garment workers union, SOIVA, the
other was a community organization called La Alameda. Although there were few
political barriers to the MTESS working with unions, SOIVA was largely inactive and
did little, if anything, to support precarious workers in this sector.386 Consequently, the
union did not offer resources to inspectors. La Alameda, on the other hand, was highly
active and had much to provide regulators in support of enforcement. La Alameda was
founded in a working class neighborhood by community leaders in the wake of the
economic crisis in 2001 as a popular assembly.387 With their extensive network of
382 Interviews: B63, Department of Human Resources, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security,
Buenos Aires, 4/22/2009; B51, Senior Official Department of Labor Inspection, Ministry of L abor,
Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires, 4/8/2008; B52, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment
and Social Security, Buenos Aires, 4/23/2008; B45, Department of Planning, Ministry of Labor.
Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires, 9/17/2008
m See ILO Convention 81, Article 6
3 Interview: B63, Department of Human Resources, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security,
Buenos Aires, 4/22/2009
38S Evans 1995
386 Multiple interviews with government officials, NGOs, and media accounts. See also: Licutier 20 10 p.
145.
3 While many of the neighborhood assemblies that formed in response to the crisis quickly disbanded, L a
Alameda was solidified as an organization providing multiple services for the community. The
organization took over an abandoned building and started a soup kitchen to help the wave of unemployed
workers, which was the beginning of its labor advocacy.
contacts in the Bolivian community, and their location in a neighborhood with garment
workshops, they had ample information about violations in the sector. 388 By 2005, La
Alameda began to act on this information, denouncing the problem of illegal garment
workshops to anyone who would listen, including to the MTESS. 3 89
Even though leaders from La Alameda "tried to establish a dialogue with the
MTESS", 390 inspectors from the MTESS "could not go with La Alameda because it is not
a u/nion,, 391 and linkages were effectively blocked from forming. Legally, there was little
to stop the MTESS inspectors from working with La Alameda (as inspectors from STBA
did after 2006). At this time, however, the MTESS was under the administration of
Nestor Kirchner, who had a political alliance with the main union confederation (the
CGT) and had appointed a long time union-advisor, Carlos Tomada, as Secretary of
Labor (see Chapter 2). There would have been a political cost to allowing inspectors to
work with La Alameda, which was not part of the union movement and was threatening
to compete with SOIVA to represent workers in the industry.39 2 Senior officials in the
MTESS simply did not allow this linkage to form, even though they acknowledged that
"the informationfrom La Alameda is useid."393 Just as in the case of the brick-makers in
C6rdoba from the previous chapter, inspectors were unable to work with a civil society
organization that was not a union.
In sum, before 2006, notwithstanding extensive and extreme violations of labor
laws, there were low levels of enforcement in the garment industry. These low levels
cannot readily be explained by examining only the features of the bureaucracy-the
MTESS had relatively high levels of administrative capacity, but it also clearly had a
number of organizational shortcomings. Nor can these enforcement levels be explained
entirely by examining civil society organizations; La Alameda had the ability to offer key
resources to regulators, especially information about the location of illegal workshops,
which is difficult for inspectors to gather. However, the MTESS inspectors lacked
linkages with La Alameda and, consequently, inspectors could not access their resources.
Intensified Enforcement
In 2006, there was a tremendous shift in enforcement, triggered by a fire in a
garment workshop that killed two adults and four children, all Bolivian migrants.394 This
incident set off a flurry of criticism of both the STBA and the MTESS, which created
3 Interview: B46, La Alameda Foundation, Buenos Aires, 2/23/2009
3 Defensor del Pueblo. "Resolution N' 3301 / 05", 2005. The STBA was less relevant because of the
problem with jurisdiction.
390 Interview: B46, La Alameda Foundation, Buenos Aires, 2/23/2009
39 Interview: B06, Senior Official, Department of Labor Inspection, Ministry of Labor, Employment and
Social Security, Buenos Aires, 3/13/08 & 2/26/09
392 These barriers are similar to the political difficulties of officials going against partisan coalition's with
unions in Tucuman and Santa Fe. Interviews: T37, Former Senior Official, Tucumen Labor Secretariat,
Tucuman, 4/14/2009- S 11, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe L abor Secretariat, Reconquista, Santa Fe,
12/16/2008
393 Interview: B06, Senior Official, Department of Labor Inspection, Ministry of Labor, Employment and
Social Security, Buenos Aires, 3/13/08 & 2/26/09
394 Pdgina 12 "El infierno del trabajo esclavo" 3/31/06. La Naci6n "Mueren seis personas en un incendio"
3/31/06.
pressure for resolution of the conflicts of jurisdiction over home-based work and a clear
line of responsibility for the industry. The STBA, which had been blamed even though it
lacked jurisdiction to enforce the home-based work law, began taking ownership over the
problem and defying the formal jurisdictional barrier.395 In the eleven days that followed
the fire, a series of operations by inspectors from STBA closed 122 workshops. In forty-
percent of these workshops, the workers (and often their families) lived and worked in
the same place. The closures immediately resulted in the displacement of 110 Bolivian
migrants who had been employed in workshops that were shut down or had been thrown
out by their employers in anticipation of inspections.396 By September of 2006, the
STBA had conducted 1,700 inspections in the sector and closed 500 clandestine
workshops. The crisis quickly grew in scale as officials from the Bolivian embassy
became involved and displaced workers had to be housed in government shelters.
The initial reaction of the STBA to the fire was somewhat expected, but
enforcement did not end after saliency of the issue waned. Instead, the STBA began a
multipronged effort to reduce the worst forms of abuse in the garment industry. The
STBA undertook an extensive campaign to gather information about the industry.
Working with La Alameda, the STBA targeted workshops that produced for well-known
local brands. In one case, after finding workshops that produced for the brand Kosiuko,
the government of the Federal Capital forced the brand to provide addresses for their
other producers. Inspectors then worked with La Alameda to send Bolivian
undocumented migrants to look for work in these factories. In one case, a "spy" was
given ajob at one of the workshops and found that it violated a series of laws, including a
lack of fire extinguishers or emergency exits, and salaries did not conform to wage and
hour regulations. La Alameda then passed this information back to the STBA, which
followed up with inspections. The information that La Alameda generated through its
network in the community of Bolivian migrants was extremely valuable-inspectors
found violations in 97% of the workshops that La Alameda identified. 398 To put this
number into context, wage and hour regulators in the United States' garment industry
found violations in 49% of their investigations between 1996 and 2000.399
With the information they gathered, the STBA took far-reaching steps to raise the
costs of non-compliance for workshops that continued illegal practices, prosecute the
firms at the top of the supply chain that sourced from clandestine factories, and to create
employment in cooperatives that did not exploit workers. Inspection campaigns and
extensive closures continued over a full year after the fire. In the first eight months of
395 Interview: B39, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009.
On June 22, 2006, the government of Federal Capital formally signed an agreement (Convenio N' 14-
GCCBA/06) with the MTESS to take primary jurisdiction over home-based work. This agreement did not go
into legal effect until the end of 2007, but its existence made it possible for the STBA to increase its
involvement in regulating the garment sector.
"9 Pgina/12 "Tras los controles, las textiles ilegales ya se mudan al conurbano". 4/11/06: La Vacion -Tras
el incendio, combaten el empleo ilegal" 04/01/06; "Bolivia en Buenos Aires: la vida despuds de las
clausuras" 04/26/06.
l (farin "Trabajo esclavo: usaron a espias para investigar talleres" 09/06/06; "Se infiltr6 en un taller
ilegal para denunciar a una marca de ropa" 09/07/06.
Source: Auditoria General la Ciudad Buenos Aires 2006
399 Weil 2005 p. 242
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2007 alone, the STBA closed down 713 workshops. 400 To complement this strategy,
inspectors, with their allies in the public prosecutors office and La Alameda, started
mapping out the entire supply chain of the garment industry in Buenos Aires and began a
campaign against lead firms. The first brand that the STBA publically denounced was a
local apparel firm called Cheeky. Inspectors linked Cheeky to a number of clandestine
workshops, resulting in a series of articles detailing exploitation and child labor among
Cheeky's suppliers. 40 After a number of investigations, the STBA put together
information on five more local brand name apparel firms that produced in clandestine
402
workshops and held a press conference to publicize the information. This put direct
pressure on the firms, embarrassing them and sparking public protests in front of their
stores.
The campaign in the media was complemented with new judicial actions against
firms that sourced from clandestine workshops. The STBA made an effort to use laws
that make firms responsible for the actions of their subcontractors in order to pressure
firms further up on the supply chain. In justifying this tactic, a former Subsecretary of
Labor explained that the "function" of the STBA "was not to inspect, but to change the
working conditions."40 3 Collaborating, once again, with La Alameda and the public
prosecutors, the STBA identified an intermediary supplier that produced for a number of
brands (including Puma) and had a network of smaller clandestine subcontractors.
Inspectors were able to locate these workshops, which were in extreme violation of labor
laws, and not only shut them down, but also prosecute the intermediary factory.40 4 These
actions began to impose a cost not only on the workshop owners, but also up the supply
chain, thereby creating a greater deterrent.40 5
Not all cases were successful in court. One case in which prosecution failed
406involved a local apparel brand called SOHO. Inspectors learned about the brand's
direct use of clandestine workshops from employees of a firm that supplied SOHO with
materials. Upon investigating, the STBA discovered four workshops in the Federal
Capital that produced for SOHO and began to piece together their ownership structure. A
series of inspections discovered serious labor law violations, including illegal overtime,
wage violations, and health and safety violations in the supply chain. The STBA worked
with prosecutors to take both the brand and the workshop owners, who were themselves
Bolivian nationals, to court on charges of exploitation and violation of immigration
statutes. A judge, however, ruled in favor of the workshop owners on the grounds that
their actions were legitimate "cultural" practices of Bolivians. The ruling was widely
criticized as ridiculous, prompting condemnation from the Bolivian embassy and the
4"C/ain "Trabajo esclavo: la Comuna denunci6 a seis marcas textiles" 07/31/07
Pdg ina 12 "Ropa infantil con manchas legales" 01/16/07; "".Nos pagaban centavos por prendas que en
vidriera estaban a 30 pesos.. 01/17/07.
4()1 Pigina 12 "Denuncian a cinco marcas deportivas por explotar a los indocumentados" 07/30/07
Interview: B66, Fonmer Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires., 2/24/2009
4 Interview: 366, Former Senior Official. Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/24/2009
14"1 See: I ieutier 2010 p. 169
4" This practice is somewhat similar to the highly effective use of the "hot goods provision" by the U.S.
Department of Labor to increase costs for firms that source from illegal workshops. See: Weil 2005.
W6 Pagina 12 "Otra marca de ropa en el banquillo por una denuncia de trabajo esclavo" 03/28/07; "Allanan
un taller clandestino en Parque Avellaneda" 11/20/07; "Con la marca del trabajo esclavo" 12/13/07
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Argentine association of anthropologists, both of which claimed that exploitation of
workers was hardly an accepted cultural practice.407 Notwithstanding these setbacks,
multiple prosecutions against firms at various levels of the supply chain put significant
pressure on workshops that violated labor laws.
In addition to penalizing violators, the STBA worked with the National Institute
of Industrial Technology (INTI) 408 to create two programs to support garment production
that did not exploit workers. One program, modeled on international private-voluntary
regulation, was designed to reduce labor abuses by using the power of consumers and
brand name firms. 4 09 Brands could participate in the program and have their supply chain
certified by INTI as being free of the worst forms of labor abuses. In addition, INTI
would offer training on management systems to help brands upgrade their supply chain.
This program ultimately failed because brands did not sign up. A second program, to
create employment for displaced workers, was successful in building a cooperative. 410
The cooperative became a part of La Alameda and employed 200 people who had worked
in the clandestine factories. The cooperative sold the clothing under the label "slavery
free" in the fashionable Palermo neighborhood of Buenos Aires and made uniforms for
the police and Ministry of Defense. A coordinator for INTI explained that "due to the
labor inspections, which have closed many workshops and left hundreds ofworkers out in
the street and without employment... we are working to develop a garment cluster that
till provide job opportunitiesfor these people."4 1
Finally, the STBA was able to resist pressure against enforcement from those
firms that had immediately benefitted from labor law violations. Even though workshop
owners were able to bribe police for protection, there is no evidence that they were able
to bribe labor inspectors. The industry also lobbied against enforcement, putting pressure412 413on the STBA. Inspectors came to see the industry associations as an enemy. The
large brands made little progress putting pressure on the agency, so they changed tactics.
Instead of preventing enforcement, they eventually attempted to alter the law to reduce
their responsibility for compliance in their supply chains.414 This legislative strategy also
failed.
In sum, over a two-year period (2006-2008) enforcement levels were sustained at
high levels and the actions undertaken by the STBA approximated best practices of labor
inspection.4" While there were limitations--notably in the prosecution of SOHO and the
Pdfgina/12 "Explotaci6n, esa "costumbre ancestral"". 05/15/08; "Rechazo del consul de Bolivia"-.
05/1 5/08; La explotaci6n no es herencia cultural 06/27/08
48 Instituto Nacional de Teenologia Industrial
4(9 ,Programa de Certificaci6n INTI Compromiso Social Compartido Empresas de Indumentaria" Instituto
Nacional de Teenologia Industrial, 2006.
41 Interview: B46, La Alameda Foundation, Buenos Aires, 2/23/2009. See also: Lieutier 2010.411 Pdgina/12 "De ilegales a cooperativistas" 12/04/07.
412 Interviews: B66, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires,
2/24/2009; B39, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009
413 Interview: B11, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 &
02/1 7/09
414 Clarin "Ya se gener6 polemica por la ley contra "el trabajo esclavo"" 8/21/08. This proposed law was
eventually defeated.
4 Many of the steps taken by the STBA fit in the model of "strategic inspection." See:Weil 2008
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failure of the INTI program to engage lead firms as collaborators-enforcement was
substantial when compared with the cases discussed in the previous chapter. For
instance, after the children of workers died in the brick-making sites in Cordoba, only a
handful of worksites were closed down and inspection operations quickly ended.
Whether or not the inspections had an impact on working conditions in the garment
industry is a difficult question to answer (the workshops, after all, are clandestine and no
reliable data exist on working conditions). There were still illegal workshops in Federal
416Capital after the campaign, but there was also a noticeable change. Between 2005 and
2008 nearly 1,000 workshops were closed down, creating a real deterrent for garment
producers that selected the low road of exploitative workshops.4 " A lawyer with the
Defensor del Pueblo, who was closely involved in defending the rights of migrant
workers, described the changes this way: "My view is that this effort already created a
change ... From the total impunity at the beginning, to not having total impunity."4" In
short, the institutions that were meant to structure the labor market became somewhat
stronger.
Explaining Enforcement: Linkages and Administrative Capacity
What drove this dramatic shift in enforcement? The fire in the workshop clearly
set the change into motion, but it was by no means decisive. 419 There were other cases of
tragedies in Argentine workplaces of equal (or greater) magnitude that did not result in
intense enforcement. 420 How did the inspectors in the STBA undertake a broad,
sustained, enforcement campaign that went well beyond just responding to complaints?
Similarly to the case of construction in C6rdoba, the answer lies in a combination of
strong linkages with capable civil society partners and significant administrative capacity
accounts for the high levels of enforcement.
First, linkages with La Alameda were crucial in enabling the STBA to take such
far-reaching actions. While, as described above, officials in the MTESS would not
collaborate intensively with a civil society organization that was "not a union, " the
STBA did not have the same constraints. 4 Non-union civil society organizations did not
challenge the coalition of the head of government, Jorge Telerman of the center-left
Alianza Party.42 If the STBA could have only worked with unions, like the inspectors in
C6rdoba, enforcement levels would likely have been much lower. The union, SOIVA,
6 Some workshops have also moved out of the Federal Capital, where enforcement has been less
concentrated.
La Nacidi "El lado oscuro del negocio textil" 5/11/08
4 Interview: B 13, Defensor del Pueblo, Buenos Aires, 2/26/2009
419 Tragedies of this nature are often cited as the prime causal force behind reforms, but they are usually not
decisive. Many tragedies fail to trigger change, and for those that do, a variety of factors influence what
kind of policy change occurs. See: Carpenter and Sin 2007.
42u For example, the cases of the brick-makers in C6rdoba and construction workers in Tucumin analyzed
in the previous chapter. In 2006, over 600 registered workers were killed on the job in Argentina.
Superintendencia de Riesgos del Trabajo 2007
421 Interview: B39, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009
4 Telerman's relationship with the unions was reflected in the officials he appointed to be in charge of the
STBA, only one of whom had strong ties with unions. This union-linked official was actually forced to
resign soon after the fire in the garment workshop. Interview: Interview: B19, Metal Workers' Union
(JOM), Buenos Aires, 2/12/2009; La Naci6n "Mueren seis personas en un incendio" 3/31/06.
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simply did not request many inspections of the STBA;42 3 an official in the division of the
STBA responsible for the garment workshops recounted: "To me, the unions don 't
come. "424 Senior officials at the STBA invited SOIVA to participate in the operations
and press conferences when clandestine firms were discovered and closed, but they did
not.42 5 In fact, there were widespread accusations that the garment workers' union
SOIVA is captured by management, or a "yellow" union that discriminated against
426Bolivian migrants.
In contrast with the union, La Alameda had ample resources for the inspectors. A
lawyer closely involved with the industry explained that La Alameda's great advantage
was that "it worked directly with the people" in the workshops. These ties with workers
in the industry began around the time of the economic crisis of 2001, when La Alameda
started a soup kitchen to address social needs of its neighborhood:
"They began to build rapport with the Bolivian workers because the
bosses from the clandestine workshops sent their workers to the soup
kitchen to eat, so they didn't have to pay. After workers started to go and
eat, leaders of La Alameda began to understand what was going
on... workers started to tell stories... and La Alameda began to help people
escape from the workshops and make formal complaints. "427
According to officials from the STBA, La Alameda became a key partner in providing
"logistics, and [information] befbre, during and after" inspection operations.4 28 An
inspector explained that the people from La Alameda are crucial because they: "provide
training and teach the garment workers. They tell them what their rights are, what to do
when a labor inspector comes, how they can collaborate with the inspectors." The
inspector went on to explain that these actions are important "because the bosses scare
workers by saying that if they go out in the street or see the police they will be deported
to Bolivia...It is all a lie, they won't be sent to Bolivia. We don't deport anyone. We help
them get their documentation."4  The intermediary role of La Alameda was essential to
making worker collaboration with regulators possible.
The simple fact that La Alameda had resources did not mean that they could
automatically be used for enforcement by inspectors. Instead, an additional crucial step
was the ability of La Alameda to generate political strength by taking to the streets, which
423 Auditoria General la Ciudad Buenos Aires. "Informe Final: Direcci6n General De Protecci6n Del
Trabajo" 2006.
424 Interview: B 11, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 &
02/17/09
125 Interview: B66, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/24/2009426 Interview: B13, Defensor del Pueblo, Buenos Aires, 2/26/2009; B29, Federal Capital Labor
Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 6/30/2008. To put pressure on the union, workers involved with L a Alameda
began running in shop elections contesting SOIVA's delegates. They also created their own union, the
Unidn de Trabajadores Costureros de Buenos Aires (UTCBA) to challenge SOIVA to represent the
workers. This action created competition for SOIVA, but still little changed.
- Interview: B 13, Defensor del Pueblo, Buenos Aires, 2/26/2009
428 Interview: B39, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009
429 Interview: BI I, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 02/12//09 &
02/17/09
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lead to linkage formation. The leader of La Alameda describes how he got access to the
STBA in 2006.
"After the fire, the STBA went and did a ton of inspections in small
workshops that worked fbr small brands. They said that they didn'tfind
large brands, so we brought together all of the media outlets and went to
knock on the doors of the clandestine workshops of the large brands. All
the while we were making the government look ridiculous in the view of
the public... During that time, La Alameda was really well known and had
a strong relationship with the journalists in the press. For this reason,
politicians were afraid... In this way, La Alameda had a lot ofweight... and
that is the way we got access. Not for any other reason."4
At first, there was a lot of "distrust" between the two sides, which did not know each
other beforehand. But with political expediency and congruent objectives, linkages
began to develop. The Subsecretary of Labor saw value in collaborating because La
Alameda came with "ideas and suggestions" to go beyond an "indiscriminate policy of
inspectionfrom workshop to workshop" in order to have a greater impact. 4 1 After only a
few months of working with La Alameda, however, the Subsecretary was forced to resign
in September 2009. When he left the government and returned to a legal practice
representing workers, he became an advisor of La Alameda on legal matters.4 33
Linkages were initially shaken with the transition to a new Subsecretary of Labor,
Ariel Lieutier. Lieutier did not have a prior relationship with La Alameda, but he was
selected in part because he had experience working with unemployed workers'
movements. When he came into office, Lieutier, "went lookingfor allies" to address the
problems in the garment industry and La Alameda was the biggest player. No matter
what Lieutier did, La Alameda was going to be in the press and collaborating with the
Dfensor del Pueblo to go after the brands. At first, Lieutier and La Alameda had trouble
coming to an agreement and it took some time before they could work together, but once
again the power of La Alameda and the objectives they shared with the regulators
allowed the two to build strong linkages. By the end of 2006, the STBA under Lieutier
had gained significant intelligence from La Alameda, laying the groundwork for the 2007
campaign against the brands. Just like Pereyra, when Lieutier eventually left the STBA,
he continued collaborating with La Alameda, volunteering his advice to the organization
and its members.
13 Interview: B46, La Alameda Foundation, Buenos Aires, 2/23/2009. On the protests and attention that la
Alameda w as able to generate, see: La Naci6n "Marcha de trabajadores bolivianos" 04/05/06; "Protesta
contra el trabajo esclavo" 09/15/06.
" Intcrview: B39, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires. 2/6/2009
1 The motivations for firing of Pereyra are not obvious, but it is clear that his replacement was not
discouraged from enforcing labor law in the garment sector. There was speculation in the press and
observers that Pereyra was fired because of pressure coming from the garment industry, but this
explanation does not appear to be true because, if anything, Lieutier increased pressure on the garment
industry. Pagina 12 "Despido y poldmica" 09/09/06; La Naci6n "Una renuncia sorpresiva" 09/10/06.
4 Interview: B39, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009
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The linkages with La Alameda were extremely important, but they alone cannot
explain why enforcement had such a broad reach. If inspectors of the STBA worked with
La Alameda in the same way that wage and hour inspectors in Cordoba or in Tucumin
worked with unions (discussed in the previous chapter), enforcement would be limited to
occasions in which La Alameda subsidized inspectors by giving them necessary material
resources, such as transport and overtime pay. This clearly was not the case and the
STBA went well beyond responses to immediate complaints. To understand how, we
need to examine the administrative capacity of the STBA.
The STBA had a relatively high number of inspectors, one per 15,000 workers in
2007 (see Table A. 1 in the Appendix). This helped the STBA meet the demands for
enforcement without becoming so overwhelmed by complaints that programmed
inspections were crowded out. In addition, the STBA had a number of other features of
high administrative capacity, including an advanced database, which allowed officials to
plan and keep track of their actions. This technology made large campaigns on targeting
workshops, and analysis of the results of these campaigns, possible. In 2007 the STBA
created a specialized division within the labor inspectorate to only enforce regulations in
home-based work. The creation of a new division had three consequences. First, it
dedicated a number of inspectors, more than 15% of the total, to the problem of the
clandestine workshops. This change ensured that inspection capacity would be
apportioned to the garment industry even if other industries demanded many inspections.
This tactic contrasts strongly with the cases analyzed in the previous chapter, in which
the demands of powerful unions occupy most of the time of the inspectors and there is
little effort to reduce these pressures on a segment of inspectors.
Second, these inspectors received special training in human rights, child welfare,
and migration issues that prepared them to deal with the complex, and often extremely
difficult, problems that they encountered in the clandestine workshops. 4 34 Third, creating
a division put in place a certain amount of stability that would ensure inspection in the
sector even with a change of government. According to the officials at the time: "We
ianted to do something sustainable, to create apart of the bureaucracy that would be
dedicated to the problem of the clandestine workshops... by creating a division, it would
be difficultfor others to change it.'''These investments in the bureaucracy are similar
to those in C6rdoba during the creation of CYMAT. They also stand in stark contrast to
the approaches used by officials in the cases analyzed in the previous chapter-the STBA
matched linkages with increased administrative capacity instead of becoming dependent
on societal resources.
The high levels of administrative capacity did not, however, mean that the STBA
was a highly Weberian bureaucracy. Nearly all (99%) of inspectors had precarious
contracts and a number of inspectors were actually contracted as employees of the
University of Buenos Aires, with the government paying the university for their
436
services. One inspector in the STBA described the limitations his short-term contract
134 Interview: Bi 1, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 &
02/17/09
43 Interview: B66, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/24/2009
436 Pdgina/]2 "La paradoja de los inspectors" 09/18/08
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posed : "in this position, ifyou don't have civil service protection, you are prone to all
kinds ofpressure ... you feel somewhat constrained in front ofpowerful corporations."4 3 7
Another inspector explained, "At any moment they can unilaterally rescind our contract.
If we go and ring the bell (to inspect) the cousin of an important official, and he says to
me, 'Shut up you'll lose your contract', we are done."438 In addition, many inspectors
have jobs outside of the STBA to supplement their income (a practice that is tolerated).
While there have been some efforts to hire inspectors with a minimum level of education,
there has been no exam system to ensure meritocracy. And some of the immediate
managers of inspectors were appointed for patronage, rather than experience. In fact, the
political support for the expansion of the inspectorate was based, in part, on promises that
legislators could influence the hiring process.4 39 In short, the success of the STBA cannot
readily be explained by the fact that it had organizational characteristics that led to be a
particularly Weberian or autonomous bureaucracy.
In sum, the increases in enforcement can be traced back to a series of political
shifts that followed the tragic fire, which transferred jurisdiction over enforcement to the
government of the Federal Capital and empowered La Alameda. In turn, the combination
of linkages with La Alameda and a high level of administrative capacity in the STBA
enabled regulators to undertake the far-reaching enforcement campaign described above.
Without linkages with La Alameda, it would have been nearly impossible for inspectors
to identify so many hidden garment workshops. And without administrative capacity,
inspectors would not have been able to go beyond the immediate demands of La Alameda
and conduct broad operations.
Putting the Brakes on Enforcement
The election of the center-right Mauricio Macri (PRO), in December 2007, to the
head of government in the Federal Capital marked another shift in enforcement in the
sector. Macri was a not the favorite candidate of any workers' rights groups; he only had
440
support of two relatively small private sector unions. Under the new leadership,
administrative capacity stayed relatively high and the Home-Based Work Division
remained intact. 4 4 1 There was only a slight decrease in the number of staff, in the entire
STBA five inspectors who left were not replaced. However, upon his taking office,
Macri replaced a number of the senior officials at the STBA, removing many of those
who had developed ties with La Alameda.4 4 2 The newly appointed officials then took
steps to curb linkages. The Subsecretary of Labor instituted new rules within the
bureaucracy to control how civil society organizations (including unions) gained access
to labor inspectors, creating formal agreements guaranteeing access for some
4 Interview: B16, Inspector, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/14/2008
4 Pdgina 12 ""Trabajamos en forma precaria"" 08/15/10
439 Interview: B39, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 2/6/2009
44 Carin "Los gremios tambien juegan sus porotos por los candidatos" 05/24/07
44 There were some decreases in the numbers of inspectors, but the STBA continued to have the highest
administrative capacity of any provincial-level inspectorate in Argentina. Interview: B 11, Senior Official.
Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 & 02/17/09
442 In a similar fashion to previous changes in leadership, a few of these officials continued to work with L a
Alameda as advisors after they left office. This is further evidence of the strength of ties between these
officials and La Alameda.
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organizations, while leaving others out.443 This new policy had a direct impact on
enforcement in the garment sector. A leader of La Alameda recounted:
"With Macri, we have tried to collaborate. We have sent more than 200
addresses of workshops that have not been denounced [by the STBA]....
Nor have they denounced any of the brands that work with those
workshops. We have waited a year, patiently, fbr them to act-the time
has already passed by. "'
The weakening of linkages with La Alameda meant that the overall amount of resources
that could be mobilized for enforcement was substantially reduced. For example, the
quality, and quantity, of information about violations available to the inspectors
decreased.
The inspectors at the STBA were also blocked from pursuing certain actions, such
as enforcement campaigns. Even though they had discretion on the street, there was little
that labor inspectors could do to override the will of the political appointees when it came
to large campaigns. And because the political change also weakened their linkages, they
could no longer use their alliance with La Alameda to muster the backing for strong
actions against violators. La Alameda still had the same (if not more) capacity to
generate information about violations and to generate attention that could translate into
political support, but these resources were now much more difficult for inspectors to
mobilize.
As a consequence, levels of enforcement declined. A close observer noted that
the new Subsecretary of Labor "has not stopped working on this issue, but he does not do
it as well as the others."4 45 La Alameda and its allies were highly critical of the new
administration, writing in an open letter to Macri:
"During the period 2006-2007, the Defensor del Pueblo and the STBA
closed hundreds of clandestine workshops, denounced dozens ofbrands,
and brought workshop owners to Federal justice for servitude, human
trafficking, and slavery and significantly reduced the quantity of
workshops with a policy of inspection, penalties, and publicity ... After
[Macrij took office, there was a significant reduction in the fight against
slave labor... his policy consisted of bean counting inspections without
penalties for factories that exploited undocumented workers nor collecting
fines that were placed on closed workshops that have once again
mysteriously began functioning recently. "446
In sum, the enforcement in the garment industry was fleeting. Although administrative
capacity did not significantly decline, linkages between inspectors and capable allies in
44 Interviews: B08, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 9/23/2008; B49,
Laundry Workers' Union (UOETSYLRA), Buenos Aires, 6/30/08 & 10/20/08
444 Interview: B46, La Alameda Foundation, Buenos Aires, 2/23/2009
44 Interview: B 13, Defensor del Pueblo, Buenos Aires, 2/26/2009
446 An open letter from La Alameda and the Asociaci6n Civil Que no se Repita to Mauricio Macri
9/27/2010. See also: Pdgina/12 "Una carta abierta sobre la corrupci6n" 9/27/2010
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civil society were fragile, and enforcement was reduced dramatically when political
support was lost.
Conclusion: Co-Produced Enforcement
At first brush, the cases of the construction industry in C6rdoba and the garment
industry in the Federal Capital appear to be quite different from one another. These two
industries involve distinct technologies of production and different types of markets (one
with international competition and another largely local). The way interests are
organized in each industry also varied considerably. In C6rdoba inspectors worked with
a labor union, UOCRA, through formal and informal institutional arrangements that built
on the corporatist structures of Argentine labor politics. In contrast, in the Federal
Capital inspectors collaborated with an organization that was anything but a union. In
fact, La Alameda directly challenged the privileged access that labor unions had to the
state and functioned without the organizational inducements (or constraints) under which
unions operate. This attribute of La Alameda casts doubt on the possibility that linkages
between inspectors and civil society organizations are only a vestige of Argentina's
historical corporatist legacy. In addition, the political coalitions of elected officials were
very different across these cases. In C6rdoba, the governors were from the labor-based
PJ party that had a strong alliance with unions. In the garment industry case, the industry
started out under the MTESS, which was overseen by politicians from the PJ, but when
enforcement had reached high levels, the political leaders above the regulators were from
the center-left Alianza party that controlled the Federal Capital.
Notwithstanding these differences, there were a few key similarities. In contrast
with the cases analyzed in the previous chapter, in both Cordoba construction and Federal
Capital garment industry, inspectors drew upon civil society resources without being
dependent on them. While in Tucumin inspections were limited to places where unions
could physically accompany inspectors, in both C6rdoba health and safety and the
Federal Capital, there was no such constraint. CYMAT inspectors in C6rdoba went to
construction sites even when UOCRA did not request an inspection. Similarly, inspectors
in the Federal Capital took an approach that did not depend on La Alameda. Regulators,
in both cases, had the administrative capacity to take actions on their own. The result
was a pattern of enforcement that approximated the co-produced ideal-type.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Cases
Industry Administrative Civil Society Linkages Enbrcemeni
(Time) Capacity Strength Level
C6rdoba Construction High High Strong High
(2003-2009)
Federal Capital Garment High High Weak Low
(2003-2006)
Federal Capital Garment High High Strong High
(2006-2008)
Federal Capital Garment High High Weak Medium
(2008-2009)
These cases provide evidence that enforcement is not merely a matter of political
will, administrative capacity, or civil society strength alone, but rather a combination of
these factors. Consistent with theories of political control of the bureaucracy, top-down
support for enforcement was key. In C6rdoba, CYMAT inspectors were pushed by
appointed officials who supported enforcement in the construction industry; and before
Macri took power, senior officials at the STBA made the garment industry a priority.
Political support from appointed officials worked directly on the bureaucracy, but also
indirectly by altering linkages between inspectors and their allies in society that provided
key inputs for enforcement. In addition, civil society organizational strength alone does
not appear to be doing all of the work La Alameda's capacity, either to provide
resources to inspectors or to mobilize politically, did not change dramatically from 2005
onward. Yet, the availability of those resources to inspectors did change as linkages were
formed when jurisdiction was transferred to the STBA, and then broken with the election
of Macri. In a similar manner, the defining feature of enforcement in the construction
industry in C6rdoba was not union strength. UOCRA clearly had many resources to offer
inspectors and was strong politically, but it was not substantially better positioned than
many of the unions in industries analyzed in the previous chapter (e.g. the metal workers'
union in Cordoba). The difference between enforcement in construction and in other
industries was in the how the inspectors utilized societal resources-with more
administrative capacity CYMAT had options that were simply unavailable to the
inspectors in the wage and hour division. These findings suggest that the resources of
civil society organizations on their own are not determinant of enforcement levels, but
that linkages and administrative capacity need to be taken into account as well.
Finally, an important feature of both these cases was that civil society resources
were not used as a substitute for state resources, but as a complement. This development,
perhaps more than anything, appears to be a key factor in building enforcement capacity
in the long-term. The following chapter examines the politics behind linkage formation
and investment in capacity to develop a more complete explanation for enforcement.
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Chapter 5: Partisanship, Linkages and Capacity
The argument advanced thus far in this dissertation highlights the role that
combinations of linkages and administrative capacity play in determining whether, and
how, regulations are enforced. Chapter 3 analyzed cases of society-dependent
enforcement. This pattern of enforcement was traced back to particularly low levels of
administrative capacity, which constrained the state labor inspectors, combined with
strong inspector-union linkages, which enabled regulators to take action in specific
industries. While enforcement was made possible by linkages, it was also clearly limited.
By contrast, in the cases of co-produced enforcement discussed in Chapter 4, linkages
were combined with high levels of administrative capacity, thereby creating the
conditions for enforcement beyond instances in which societal groups could supplement
the state. A series of questions emerge from this analysis: What explains these
combinations of linkages and administrative capacity? Why do linkages sometimes
sibstitutefbr administrative capacity?
This chapter explores these questions by tracing the history of labor
administration in Santa Fe, and comparing it with C6rdoba and Tucumin. In Santa Fe
during the 1980s, systematic appointments of leaders from organized labor effectively
gave unions control over labor administration, and inspectors built strong linkages with
unions. Despite the pro-labor political appointments, there was very little investment in
administrative capacity. This pattern, by which linkages were used as a substitute for
capacity, persisted for over twenty years until, in 2007, there was major reform that
significantly increased administrative capacity, mainly in the health and safety division.
In C6rdoba, the trajectory of the inspectorate was nearly a mirror image of Santa Fe. In
the 1980s, there was significant investment in administrative capacity in Cordoba. Over
time, administrative capacity declined and, after the economic crisis in 2001, unions
pushed to increase investment in labor inspection once again. Instead of capacity, unions
were given key appointments and attempts at reform failed. Similarly, in Tucumin, in
2003 Governor Alperovich attempted to reform the inspectorate, reduce the influence of
unions, and increase administrative capacity by hiring new inspectors. When the plan
was met with resistance from labor inspectors and union leaders, investment was halted
and union control was reaffirmed through the appointment of union leaders. As a result,
linkages remained strong while administrative capacity stayed weak. These cases, which
will be described in detail below, demonstrate that linkages and administrative capacity
are not set in stone and there are differences across time and space. They also suggest
that the politics of enforcement are more complex than a simple translation of the agenda
of politicians for or against regulation into bureaucratic budgets or practices, as is often
central to explanations of regulatory politics.
This chapter offers an explanation for these changes, focusing on the ways in
which interactions between union leaders and elected officials are conditioned by their
partisan contexts. When the partisan allies of unions are in office, it is much less costly
for elected officials to reward key union leaders with appointments that facilitate linkages
than to allocate scarce resources for investments in administrative capacity. The most
powerful union leaders gain appointments and, by virtue of these appointments, defricto
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control over the agency. As a result, unions become relatively reticent to agitate for more
investment in the inspectorate; for favored unions, an under-resourced agency they can
control is more valuable than an agency with greater capacity that they cannot control.
When the governing party does not have partisan ties with the unions, the dynamics of
this interaction change substantially. For the elected official, the cost of giving
opposition unions control over a regulatory agency is relatively high compared with that
of allocating scare resources to invest in administrative capacity. And unions have less to
risk when criticizing the government about the lack of investment in administrative
capacity when serious labor law violations are (inevitably) discovered. Under these
conditions, linkages are less likely to substitute for capacity. It follows that the elected
officials most likely to invest in capacity are those who both favor strengthening
institutions through enforcement and are not partisan allies of unions.
This argument builds on the literature of the politics of economic reform. To
account for why reforms tended to reward certain groups and not others, scholars focused
on context in which interest groups interact, especially the role of partisanship.4 4 7 This
literature provides a starting point for identifying the political underpinnings of linkages
and administrative reform. Dominant arguments about the politics of labor policy in this
line of research, however, suggest that the combination of political uncertainty (due to
close elections) and partisan alliances between organized labor and the political party in
power are likely to result in pro-labor policies.4 4 8 In contrast, the argument advanced in
this chapter further disaggregates the rewards that workers gain, finding that partisan
alliances can result in more uneven benefits for workers, privileging strong unions at the
expense of investment that enables broad enforcement. This analysis of the politics of
regulatory agencies raises questions about how far studies of changes in labor law, which
have dominated the literature, can be generalized to other aspects of regulatory politics.
The first section of this chapter analyzes a snapshot of variation in linkages and
administrative capacity in 2008-09 across a number of provinces. The cross-sectional
survey finds that there is a robust relationship between partisanship and linkages, but the
association between partisanship and administrative capacity is less clear. The second
section traces the history of Santa Fe in detail, focusing on key moments in the
development of labor administration and the ways in which partisanship context
influenced union-governor interactions and, ultimately, labor administration. The third
section contrasts Santa Fe with C6rdoba and Tucuman, placing Santa Fe in comparative
context and evaluating alternative explanations for reforms of regulatory agencies.
Variation in Administrative Capacity and Linkages
The previous two chapters introduced variation in linkages and administrative
capacity in labor regulation. In some cases, such as in Tucumain's TST and C6rdoba's
wage and hour division, inspectors and union leaders had very strong linkages that
allowed for a constant flow of information and unfettered sharing of material resources
that, at times, bordered on capture. In other cases, such as in the Federal Capital under
For example: Gibson 1997; Levitsky and Way 1998; Murillo 2000; Kingstone 2001; Snyder 200 l a;
Schneider 2004; Murillo 2005; Murillo and Schrank 2005
4 Murillo 2001: Murillo 2005; Murillo and Schrank 2005
112
Macri, linkages were more controlled and filters within the bureaucracy limited the
inspectors' ability to access the resources of some unions (along the resources of other
civil society organizations). Table 5.1 shows inspector responses to survey questions
related to union involvement in inspection. These data compare linkages in a systematic
fashion across the three provinces discussed above, as well as the provinces Corrientes,
Santa Cruz and Santa Fe.449 Inspectors' responses are divided between those who work
in provinces with the partisan allies of unions in power (PJ) and those who work in
provinces with governors from other parties (Non-PJ).
These data suggest that there is a strong relationship between partisanship and
inspector-union linkages. For nearly all of the questions, inspectors from PJ provinces
indicated greater union participation than in the Non-PJ provinces. The questions with
the most striking contrasts are about types of union participation that give the most
control to the unions over how the inspection occurs. In PJ provinces, only 23% of
inspectors indicate the unions "never" help the inspector collect information from
workers during inspections, contrasting sharply with the 50% of inspectors in non-PJ
provinces who chose this response. Congruently, when asked whether, after finding a
violation, the inspectors talked with union leaders and give the firm time to comply "only
ifthe union leader agrees", 22% of inspectors in PJ provinces responded "never", in
contrast with 81% of inspectors from non-PJ provinces. Responses to other questions
about union leaders accompanying inspections, observing inspections, providing cars,
orienting inspectors towards the most important problems during inspections, and
collaborating with follow-up after the inspection all had similar results. In sum, these
data support the conclusion that partisan alliances between the governor and labor unions
influence linkage formation.
449 The survey was conducted in 2009 of inspectors in six provinces. See Chapter 1 for a description and
the appendix for a full English translation.
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Table 5.]1: Union Participation in Inspections4
During Inspections, how often does a union representative:
Orient the inspector towards
the most important problems Non-PJ
Almost Always
26%
18%
Help the inspector with p
knowledge about the I%%
collective bargaining Non-PJ
agreement 35% 45% 20%
Help the inspector collect pJ 23% 47% 31%information from the
workers Non-PJ 60% 33% 6%
Collaborate with follow-up PJ 19% 43% 38%
after the inspection Non-PJ 47% 35% 19%
When you encounter a violation of labor laws, how often do you:
Never Sometimes Almost Alwavs
Talk with the union and give PJ ?2, 34% 43%
the firm time to comply
when the union agrees Non-PJ 81% 13% 6%
There could be, however, other factors besides partisanship that drive these
differences in union participation in inspections. Maybe linkages are really a result of
union strength, rather than union-governor alliances? Or perhaps linkages are driven by
an alignment between union and inspector attitudes about appropriate enforcement? To
control for these, and other, variables, I statistically examine the relationship between
partisanship and inspector-union linkages using a series of regression analyses. To
operationalize the indicators of inspector-union linkages, I scored all responses to
questions about the frequency of union participation (never=-1, sometimes=0, and almost
always=1). I then created a "union score" for each individual inspector based on their
' Non-responses are not shown. Columns do not add up to 100 because of rounding and non-responses.
See Table A5. 1 in the appendix for summary statistics.
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35% 46%
Never Sometimes
average responses to the union participation questions. The main explanatory variable of
interest is the party of the governor in power (coded using a simple dummy variable).
The expectation is that this variable will have a statistically significant positive
relationship with indicators of linkages.
The control variables explore a series of potential compounding factors. First, the
number of inspectors per capita tests for whether the correlation between linkages and
partisanship is merely a product of different levels of staffing. Second, the rate of union
participation in the province indicates the degree to which the power of unions,
independent of partisanship, drives differences in linkages. 45 ' Third, field research
indicated that health and safety inspectors, for a variety of reasons, tend to have different
relationship with unions than wage and hour inspectors 4  Therefore, the regression
analyses include an indicator of whether or not inspectors work primarily in health and
safety. Fourth, inspector-union linkages may be influenced by the inspectors' attitudes
towards enforcement, instead of partisanship. To control for whether or not inspectors
with more strict attitudes towards enforcement are more apt to work with unions, the
regressions include a variable coded by inspector agreement with the statement:
"Sometimes, it is more important that the workers have jobs than that the firm complies
with all of the laws." Finally, linkages could be the result of bureaucratic practices
related to autonomy, such as civil service protection, that could make inspectors more or
less likely to work with unions. Therefore, for each inspector, a variable is included that
indicates whether they have a short-term contract or civil service protection.45
Table 5.2 presents the results of a series of regressions that analyze the average
union score, as well as the particular union actions during inspections. The results of all
the regressions indicate that governor-union partisan alliances are correlated with strong
inspector-union linkages, even after including controls. 454 In the first regression (Model
1), which analyzes the union score, the estimated effect of the dummy variable for
governor-union partisan alliance is positive and statistically significant. Of the controls,
only two were significant.455 The remaining regressions (Models 2-5) examine responses
to questions about specific types of union participation.4 56 For every individual question,
the coefficient on the governor-union alliance variable is positive and statistically
151 All data from the survey of inspectors. Union strength data is calculated from the SIEMPRO National
Survey in 2001. This method is imperfect, but it is one of the best available estimates of union strength.
See: Marshall and Perelman 2004.
4 The reason for health and safety inspectors having different relationships appears with unions appears to
stem from union priorities-many union leaders are more concerned with, and knowledgeable about, wage
and hour issues than health and safety issues.
m This captures whether or not unions are more likely to be linked with inspectors who are most exposed
to political influence.
411 Model I uses a simple linear regression, with standard errors clustered by province.
" Inspectors in provinces with more inspectors per capita, and health and safety inspectors, are less likely
to \\ ork with unions
SIhese regressions use an ordered logit model with standard errors clustered by province.
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significant. The results of these regressions further support the argument that that
partisan alliances are behind inspector-union linkages
Table 5.2: Partisanship and Inspector-Union Linkage Regressions458
nion Provide car Gather F -up Advict on
Safeibilit
Governor-union 0.31** 1.8** 1.9** 0.93* 2.7**
partisan alliance (0.07) (0.59) (0.29) (0.43) (0.29)
Provincial inspl -0.60** -3.5** -0.97** -1.6** -1.1**
population (0.05) (0.84) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
Provincial union -0.19 2.7 -8.8** -6.8* -1.0
affiliation rate (0.31) (1.6) (2.8) (2.9) (1.7)
Health & safety -0.52** -2.9** -0.71 -1.7* -1.2
specialist (0.09) (0.74) (0.76) (0.78) (1.4)
Flexibility on jobs vs. 0.07 0.066 0.14 0.41 -0.04
compliance (0.08) (0.31) (0.49) (0.27) (0.47)
Civil service 0.22 0.042 0.03 1.1* 0.84**
protection (0.11) (0.61) (0.43) (0.5) (0.29)
Number of 153 148 146 145 152
observations
The analysis above suggests that partisanship plays a large role in shaping linkage
formation, but what about administrative capacity? The previous two chapters described
levels of administrative capacity in Cordoba, the Federal Capital, and Tucumin, which
varied substantially. Table 5.3 below summarizes the differences in administrative
capacity across these three provinces along with Santa Fe in 2009 (more detailed
indicators of administrative capacity are in Table Al in the dissertation appendix). The
snapshot of data at a single point in time does not reveal a relationship between capacity
in places where the partisan allies of unions are in power. For instance, Tucumin, a
province with the PJ in power, clearly has the lowest levels of administrative capacity of
all. C6rdoba, also with the PJ in power, has relatively low levels in the wage and hour
division, but higher levels of administrative capacity in the health and safety division. In
contrast with the PJ cases, the Federal Capital clearly has the highest levels of
administrative capacity across both dimensions. And Santa Fe is an intermediary case,
with the health and safety division having greater capacity than wage and hour. Across
these provinces, it appears that partisan alliances between governors and unions may not
increase investment in administrative capacity.
457 With the exceptions of union strength in Models 3 and 4, the controls that have significant coefficients
are all in the expected direction. This appears to be due to the fact that some PJ provinces actually have
substantially lower levels of union affiliation than non-PJ provinces.
41 Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. Model I is a robust linear regression with standard errors
clustered by province. Models 2-5 are ordered probit models with standard errors clustered by province.
*p<0.05- **p<0.01. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A5.1 in the appendix.
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Table 5.3: Simplified Comparison ofAdministrative Capacity (2009)
Inspectorate Governor-Union Size of Staff Material
Partisan Alliance Resources
C6rdoba (wage & hour) PJ Medium Low
C6rdoba (health & safety) PJ Medium High
Federal Capital Non-PJ High High
Santa Fe (wage & hour) Non-PJ Low Medium
Santa Fe (health & safety) Non-PJ Medium High
Tucuman PJ Low Low
This cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between partisanship and
administrative capacity cannot, however, rule out alternative explanations. For example,
within the provinces of C6rdoba and Santa Fe, there are substantial differences between
divisions of the inspectorate, which cannot be accounted for by partisanship alone.
Provincial wealth also appears to be a factor-the richest province, the Federal Capital,
has the highest levels across both dimensions, and the poorest province, Tucumin, has
the lowest levels. Therefore, we cannot draw any firm conclusions from static data of a
small set of provinces. To better understand the relationship between partisanship,
administrative capacity, and linkages, the remainder of the chapter analyzes changes in
provinces over time.
Labor Administration in Santa Fe
The recent history of the labor politics in Santa Fe had three distinct political
periods (see Table 5.4). First, between the return to democracy and 1991, the labor-based
PJ took power and the main unions were important players in the governing coalition.
Second, between 1991 and 2007, the PJ remained in power and the governors had a
partisan alliance with the union centrals, but the Peronist faction that won the
gubernatorial elections was not closely aligned with unions and provincial policies took a
decidedly pro-market turn. Third, in 2007, Hermes Binner from the Socialist Party (PS)
was elected and the PJ lost control of the province for the first time. The following three
sections examine each of these periods in turn, focusing on changes in linkages and
administrative capacity. To explore the impact of these changes on enforcement, these
sections are followed by an analysis of enforcement in the construction industry between
2003 and 2009.
117
Table 5.4: Governors of Santa Fe (1983 - Present)
Period Years Governor Relationship with Organized Labor
1983-1987 Jos6 Maria Vernet (PJ) Partisan tie and from union faction
1987-1991 Victor Reviglio (PJ) Partisan tie and from union faction
1991-1995 Carlos Alberto Reutemann (PJ) Partisan tie, not from union faction
2 1995-1999 Jorge Obeid (PJ) Partisan tie, not from union faction
1999-2003 Carlos Alberto Reutemann (PJ) Partisan tie, not from union faction
2003-2007 Jorge Obeid (PJ) Partisan tie, not from union faction
3 2007-2011 Hermes Binner (PS) No partisan tie to unions
Formation of the Secretaria de Estado de Trabajo de Santa Fe (1983-1991)
For the first eight years after the return to democracy, Santa Fe was led by
governors who were closely allied with organized labor. The first governor, Jose Maria
Vernet, had been an accountant for the metal workers union (UOM), and the second
governor, Victor Reviglio, drew on unions for significant support.4 59 Both of these
governors had partisan ties to organized labor through the PJ, and, during the 1980s,
unions had a strong position in the PJ (both nationally and in the province). In 1985, the
province regained control of labor inspection from the national government (which had
been centralized under the military regime) and formed the Secretaria de Estado de
iabajo de Santa Fe (STSF). 460 By creating a secretaria de estado, which is the second-
highest designation for an agency, Vernet sent a signal that labor administration was
politically important. 461
The initial staffing of the STSF was heavily marked by union involvement.
Governor Reviglio gave his allies from organized labor key slots in the management of
the STSF, placing union leaders in all appointed positions; a longtime official recalled:
"When the STSF formed, the Secretary of Labor was from a union, below him the
Director was from a union, and the Sub-director was from a union."462 In addition to
459 Zapata 1994; Levitsky 2003 p. 93, 123
4 The legislature passed the law to authorize the STSF in 1985 under Vernet, but the province did not hire
staff and fully take over the task of labor administration until 1988 when Reviglio was in office; as a
consequence, both governors played a key role in the early days of the STSF. Interview: S 12, Senior
Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/12/2008; S27, Labor Lawver and
advisor to CGT, Rosario, 5/13/2009
461 In the hierarchy of agencies, ministries are the highest, followed by secretarias de estado (state
secretariats), then by secretariats (which are contained within ministries), then by sub-secretariats and
departments. These ranks have significance both in terms of resources (ministries tend to have larger
budgets) and in political control (ministers and the heads of secretarias de estado respond directly to
governor without any intermediaries). As of 2008, approximately 20% of provinces have labor
administration as a secretaria de estado or greater (see Table A5.3 in the appendix).
46 Interview: SI5, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/l l/2008. These
olTicials included union leaders from the water utility union and the food workers' union. Interview\.: 502.
Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario, 5/5/2009
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political appointments, the governor also rewarded unions with patronage positions that
filled out the ranks of the bureaucracy:
"When they were forming the agency, unions sent lists ofpeople who
could work for the inspectorate, and the governor chose from those lists.
Labor inspectors were not selected based on their education, experience,
or an exam ... [Instead], a scheme of politically designated people was put
together. "463
Not only did the unions get to place people in valuable public sector positions, but they
also ensured that their allies completely permeated the STSF. After a year, these initial
hires were given civil service protection, locking them in the STSF for decades; over
60% of wage and hour inspectors in 2009 had been hired before 1990 under this
patronage system.464 In short, organized labor in Santa Fe was given nearly complete
control over the STSF through political appointments and unions permeated the
bureaucracy.
Governor Reviglio did not, however, give workers a regulatory agency that could
enforce labor laws on its own. There was no effort to train the new inspectors so that
they could become experts, an inspector recalled that senior officials "just told us how to
fill out the forms, nothing more, and we went out into the street."465 The STSF
essentially had no budget beyond the minimum to cover the salaries of the officials. To
fund all non-salary operating costs, the STSF was expected to rely on the money
collected through fines. 4 66 But the fines were not enough to provide basic resources, such
as cars inspectors could use to reach firms. Not surprisingly, regulators were highly
dependent on union leaders; inspectors drew on union leaders for much of their material
resources, one inspector recounted that "when you havefew cars, andyou have to do a
number of inspections that aren't local, the union leaders say 'Come in our car'and you
go."467 For over two years, the STSF only responded to complaints and never conducted
any programmed inspections. In addition, inspectors were not expected to be experts in
labor law or in managing conflict, instead they were appendages of the union leaders who
were able to use inspectors as they wanted.
In sum, in the first two administrations after the return to democracy, the STSF
was formed with low levels of administrative capacity and high linkages. Governors
Reviglio and Vernet gave their union allies extensive control over labor administration
through appointments, but did not invest budgetary resources in the STSF.
163 Interview: S12, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/12/2008
Source: Survey of inspectors. For example, one inspector, who was hired in 1988 because she was the
personal assistant of the secretary general of the health care workers' unions, remained an inspector until
the time of this research. Interview: SOS, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa
Fe. 12/11/2008
1Interview: S 15, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/11/2008; S02,
Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario, 5/5/2009
166 T[his arrangement greatly influenced the behavior of the inspectors; one of their central goals was "tax
collection- to keep the organization going. To evaluate their actions, inspectors were asked "how much did
we collect this month?", not "what was the result of inspection? " Interview: S12, Senior Official, Santa Fe
Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/12/2008
40 Interview: S12, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/12/2008
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Decline in Union influence and a Chance at Reform (1991-2007)
The gubernatorial elections of 1991 in Santa Fe marked the end of strong union
influence in the governing coalition. Internal competition among factions of the PJ
resulted in the election of the outsider, Carlos Alberto Reutemann, as governor.4 68
Reutemann was aligned with President Carlos Menem, who, at the national level, pursued
a pro-market agenda and attempted to liberalize labor laws. 4 69 Even though Reutemann
retained his partisan alliance with key elements of organized labor through the PJ, he was
not a close ally to the unions. He pursued an agenda that was in line with the
"neoliberal" policies of Menem, including large scale privatization of services and
provincial-owned enterprises. In 1995, Reutemann's successor, and ally, Jorge Obeid
was elected governor. Following Obeid's first term, these two men were both reelected
in succession, with Reutemann serving a second term from 1999-2003, followed by
Obeid's second term from 2003 to 2007. As a consequence, organized labor in Santa Fe
found itself in a difficult position: their partisan allies were in power, but unions did not
hold high levels of sway in the governing coalition.4 70
During this time, the administrative capacity of the STSF declined from its
already low levels. Staffing was inconsistent and the material resources for enforcement
were further reduced. 471 Between 1995, 1996 and 1997, the number of labor inspectors
fluctuated rapidly-dropping from 41 to 10, and the increasing to 22, where it stayed
until 2000.47 These levels of human resources were extremely low for the size of the
province-to put Santa Fe in comparative perspective, it had approximately half the
number of inspectors per capita in C6rdoba at the end of the decade. The cuts in
personnel in Santa Fe occurred during a time in which the number of public employees in
the province actually increased, indicating that the reductions in staffing for labor
inspection were not only part of a broader policy of state downsizing. For the
inspectors who remained through these changes, there were fewer material resources to
use for enforcement. Inspectors only had one vehicle to cover the entire province, which
is over 400 miles long. Moreover, with a series of economic crises, self-financing
through fines became extremely difficult. An official from this period recounted:
"We had many internal contradictions. On the one hand, we lived better
when we collected many fines, because we used those fuinds to operate the
STSF, but on the other hand, we didn't have the will to collect. "4
During the crisis of 2001, instead of conducting pedagogical inspections, inspectors
essentially stopped working. No efforts were made to train inspectors or to hire staff with
468 Zapata 1994; McGuire 1997; Levitsky 2003; Petracca 2003
469 Etchemendy and Palermo 1998; Murillo 2005
4 This was the same political arrangement at the national level, in which the CGT had a partisan alliance
with Menem, who tried to liberalize labor laws (described in Chapter 2).
41 Interview: Sl9, Senior Official, Inspection Department, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security.,
Rosario, 5/7/2009
42 Data from various sources, including Lucas Ronconi. See: Ronconi 2010
m7 The provincial public sector increased from 28 public employees per 1,000 residents in 1990 to 34 per
1,000 in 2000. Source: Ministry of Economy and Public Finance data.
47 Interviews. S32, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/15/2008
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higher levels of education. As the salaries declined, corruption festered.47  A senior
official in the STSF from 1999-2003 explained: "The corruption was very entrenched
and really tough to fight against. And after four years... that I worked on it, I couldn't
eradicate it."4 6 For the inspectors, accusations of corruption "took away their prestige"
so that workers would not come to them with problems. When a prominent businessman
accused inspectors of being corrupt in 2000, the provincial government did little to
defend them; one inspector noted "How do you think Ifelt when my daughter came to me
and said: 'Dad, are you one of them? Are you corrupt?...And what did the government
do to support us. Nothing."477 In combination, all of these factors reduced the capacity
of the STSF.
In a weaker position within the governing coalition, organized labor lost some
political influence in the leadership of the STSF, but union leaders still kept very strong
linkages with labor inspectors. After 1991, unionist were no longer able to gain the top
Secretary of Labor position, which instead went to a series of outsiders who were well
connected politically within the PJ (from non-union factions). 4 78 For example,
Reutemann appointed a Sub-Secretary of Labor who was a Peronist party activist with no
ties to labor unions.4 79 The appointed officials who were not from the labor movement
had misgivings about the heavy involvement of unions in inspection. An official
described the problem: "Our job is to protect the workers, we needed to have a
relationship equidistant from workers and employers, to have the objectivity necessary to
analyze conflicts. But if the union is giving me food to eat, and a car, I lose
objectivity. ''480 Despite their absence at the top of the bureaucracy, union leaders
managed to gain middle management positions in the STSF and the lower level union
leaders retained their allies in the civil service. These appointments kept linkages strong,
and union leaders remained influential by continuing to give inspectors the resources they
needed, including cars and payments for travel. The partisan alliance between the PJ and
organized labor was sufficient to keep linkages open, even against the will of some of the
people appointed to run the STSF.
In 2003, a national change in labor policy created an opportunity for reform in the
STSF. The election of President Nestor Kirchner, and the national rejection of Menem-
style free-market policies, put labor law enforcement back on the agenda (as described in
Chapter 2). In the post-crisis period, Santa Fe's economy had some of the highest growth
* Interviews: S35, CGT Rosario, Rosario, 5/4/2009; S38, Labor Lawyer and advisor to CGT, Rosario,
5/5/2009
476 Interviews: S32, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/15/2008
4 Interview: S34, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministiy of Labor and Social Security, Rosario, 5/5/2009
4 Interview: S02, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario, 5/5/2009. For
example, in his second administration, Reutemann appointed Ruben Dunda as Secretary of Labor. Dunda
was a politician who went on to be candidate for congress and was not a favorite of the unions.
479 Interview: S32, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/15/2008
480 Interview: S32, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/15/2008. In some
cases, the unions captured the inspectors and their interaction devolved into corruption: "In Rosario, the
unions would always look for the [same] inspectors and would use them. In construction, this happened a
lot. The union would go get the inspector, leave him in the car, and the union leaders went to get a bribe
from the firm, saying that if they don't pay, they will be inspected." Interview: S11, Former Senior Official,
Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Reconquista, Santa Fe, 12/16/2008
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rates in the country, and organized labor shifted from the defensive to the offense. Union
leaders were no longer worried primarily about retaining jobs in the face of high levels of
unemployment, but now could fight for salaries and benefits.48 '
There was also new interest from organized labor in increasing capacity of the
STSF. Unions in Rosario started to complain about the lack of inspectors in the press;
the head of the commercial sector union was quoted in the newspaper saying: " To control
the cascade of abuses that we know are occurring, [our union] would need ten inspectors
every day... but today there are no more than seven inspectors jor all of the unions. "482
Within the diverse currents of organized labor, a faction of unions that had broken off
from the main Peronist centrals and gave its support to an opposition deputy from the
Radical party who proposed a reform that would increase the budget of the STSF by
nearly 60% and hire more inspectors.4 83 In addition, the election of Governor Obeid in
his second term had been extremely close; he won without even a plurality and the PJ's
total vote share was only 43%.484 If the interaction of labor-based candidates, close
elections, and competition within the union leadership leads to pro-labor policies, as the
literature suggests, the early period after the crisis was ripe for reform investment in
administrative capacity.485
Notwithstanding these seemingly favorable conditions, investment in the STSF
was very modest compared with other provinces during this period. The newly appointed
officials complained that they found the STSF practically "disappeared' due to the
"neoliberal" policies of the 1990S.486 They made statements to the press indicating there
had been "apolitical decision by Governor Jorge Obeid to reinforce [labor ilspeclion|/"
and that the STSF made it "a top priority to hire more agents and to train them."48 But
new inspectors were never hired; a senior official explained: "We didn 't get to hire iewi
staff; and we lost some to retirement. The Governor was very strict... with fiinding. "41
The resources were simply not forthcoming. In one delegation of the STSF, the head of
the local office complained that: "From 2005 to today (2007) we have put three formal
requests to the STSF asking for more people and a car, but nothing changed."489 The
health and safety division was "insufficient" according to the Secretary of Labor-the
STSF only had five (three in Rosario and two in the city of Santa Fe) health and safety
inspectors who were paid for by the national government (not out of the provincial
budget). 490 In response to requests to open a new delegation in the growing industrial
city of San Lorenzo, the STSF opened the office, but gave it no resources. After a
worker died in a construction accident, the head of the CGT-San Lorenzo complained
a Interview: S35, CGT Rosario, Rosario, 5/4/2009
4 La Capital "Por gremio: cudntos son y cuAnto ganan" 11/30/03
4 La Capital "Gremios del cord6n impulsan una reforma laboral" 07/13/06
4,4 In 2003, Santa Fe had a double simultaneous voting system, which gave Obeid victory because the total
votes for the PJ (43%) were greater than those for the rival PS (38%). Obeid's ticket, however actually a
smaller portion of votes (2 1%) than the main Socialist candidate, Hermes Binner (36%).
485 Murillo 2001; Murillo 2005
46 Interview: S11, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Reconquista, Santa Fe, 1 2/16/2008
487 La Capital "En Rosario se detect6 un 30% de empleo informal" 04/28/05.
4" Interview: S11, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Reconquista, Santa Fe, 1 2/16/2008
4 La Capital "Limitaciones para combatir trabajo en negro" 07/19/07.4 La Capital "Pocos inspectores para evitar los accidentes laborales" 0 1/13/05
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"the delegation doesn't have personnel, a telephone... or even a car jor the officials. Like
this, they can't regulate ...and businesses are never going to respect them. "491
Senior officials were, however, successful in getting some resources for the STSF.
For example, they managed to upgrade the information technology in the STSF: "when
we arrived, there were seven computers, and when we left there were one hundred. "492
The investment aligned with the modernization of inspection that was occurring at the
national level, linking the STSF to the database of the national tax agency (AFIP). It was
supported by both union leaders and by the main industry association, the Industrial
Federation of Santa Fe (Federacidn Industrial de Santa Fe), because it "simplified' the
regulatory process.4 93 Close observers noted that these investments were not the
primarily the result of union pressure, but rather due to a broader effort to modernize
public administration.4 94
Notwithstanding these improvements, according to union leaders, the STSF
simply "did not have the resources" it needed for enforcement.495 By the end of Obeid's
term, an official in the STSF lamented the inability of the state to confront labor
violations, and described the situation by stating: "when the inspectors go out to conduct
programmed inspections, they are labeled corrupt [coimeros]. Meanwhile, the union
leaders don't come when it isn't in their interest to go out on the street with corrupt
inspectors. The problem is extremely grave."496 In sum, there was only a partial
investment in administrative capacity, which focused on material resources instead of
hiring more inspectors or reforming the inspectorate to decrease corruption.
Although Obeid only allocated funds for a modest increase in administrative
capacity, the governor, once again, gave organized labor influential positions of the STSF
(below the level of the Secretary of Labor). When he was elected for his second term,
Obeid appointed a former judge, Alberto Gianneschi, to head the STSF as Secretary of
Labor and gave rival union leaders from the auto workers' union (SMATA) and the metal
workers union (UOM) the top posts at the main regional offices in Rosario and Santa Fe
Capital, respectively.497 By splitting the STSF between two major factions of unions, the
governor did not alienate either group and was able to bring conflict among these two
unions into the STSF itself.498 And with appointments in key positions, union leaders
"i' La Capital "Firrmat- Piden una delegaci6n de la Secretaria de Trabajo " 08/25/04; "Nuevo local de la
Secretaria de Trabajo en San Lorenzo" 04/07/05; "Muri6 un joven al caer del techo de un silo en Timbnes"
03/16/06. Interview: S19, Senior Official, Inspection Department, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social
Security, Rosario, 5/7/2009
49 Interview: Si 1, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Reconquista, Santa Fe, 12/16/2008
493 Interview: S24, Industrial Federation of Santa Fe, Rosario, 5/13/2009
491 lntervieX: S39, Deputy, Santa Fe Chamber of Deputies, Rosario, 5/6/2009
19 Interview: S35, CGT Rosario, Rosario, 5/4/2009
496 La ('apilal ".imitaciones para combatir trabajo en negro" 07/19/07
Gianneschi was not initially considered for the STSF position, but instead was appointed as Ministry of
Government. I lowx ever, the Obeid faced to Gianneschi appointment the governor immediately transferred
Gianneschi to the STSF. La Capital "Gianneschi cree que lo echo la prensa rosarina" 03/17/04.
'9 An inspector describe the consequences: "When the senior officials are from the unions, it is over,
because what you have is that the head is from UOM and SMA TA both want you to do inspections in the
UOM 'sfirms. And then they fight, saying "Why did you go out on an inspection with SMATA when the
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continued to have unfettered access to inspectors, and linkages remained strong. The
STSF did make new attempts to undertake inspection operations and to address
previously ignored issues, such as child labor, but serving the unions remained the
priority.
In sum, throughout twenty-five years of Peronist rule in Santa Fe, the labor
inspectorate was marked by low levels of administrative capacity and very strong
linkages with unions. Although the ability of unions to gain top positions decreased
when organized labor's position within the PJ was diminished, the pattern of exchange
remained the same. Even weakened, labor union leaders were able to remain influential
in the day to day operations of labor inspection and inspectors had access to union
resources. However, despite their efforts and the fact that their partisan allies were in
power, union leaders did not win meaningful investments in administrative capacity.
Instead of allocating scarce resources to labor administration, governors left the STSF to
rely mainly on fines to finance operations and, short on funds, administrative capacity
languished. Clearly, the election of the partisan allies of organized labor, close elections,
and even a national shift towards regulation were not sufficient in transforming labor
inspection.
Ihe Socialist Party and Reform
The 2007 elections pitted the Peronist candidate, Rafael Bielsa, against the center-
left Socialist candidate, Hermes Binner, who had been the mayor of Rosario. Just before
the election, the head of the political organization of the CGT-Rosario stated that "the
union leaders clearly understand that the enemy is not Peronism, but ... Hermes Binner."
500 For the first time the unions' ally did not prevail; Binner won with 54% of the votes,
beating out Bielsa, who only won 43% of the votes.
Upon his election, Binner made two important decisions to signal that he was
serious about building up the ability of the provincial government to enforce labor laws.
First, he passed a law upgrading labor administration from a Secretaria de Estado to a
full ministry, transforming the STSF to the Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social
Security (MTSF).5 This was not just a symbolic renaming, but it also allocated greater
funds and political power to labor administration within the executive branch (and gave
labor administration in Santa Fe a higher rank than 80% of Argentine provinces). Even a
PJ deputy in the provincial legislature observed: "When you create a ministty, you are
signaling that labor is a priority, and you are going to incur costs." 2
Second, Binner appointed a technocrat with an impeccable resume, Carlos Anibel
Rodriguez, to be the new Minister of Labor. Rodriguez, a medical doctor by training,
had over thirty years of experience with issues related to worker health and safety at very
high levels, including stints at the ILO in Turin (Italy) and various faculty positions in the
firm is from UOM?' This is what happened in the last administration." Interview: S1 5, Inspector, Santa Fe
Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/11/2008
499 Interview: S 11, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Reconquista, Santa Fe, 12/16/2008
5()() La Capital "Las 62 dieron libertad para elegir candidato" 03/14/07.
W Law 12.817, adopted 12/06/07.
5o2 Interview: S39, Deputy, Santa Fe Chamber of Deputies, Rosario, 5/6/2009
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Universidad Aut6noma de Barcelona in Spain, Universidad de Buenos Aires, and
Universidad Tecnologica Nacional in Buenos Aires. From 2003 to 2007, just before
becoming Minister of Labor in Santa Fe, he served as head of the national occupational
health and safety agency (SRT) under the President Nestor Kirchner. Rodriguez had
planned to retire after finishing his term at the SRT, but given the opportunity to reform
labor administration in Santa Fe, he postponed retirement. 50 3 His background contrasted
with previous heads of labor administration in Santa Fe, who were either labor union
leaders (in the early period) or well-connected Peronists with little experience in labor
issues (in the later period).
Not only was Rodriguez technically competent, but he was seen as legitimate to
the unions without being one of them. 0 4 Union leaders complained that the "Socialists
don 't know the unions" 5 and they had many problems with Binner, but they found it
difficult to criticized Rodriguez. A story in La Capital about Binner's choices for cabinet
posts reported : "A [Peronist] union leader stated: 'The designation of Carlos Rodriguez
as Minister of Labor has been well received. He is an excellent person, familiar with the
506//D0, /and/afriend of 'Carlos Tomada", the federal Minister of Labor under Kirchner.
Some major industry associations also sup orted Rodriguez, describing him as "very well
known " and citing his work with the ILO. 4
Raising the rank of labor administration and appointing a technocrat with a very
strong background sent a message that, although Binner did not have the support of the
CGT, he was going to take labor administration seriously. Rodriguez came into office
with plans for radical reforms. In his first week on the job, he stated that he would
intensify inspections and start a "mercilessfight against corruption and inefficiency" in
the bureaucracy.508 While the rhetoric was not substantially different than that of the PJ,
the actions that followed were. Rodriguez focused his attention on the health and safety
division, where the existing inspectors had short-term contracts and could easily be
removed (unlike the wage and hour inspectors, who had civil service protection).509 With
the chance to completely reshape health and safety inspection, Rodriguez fired the
existing inspectors and began a meritocratic process for recruiting new inspectors using a
civil service exam. This was the first time an exam was given to hire inspectors in
Argentina since the 1980s in C6rdoba (described below). The civil service exam was
combined with psychological screening to "see how [applicants] managed corruption
and honesty" along with a set of educational requirements (70% of the new health and
safety inspectors had post-graduate degrees). 1  Most of the inspectors came from the
5 Interview: B76, Minister of Labor, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
3/15/2008
504 For example, union leaders complained about the PS playing politics with collective labor disputes, but
Rodriguez was not seen as part of these game. Interview: S37, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), Rosario.
6/1/2009. See also: La Capital "Futuro, dirigencia gremial y Ministerio" 11/25/07
505 Interview: S37, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), Rosario, 6/1/2009
506 La Capital "Seguridad: el gran desafio" 10/16/07
5 Interviewv: S08, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), Rosario, 4/29/2009
La Capital "Rodriguez: "Haremos cumplir los derechos del trabajador"" 12/21/07
I Health and safety inspectors were not actually paid by the province, but by the federal government's
SRT.
5Intervie.: S06, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security., Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
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private sector, where they had worked as health and safety experts or engineers. The
inspectors were given two trucks-still not adequate, but more than they had before-and
each two-person team of inspectors was issued a laptop so they could complete their
reports while they were in the field.
New inspectors were given probationary contracts to be converted into full civil
service contracts after one year. They were required to sign a "code of ethics", which
placed strict limits on actions that were not considered professional.m Unlike other
provinces (and Santa Fe in previous years), the new inspectors were not allowed to have
secondary jobs and were paid a salary that was competitive with private sector
employment. An official explained: "No one makes less than (US) $1,450.... We already
had tofire someone because... he was consulting outside. There is zero tolerance." 12
These practices contrast strongly with other inspectorates, including the Federal Capital
where salaries are almost half, $780 per month, and most health and safety inspectors
have outside consulting employment.m
When they were hired, inspectors were given two months of training, full time, by
Rodriguez himself. The training not only provided the inspectors with an understanding
of the rules of the agency, but involved detailed discussions of strategies to improve
compliance in specific industries (going well beyond past inspector training). 1  In
addition, the health and safety division was moved from the MTSF's main headquarters
in Rosario to its own building so that the new inspectors would not be influenced by the
practices of the wage and hour inspectors who remained in the MTSF. The new
inspectors were told that they constituted an "elite team", set in contrast with the wage
and hour inspectors. In addition, the MTSF published photos of all inspectors on their
website, increasing transparency.
Rodriguez also took steps to shift the relationship between inspectors and civil
society by reshaping linkages. For key appointments, Rodriguez chose a mixture of
officials that included technocrats (e.g. former labor inspectors from the federal MTESS
and the Federal Capital) and a PS activist who had experience working on labor issues
(including a stint with the ILO). Only one member of the appointed staff was from
organized labor, Luis Ortega of the bank workers' union, who was part of the CGT but
was also close with the PS. 516 Ortega only lasted two years, and when he left, there were
no union leaders in the MTSF (for the first time since the 1980s). The appointments were
structured in a way to reinforce technical expertise, maintain some relationships with the
unions, but to control these relationships by steering them to more formal channels than
511 "Codigo de Etica de la inspecci6n de Trabajo" Resolution 001/2008, Minsterio de Trabajo y Seguridad
Social, Santa Fe.
512 Interview: S26, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Secunity, Rosario.,
5/13/2009. This is similar to the insider-outsider dynamic that Schrank found in the Dominican Republic.
Schrank 2009
51 See Table A l in the appendix.
5 Interview: S09, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario,
5/12/2009
5is Interview: S20, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario.,
5/12/2009
; See Table A5.2 in the Appendix
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had previously been common practice. While under the PJ administrations, union leaders
would go directly to their fellow unionists inside the government, when Ortega left and
there were no more unmediated ties-the heads of the CGT had to go to Rodriguez or to
a number of newly created commissions (described below) when they wanted access to
the upper levels of the MTSF.m'
The appointed officials set out to eliminate situations that would make inspectors
the "property" of unions, and to reduce corruption.5 1 8 For the new health and safety
inspectors, this process was fairly simple-all the inspectors were new and none came
with strong existing ties to unions. The operating procedures that they put into place
were that "no union leader can come here and just take an inspector" and union leaders
cannot work with inspectors "without the coordinator knowing."519 Unions that collect
information about working conditions, such as the commercial laundry workers' union,
continued to give health and safety inspectors lists of firms with violations, but under
modified conditions.5 2 0 An inspector described the system: "if a union wants to make a
complaint... we go and conduct the inspection... [but] we always manage the inspection
ourselves."5 2 ' This structure allowed inspectors to access union information, but limited
their use of material resources so that "we do not become the arm of any union."m
In short, linkages were allowed between unions and health and safety inspectors,
but they were restricted to avoid capture. In addition, appointments to reward loyal
unions, which were the currency of political exchange and the basis of strong linkages,
ended. Instead, Binner used investments in administrative capacity to deflect criticism
from the opposition and the unions. When unions complained about the lack of progress
in enforcement to the press, Rodriguez responded with credible statements about
improvements. In private, union leaders even admitted that the PS did more than the PJ
had ever done; a former official in the STSF, and Peronist political appointee, described
the changes under Binner as "excellent" because when the PJ was in power
occupational health and safety... had been totally abandoned." 
5 23
In the wage and hour division, personnel reform and altering linkages were both
more complicated. Unlike the health and safety inspectors, wage and hour inspectors had
civil service protection and the public sector union fought to keep them from being
replaced. As one official commented, the newly appointed officials could not "throw a
bomb in the [wage and hour division] and start from scratch."52 4 Rodriguez's long-term
plan was to raise the educational requirements for the inspectors. This way, any
Interview: S_35, CGT Rosario, Rosario, 5/4/2009
Interview: 1376, Minister of Labor, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
3/15/2008
", Interview: S26, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario,
5/1 3/2009
Interview: S44, L aundry Workers' Union (UOETSYLRA), Rosario, 5/8/2009
52 Interview: S20, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministiy of Labor and Social Security, Rosario,
5/12/2009
5- Interview: S26, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario,
5/1 3/20094;3 Interview: S32, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/15/2008
524 Interview: Anonymous official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Rosario.
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inspectors who did not get a university degree could legally be transferred to other tasks
within the MTSF to make room for new, professional, staff. However, by the time the
new health and safety inspectors were hired and senior officials could concentrate their
attention on wage and hour, the global financial crisis hit Santa Fe hard, and plans for
expansion were put on hold. As a result, the wage and hour division had two layers of
staff that existed in tension: the new appointed officials who were technocrats aligned
with the PS, and the old inspectors who had extremely close ties to both the unions and to
Peronism. The wage and hour inspectors did not get any of the benefits of the reform-
their salaries were one third of the health and safety inspectors. Nor did the inspectors
have to meet all of the new standards (one inspector worked as a taxi driver in the
afternoon to supplement his salary).m In short, reform was decidedly incomplete in the
wage and hour division.
In the wage and hour division, senior officials were hesitant to send inspectors out
into the street on preventative operations. One senior official explained they "have very
little trust" in the inspectors. If sent out alone, "you don't know what they are doing to gel
themselves involved in. "526 When a corruption scandal hit the MTSF in 2008, Rodriguez
publically compared the wage and hour division to the "protection racket (?/Al Capone"
in which inspectors would charge a monthly fee to firms to prevent inspections. 52 7 To
keep up enforcement in the face of these limitations, the appointed officials allowed
linkages to stay strong enough so that union leaders could be accountability agents in the
street. The logic behind this decision was that it would be harder for inspectors to solicit
bribes with union leaders observing the inspection.
Despite a more open attitude towards inspectors relying on union resources in the
wage and hour division compared with the health and safety division, new rules were put
into place to reduce collusion and stamp out the most obvious corrupt practices. The
appointed officials told the union leaders: "We don 't have a problem when you bring
complaints, and you can participate in the inspection, but we need to know where you are
taking our inspectors."5 28 Identifying inspection targets beforehand made it difficult for
inspectors to conspire with union leaders in threatening a firm with enforcement unless
the firm paid a bribe (which had been common in some industries in earlier years). With
this use of linkages, senior officials at the MTSF did not have to stop all enforcement
while they waited to replace the inspectors, and they could calm the concerns of the
unions that worried about losing access to the state under the PS.
For the unions with the most developed systems of supporting enforcement, the
changes in their relationships with inspectors were not major. A leader from the metal
workers union described his relationship with inspectors as mostly same as it had been
before, but whereas with the PJ "to do an inspection we would go to the delegation and
get the inspectors and go, it was spontaneous... now we have to say where we are
going. "529 Similarly, for the commercial laundry workers' union, the "rhythm hasn 't
5 Interview: S34, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario, 5/5/2009526 Interview: S42, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario, 5/5/20095 La Capital "Una mafia opera en Trabajo para frenar las inspecciones laborales" 08/30/08
528 Interview: S06, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
9 Interview: S37, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), Rosario, 6/1/2009
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changed" with the new administration. 530 The union asks for three inspections a week,
and the MTSF responds with three inspections. Union leaders can still point out key
problems, such as in the case of the laundry workers when a union leader tipped off the
inspector that a firm was hiding unregistered workers in the bathrooms. In sum, without
reform in the wage and hour division, shifts in linkages were relatively minor, allowing
information to keep flowing between the inspectors and the unions, but there were new
attempts to reduce corruption and capture.
The changes to linkages were not, however, limited to new rules about inspector
access. Rodriguez worked to create a number of formal spaces of dialogue to bring in a
wider variety of non-state actors to work alongside unions in collaboration with the
MTSF. One of the first acts of Binner upon taking power was to sign a memorandum of
understanding with the ILO's Argentine office to create a provincial program for "decent
work." The agreement constituted a mechanism by which the MTSF could draw on
technical assistance from experts in the ILO. It also gave legitimacy to Rodriguez
because it was the first provincial collaboration with the ILO in Argentina.532 In addition,
it created a vehicle for the MTSF to form a series of commissions that brought a wide
variety of actors, including non-union civil society organizations, into dialogue with the
state around labor issues. 3 These commissions started developing new forms of
linkages between the MTSF and society, diversifying the groups that had access to the
state and reducing union dominance (as will be described below for the construction
industry).
In sum, the change of the party in power in Santa Fe led to a major shift in labor
administration. Binner did not give unions control over the inspectorate in exchange for
their support. Instead, Binner appointed Rodriguez who could show that the province
was seriously addressing issues of labor violations. A part of that strategy was the first
serious effort in thirty years to professionalize the inspectorate and expand administrative
capacity. This initiative was successful in the health and safety division, but failed (at
least up to the time of this research) in the wage and hour division. In addition, with the
PS in power, the structure of linkages between regulators and society shifted. In some
ways, ties between inspectors and unions were weakened due to the imposition of greater
hierarchical control. New linkages, however, were fostered through the series of formal
commissions created in the decent work initiative. Ultimately, the political realignment
changed the structure of state-society relations, which, in turn, should alter patterns of
enforcement.
;' Interview: S44, Laundry Workers' Union (UOETSYLRA), Rosario, 5/8/2009
P31 rovincia de Santa Fe. 'Agenda Provincial de Trabajo Decenie en Santa Fe" April 2009.
Santa Fe w\as the second subnational government in all of South America to work directly with the ILO.
In 2009, Rodriguez was invited to present the changes in the MTSF to an ILO meeting in Germany, giving
him positive press. El Litoral "Santa Fe expone en la OIT su inspeccion de trabajo decente" 09/28/09
5 The commissions included a construction commission, a rural workers commission, a "Four-Part Inter-
institutional Commission for the Eradication of Child Labor" (which had already existed under the previous
administration), and "Four-Part and Inter-institutional Commission for Equal Opportunity." Interview: S16.
Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/15/2008
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Changes in Enforcement in the Construction Industry (2003-2009)
Without looking at the actions of the MTSF, it is difficult to assess the meaning of
hiring new inspectors and instituting new policies governing inspector-union linkages.
What concrete differences in enforcement resulted from these investments in
administrative capacity and alterations in linkages? The case of the construction industry
in the city of Rosario provides a way to examine the consequences these changes had for
enforcement. This section recounts the shift from society-dependent enfbrcement at low
levels under the PJ, to state-driven enforcement under the PS that reached medium levels.
Just as in C6rdoba and Tucumin, there was a tremendous increase in construction
activity in Rosario in the post-2003 boom.53 4 With rapid expansion there were dramatic
workplace accidents that made unsafe conditions in the industry highly salient. 3 5 The
principal local newspaper, La Capital, began to keep count of the deaths, which
regulators estimated reached one hundred workers every year in the province. 536 In
addition to the deaths and serious injuries, investigations found atrocious practices,
including "1,500 migrant construction workers living on the construction sites" in
537dangerous conditions. The construction industry was clearly in crisis, and nearly every
month there was an article in the newspaper focusing attention on the industry and the
horrific consequences of labor law violations (significantly more attention than any other
industry).
By their own assessment, officials in the Obeid's administration stated that
responding to these challenges in construction was "one of ourfailures",38 After the
death of two workers on a construction site in 2005, the Secretary of Labor, Gianneschi,
was quoted in La Capital saying: "In Rosario, where we have nearly 200 construction
sites of tall buildings and 8,000 small sites at the same time, we only have three
employees for inspection."5 39 After yet another accident, officials stated that there "exists
a marked impotence of the state" in tackling the problem. With the resources that they
had, and with some borrowed from the SRT, the STSF attempted to step up enforcement
in the industry in 2006. Inspectors conducted what they called a "mega operation" over
eleven days and issued 200 fines for violations, but they did not suspend any worksites or
s3 The increases in registered constructions workers in the province illusrate this explosive growth. In
July, 2004, there were 1,208 registered workers, this shot up to 27,915 by July 2005, and reached 35,925 by
July 2007. Source: Instituto de Estadistica y Registro de la Industria de la Construcci6n (IE RIC).
.S La Capital "Un obrero muri6 al caer al vacio desde un 14' piso" 06/07/05; "Muri6 un obrero en San
Lorenzo al caer desde 20 metros de altura" 12/22/05; "En un afuo, 6 albaffiles muertos y 10 heridos"
03/13/06; "Un pared6n de una escuela cayo sobre dos obreros" 10/27/06; "Otro albafiil sufri6 lesions"
I 1 /0 1/06; "Cuestionan a empresas que no cuidan a obreros de la construcci6n" 11/01/06.
536 La Capital "En un aio, 6 albaffiles muertos y 10 heridos" 03/13/06; "Descartan que paraguayos vivan
dentro de una obra" 03/06/07; "Cuestionan a ermpresas que no cuidan a obreros de Ia construcci6n"
11/01/06
3 La Capital "Mas de 1.500 albaiiles migrantes viven en obras en construcci6n" 09/10/06; "Los
inmigrantes ven la cara oscura del "futuro mejor" que buscan en el pais" 08/13/06.
3 Interview: Sl 1, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Reconquista, Santa Fe, 12/16/2008
5 La Capital "Pocos inspectores para evitar los accidentes laborales" 0 1/13/05
S4 La Capital "Un obrero muri6 al caer al vacio desde un 14' piso" 06/07/05
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continue these inspections for a sustained period of time. 4 Enforcement efforts during
this period were mostly limited to issuing suspending worksites after accidents, not
preventative efforts. 4 2 In short, levels of enforcement remained low throughout the
Obied administration.
Why such an inadequate reaction from the government to the challenges in the
construction industry? Part of the answer was the lack of administrative capacity. As
described above, the STSF simply did not have the inspectors or resources sufficient for
enforcement. In a similar fashion as the cases analyzed in Chapter 3, enforcement in
Santa Fe was highly dependent on civil society organizations with which inspectors had
linkages. Unlike UOCRA in C6rdoba, in Rosario the construction union did not have its
own health and safety specialist to check the worksites.543 In addition, UOCRA-Rosario
had serious problems with its own internal corruption; union leaders had a reputation for
soliciting bribes from employers that wanted to avoid inspections. The limiting factor
was not that inspectors' access to UOCRA (linkages were strong), but the problems
within UOCRA itself. With their allies in power, UOCRA-Rosario did not publically
criticize the government in the press for its failures (in fact, in most of the press coverage
the officials were more critical of their lack of enforcement than UOCRA).
There was one additional civil society organization, formed in 2005, that
advocated for worker safety in the construction industry called Manos a la Obra. The
group, which functioned as a loose cooperative of workers, directly challenged UOCRA
by going to sites after accidents, protesting, denouncing union leaders, and trying to
organized workers in an alternative movement. Officials at the STSF could have allied
with this group to gain a vocal partner in civil society, but inspectors stayed with the
union, even though UOCRA was not helping with enforcement. Leaders from Manos a
la Obra approached the STSF with little success: "Everyone sent us... to the STSF. They
sent us to the viper pit. We went ... [and] they threatened me and told me to keep my
mouth shu." 54 4 In short, low levels of enforcement were due to the general pattern of
society-dependent combined with a failure in the linked groups on which the state relied.
This pattern of enforcement drastically changed after the election of the Socialists.
Even before he was able to hire new inspectors Rodriguez, undertook an intensive
campaign in the industry.
"We came into office on December I1 ... on the 18' we put together an
inspection operation using people from the office in the city of Santa Fe,
because the inspectors in Rosario were very questionable. It was a huge
shock to the industry. After a week, we visited 33 construction sites, and
we suspended operations in 32... This was all without advising anyone in
advance. Afterwards, we had a press conference. It was a way of
4 La Capital "La seguridad laboral" 03/14/06; "Inician plan de inspecci6n en obras de construcci6n en
Santa Fe' 03/21/06; "-Detectan fallas de seguridad en la construcc6in" 03/21/06
La Capital "La Secretaria de Trabajo clausur6 la obra donde se mat6 un albahil" 06/08/05;
"Suspendieron las obras del edificio del que cay6 un tirante a un jardin" 09/01/07
Interview 4 1, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Rosario, 5/13/2009
Interview S23, Manos a la Obra, Rosario, 5/7/2009
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marking the field to say: 'Here we are and we aren't going to permit these
violations '"4
The message was received by the industry as intended-representatives of the local
industry association also described the operation "as a shock", noting that "somefirms
complained... because some of the violations were small and did not merit closures.",54
A few days later, the MTSF held a meeting with firm owners to begin dialogue around
what needed to be done to reduce construction accidents.547 Shutting down 32 out of 200
major construction sites that were operating around that time in Rosario was a very
significant first week in office, and inspections did not stop after this initial operation.
Whereas under the Obied administration, the STSF fined on average one firm a week and
suspended operations after major accidents, during the first year of the Binner
administration (between May and October of 2008) inspectors were averaging 8.3
suspensions a week.548 These actions indicate a tremendous increase in penalties for
firms that violated health and safety laws.
Once the process of hiring and training new inspectors was complete,
enforcement increased even more in construction. By 2009, there were 2,800 health and
safety inspections in the Rosario metropolitan area, the majority of which were in the
construction industry (reaching the same quantity of inspections as in C6rdoba). 54 9 This
number was equal to the total of all inspections (wage and hour plus health and safety)
conducted in the entire province in 2006 under Obeid. The MTSF mapped out different
zones of Rosario where there were worksites and the regulators systematically inspected
550them. In short, this evidence points to a marked increase in enforcement with greater
information collection about violations, a stronger response to these violations (at least
the component of sanctions), and shows that the MTSF did not succumb to resistance and
kept shutting down worksites. Although enforcement did not include some components
that were evident in other provinces-such as the training programs in C6rdoba's
construction industry-preventing it from reaching high levels, there was a clear increase
from the previous period in Santa Fe.
The change in enforcement cannot be traced back to any new ability of pro-
enforcement civil society organizations to work with the state. Mired in its own conflicts,
UOCRA remained with very little operational capacity and never was able to hire its own
health and safety officer to work with the state.55' Leaders in UOCRA did not have
545 Interview: S06, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008.
Also reported in: La Capital "Rodriguez- "Haremos cumplir los derechos del trabajador" 12/2 1/07;
"Suspenden 31 obras en construcci6n por "faltas graves" en seguridad" 12/21/07
546 Interview: S08, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), Rosario, 4/29/2009
5 La Capital "Obras en las que detectaron fallas vuelven a trabajar" 12/28/07
548 Source: Internal data from the MTSF.
549 La Capital "Trabajo provincial realiz6 2.800 operativos en 2006" 02/20/07; Trabajo tiene solo 13
inspectores para controlar siete departamentos" 0 1/14/10.
550 Interview: S26, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministiy of Labor and Social Security. lZosario.
5/13/2009
; In 2008, there was an election for secretary general that was actually contested election (the first
contested election since the 1980s). To make sure there was no violence, there were 160 police officers
present to ensure that the elections occurred without violence. The incumbent secretary general won with
only 791 of the 9,000 affiliates voting. After the election, in 2010, a group of union leaders attempted to
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problems accessing the new inspectors-one leader explained that he had "direct phone
numbers" for officials in the MTSF who "never impeded the union, and never rejected
requests for information."m But the MTSF found that information that UOCRA
provided the MTSF was not very accurate or useful; an inspector explained that in the
one month during 2009, "62% of the UOCRA's requests were inconclusive, meaning that
the address did not exist or the construction project had ended."55 3
The MTSF restructured linkages with other civil society organizations through the
creation of the Tripartite Construction Commission, which helped inspectors with
enforcement. The Commission met monthly, overseen directly by Rodriguez, and
included UOCRA, the construction industry association (CAC), and various professional
associations. One of the first problems that the CAC brought to the table was the
prevalence of subcontracting in the industry and a number of fly-by-night construction
firms that were undercutting the established firms and were responsible for safety
problems.5 4 This was an issue that UOCRA had already brought up during the Obeid
administration, citing the trouble in fighting "ghost" firms that are "insolvent" and only
stay in business for "constructing one building."55 5 In response, Binner issued a decree
mandating that all construction sties have a large sign that indicated all of the investors,
556
managers, architects, and insurance companies involved in the site. This new rule
helped the inspectors identify those responsible for putting workers at risk. It was praised
by the business community in part because, as described by worker advocates, it
"separated the wheat fom the chaff' when it came to construction firms.55
The relationships established between the MTSF and the business community also
helped fight corruption. A manager from a construction firm came to Rodriguez to report
an official in the MTSF's collection department who solicited a bribe from a firm in order
to make some paperwork disappear and to eliminate penalties. After a two month
investigation, the MTSF worked with a provincial anti-corruption agency to set up a sting
operation that caught the official taking a bribe of nearly 1,000 dollars in a cafe near
MTSF headquarters.5 The arrest lead to a broader inquiry into corrupt practices among
the old inspectors. The businessman involved was from the Housing Business
Association (Asociacion Empresaria de la Vivienda) explained that his collaboration in
the sting "was part of/the ongoing cooperation we have with the Ministry Qf Labor since
displace the secretary general of the union because of his lack of effort in protecting the workers and
alleged corruption. La Capital "Sin violencia gan6 el oficialismo en la Uocra" 12/12/08. Rosario /12
Secretano cuestionado" 07/28/10. Interview: S43, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA),
Rosario, 5/1 3/2009
s Interview: S4 1, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Rosario, 5/1 3/2009
5 Interview: S26, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario,
5/1 3/2009
5 Interview: S08, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), Rosario, 4/29/2009
ss5 La Capital "La Uocra devel6 la cara oculta de la construcci6n" 07/18/07
5 La Capital "Seguridad: mayores exigencias para la exhibici6n de carteleriam en obras" 07/22/08
5 La Capital "L a provincia sacari 20 inspectores a la calle" 0 1/06/09
558 La Capital "Un abogado fue detenido por coimear a empresarios de la construcci6n" 08/27/08; Desde el
"Ministerio de Trabajo dicen que habria mis implicados" 08/27/09; "Detienen a inspector de Trabajo por
pedir una coima a una constructora" 08/28/08; "El inspector que pedia coimas tenia 33 expedientes
guardados en su casa" 08/29/08; "Una mafia opera en Trabajo para frenar las inspecciones laborales"
08/30/08
133~
we have been working, side by side, in the Tripartite Construction Committee, along with
the CA C and UOCRA." In sum, the Tripartite Commission created the opportunity
for a different kind of relationship between the regulators and organizations in society.
Whereas before the state depended on the unions and did not work closely with other
organizations, now regulators and a broader range of organizations discussed actions that
would improve enforcement in the construction industry, and the MTSF followed
through.
The MTSF's relationship with organizations outside of the state was not,
however, always cooperative. Industry associations and unions pushed back on plans to
create new health and safety committees in the workplace. 560 And although leaders of
UOCRA privately praised the efforts of the MTSF, they publically criticized the
provincial government for not doing enough to reduce accidents. 561 During the Obeid
administration, UOCRA and the other CGT unions never protested about health and
safety problems in the worksites or petitioned the Secretary of Labor in the media. Not
even four months after Binner took power, UOCRA organized a protest of 100 workers
who marched to the MTSF to demand "implementation of safety measures and the
provision of inspectors because without these actions the accidents, many of them fatal,
will not stop."5 2 As the accidents continued, demands from the unions grew, protests
went on, and the CGT-Rosario demanded more inspections.563 The local newspaper
quoted the head of the CGT stating 'from November until today (May 2008), every time
an inspector is requested they aren't there. It took people dying once again to get the
inspectors out into the street."5 64 These statements, which contrast sharply with the
private accounts of a number of unions (including UOCRA) that praised Rodriguez,
illustrate the more aggressive stance that the unions took against a governor with whom
they had no partisan alliance.
In summary, the case of the construction industry demonstrates how shifts in the
MTSF translated into changes in patterns of enforcement. Under the PJ, administrative
capacity in health and safety inspection was weak, the state was dependent on unions for
enforcement, and UOCRA did not have the resources to make up for the state's
deficiencies. As a result, despite the saliency of the crisis in the industry, there was failed
society-dependent enforcement at low levels; the union had unfettered access to the few
inspectors who were on staff and UOCRA; and the CGT did not protest or make public
statements demanding more resources be allocated to health and safety inspection in
construction. Everything changed when the PS came into power. With investments in
administrative capacity, enforcement was possible even without drawing on resources
from society. Enforcement increased sharply due to decisions made by Rodriguez, even
without any major change in the capabilities or actions on the part of UOCRA. In
5 59 La Capital "Un abogado fue detenido por coimear a empresarios de la construcci6n" 08/27/08
5 Interview: S24, Industrial Federation of Santa Fe, Rosario, 5/13/2009
561 Interviews: S43, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Rosario, 5/13/2009; S4 1,
Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Rosario, 5/13/2009
562 La Capital "Trabaj adores de la construcci6n marchan en reclamo de mss seguridad" 03/07/08; "Obreros
de la construcci6n marcharon para exigir seguridad" 03/08/08
;63 La Capital "La Uocra y otros 35 gremios ir6n con reclamos a Trabajo" 05/19/08
564 La Capital "Ahora la CGT pide controles "ms frecuentes" en las obras" 05/22/08
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addition, with their opponents in power, UOCRA and the CGT went on the offensive and
publically demanded more state action and investment, keeping the pressure on Binner.
The MTSF did not cut off all linkages with society, but the inspectors could not draw on
resources of outside groups in as significant an operational way as in the cases analyzed
in Chapter 4. Instead, regulators were mostly on their own, and of the increases in
enforcement were a result of bureaucratic decision processes within the MTSF.565
Ultimately, enforcement in the construction industry became state-driven at medium
levels. Increases in enforcement were notable, but levels did not reach the same intensity
as the cases of construction in C6rdoba or the garment industry of the Federal Capital.
Control Instead of Capacity
Contrasting Santa Fe with other Argentine provinces provides a way to further
examine the relationship between partisanship, linkages, and administrative capacity, and
to assess alternative explanations. Perhaps, the reforms in Santa Fe were really just a
matter of national politics. After 2003, there was a strong swing towards enforcement all
over Argentina, it may be that Santa Fe just finally became caught up in this trend? Or,
perhaps there changes were due to some factor other than partisanship, such as a response
to high levels of violations, weakness among business, electoral uncertainty, or economic
growth? To help answer these questions, the first part of this section analyzes changes in
C6rdoba over the same period of time (1983-2009). In contrast with Santa Fe, C6rdoba
had high levels of investment in the 1980s, but not in the 2000s. The second part of this
section briefly recounts an attempt to reform the Tucumin inspectorate in 2003. The case
of Tucuman helps bring into view the importance of union-governor exchanges over
control of the inspectorate even when there is a commitment from the governor to invest
in administrative capacity. These two additional cases help refine our understanding of
the political underpinnings of enforcement capacity.
(6rdoba
The trajectory of C6rdoba's labor administration is, in many ways, the reverse of
that of Santa Fe. The similarities between labor and administration in C6rdoba in the late
1980s and Santa Fe in 2007-09 are striking. Following the return to democracy, the first
governor of C6rdoba was Eduardo Angeloz from the Radical Party (UCR).5 66 Like the
Socialists, the UCR was in opposition to the PJ. Under Angeloz, C6rdoba created a
Ministry of Labor (MTC, Ministerio de Trabajo de Cdrdoba) in 1985, signaling the
importance of labor administration. To head the MTC, the governor selected a well-
known labor lawyer, Jorge Sappia, as Minister of Labor. Sappia was a member of the
Radical party and not an ally of the unions, but he had experience working with unions as
a lawyer, and was seen as highly skilled by both the business community and union
leaders.567 Under Angeloz, politically appointed officials were mainly labor lawyers,
465 And although enforcement clearly increased, the numbers of fatal accidents did not decline in 2009 and
20 10. It is uncertain what exactly was driving the high levels of accidents. Rosario/12 "El record mas
triste del aho" 01/21/11
,66 The Radicals also controlled both changes of the provincial legislature, dominating the province.
567 Interviews: C 13, Industrial Union of C6rdoba, C6rdoba, 6/19/2008; C03, Union of Pastry, Pizza, and
Alfajor Workers. C6rdoba, 7/16/2008; C46, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009
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from a variety of backgrounds, including the union movement.568 Sappia described the
initial hiring of labor inspectors:
The majority of inspectors we hired with a civil service exam. We gave
them the best pay that we could within the salary scales of the provincial
government, and on top of that we gave them overtime, travel
compensation, and bonuses.... When I was the minster, the
inspectors... were required to take training courses of 70 hours a year. 6 9
The MTC in 1988 had 57 labor inspectors, including a technically trained health and
safety division. And they had access to cars and other basic material resources. In short,
the MTC was founded with relatively high levels of administrative capacity. With these
resources, inspectors were able to conduct over 20,000 inspections in 1990 (nearly double
the number of inspections in 2007). There is consensus among those involved in labor
politics in Cordoba, both from unions and industry, that Sappia's tenure was the high
point of labor inspection in the province.
Linkages between the MTC and organizations and unions were controlled in a
similar fashion as in Santa Fe under Binner. Inspectors could routinely draw on union
resources, but they were prohibited from undertaking practices that could most readily
turn into capture. Sappia described the structure of linkages:
Traditionally, the unions came at seven in the morning and asked for
inspectors. During my administration, we maintained this system to not
make it bureaucratic or difficult. What I intended to do was to suppress
the gifts that the unions give to the inspectors, (prevent) union leaders
taking inspectors in the car of the union to do the inspection... I had cars
of the MTC. They weren't many, but we were not completely dependent
on the unions for resources.71
For union leaders, this system was seen as effective-unions did not have to subsidize
572inspectors' salary but they still could get a response from the state. In addition to these
informal linkages, the MTC also facilitated more formal consultations. The most lasting
of these was the Tripartite Construction Commission (discussed in Chapter 4), which
served as a space for UOCRA, the CAC, and the MTC to coordinate enforcement in the
construction industry." 3
The similarities between labor administration under governors Angeloz and
Binner in Santa Fe are striking: both gave labor administration a high rank in the
executive branch by making it a ministry; both were led by neutral technocrats; both
5 Interview: CO1, Former Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 06/18/08 & 03/10/09.
Also: Government Report title: "Gobierno de C6rdoba: Secretaria Ministerio de Trabajo 1985-198T7
569 Interview: COl, Former Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 06/18/08 & 03/10/09
5 In dozens of interviews in C6rdoba there was consensus about the quality of Sappia's term as Minister
of Labor.
571 Interview: C01, Former Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 06/18/08 & 03/10/09
512 Interview: C46, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009
5 Interview: C15, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), C6rdoba, 3/3/2009
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involved investment in administrative capacity; both allowed inspector-union linkages
while taking steps to reduce the most pernicious forms of capture; and both supplemented
inspector-union linkages with more formal processes of collaboration that involved a
variety of civil society organizations. The political conditions that led to these outcomes
in C6rdoba were remarkably similar to those in Santa Fe. Without a partisan alliance
with unions, Angeloz could not easily give unions control in exchange for support.
Instead, to show that he was serious about enforcement, he allocated scarce resources to
building administrative capacity. The unions, for their part, were not limited by partisan
commitments and could take an aggressive stance towards the governor. A union leader
from this period summed up the success of organized labor under Angeloz in comparison
with the Peronist governors, stating:
When Angeloz was the governor and Sappia the Minister, they were from
the other party because unionism is Peronism-we demanded a ton and
they were af-aid... and because qfthat, they complied with our demands.
When we were f-om the same party as the governor, they would say 'Not
sofist, wait." It is because there is an alliance. We won much more in
the years of the Radicals than in the years of the Peronists.5 7 4
Just as in Santa Fe under Binner, union leaders were not shy in criticizing the governor
and keeping pressure on for labor law enforcement during the Angeloz administration. In
sum, the initial investment in labor inspection in Cordoba can be explained by the
particular combination of political circumstances that made it impossible to substitute
linkages for administrative capacity.
After Angeloz and Sappia left office in 1995, labor administration was dismantled
by the new governor, Ram6n Mestre. Although he was also from the UCR party, Mestre
had a much more free market orientation than Angeloz. During Mestre's administration,
the province had a debt crisis, unemployment spiked, and the provincial government
worked with the World Bank to institute a series of structural reforms.m In this context
of cuts, labor administration was disproportionately targeted. The number of inspectors
was reduced drastically between 1995 and 1996 from 56 to 36-a rate much greater than
576the overall reduction in C6rdoba's public sector. Overall, resources were cut off from
inspection, which "political was considered a secondary task."5 77 The MTC was
downgraded three levels to become a Sub-Secretariat of Labor, leaving it diminished in
terms of political strength and budgetary resources. To head the Sub-Secretariat, Mestre
appointed a labor lawyer, Noberto Ciaravino, who had close ties to Sappia and to the
construction union. Ciaravino did not take steps to supplement the decreased
administrative capacity with stronger inspector-union linkages. Instead, during his
administration more constraints were put on inspector-union collaboration. Ciaravino
instituted a policy in which there were "two days a weekfor programmed inspections,
- Interview: C 17, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), C6rdoba, 7/15/2008
55 Ladrone and Cingolani 2006
; The number of public sector employees per 1,000 inhabitants in C6rdoba only dropped from 28 to 26
Source: Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas Pniblicas, Direccion Nacional de Coordinacion Fiscal con las
Provincias
s,7 Interview: C01, Former Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 06/18/08 & 03/10/09
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and three days a weekfor the others [union requests]", which effectively limited the
ability of inspectors to draw on unions. In short, under the Mestre administration,
there was a substantial decline in administrative capacity and a weakening of linkages.
The "deactivation"57 9 of labor inspection in C6rdoba under Mestre is, in many
ways, not surprising. Mestre was not an ally of the unions and was a self-proclaimed
advocate of reducing state intervention in the market. Moreover, the mid-I 990s were a
period of fiscal crisis in Cordoba and a swing towards liberalization in Argentina.
Unions could not block Mestre's action and were more concerned about preserving jobs
than preserving labor inspection. The dismantling of labor inspection under a UCR
administration confirms the simple (and obvious) fact that the election of a union foe is
not sufficient for investment in administrative capacity (as might be suggested by the
Binner and Angeloz administrations).
More surprising than the change under Mestre was the only modest investment in
labor inspection when the PJ took power. In 1998, for the first time since the return to
democracy, a PJ candidate, Jose Manuel De la Sota, won the election for governor in
C6rdoba. De la Sota rewarded unions for their support by elevating labor administration
from a Sub-Secretariat to a full Secretariat (STC). In 2003, De la Sota won reelection
and, in 2007, he was followed by his ally from the PJ, Juan Schiaretti. For twelve years
(at least), the unions' partisan allies were in power, thereby creating the opportunity for
unions to win investment in labor law enforcement. However, the dynamic in C6rdoba
during this period closely mirrored that of Santa Fe in the 1980s-unions consistently
won key appointments, inspector-union linkages were strengthened, but investments in
administrative capacity were modest in comparison with those under Binner in Santa Fe.
After De la Sota was elected, union factions jockeyed to get their favorite
candidate to be Secretary of Labor."80 For Secretary of Labor, De la Sota chose the labor
lawyer, Luis Eugenio Angulo who was supported by one union faction (and had strong
connections to De la Sota's allies within Peronism). To run the labor inspection division,
De la Sota chose the preferred candidate of the other union faction, Alberto Castro.;"
This strategy was extremely similar to Obeid in Santa Fe, who distributed appointments
in the STSF across rival unions. Angulo stayed in office until 2004 when there was a
moment of "open conflict" between the unions and the governor, mainly over salary
disputes with some public sector unions. 8 2 Upon resigning, it was leaked to the press
that Angulo was leaving because he was "angry that the STC suffered from being
dismantled in the recent years."5 83 De la Sota's response to the conflict was to replace
5 Interview: B53, Senior Official, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
9/4/2008. As a result, in 1998, only half the inspections were conducted at the requests of unions, which is
a very low number when compared with the period after the 2001 crisis, when upwards of 80% of
inspections were at the request of unions.
579 Interview: C 15, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), C6rdoba. 3/3/2009
580 La Voz del Interior "Angulo y Castro para Trabajo" 07/06/99
581 La Voz del Interior "Los gremios se reacomodan luego del recambio" 07/19/99
58 2 La V'oz del Interior "Mis tension entre los gremios y De la Sota" 05/16/04
L 3a Voz del Interior "Enojado, Angulo dejars este mes la Secretaria de Trabajo provincial 05/09/04:
Enojado, Angulo dejari este mes la Secretaria de Trabajo provincial Lleg6 la hora de agitar las banderas,
05/10/04
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Angulo with the powerful head of the public sector union UPCN, Miguel Benedetto.
While organized labor did not win more resources for inspection, they were able to
effectively chose the Secretary of Labor and, for the first time, they had a sitting secretary
general of a union at the helm of the STC.584 In addition, the rest of the appointments in
the STC went to lawyers "aligned with distinct unions," thereby rewarding key unions
with positions inside the state.585 In short, instead of responding to labor demands by
investing in administrative capacity, unions were rewarded with appointments.
In 2007, not long before the coming elections, De la Sota fired Benedetto and
replaced him with Jos6 Luis Farre, a politician who was an ally of the favorite candidate
5861
for governor, Juan Schiaretti. When Benedetto left, so did all of the union-affiliated
political appointees. Two weeks later, now on the outside, the two C6rdoba CGT
factions made demands for greater investment in administrative capacity. The union
leaders argued that the STC should become a full Ministry because it suffered due to
"budgetary limitations" and "complete dependence on the Ministry of Production."5 17
Still, the majority of the unions once again supported the PJ candidate, Juan Schiaretti, in
the election of 2007.588
Once Schiaretti had won the election, a group of unions from both CGT factions
united in pushing once more for the STC to be converted to a full ministry: "We want it to
stop being a secretariat, and to be changed to the level of a ministry, or at least a
secretaria de estado."89 As an official in the STC (and union leader) explained:
"1eryone iw'ants there to be a Ministry of Labor. The structure, a Ministry.... more than
anything it is about the budget ... If they convert us into a Ministry, we will be able to act
in a di/gerent iay. It would be ideal, fbr the population, fr the people inside, Jor the
unions, for everyone. " 590 Instead, once again, the governor gave the unions key
appointments that allowed them to control the STC. For Secretary of Labor, Schiaretti
chose the labor lawyer Omar Hugo Sereno, who previously worked in the STC under
Benedetto and was the "man of SMA TA", the strong union auto workers union. 59' Like
Benedetto, Sereno was put forward by one of the CGTs and then accepted by the
governor after political wrangling that alienated some factions of organized labor. 592
Schiaretti also made an effort to reward a variety of unions, giving key appointments to
labor lawyers who worked for unions from each faction.
Besides the appointments, the governor made promises to double the number of
labor inspectors, increase the number of cars, build a new office for the Rio Cuarto
" Interview: C04, Former Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 3/11/2009
La V oz del Interior "Benedetto confirm6 su gabinete" 06/03/04
;6 La 1oz de/ Interior "Molesto con Benedetto, De la Sota lo reemplaz6 por Farrd en Trabajo" 01/31/07.
The circumstances surrounding the firing are unclear and appear to be mainly due to a personal conflict
between Benedetto and the governor.
La l oz del Interior "Cautela de gremios por gesti6n de Trabajo" 02/12/07
L a I 'oz de/ Interior "En campa'a" 8/30/07
La 1 'oz del Interior "Gremios por un Ministerio de Trabajo" 11/20/07
lntervic\w C3 1, Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 7/17/2008
9 La l oz del Interior "Sereno es el nuevo secretario de Trabajo" 12/12/07
592 Sereno had been a legal advisor to SMATA for many years, and his father was member of SMATA
during the Cdrdobaza.
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delegation, and upgrade the information management system. 593 These investments,
however, were never made. The number of inspectors increased from 45 in 2006 to 56 in
2008, but they did not double (as promised) and remained lower than the 63 who were
employed in 2001. In fact, the absolute number of labor inspectors was almost exactly
the same in 2008 as it was in 1988, but the province had grown in population by a over
half a million people. Furthermore, the new inspectors were hired based on patronage,
not on merit. 594 In other aspects of administrative capacity-including technology,
transportation and training-the STC continued to lag (see Chapter 3). Only the division
of health and safety inspection, that had been put into place under Sappia and had been
somewhat protected, had high levels of administrative capacity. In short, the STC still
had not regained the position it had under the UCR administration of Angeloz in the late
1980s and early 1990s.
Union leaders were, however, able to foster strong inspector-union linkages
through their positions within the STC. When Benedetto was appointed Secretary of
Labor, unions gained open access to the bureaucracy-"the general secretaries of the
unions all had my cell phone number, no one in the waiting room, no one askingfor an
official hearing. They had totally free access to my office. "'5 95 Benedetto made union
requests for inspection a priority, "we did the programmed inspections that we wvere able
to, the ones that the unions gave us."596 These practices continued under Sereno, who
wanted to reduce inspector dependence on unions, but would not do so at the expense of
weakening linkages with unions. 97
In sum, despite over ten years of PJ rule, a massive economic expansion, and a
change in the trends of national policy towards enforcement, there were few investments
in administrative capacity. Instead, in exchange for their support, allied unions gained
strategic appointments in the state that guaranteed their access to inspectors. In short,
linkages substituted for capacity. A union leader summed up this outcome, stating:
We have lost due to the fact that the labor movement has put forth its
demands in a segmented way... The unions... created the possibility that
their people could be a part of the STC. [This way] the STC would give
them more weight... Therefore, if the governor gave unions positions in the
STC,... it didn't matter that it was Secretariat, when in reality it should be
a Ministry.m
This dynamic helps explain the underinvestment in labor inspection, which led to the
pattern of society-dependent enforcement in the wage and hour division of the STC.
Only CYMAT, which had been given marginally better resources (in part due to
La 1Voz del Interior "Schiaretti duplica la cantidad de inspectores laborales' 04/29/08
Many of the staff that came into the inspectorate were transferred from other parts of the governmnciit
such as the provincial bank, which was privatized. La Voz del Interior "25 ex bancarios y a dependen de la
Secretaria de Trabajo" 09/15/04. Interviews: C38, Inspector, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba,
7/18/2008
"> Interview: C04, Former Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/1 1/2009
;9 Interview: C04, Former Senior Official, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/11/2009
"9 Interview: C45, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/19/2008
598 Interview. C46, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009
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subsidies from the national government), was able to co-produce enforcement with
UOCRA. 599
Tucumdn
The politics of reform in Tucumin provide an example of unions prioritizing
linkages over increases in administrative capacity. As described in Chapter 3, Tucumdn's
labor inspectorate (TST) had extremely low levels of administrative capacity and
particularly severe problems with inspector corruption in the post-crisis period. In 2003,
Jose Alperovich (PJ) was elected governor with support from the main faction of the
provincial CGT. At that time, levels of labor law violations in Tucumin were extremely
high, in 2004, 59% of workers were unregistered, giving Tucumin the second highest
level of informality in the country. 600 Being one of the worst performers in the country,
the federal MTESS put pressure on Alperovich to take measures to address the issue.601
Alperovich proposed, and eventually passed, a law increasing penalties for employers
who contracted workers off the books, including fines up to $10,000 dollars.60 2 The
province also started using its tax inspectors, sometimes in joint operations with labor
inspectors, to enforce worker registration laws. These inspectors undertook a series of
operations aimed at domestic workers, commercial workers and the construction
industry .603
In addition to these measures, Alperovich attempted to invest in the administrative
capacity of the TST. As part of this effort, he broke with the tradition of appointing
union leaders to the top Secretary of Labor slot and chose Rogelio Mercado, a labor
lawyer who was more of a technocrat than a union ally.604 Mercado, along with other top
officials at the TST, travelled around Argentina to learn about best practices in labor
inspection from other provinces that they could emulate. They concluded that Tucumin
UOCRA took a different strategy than other unions towards the STC. Notwithstanding its size and
political weight, UOCRA did not push to get its leaders appointments in the STC. Instead, it worked to
maintain CYMA T and its relationship with the inspectors.
0"" Author's analysis of EPH data.
" Interview: T 12. Senior Official, Tucumdn Labor Secretariat, Tucuman, 10/27/2008 & 11/12/2008
6(12 The law also called for firm closures between three and ten days, and a prohibition on these firms
receiving public contracts. It was of questionable legality due to the federal structures that set rates for
fines in the entire country. La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Alperovich anunci6 sanciones contra el trabajo no
registrado" 05/12/07; "Se intensifica la lucha contra el trabajo en negro" 06/12/07; "AplicarAn duras penas
a quienes tengan personal sin registrar" 01/17/08
6()3 La Gaceta de Tucundn "Comienzan los controles contra el empleo domestico informal" 09/07/06;
"Fueron regularizadas 1.800 empleadas domesticas en la provincia" 09/09/06; "Arrancan los controles
sorpresivos de las casas" 09/11/06; "Multarin desde hoy a quienes empleen dom6sticas en negro
09/11/06; "Mis controles por el personal domestico" 09/13/06; "Por no emitir facturas, clausuraron bares,
garajes y hasta consultorios" 11/01/07; "Este fin de semana, los "sabuesos" visitarin boliches, bares y
pubs" 11/02/07; "Detectan ilegalidad en obras y en comercio" 11/02/07; "Rentas va por el blanqueo de
14.000 empleadas domestica" 11/03/07; Rentas apunta a 89 negocios que pueden ser clausurados 11/23/07;
Por el empleo no registrado, controlan hoteles y heladerias 12/01/07; "El control de empleo en negro deriv6
en la clausura de un local" 02/14/08; "Controlarin dia y noche que no haya empleo en negro" 01/30/00;
"I .a construcci6n es el sector con la mayor cantidad de empleados en negro" 02/04/08; "El Gobierno
detect6 hasta ahora 88 empleados en negro" 02/07/08.
( Alperovich did select a union leaders Sub-secretary of Labor (Ramon Aguirre) and Director (Jorge
Blasco), thus maintaining the ties between the TST and the unions.
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should introduce merit based hiring to bring in "professionals", improve training, and
prohibit inspectors from having employment outside the state-many of the steps that
Rodriguez took in Santa Fe. 605 They also decided that they needed to replace the existing
inspectors to reduce rampant corruption.
In order to complete the reform, senior officials concluded that they needed to
initiate a number of steps that would reinforce hierarchical control of the inspectors. This
meant preventing inspectors from being completely dependent on unions. Mercado's
assault on union control over inspection was fairly direct-he ordered inspection
campaigns that officials described as going beyond just "protecting the union"
interests.606
Not surprisingly, unions resisted changes that would weaken their linkages with
labor inspectors. As the conflict escalated, it threatened the union's alliance with
governor Alperovich. Powerful union leaders criticized the governor and called for
607Mercado's resignation. Moreover, with the support of the public sector unions, labor
inspectors went on strike and blocked roads. The conflict grew and fist-fights broke out,
leading to the arrest of some inspectors. 08 Alperovich tried to resist the pressure,
proclaiming that he would "support IMercado] to the death "609 He also proposed
legislation that the TST could keep the money from fines to supplement its budget-a
policy that the unions had long ago demanded.610 But as the conflict escalated and
further threatened the governor's alliance with key unions, Mercado was forced out and
the reform halted.
To keep his coalition together, governor Alperovich reinstated the exchange with
unions and appointed the head of the "62" Peronist Organizations (the political wing of
the unions aligned with the governor) Roberto Jimenez, Secretary of Labor.i" Jimenez,
who was the head of the powerful transport workers' union (UTA), maintained his
position as a union leader while serving as Secretary of Labor. The exchange was
successful in subduing conflict; as a union leader observed: "The governor chose Roberto
Jimenez so that he could control us, the unions, so we don't go out on the street and
mobilize...Jimenez is a sort of bridge, a nexus, between the unions and the governor."
Jimenez put on hold the process of reform that could have weakened inspector-union
linkages, stopping Mercado's proposals in their tracks.
Or; Interview: T37, Former Senior Official, TucumAn Labor Secretariat, TucumAn, 4/14/2009
6 6 La Gaceta de Tucumin "Blanquean" a obreros por la presi6n official" 12/17/03; also there is some
pushback against enforcement in the agricultural sector: "Alivia a los productores el repunte en el precio de
la papa" 11/13/04
607 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Los gremios marcharAn mafnana y el jueves por un bAsico de $ 350" 05/27/04;
"Habria 8.000 obreros azucareros en negro" 06/28/04.
608 La Gaceta de Tucumdin "Jomada de paro en la Secretaria de Trabajo" 06/05/04
609 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Alperovich aval6 con un abrazo a dos funcionarios de su gabinete" 05/27/04:
Se autofinanciaria la Secretaria de Trabajo" 06/14/04; "Trompadas en la Secretaria de Trabajo- 06/06/04:
"Empleados de la Secretaria de Trabajo cortan el trAnsito" 07/14/04
(1 La Gaceta de Tucunan "Se autofinanciaria la Secretaria de Trabajo" 06/14/04; "Trompadas en la
Secretaria de Trabajo" 06/06/04; "Empleados de la Secretaria de Trabajo cortan el trAnsito" 07/14/04.
61 La Gaceta de Tucundn "Alperovich suma a un sindicalista al PE" 08/17/04; Repercusiones sobre la
nodificaci6n en Trabajo 08/17/04; "Jimenez asumi6 y pidi6 un mayor presupuesto" 08/20/04
612 Interview: T06, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), TucumAn, 4/14/2009
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Union leaders were ambivalent about the stalled reforms, effectively choosing
control over capacity.613 Alperovich tried new approaches to reform, including a
corruption crack down that involved a sting operation and an executive decree removing
all existing inspectors.614 But he was stalled in court by a lawsuit from inspectors
claiming that the executive decree violated their civil service protection. Alperovich
received no support from the unions in these efforts. Ultimately, his attempts to reduce
unregistered work were shifted from the TST to the tax agency. Alperovich gave the tax
agency additional staff who acted as para-inspectors and only enforced registration laws
(much in the same way as the MTESS Plan Nacional de Regularizacidn de Trabajo
discussed in Chapter 2).615 Up until the time of this research, reforms of the labor
inspectorate in Tucumin never came to pass, but the unions maintained high levels of
control over the inspectors.
The case of Tucumin is instructive of the dynamics of partisan exchange and the
hierarchy of union-interests. Unions in Tucuman did not have to supply the pressure for
reforming the inspectorate, this came from the national government. Still, reform was
blocked because leaders of some of the most powerful unions preferred control to
capacity. And even after Alperovich reaffirmed his ties with the unions through the
appointment of Jimenez, he faced new barriers in the form of civil service protection of
the existing inspectors. In sum, the influence of partisan exchange on the politics
linkages and administrative capacity was strong enough that it essentially blocked reform
even when the governor had political will to invest in the inspectorate.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that in order to explain linkages and administrative
capacity, we need to examine the ways in which union-governor interactions are
structured by partisan context. The analysis began by examining a cross-section of
provinces in 2009, using data from the inspector survey to show that there is a strong
relationship between partisanship and linkages. The discussion then focused on changes
over time in Santa Fe, C6rdoba, and Tucuman. Table 5.5 below summarizes the findings
from these cases, as well as the case of the Federal Capital discussed in the previous
chapter. When the PJ was in power, unions were much more likely to win strong
linkages, but governors were less likely to invest in administrative capacity. Only with a
centrist governor (without a deregulatory agenda) who did not have a partisan alliance-
as in C6rdoba in the 1980s, Santa Fe after 2007, and in the Federal Capital (in 2003 and
again in 2006)-were there major investments in capacity.
613 Interview: T57, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), Tucumin, 4/21/2009; T06, Construction Workers'
Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Tucumin, 4/14/2009
611 La Gaceta de Tucumin "Acusado de cobrar una coima" 07/24/08; "Detienen a un inspector acusado de
cobrar coima" 07/24/08; "Un arresto reaviva el conflicto laboral en Trabajo" 07/25/08; Encontraron en su
carpeta billetes marcados 07/27/08; "Un arresto reaviva el conflicto laboral en Trabajo" 07/25/08.
615 Interview: Ti 1, Province of Tucumdn Tax Department, Tucuman, 4/17/2009
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Table 5.5: Summary of Analysis
Partisan Context Political
Position of
Governor
Investment in
Admin. Capacity
C6rdoba
(1984-1995)
C6rdoba.
(1995-1999)
C6rdoba
(1999-2009)
Santa Fe
(1984-1991)
Santa Fe
(1991-2003)
Santa Fe
(2003-2007)
Santa Fe
(2007-2009)
Tucuman
(2003-2009)
Federal Capital
(2002-2007)
Federal Capital
(2007-2009)
No Alliance
No Alliance
Alliance
Alliance
Alliance
Alliance
No Alliance
Alliance
No Alliance
No Alliance
Neutral
Deregulatory
Regulatory
Regulatory
Deregulatory
Regulatory
Regulatory
Regulatory
Regulatory
Deregulatory
High
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
High
Low
Neutral
Weakening
Strengthened
Maintaining
Maintaining
Maintaining
Weakening
Maintaining
Strengthened
Weakened
These cases have shown that there can be changes over time in the key factors
that influence enforcement patterns. The provinces studied in this chapter have moved in
two directions-some investing more in state bureaucracies, while others allowed those
bureaucracies to decline-they were not stuck in one pattern or another. This chapter,
however, has only analyzed cases in which partisanship plays a central role in regulatory
politics. Yet, the case of enforcement in the garment industry in the Federal Capital in
Chapter 4 and the environmental cases introduced in Chapter 1 suggest that there are
other ways in which linkages form and potentially different pathways to enforcement.
The following two chapters shift the focus to environmental regulation, moving away
from partisan politics to an issue with very different interest organization.
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Province
(year)
Trends in
Linkages
Table A5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Data
Stand.Variable Description / Coding N Mean dp Dev
PJ.1 Dummy 0 = Current governor not part of PJ 166 0.46 0.50
I = Current governor part of PJ
Education Estimated years of schooling 165 15 3.7
Civil Service 0 No civil service contract (not "planta permanente") 163 0.45 0.49Protection 1= Civil service contract
Experience Years of experience as a labor inspector 159 8.2 7.6
Number of Natural log of the (number of residents in the province / number of 166 0.37 0.41Inspectors inspectors)
Union strength The percentage of workers in the province who self-identify as being 166 0.41 0.054
affiliated with a union.
Jobs more Based on response to the question: Do you agree with the following
important than statement: "Sometimes, it is more important that the workers have 158 0.25 0.43
compliance jobs than that the firm comply with all of the laws" Yes=1 No=0
Based on the response to the question: When you encounter a
Advice on violation, how often do you talk with the union leader and give the 161 -0.29 0.82Flexibility firm time to comply only if the union leader agrees (Never=-1,
Sometimes=0, Almost Always= )
Accompany During an inspection, how often do unions accompany the 162 0.16 0.67Inspection inspection: Never=-1, Sometimes=0, Almost Always= I
Observe During an inspection, how often do unions observe the inspection: 153 0.27 0.69Inspection Never=-l, Sometimes=0, Almost Always=I
Provide Car During an inspection, how often do unions provide a car: Never=-1, 158 -0.08 0.70Sometimes=0. Almost Always=l
Orient Towards During an inspection, how often do unions orient you towards the
Problems most important problems: Never=-1, Sometimes=0, Almost 156 -0.06 0.70Always=l
Gather During an inspection, how often do unions help the inspector gather 156 -0.23 0.74Information information: Never=-1, Sometimes=0, Almost Always=l
Follow-up During an inspection, how often do unions help with follow up: 155 -0.06 0.78Never-1, Sometimes=0, Almost Always= 1
Collective During an inspection, how often do unions help the inspector with
Bargaining information about the collective bargaining agreement: Never-1, 155 0.01 0.74
Agreement Sometimes=0, Almost Always=1
Union Score Average of the variables relating to union participation in 166 -0.003 0.57inspections
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Table A5.2: Selected Appointed Officials in
Provincial Labor Administrations (2003-2009)
(union affiliated appointees are shaded in grey)
Province Head of
Gov.
(Party)
Name Position Background / Trajectory
C6rdoba De la Sota Farre Secretary of Ex-legislator (only lasted six
(PJ) Labor (2007) months)
Federal Telerman Pereyra Subsecretary of Labor lawyer, not connected with
Capital (Alianza) Labor (2005- the unions. Went on to private
2006) practice afterwards.
Federal Telerman
Capital (Alianza)
Federal
Capital
Macri
(PRO)
Santa Fe Reuterman
(PJ)
Lieutier
Ginzo
Ercoli
Subsecretary of
Labor (2006-
2008)
Subsecretary of
Labor (2008-)
Secretary of
Labor (2000-
2003)
Engineer who had been working
with groups of unemployed, went
on to various government
positions.
Labor lawyer with various
positions in government at the
national and provincial level
Party activist.
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Position
Subsecretary of
Labor (1999-
2003)
Santa Fe Obei (PJ) Gianneschi Secretary of
Labor (2003-
2007)
Santa Fe Oie (PJ) a
Santa Fe Obei( J 
(Socialist) Labor (2007-
Santa Fe Binner Mrtaii t
Santa Fe Binner Ciciliani Subsecretary of
(Socialist) Labor for
promotion of
Decent Work
(2007-2009)
Santa Fe Binner
(Socialist)
Santa Fe Binner
(Socialist)
Rubio
Muriaga
Head of Health
and Safety
Inspection
Head of Labor
Inspection
(2007-)
Background / Trajectory
High level PJ party activist,
worked in a number of branches
in the government.
A judge with ties to the PJ, who
came in as an outside appointee.
Afterwards he retired.
Served as head of the national
occupational health and safety
agency, as well as with the ILO.
Never worked for unions.
A political activists within the PS
with experience in labor issues.
Previous appointments included
Director of Employment for the
city of Rosario, a consultant to
the ILO, and a member of the
policy making think tank of the
PS. Left the MTSF to become a
national deputy.
Previously was a health and
safety inspector in the Federal
Capital.
Previously was a labor inspector
for the national MTESS branch in
Rosario.
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Province Head of
Gov.
(Party)
Santa Fe Reuterman
(PJ)
Name
Traverso
Province Head of
Gov.
(Party)
Background / Trajectory
Table A5.3: Ranks of Labor Administration (2008)616
Rank
Ministerio
Secretaria de Estado
Secretaria
Subsecretaria
Direccion
Total
% of Provinces
17%
4%
17%
54%
8%
100%
616 Source: Data compiled by author.
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PositionNamne
Chapter 6: Putting out Fires in Santa Fe and C6rdoba
This chapter shifts the from labor politics to environmental politics, returning to
the provinces analyzed in the previous chapters with a new focus. Contrasting labor and
environmental issues allows us to ask a series of questions about the nature of
enforcement under the conditions of politicized bureaucracies that cannot be answered by
examining labor regulation alone. First, is the role of societal organizations enforcement
primarily an artifact of the legacy of Argentina's corporatist institutions, or the alliance
between the PJ and the Peronist unions? Analyzing environmental enforcement is
particularly helpful because of the very distinct structure of environmental politics, which
has none of the features of corporatism or partisanship (as described in Chapter 2). If the
analytical framework advanced in this dissertation applies beyond labor politics, it should
be able to explain variation in environmental enforcement as well. Second, due to the
distinct organization of social groups and politics, there should be some differences
between environmental and labor issues, which can help refine the analysis of the drivers
of enforcement. For example, if partisanship is not a key issue in environmental politics,
what determines whether or not regulators can form linkages with civil society
organizations? Investigating environmental politics can help uncover alternative sources
of linkages formation, facilitating a more complete understanding of a key attribute of
state-society relations.
Third, revisiting some of the provinces analyzed in Chapters 3 through 5 provides
an opportunity to juxtapose the politics of two different sets of policies in the very same
provinces. These comparisons help identify the degree to which provincial-level factors,
such as the structure of the economy, are the primary drivers of enforcement and whether
administrative capacity and linkages are only secondary factors. For example, was the
reform of labor inspection in Santa Fe that took place in 2007 and 2008 primarily due to a
broad effort by the Socialist administration to invest in good government, or due to the
particulars of labor politics? Were the failures to broadly enforce labor regulations in
Tucuman due to its level of socio-economic development? Comparison of labor and
environmental regulation can help answer these questions, providing a more robust
assessment of alternative explanations for enforcement.
The first, and main, section of this chapter analyzes the actions of environmental
regulators in Santa Fe, identifying two distinct logics of action. Under most
circumstances, the routine process of enforcement is highly limited and at an extremely
low level. However, when there is sharp social conflict around a particular industrial site,
regulators are able to leverage resources outside the state, and high levels of concentrated
enforcement follow. The chapter then develops an explanation for this pattern of society-
dependent enforcement. While attributes of the regulatory agency or the environmental
organizations in the province are important, they alone cannot account for variation in
enforcement. Instead, it is necessary to examine which civil society organizations
become linked with regulators and how the capabilities of these groups combine with
those of the state. In the case of Santa Fe, regulators lack administrative capacity and
cannot work with professional environmental organizations that have the potential to
support enforcement aimed at an industry or region. Instead, regulators only formed
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linkages with small community groups that can generate the conflict necessary to become
politically viable partners. However, these groups only enable the state to enforce
regulations in a highly concentrated way on specific firms.
Analysis of Santa Fe suggests that linkages are crucial for explaining
environmental enforcement. To further test this proposition, the second section of the
chapter briefly analyzes a shadow case of C6rdoba, which by most measures has even
stronger professional environmental organizations than Santa Fe (in terms of funding,
expertise, and international connections). Notwithstanding the robust professional
environmental organizations in C6rdoba, the pattern of enforcement is extremely similar
to Santa Fe. This additional case provides stronger evidence that analyzing both linkages
and administrative capacity is necessary for explaining the dynamics of environmental
enforcement. The chapter concludes by summarizing the implications of these cases for
the broader study of enforcement.
Santa Fe
The Santa Fe Secretaria de Medio Ambiente (SFSMA) is the primary government
agency responsible for implementing environmental regulations in the province.617 As
introduced above, examining the actions of regulators reveals two main logics of
enforcement. One logic involves routine inspections to gather pollution samples, analysis
of those samples, followed by attempts to sanction firms that are in violation. Officials
estimated that they conducted 260 such inspections in 2008, which were composed of a
mixture of programmed actions and responses to complaints. 618 They differ by media
(e.g. air, water, solid waste), but inspections generally involved surprise visits in which
the regulators "take a sample, talk with the manager, review the plant, the processes, and
systems of waste treatment. " Regulators use a strategy that is at once pedagogical and
punitive:
"We have a double function. On the one hand, we monitor the firms and
the way they are being managed. On the other hand, we have to convince
firms to manage the environment well and minimize their impacts so the
firm can really grow. [This way,] they are going to have fewer
difficulties, no problems with their neighbors, or with the courts... In this
aspect we guide firms, telling them what technology exists... and which
consultants they can hire who do good work"6 19
61 The agency was created when the provincial water authority (DIPOS) was privatized in the 1990s. It
was initially formed as a secretaria del estado but was downgraded in rank under the Binner
administration (in 2007) to a normal secretaria.
618 There are no precise figures available for the number of inspections, which fluctuates highly year to
year Nor are there any exact figures available for the portion of these inspections that were programmed
or in response to complaints; in air pollution officials estimated that half of the inspections were triggered
by complaints, while in water pollution the number is closer to 20%. Interviews: S49, Inspector, Santa Fe
Lnvironmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008 and S50, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat.,
Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
619 Interview: S49, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
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In sum, there are routine processes in the SFSMA to collect information about
compliance and to fashion responses, which aim to cajole, convince, and enable firms to
come into compliance. If the analysis of enforcement focused entirely on style, it would
appear that the SFSMA is approximating best practices in regulation.
After looking more closely, however, it becomes clear that these routine actions
have resulted in only low levels of enforcement across broad swaths of industry. First,
when placed in context of the vast number of polluting firms concentrated in the
province, the quantity of inspections was very low. In the economic census of 2004,
there were nearly 10,000 industrial facilities operating in the province, in addition to
hundreds of other firms in the energy sector, ports, mining, and agriculture that are
potential contaminators. 620 This number undoubtedly grew substantially in the post-crisis
boom, indicating that inspectors visit less than 3% offacilities. Therefore, regulators are
just scratching the surface in terms of information gathering. Officials from the SFSMA
estimated that there were some 5,000 firms that "are not totally identified" and operating
completely outside of the regulatory system. 621 This is no small deficiency. A study
released by researchers in the National University of Rosario's medical school in 2011, in
collaboration with the United Nations, found that Santa Fe's industry posed the highest
risk of contamination in the country.622 Yet, regulators were not consistently monitoring
majority of firms.
Second, after issuing violations, inspectors had difficulty taking steps that could
alter firm behavior. For one, the process of using fines was often blocked; out of the
inspected firms in 2008, upwards of 50% were issued notices that they were out of
compliance, but only 5% were issued penalties.623 This was not due to a strategic use of
flexibility, but instead stemmed from interrelated formal and informal failures in the
regulatory system. Formally, Santa Fe's environmental laws made it difficult, although
not impossible, to penalize firms that violate air pollution provisions some industries. Air
regulations in Santa Fe limited the amount of ambient pollution in any particular area, but
624did not specify specific fines for emissions. As a consequence, the normal
administrative processes of fines could not be used in these cases. There were, however,
625
ways around this problem. For example, the SFSMA could void the firm's license to
operate by finding that the firm is not following the management plan described in its
environmental impact assessment (EIA), or by working with the municipality to shut the
firm down. Also, in specific industries, like grain silos, there were supplemental pieces
626
of legislation that could be used to issue fines. Furthermore, a number of national and
international statutes could be applied by provincial regulators (the presupuestos minimos
described in Chapter 2). These processes have barriers built into them, which make it
difficult for regulators to utilize penalties in air pollution.
620 Source: Economic Census of 2004, INDEC.
621 Interview: SO1, Senior Official Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
62 La Capital "Rosario es una de las zonas con mayor contaminaci6n del pais" 05/08/11
6'3 Interview: SO1, Senior Official Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
621 Interview: S13, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
62S Interview: S18, Taller Ecologista, Rosario, 5/14/2009
626 Interview: S48, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
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Perhaps even more important than the formal limitations in regulatory rules, there
was an additional set of weak points in enforcement across media (i.e. air, water, and
solid waste). The formal penalties that do exist were easily be evaded by firms that put
up resistance. 627 Firms could avoid penalties that came with non-compliance either by
exploiting organizational failings in the SFSMA or by taking advantage of the limited
appetite for punitive measures among senior officials. As a result, even in areas like
water pollution in which regulations specified clear penalties, the SFSMA rarely executed
62
sanctions.628 When combined with the low rate of information gathering, the weakness in
the SFSMA's ability to overcome resistance and make penalties on violating firms stick,
resulted in very low levels of enforcement across all industries.629
The SFSMA was not, however, always a crippled agency and there was an
entirely different logic of enforcement that coexisted with the routine practices described
above. When there was social pressure over pollution in a specific community or firm,
regulators could surmount the formal and informal limitations in their monitoring
abilities and sanctioning power. One inspector described the difference in sanctioning
when there is conflict:
"We can demand more because the firms feel very pressured because
there can be a protest and blockade of the plant so that no one can go to
work. Everything functions like that here. When there is popular
pressure, everything gets really interesting. We have had cases in I'hich
popular pressure was the only way to get afirm that was out (f
compliance to change. "630
Not only do firms worry about the direct effects of social protests (e.g. blockades), but
firms also need to worry about civil suits filed in court, which strengthen the hand of
regulators.631 In short, the political pressure generated by social conflict can, under some
conditions, create opportunities for inspectors to overcome barriers that prevent them
from making regulatory actions stick against reluctant firms in routine enforcement
processes.
In circumstances of conflict, inspectors can also leverage connections with the
local actors to continually monitor firms. For example, one inspector in northern Santa
Fe recalled:
"The most successful case that I have seen was in Rafaela. There were
three firms that the population systematically denounced... One daity plant
6 Interview: S13, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
68 Interviews: S01, Senior Official Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009: and 504.
Taller Ecologista, Rosario, 6/3/2009
6'9 The inability for the SFSMA to overcome resistance is somewhat surprising considering the fact that,
compared with most of other bureaucracies analyzed thus far in this dissertation, the SFSMA has some
Ieatures that tend towards bureaucratic autonomy. Even though they were not hired through a mentocratic
process, all officials in the small team that enforce environmental regulations had civil service protection
and university degrees. These organizational features, however, were insufficient in the face of pressure
from firms.
6 Interview: S13, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
631 Interview: S29, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
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and two meat packing plants. An NGO, the municipality, and city
councilors all started moving [against the firms]. They put together a
commission with the SFSMA to keep checking on the firms. This was due
to social pressure... We went to inspect them ... [and] social pressure made
the three firms create first rate wastewater treatment plants, which arefunctioning really well. "632
In this case, regulators were not only getting political backing from civil society
organizations and the municipality, but they were also extending their capacity to collect
information (particularly important in this case because the firms were located some
distance from the nearest office of the SFSMA). In sum, regulators do not just draw on
civil society for political support, but they also draw on civil society to make up for
administrative weaknesses in information gathering.
Santa Clara and the Dynamics of Conflict
The case of the Santa Clara Plant, which processes soy and sunflower seeds to
produce vegetable oil in the city of Rosario, is illustrative of how social conflict translates
into successful enforcement. The Santa Clara plant is owned by Molinos Rio de la Plata,
an Argentine agro-industrial firm that produces primary products (soy beans, sunflower,
rice), vegetable oils, biodiesel, and a variety of processed food products. Molinos Rio de
la Plata is a large firm that grew extremely rapidly during the commodity boom to reach
6331.7 billion dollars in sales, 1.3 billion dollars in exports, and 5,000 employees in 2007.3
In the 2000s, many of the firm's principal operations were in the province of Santa Fe,
which was one of the leaders in the agro-industry sector.634 In total, Molinos controlled
significant economic resources in the province, making it no easy target for regulators.
Santa Clara, one of five plants owned by Molinos, had the capacity to process a
massive amount of soy and sunflower seeds (4,500 tons per day). This industrial process
results in a variety of pollutants that need to be treated (in the air: particulates, hexane,
nitrogen oxides, ammonium, residual pesticides; in the water: oils, fats, and sulfates).635
When Santa Clara began its operations, the area around the plant was essentially
farmland. As the city of Rosario expanded, housing was built nearby, and the plant
became engulfed on three sides by working class residential neighborhoods. By the
2000s, the plant was operating in close proximity to people without complying with a
variety environmental laws, which meant that the plant was exposing its neighbors to
contaminants.
Inspectors from the SFSMA were well aware of the environmental problems
caused by Santa Clara, which were common in the industry. But regulators were largely
unable to take steps that would lead to compliance. According to inspectors, Santa
Clara's air "emissions were very bad because they were burning sunflower seed shells to
632 IntervieW: S28, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
6 Source. Annual Report, Molinos Rio de la Plata, 2007.
631 In 2004, it proposed an 80 million dollar investment in the province.
6 Torres de Quinteros, Zulema et. al. "Condicones ambeintales y salud en el Area influencia de la Aceitera
Santa Clara (Distrito Sudoeste de Rosario-Argentina)" Investigaci6n en Salud vol. 8, nimero especial,
2007.
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fire the boiler, which created high levels ofparticulates and noise. We confirmed all of
this ourselves. As always, we required changes, but there were no sanctions. We
required the changes again, and there were no sanctions again. It was a closed loop."636
In short, the firm was intransigent and inspectors could do little to surmount its
resistance. In addition to air pollution, regulators later discovered that Santa Clara was
also violating water pollution laws by releasing fats, oils, and sediments through an
illegal connection to a storm water drain.637 The former Secretary of Environment, who
was leading the agency at this time, recounted: "The state... was not complying with its
own rules to apply sanctions and implement legislation." 6 3 8 There were routine
inspections of the plant, violations were found, but the SFSMA was unable to force
investment in technologies that would lead to compliance. In short, Santa Clara, like
many of the cereal processing facilities in Santa Fe, was causing serious environmental
damage and violating laws, and responses from regulators did little to mitigate the
pollution.639
The trigger for change in this case was a series of fires and explosions, beginning
in April 2004, in the Santa Clara plant. 640 The fires were caused by problems in silos that
held sunflower seeds, which were not properly ventilated, leading to gas build-ups that
eventually ignited.64 1 These incidents frightened nearby residents and brought the
problems at the plant to the attention of officials in the municipal government. People
living in the surrounding neighborhoods had a longstanding conflict with the plant but,
until this point, they had little success finding allies to help them press their demands.642
After the fire, there was a neighborhood assembly, local protest, and a city councilor met
with residents to demand greater pollution control.64 3
One of the most vocal neighborhood groups was an informal collection of
residents called the Vecinal Santa Teresita, which came to represent the community in a
number of local forums. The leaders of the Vecinal had several of factors on their side
that allowed them to mobilize a serious campaign against Santa Clara.64 4 First, when
attention was focused on the plant, the provincial government was under the control of
the PJ, while the municipal government was controlled by the opposition Socialist Party
(PS). This condition was important because various actors in the municipal government
aligned with the neighbors to demand action by the provincial government, which had
jurisdiction over enforcing environmental regulations through the SFSMA. In short,
636 Interview: Si 3, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
63- La Capital "Una inspecci6n detect6 un desague clandestino en la aceitera Santa Clara" 06/15/04:
"Intiman a la aceitera Santa Clara por el desague pluvial clandestine" 06/16/04
638 Interview: B12, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Buenos Aires, 5/26/2009
639 For example, see an editorial from the environmental group Taller Ecologista: La Capital "Mis
cerealeras, mds deuda ecol6gica" 02/20/04.6 40 La Capital "Explot6 un silo y provoc6 gran incendio en una aceitera" 04/06/04; "Un incendio destruy6
un silo en una aceitera" 04/07/04; "Un incendio en la aceitera Santa Clara arras6 un silo" 05/09/04; "Otro
incendio en un silo de la aceitera Santa Clara" 05/11/04.
Interview: S36, Manager, Cereal Industry Firm, Rosario, 5/13/2009
612 Interview: S25, Vecinal Santa Teresita, Rosario, 5/8/2009
6. La Capital "Piden controlar los silos de la planta aceitera Santa Clara" 05/11/04.
614 In addition to the ones listed below, the Vecinal Santa Teresita connected with students in the National
University of Rosario's communications program to produce a documentary on the problems of pollution
and draw attention to the problem.
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exploiting the conflict between political parties operating at different levels of
government enabled the Vecinal to gain powerful allies outside of the main regulatory
system.
Soon after the fire, health officials from a local clinic revealed to the press that
there had been disproportionately high rates of asthma in the Santa Teresita
neighborhood.64 5 The city health department then conducted a household survey of the
conditions in the neighborhoods surrounding the Santa Clara plant.64 6 The results,
published in 2007, found that there were high levels of illnesses commonly associated
with air pollution. The study went beyond health issues and surveyed residents about
their opinions regarding Santa Clara. Its findings revealed broad support for the claims
of those in the neighborhood in favor of more enforcement, indicating that over 90% of
residents felt that there were serious environmental problems in the community and 60%
felt that the plant should be relocated.64 7 Second, neighborhood leaders connected with a
law firm that began to file civil suits on the behalf of the individuals against the owner of
the plant. As one neighborhood leader described: after the fire, "we were all under the
smoke and ash, with people evacuated from their houses. The first issue was health, and
afterwards, the lawyers.... We made it so all of the people in the neighborhood started
individual lawsuits. They received a lot of support from... the public health officials who
had been studying the neighborhood."648 The threat of civil legal action was, according
to the neighbors, key in getting managers in the plant to pay attention to the
community.649
As the conflict escalated, the managers began to feel threatened and feared the
community would demand that the plant be closed down or relocated. 650 According to
regulators: "the pressure of the neighbors was so strong that the firm had to solve the
problems, or the plant could not keep working. "651 Regulatory institutions were
completely failing; not only were pollution standards being ignored, but conflicts were in
the courts and the streets instead of being structured by regulations. In response,
provincial and municipal governments took steps to resolve their conflicts and address
the problem by conducting joint inspections.652 These inspections uncovered further
violations in the plant, including the illegal wastewater discharges. They marked the
beginning of an enforcement campaign on the part of the SFSMA, which grew into an
intensive monitoring effort and the imposition of a series of requirements on the firm that
could not be ignored.
61 La ('apital "Advierten que aumentaron los casos de asma cerca de una planta aceitera" 05/25/04
6 lorres de Quinteros, Zulema et. al. "Condicones ambeintales y salud en el Area influencia de la Aceitera
Santa Clara (Distrito Sudoeste de Rosario-Argentina)" Investigaci6n en Salud vol. 8, nimero especial,
2007.
64 The methodology of the study was questionable, but nevertheless it gave a scientific endorsement to the
claims of the neighbors who were against the plant.
648 Interview: S25, Vecinal Santa Teresita, Rosario, 5/8/2009
649 At the time of the research, some cases were still in court and their outcomes were uncertain.
650 Interview: S36, Manager, Cereal Industry Firm, Rosario, 5/13/2009
651 Interview: S13, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
652 La Capital "Por la aceitera Santa Clara se redinen provincia y municipio" 05/27/04; Controlar~n las
emanaciones que produce la aceitera Santa Clara" 06/01/04
155
One key element of the change in enforcement came when neighborhood activists
and city councilors started a "Monitoring Committee" to bring together all the actors
involved in the conflict. 653 The Monitoring Committee, which met at a local office of the
SFSMA, included representatives from the neighborhood, the SFSMA, health
professionals, and city council members.654 Plant managers did not participate at first
because they feared neighbors would make unreasonable demands, such as requiring the
firm to buy houses so residents could move or forcing the plant to relocate.655 The
Vecinal Santa Teresita "invited the managers from the plant. They did not come, but
they sent union leaders, who almost wanted to kill us." 656 Through the union leaders,
Santa Clara sent a message that enforcement threatened jobs. Despite this initial
resistance, when the pressure did not abate, managers eventually came to the table and
began an open dialogue with the neighbors and the SFSMA about actions they could take
to come into compliance.
This series of events, which only took two months from the initial fire to the
formation of the Monitoring Committee, greatly increased the capabilities of
environmental inspectors to enforce regulations. The SFSMA became "a mediator,
demanding actions from the plant and... monitoring the plant to make sure the changes
were adequate . Now, according to the inspectors, the "closed loop" of violations
without sanctions repeating endlessly had been broken. In August 2004, managers from
Santa Clara presented a plan of action to reduce pollution and come into compliance with
regulations over a two year period. The plan included the installation of electrostatic
filters in their chimneys to reduce air pollution and a change in grain handling practices
to further reduce air pollution. The plant management also promised to install a series of
controls in the silos to reduce the risk of additional fires and an alarm system that could
notify neighbors of any accidents. Finally, Santa Clara committed to undertaking a
number of projects in the community, including planting a barrier of trees between the
neighbors and the plant.' 8
These promises were important first steps because they pushed Santa Clara to
begin seriously managing environmental issues and, after the plant had a plan, it became
clear that the plant could comply and "was notjust going to be shut down "659 Still,
inspectors from the SFSMA had to make sure that Santa Clara actually undertook the
investments outlined in the plan. To do so, regulators from the SFSMA worked directly
with the Vecinal Santa Teresita and conducted a series of inspections. According to
neighbors, "When environmental officials come to inspect the plant, we go to the plant as
iell."660 Residents called this a system of "neighborhood monitors."661 Managers at
Santa Clara accepted this practice, which was not legally mandated; a manager explained
"J didn't have anything to hide, so I opened the doors to the neighbors and the
653 Interview. S25, Vecinal Santa Teresita, Rosario, 5/8/2009
6 La Capital "Reuni6n de vecinos, funcionarios, empresarios y concejales" 06/15/04
6Interview. S36, Manager, Cereal Industry Firm, Rosario, 5/13/2009
6i6 Interview: S25. Vecinal Santa Teresita, Rosario 5/8/2009
65 Interview: S13, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
" La Capital "Santa Clara busca bajar la poluci6n ambiental con un plan forestal" 08/23/04
6 Interview: S13, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/20096 Interview: 547, Vecinal Santa Teresita, Rosario, 5/8/2009
061 In Spanish: "vecinos controladores. " Interview: S25, Vecinal Santa Teresita, Rosario, 5/8/2009
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government and let them in."62 The SFSMA kept monitoring the plant, pushing it along
and evaluating the technical aspects of the investments, all the while the community
organization served as local observers and, in combination with the municipal
government, kept political pressure on the regulators and the firms.
The process was anything but smooth, but this form of enforcing regulations with
tight interactions between the SFSMA, the Vecinal, municipal government and Santa
Clara persisted for over two years. There were challenges along the way in keeping the
firm on track with the investments. For instance, Santa Clara delayed in purchasing the
air pollution filter. When the plant fell short on its commitments, new negotiations were
triggered. Eventually, Santa Clara spent additional money to expedite the installation the
filter without a long delay. By 2006, the firm made over two million dollars in
investments and completed the projects that it had proposed.663 From the point of view of
the regulators, enforcement was a success: "After two longyears, a lot of tolerancefrom
the neighbors, an effort from the firm, and an effort from us acting in between those two
groups, Santa Clara managed tofix the emissions and made many improvements.''664
Representatives from the Vecinal Santa Teresita recognized noticeable improvements in
the environment and to their health: "after they put in the chimney... [my friendidid not
have any more asthma crises. The children haven't had them either."665
For managers at Santa Clara, the transformed relationship with the community
had long-term benefits. First, they stopped worrying about the plant being shut down
because of popular pressure. Second, when they made new changes in the plant, they
were able to talk them through with regulators and the community to gain their support.
No longer did managers have to operate outside formal rules. For example, in 2009,
Santa Clara needed approval from the city government for some alterations to the plant
layout. Managers talked it over with the community leaders, who asked for some public
works projects in the neighborhood and then agreed to support the plant to help it secure
the permits. Plant managers called this the "cherry on the cake" of building a good
relationship with the community. 666
In sum, the Santa Clara case was an example of how, in the context of social
conflict, regulators from the SFSMA could take steps that approximated high levels of
enforcement in specific cases. These actions reinforced environmental regulatory
institutions. Leaders from a professional environmental located in Rosario, who were not
directly part of the Monitoring Commission but observed the process closely, also saw
the efforts as a success: "It is a positive case because they made many environmental
improvements."667 There was complete consensus that, with a lot of help, environmental
regulations had been enforced by the SFSMA.
0 Interview: S36, Manager, Cereal Industry Firm, Rosario, 5/13/2009
66 a Capital "Avanzan las mejoras ambientales en la zona de la aceitera Molinos Rio de la Plata"
08/09/06. Interview: S36, Manager, Cereal Industry Firm, Rosario, 5/13/2009
"0 Interview: S1 3. Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
(6 Interview: S25, Vecinal Santa Teresita, Rosario, 5/8/2009
6 Interview: S36, Manager, Cereal Industry Firm, Rosario, 5/13/2009
60 Interviews: S04 and S18, Taller Ecologista, Rosario 5/14/2009 and 6/03/2009
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The Santa Clara was not unique, but rather indicative of the logic of enforcement
that occurs when regulators can leverage social conflict. There was a similar case in the
northern city of Rafaela, which also involved a commission of municipal government
officials and neighborhood groups that monitored firms. Also, there were at least two
other similar cases involving industry in the greater Rosario area. 668 All of these cases
involved some sort of community mobilization and conflict, followed by actions of the
SFSMA to take steps to enforce environmental regulations.
Not all of the cases, however, ended up with investment and compliance. The
blocked installation of a car battery recycling facility in a small town in southern Santa
Fe illustrates a somewhat different result of environmental conflict. In 2007, an
Argentine firm with investors from Buenos Aires called Ramsafe received permission for
the plant from the SFSMA. The recycling facility promised to produce 120 jobs and was
supported by the municipal government over the objections of some environmental
groups. In response to their concerns, the mayor stated: "the municipalgovernment and
the SFSIM will conduct periodic inspections to ensure that the facility complies itith all
of the requirements contained in the over 400 pages of documentation that have been
approved by the SFSMA."669
There were claims, however, that the environmental impact assessment (EIA) was
highly flawed, and had essentially overlooked a community that was located near the
facility. 670 Just as the construction of the facility began, a group of residents, along with
a small community organization, Centro Ecologista Renacer, and a few politicians, began
to protest the facility. They argued that "if the project continues, within afew months all
(four [agricultural] products will be contaminated."671 The protests continued and, only
three months later, the SFSMA reversed its decision, revoked the permission for the
facility based on the faulty EIA, and effectively shut Ramsafe down.672 In some ways,
the outcome was not as positive as that of the Santa Clara case; instead of finding a
solution that would allow development and environmental protection, the SFMSA
stopped development. Nevertheless, the SFSMA was able to take steps to enforce rules
around the EIA process. Again, mobilization by the community made action by the
regulators possible.
In sum, enforcement of environmental regulations in Santa Fe by the SFSMA in
the period after the economic crisis involved two very distinct logics. On the one hand,
668 On Rafaela: Interview: S28, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008. On
Capitan Bermudez: S04, Taller Ecologista, Rosario, 6/3/2009 and La Capital "La Justicia orden6 la
clausura de Petroquimica Bermndez" 11/11/06; "Celulosa y una medida a favor de los vecinos" 03/13/08:
"Hallan cianuro en lo que fue una laguna estabilizadora de Bermndez" 06/05/08. On Laser House:
Interview: S13, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009 and La Capital
"Clausuran una fdbrica que emanaba olores en zona norte" 03/22/07; "Nueva denuncia contra una empresa
por peligrosas emanaciones" 06/12/07
669 La Capital "Instalan una f~brica de baterias para autom6viles en Fighiera" 05/11/07
60 Source: A presentation at a meeting of Agenda Socioambiental Santafesino
671 La Capital "Pav6n y Fighiera cortaron la ruta en rechazo a fibrica contaminante" 05/06/07
672 La Capital "Marcha en Pav6n contra un proyecto industrial" 08/05/07; "Desautorizan la instalacion de
una fabrica en Fighiera" 08/22/07. Interview: SO1, Senior Official Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat,
Rosario, 4/30/2009
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when there was no broad social conflict, there were low levels of enforcement. Routine
inspections were few and, while regulators attempted to craft responses that involved
sanctions and pedagogy, the SFSMA was unable to withstand resistance from
intransigent firms. The result was often a "closed loop," as one inspector described it, in
which the regulators continually required firms to change their behavior and firms
ignored those demands. On the other hand, when there was social conflict, the dynamics
of enforcement shifted radically. In these cases, regulators focused their attention on one
(or at most a handful) of plants, intensively monitored pollution levels, supplemented
their data with accounts from small civil society organizations, and drew upon the
political resources generated through social conflict to force firms to change their
behavior.
This pattern of enforcement approximates the society-dependent ideal-type; social
conflict appeared to be a necessary condition. Enforcement remained piecemeal and
local, as efforts to leverage conflicts and scale up enforcement to an entire industry in
Santa Fe were fleeting.673 Under the Binner administration, there were attempts to create
industry level enforcement programs in the agro-industrial sector, but at the time of this
research, they were still only plans. Instead, enforcement remained "a reactivejlan" in
which regulators do not take action beyond the cases in which there is conflict. 4 This is
not the pattern of enforcement that officials in the SFSMA preferred. As an inspector
explained:
"What we would like do... is to plan in.spections with the most frequency
for the most risky firms, and with lessfrequency for the less risky firms in
order to understand their main emissions... and to remediate or prevent
any problems. [ To be]... beyond the complaints that are always going to
exist. But today we are still behind on this, and we are acting more as
firefighters ... with complaints, and with judicial requests that have to be
answered immediately. ,67
This sentiment, that rationalizing the enforcement process is an important goal, was
expressed by nearly all of the officials in the SFSMA. It remained, however, out of
reach.
Accounting for Enforcement Patterns in Santa Fe
What explains this pattern of enforcement in Santa Fe? Any account of
enforcement would be incomplete without considering the extremely low levels of
administrative capacity of the SFSMA, which greatly constrained the action of regulators.
First, the SFSMA had limited human resources for enforcement during the period after
the economic crisis. In its Rosario office, the SFSMA only had one environmental
6-3 One such effort occurred before the economic crisis in the metal plating industry, but it did not directly
involve the SF SMA and was not maintained in the period after the crisis. The project, which occurred in
the late 1990s early 2000s, mainly involved the municipal government of Rosario and the privatized
company water company. Interview: S 17, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe,
12/10/2008
6 Interview: B 1 2, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Buenos Aires, 5/26/2009
6 Interview : S1 3, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
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inspector dedicated to control full time. 676 Therefore, there was one official responsible
for literally thousands of industrial facilities, large and small, in the industrial corridor
that surrounds Rosario. In the north, which has fewer polluting industrial sites, there
were five inspectors, bringing the total to between six and ten inspectors in the entire
province (depending on how they are counted). This is an extremely small number of
staff considering the number of sites that they need to control and the sheer size of Santa
Fe. From the point of the view of the officials in the SFSMA, resources were a huge
constraint leaving them with "little margin" for action.677 Officials, by their own
accounts, argue that the lack of human resources is at the root of their reactive approach:
"itih sofew people, we react according to necessity."
In addition, the inspectors lacked the basic materials they needed to organize and
execute the tasks of enforcement. They had access to one or two cars (depending on the
office) and "more than one time we [inspectors] have had to pay for the gasoline
ourselves to be able to get to the inspection site. ,679 In addition, there was only one
laboratory in the province, located in the north, creating delays in evaluating samples
taken by the southern office (where most of the population and industry is located). The
SFSMA also lacked basic computing technology: "There is no information system " to
keep track of the firms, and officials "believe that getting IT technology is fundamental"
in order to systematically enforce regulations.680 Even as other regulatory agencies in
Santa Fe expanded in the post-crisis period, environment remained underfunded. For
example, the Santa Fe Labor Secretariat was given money to purchase over one hundred
computers under governor Obeid and was upgraded to a full Ministry under governor
Binner with funds to hire new inspectors. There was no such investment in the SFSMA,
and Binner actually lowered the rank of the agency.681 In sum, low levels of
administrative capacity help account for why the inspectors cover such little ground in
gathering information about compliance in the vast number of firms that they are
supposed to control.
Although administrative capacity helps explain some of the limitations of the
SFSMA, it is hardly determinant on its own. Societal organizations clearly appear to be
important. What about professional environmental groups? Can their interests or
distribution explain the pattern of enforcement? In the north of the province, there are
two major organizations. One is the Foundation Protect (Fundacidn Proteger, founded in
1991), which is run by a local professor and focuses on water and fish conservation in the
Parana river basin. Another is the Santa Fe Center for the Protection of Nature (('entro
Santafesino de Proteccidn a la Naturaleza, CEPRONAT founded 1977), which has a
campaign against pesticides and publishes a monthly journal "The Environmentalist" (El
Ambientalista) covering local and global environmental issues. In Rosario, the
Ecological Workshop (Taller Ecologista, founded in 1984) and Center for Biodiversity
This lasted fiorn the early 2000s until late 2007 when some temporary officials, four or five, were hired
to supplement the permanent inspector. It is unclear whether these temporarv officials remained for long6)7 Interview: B 1 2, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Buenos Aires, 5/26/2009
, Interview SO1, Senior Official Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario. 4/30/2009
679 Interview: S29, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe. 12/10/2008
1terview . SO, Senior Official Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
6 Environment was reduced from a secretaria del estado to normal secretariat within a larger ministry.
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and Environmental Research (Centro de Investigaciones en Biodiversidady Ambiente
ECOSur founded in 1993), are professional organizations with members who include
journalists, university professors, and lawyers. These organizations regularly conduct
studies about environmental issues and are referents for the press in environmental
matters. By most measures, they are comparatively well developed-they boast
expertise, funding, and some even have international connections.
To combine their forces and influence local politics, thirty-two organizations
joined to create the Socio-Environmental Agenda (Agenda Socioambiental) in 2007.682
The group's i nitial purpose was to "acquaint those who aspire to govern the province or
a sit in the legislature about the key issues that should be addressed by provincial
policies."683 The group wrote public letters to the governor regarding policies and held
meetings that included members of government, professors, and environmentalists to
debate environmental issues. Environmental groups, however, have been unable to
leverage any partisan divide-none of the major political parties (Peronists, Socialists
and PRO) have partisan alliances with environmentalists. Nor does one of the major
parties have a particularly strong environmental agenda.
Notwithstanding this limitation, environmental organizations can, at times, be
influential. For example, in 2003 Governor Obeid appointed Oscar Quintero, a manager
in a local chemical and industrial firm, to be head of the SFSMA. Quintero was heavily
criticized by environmental groups, who argued that his firm had a bad track record and
that he would be easily captured by industry.684 In front of the "pressured executed" by
the unified opposition of environmental groups, Quintero's appointment was blocked .6
In his place, Governor Obeid appointed Marcelo Terenzio, a lawyer who was not the
favorite of any environmental groups but had a more neutral profile and experience
686
working on environmental issues in projects of the Inter-American Development Bank.
This episode suggests that, in some ways, the professional environmental organizations in
Santa Fe have wielded power in provincial politics.
The political influence of these groups did not, however, directly translate into
actions by the SFSMA. The geographic distribution, or interests, of professional
environmental organizations cannot account for the cases of enforcement identified
above. For example, one leading organization, Taller Ecologista, has campaigned to
push for greater enforcement in the Rosario area since the late 1990s. 687 In 2005, Taller
Ecologista started a specific area to address industrial pollution. The goal of the initiative
was to create a plan: 'for the entire industrial corridor, that the SFSMA has the
instruments to measure pollution and shows a plan [ofaction]. We are also askingjbr a
strategic plan that neighbors can participate in to have a say in where they installfirms
68' Interview: S18, Taller Ecologista, Rosario 5/14/2009
6d genda Socioatnbiental "Una Agenda Socioambiental para Santa Fe Construyendo propuestas para
sociedades sustentables" 2007.
6, La Capital Confirmado" 12/19/03; ""L a Secretaria de Medio Ambiente se usa para pagar favores
politicos- 12/19/03.
6X La Capita! "Rechazo el cargo el secretario de Medio Ambiente designado por Obeid" 12/20/03
6 Interview.: B 2, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Buenos Aires, 5/26/2009
Interview: S04, Taller Ecologista, Rosario 6/3/2009
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in the future, and which they expand, and which they relocate. "68 8 The change that
Taller Ecologista was advocating was to move away from "fire fighting" and towards
systematic application of environmental laws-the exact goal expressed by officials in
the SFSMA.
Despite the congruence of their goals, Taller Ecologista has not played a large
role in helping environmental inspectors with enforcement, which, as described above,
remained very much reactive. In addition, many of the episodes of enforcement that have
been successful, even ones in Rosario where Taller Ecologista is based (such as the Santa
Clara plant), did not directly involve professional environmental organizations, but
instead were driven primarily by smaller, neighborhood-level, associations, such as the
Vecinal Santa Teresita. While professional groups might have been influential in policy
adaptation, their actions cannot explain enforcement in the province.
To understand why professional environmental organizations, like Taller
Ecologista, have had only modest and indirect influence enforcement patterns, it is
necessary to examine the structure of linkages between the SFSMA and civil society
organizations. Formal avenues of consultation, such as a Provincial Environmental
Council-that is supposed to have a tripartite structure including the state, the private
sector, and environmental NGOs-did not function. Quite simply, "the NGOs have
never participated" in these formal meetings.689 There were also few channels for
informal connections to form.
Furthermore, civil servants at the SFSMA had norms against going out on their
own to build relationships when they need support to do their jobs. As one inspector
recalled: It would be easy to "talk with the radio, television, or someone [fi-om an
NGO]... but it is going to create a mess...No, we do not do it... We aren't an
environmental advocacy organization, we are the state. We regulate. The NGOs have
the role of advocacy. We cannot go out and play politics from our position in the
SFSMA. We are civil servants who workfor the state."690 Among politically appointed
officials, there was little, if any, dialogue with professional environmental organizations.
Under the Obeid administration, the secretary of environment summed up his view of
professional environmental NGOs, stating: "Some NGOs are only interested in being
NGOs. Once they form, they chose an issue and focus on their own interests with an
objective ofjustfundraising. "9 Among professional environmental organizations the
feeling was mutual; one leader explains:
"They were almost all bad relationships. Very cold. As an NGO we
criticized them a lot... they seemed less like Secretaries of Environment to
preserve the environment and the quality of lfe of the people, and more
like the defenders of the firms. "69
68S Interview: S18, Taller Ecologista, Rosario 5/14/2009
8 Interview: S46, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
69u Interview: S29, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
69 Interview: B 12, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Buenos Aires, 5/26/2009
692 Interview: S04, Taller Ecologista, Rosario, 6/3/2009
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With these frosty relationships, professional environmental groups lacked linkages with
the SFSMA.693 This failure of linkage formation helps account for why, even when they
have congruent goals, regulators have not drawn upon the resources of these groups for
enforcement.
By contrast, relationships between regulators and small, neighborhood level,
organizations took on a different dynamic. Neighborhood groups were able to become
viable partners for regulators, making enforcement possible in many of the positive cases.
For instance, in the Santa Clara case, the neighbors served as "monitors, "joined
regulators during inspections, and had direct interactions with staff at the SFMSA. In
other cases, relationships with small neighborhood organizations even helped the SFMSA
overcome their transportation shortages by getting a municipal government to send a car
to pick up the inspectors.694 The result is that the seemingly weaker neighborhood
organizations-which lack expertise, budgets, and paid staff-are actually more likely to
become sources of support for regulators in the SFSMA than professional environmental
organizations.
Why were these small groups able to create the conditions for enforcement? The
key difference lies in the dynamics of linkage formation. Small neighborhood groups
took a number of steps to generate social conflict in a way that professional
environmental organizations did not. The professional environmental organizations, for
the most part, did not bring cases to court and could not mobilize mass protests. The
small neighborhood groups took both of these courses of action. In addition, as in the
Santa Clara case, some neighborhood groups formed alliances with municipal
governments. For appointed officials, working with neighborhood groups has
advantages: "When there was an high conflict issue, it was necessary to give a response
because of two interests. First, to defend the government so it isn't criticized. Second, so
they don 'tfire me. 695 Once these conflicts got going, neighborhood groups became
viable partners for regulators. The politics of linkage formation helps explain why civil
servants were able to develop ties with neighborhood groups but not professional
environmental groups, which, in turn, accounts for the localized nature of enforcement.
In sum, environmental regulation in Santa Fe is distinctively society-dependent;
social conflict that results from community mobilization is a necessary condition for
enforcement. And to explain enforcement, the structure of linkages, which privilege
small community groups over professional environmental organizations, and the low
levels of administrative capacity in the SFSMA need to be taken into account.
C"rdoba as a Shadow Case
Is this pattern of enforcement unique to Santa Fe? Is it really the case that the
politics of linkage formation are key? Perhaps the professional environmental groups in
Santa Fe, which appear to have many strengths, are in fact weak? Juxtaposition with
693 There were some nascent changes in the Binner administration, but they were too preliminary to assess
whether they would be effective.
694 Interview: S28, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
695 Interview: B 12, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Buenos Aires, 5/26/2009
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C6rdoba, as a shadow case, is useful to put the Santa Fe into comparative context.
C6rdoba is a helpful comparison because it is very similar in terms of the structure of the
economy, level of socio-economic development, and industrial composition.696
However, there is one important difference: C6rdoba has even stronger professional
environmental organizations. For this reason, C6rdoba provides a more difficult test of
whether linkages are key intermediaries between regulators, society, and enforcement. If
there is a direct relationship between enforcement and civil society organizations
unmediated by linkages, it should be apparent in a province like C6rdoba.
There are two professional environmental organizations in C6rdoba that have
propelled their founders into the international stage. One organization, the
Environmental Defense Foundation (FUNAM, Fundacidnpara la defense del ambiente)
was established by Ranl Montenegro in 1982. Montenegro, a biology professor, was the
Subsecretary of Environment in C6rdoba in the 1980s. During his tenure, he orchestrated
the adoption of a set of environmental laws that made the province an early leader in
697Argentina. He went on to undertake a series of national and international
environmental campaigns against uranium mines, receiving recognition from the United
Nations. In addition, he has been involved in campaigns in C6rdoba against pesticides,
mines, and municipal sewage. FUNAM often gives technical assistance to neighborhood
organizations concerned about contamination in their communities. And when the
conflict over Botnia began (discussed in Chapter 2), FUNAM conducted studies to
support the claims of the residents of Gualeguaycho. Montenegro has developed strong
global connections, attends international environmental conferences, and has collaborated
with Greenpeace and other international organizations.
The other professional environmental organization, the Center for Human Rights
and Environment (CEDAH, Centro de Derechos Humanosy Ambiente), was co-founded
by Romina Picolotti and Jorge Daniel Taillant in 1999.698 Prior to 1999, Picolotti and
Taillant were working in Washington D.C. with international organizations and NGOs,
including the International Human Rights Law Group and the World Bank. With
financing from the Hewlett Foundation and other international funders, Picolotti and
Taillant returned to C6rdoba and formed CEDAH with the explicit goal of linking human
rights issues to environmental issues. They starting working internationally and locally,
trying to identify high profile legal cases that could set precedents, and they opened a
legal clinic that supports individuals and groups who want to take legal action in
environmental cases.699 CEDAH was thrust into the national spotlight in 2006 when
Picolotti represented the Gualeguaychn Environmental Assembly in international courts,
leading to her appointment as national Secretary of the Environment under Presidents
N6stor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (see Chapter 2). When Picolotti
was forced to resign, she returned to the helm of CEDAH. With substantial funding,
international connections, and a high profile leader, CEDAH was a formidable
professional environmental organization.
696 Mazorra and Beccaria 2007
697 Interview: C24, Environmental Defense Foundation, C6rdoba, 3/5/2009
698 Interview: C27, Center for Human Rights and the Environmental (CEDAH), C6rdoba, 3/16/2009
" Interview: C2 1, Center for Human Rights and the Environmental (CEDAH), Cordoba. 3/20/2009
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In addition to FUNAM and CEDAH, the C6rdoba Environmental Forum (Foro
Anhiental C6rdoba), is a third professional environmental organization comprised
mainly of university professors. 700 The Foro became directly involved in local politics
when, in 2007, it invited candidates for local office to sign a commitment to
sustainability, sent a number of requests for information from the local government, and
participated in local debates.701 Combined, these three professional environmental
organizations command significant resources and, unlike environmental organizations in
Santa Fe and Tucumdn (Chapter 7), they have the ability to serve as brokers between
domestic and international spheres. These are precisely the types of organizations have
been behind successful environmental campaigns in other countries in Latin America.702
Notwithstanding the presence of these groups, enforcement in Cordoba followed
the same pattern as in Santa Fe. When there was no crisis, the C6rdoba Environmental
703Secretariat (CSMA) conducted few inspections. In fact, delays in inspections were
actually a problem for the firms that needed certificates of environment compliance, and
some firms actually paid for the transportation of the regulators to conduct inspections.704
When the CSMA found violations, it was very vulnerable to the evasive tactics of firms,
and it could be years before violations turn into penalties and fines. 7 0 5 Professional
organizations were not able to trigger much in the way of enforcement either. But, like in
Santa Fe, when local community groups mobilize, everything changes.
For example, in 2004, residents of the small town of Freyre (population 5,900)706
mobilized against a leather tannery located in the town just fifty meters from the central
square. The storyline is very similar to the cases in Santa Fe. Before the protests,
regulators had done little to address violations from a known polluter. The community
rallied against the firm, gained allies in the municipal government, and demanded that
707
something be done about the tannery. The municipality, on behalf of the mobilized
community members, requested an inspection from the CSMA. Regulators found that the
708firm had a waste treatment plant, but it was not functioning adequately. In a similar
) The Foro grew out of an older conservation organization (Comit C6rdoba de Conservaci6n de la
Naturaleza) involving a group of biologists who, in 1985, undertook a campaign to plant 800 trees in the
province and, after one year, found that they all had been cut down. In 1986, members of the group
decided what was most needed was general education in the province about environmental issues. They
began visiting schools and giving short lessons on the environment, and then in 1987 they began educating
teachers about environmental issues. These programs scaled up, reaching over 100 schools. The Foro
eventually grew into a small scale organization made up of primarily of academics who undertook low
profile actions to influence local environmental policies in the province. Interview: C20, C6rdoba
Environmental Forum, C6rdoba, 3/2/2009
, Foro Ambiental "Memoria de Las Actividades Del Foro 2006-2009", 2009. See also: La Voz del
Interior "Compromiso por una C6rdoba sustentable" 12/20/07
Steinberg 2001
Multiple interviews, including: C29, Enforcement Department, Cordoba Environmental Secretariat,
C(ordoba. 3/I 9/2009; C2 1, Center for Human Rights and the Environmental (CEDAH), C6rdoba, 3/20/2009
( Interview: C26. Inspectors, C6rdoba Environmental Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/17/2009
Interview: C29, Einforcement Department, C6rdoba Environmental Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/19/2009
Source: 200 1 Census
Lea 'Oz del Interior "Fuerte debate en Freyre por una curtiembre en el centro de la ciudad" 11/15/04:
-'Que dice la empresa" 1/15/04; "Actuara la Provincia" 05/18/05
7 Interview: C29, Enforcement Department, C6rdoba Environmental Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/19/2009
165
manner as in the Santa Clara case, a department of health (this time provincial) became
involved and conducted a series of epidemiological studies, which found that residents
had elevated levels of chromium in their blood. 709 Two hundred and fifty people
marched in Freyre and the CSMA finally conducted inspections that uncovered serious
violations.7 10 The monitoring and protests continued for six months, until the CSMA
shut down the tannery and gave it a 35,000 dollar loan to relocate to another city.71' The
Freyre case was not unique, other episodes of community protest triggered reactions from
the CSMA and enforcement.712
The reactive regulation of the CSMA can be traced back to the same structures of
linkages and the relatively low levels of capacity that were apparent in Santa Fe.
Notwithstanding the strong professional environmental organizations that were successful
in advocating for regulation in many arenas, the administrative capacity of the CSMA
actually declined during the economic growth period starting in 2003, limiting regulators'
ability to take actions on their own. Regulators in the CSMA had no routine interactions
with professional environmental organizations from which they could have drawn
significant resources-one official went as far as saying he "believes" that regulators
" should stay disconnected" from environmental groups.m Instead, the CSMA was
largely dependent on the mobilization of community organizations protesting specific
instances of contamination. At times, community organizations were supported by the
professional organizations, but only community groups could generate local political
resources on which the regulators could draw.
In short, the case of C6rdoba suggests that even professional environmental
organizations that appear to be very well endowed with resources cannot always help
regulators. Crucially, linkages need to be formed through protests, which the
professional environmental groups could not readily organize. Consequently, regulators
rely mainly on community organizations and society-dependent enforcement mirrors
local mobilizations, not a bureaucratic plan or the demands of professional environmental
groups.
Conclusion
The cases of Santa Fe and C6rdoba have two main implications for the broader
analysis of enforcement in the context of bureaucratic weaknesses. First, the pattern of
enforcement in the cases analyzed above is comparable to the cases of labor regulation in
Chapter 3. In C6rdoba's wage and hour division and in Tucumin, enforcement only
occurred when labor inspectors could draw upon linked-unions for resources. While
there are some differences-the level of access that unions have to regulators is well
beyond that of environmental groups-the cases of environmental regulation are in many
7 La Voz del Interior "Freyre: vecinos de una curtiembre muestran anilisis de t6xicos en sangre
05/18/05; "Muestran andlisis de t6xicos en sangre" 05/18/05; "Curtiembre cuestionada por vecinos estudia
trasladarse a San Francisco" 05/20/05
La Voz del Interior "Curtiembre: 250 personas marcharon en Freyre" 05/23/05
71 La V,'oz del Interior "Manana cierra la curtiembre de Freyre" 11/28/05
For example- La Voz del Interior "Finalmente, Ambiente clausur6 Tecnocuer en Villa del Rosario"
03/22/07
m Interview: C29, Enforcement Department, C6rdoba Environmental Secretariat, Cordoba, 3/19/2009
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ways highly similar. Mobilization by a specific category of civil society organizations is
practically a necessary condition for state action. This similarity suggests that society-
dependent enforcement is not only a product of corporatist labor institutions or the
particular history of Peronist unions. Moreover, contrasting environmental and labor
cases demonstrates that society-dependent enforcement is not merely a relabeling of
capture. Even using an extremely broad definition, it would be impossible to interpret
714
cases, like that of Santa Clara, as capture.
Second, in the cases analyzed in this chapter, not all civil society organizations
were viable sources of support for regulators. Just as in labor regulation, linkages were
important. Unlike labor regulation, however, the less formal civil society organizations
were privileged over professional environmental groups, which were largely left on the
outside of the day to day enforcement actions of regulators. The process of linkage
formation in these cases was similar to the case of the labor regulation in the garment
industry in the Federal Capital (Chapter 4), and not at all like that of partisan exchange
described in the previous chapter. When small neighborhood groups generated conflict
and gained allies outside of the regulatory system, their power within the system grew.
This pathway to linkage formation was not immediately available to professional
environmental organizations in these two provinces, none of which directly collaborated
with state regulators.
These conclusions raise a series of additional questions. Is society-dependent
enforcement the only option for environmental enforcement in Argentina? If not, how
can regulators develop administrative capacity so that civil society organizations
complement, rather than substitute, the state? How can patterns of environmental
enforcement change? The following chapter explores these questions by examining
environment regulation in the province of Tucuman.
1 Ifanything, these cases are examples of so-called "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) behavior.
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Chapter 7: Controlling Pollution in the "Garden of the Republic"
In many ways, Tucumin appears an even less likely place for successful
enforcement of environmental regulations than the provinces analyzed in the previous
chapter. Not only is Tucuman one of the poorest provinces in Argentina, but its economy
is dependent on a few industries that are highly polluting, making enforcement costly
economically and politically. Moreover, as we saw in the analysis of Tucumin's labor
administration in Chapter 3, the provincial government suffers from corruption and an
extreme shortage of resources. Notwithstanding these factors, state regulators from the
provincial bureaucracy have taken a series of significant steps to enforce regulations.
And even as Tucumin's Environment Department made great strides in enforcement, it
exhibited more of the organizational shortcomings that are generally associated with
capture and corruption.
Through an analysis of environmental regulation in the citrus and sugar industries
of Tucumin, this chapter traces transition from state-driven enforcement, that was at a
low level, to co-produced enforcement at a high level. The chapter is organized as
follows. First, I provide an account of the main societal actors involved in environmental
politics in the province. Second, I recount changes in environmental regulation in
Tucumin from the 1990s to 2006. During this time, regulators gained information about
violations, but were unable to take punitive actions against firms. Third, I analyze a
series of changes-including the appointment of a new federal prosecutor, a series of
court cases, and a number of episodes of protest-that led to the creation of a political
environment in which regulators could establish linkages with environmental
organizations. Fourth, I examine the enforcement from 2006 to 2009 and the creation of
the Plan for Industrial Reconversion. This new regulatory structure increased
administrative capacity and enabled bureaucrats to channel public protest into a broad
regulatory effort that resulted in concrete changes in firm behavior. Finally, the chapter
ends by highlighting some of the conclusions that can be drawn from the Tucumin case.
Polluting Industries and Social Organization in Tucumdn
Environmental conflict in Tucumin involves a wide variety of contamination
problems, including the mismanagement of urban solid wastes, toxic metals from mining,
and particulate air pollution as well as water pollution from industry. This last
problem-air and water pollution caused by industry-are key challenges for state
regulators and are the focus of this analysis. Although there are certainly many
additional environmental problems in Tucumin-including burning of sugar cane
fields-in order to even begin to give environmental laws force and reduce
contamination, pollution from industry has to be controlled. This chapter focuses on
the sugar and citrus (lemon) industries, the two biggest polluters.
E 1nvironmental regulation historically proceeds from controlling "point sources" of pollution that are
stable and easy to indentify. to controlling "non-point sources" that are spread out and technically more
diffclhult to control.
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The most problematic industry in Tucumin from an environmental standpoint is
the sugar industry, which also has many attributes that make it extremely difficult to
regulate. The sugar industry is one of the largest sectors in the province, accounting for
10% of the province's GDP and employing approximately 50,000 workers during the
harvest (in a province of 1.5 million people).716 Sugar cane is grown and milled to
produce commodity sugar and, increasingly, ethanol for fuel. The sugar industry operates
with antiquated technology that has been in use for over one hundred years. Investment
in the sector has been scarce and piecemeal. Economic power is concentrated in the
approximately fifteen mills, owned by twelve firms, that operate at powerful places in the
supply chain (between the dispersed growers and the market) and are highly polluting.
The sugar industry association CART (Centro Azucarero Regional de Tucumon) has a
monopoly on representation for the industry in collective bargaining agreements. It is a
potentially encompassing association-all of the mills have the right to participate and
vote in decisions-but in practice approximately half of the firms are active. Many
sugar mills also participate in the FET (Federaci6n Econdmica de Tucumcin), which is
the most powerful business lobby in the province. 718 As further evidence for the
industry's political weight, the head of CART was also the head of the FET.
These two associations reinforce the industry's political power. They have not,
however, offered much in terms of service to help firms upgrade or comply with
environmental regulations. Instead, for technical know-how mills lean heavily on the
Agro-Industrial Research Station Obispo Colombres (Estaci6n Experimental
Agroindustrial Obispo Colombres), which is run by the provincial government in
collaboration with the private sector. This research agency provides most of the technical
knowledge necessary to improve agricultural and industrial production and, only in the
last few years, support for firms to reduce pollution.
There are three main pollutants from sugar mills.719 First, the most difficult
pollutant to control is a viscous substance called vinasse, which is a byproduct of the
process of making ethanol. Vinasse contains extremely high quantities of organic
pollutants that, when discharged into canals, damage the health of the water systems and
often lead to fish kills in downstream lakes. There are various ways of treating or
disposing of vinasse, including incineration or treatment in lagoons. In places where
mills are located in rural areas, large lagoons can be used to treat the vinasse, which then
can be applied to the sugar fields as fertilizer. Where space is at a premium, as in
7 - Indicadores de Evoluci6n de la Provincia del Tucuman Informe 2 - Agosto 2009", Fundaci6n del
Tucuman, 2009.
Interview: T60, Tucumsn Regional Sugar Industry Association (CART), Tucum6n, 11/14/2008
The are 41 firm associations that are members of the FET, which include the commercial associations
and sugar mills, carry heavy economic weight in the province and have the ear of politicians. FET is one of
the fewv associations that has competition for the leadership in closely watched and heavily contested
elections. The FE T has been a vocal critic of Governor Alperovich, but its leaders still have access to high
ranking state officials.
- There are also a variety of environmental problems associated with growing the cane, especially burning
it in the field, but I am focusing this analysis on the mills.Goldemberg, Coelho, and Guardabassi 2008
169
Tucumdn, the costs of treatment are much higher and vinasse is often discharged directly
720into rivers without mitigation.
The second type of water pollution consists of wet organic solids called cachaza
that result from the cleaning and processing of the raw cane. Cachaza can be removed
from wastewater flows through filters and placed back on the fields as a fertilizer.
However, the costs of transporting the cachaza are greater than that of applying
commercially available fertilizers. Therefore, many mills prefer to dump the cachaza
into canals rather than incurring the expense of using it as a fertilizer. When released in
large volumes into canals and rivers, cachaza has a similar effect as vinasse because, as it
decays, it increases the levels of dissolved oxygen in the river system and harms water
quality.
The third set of pollutants is a combination of particulate matter (soot) and a
variety of other chemicals that are released into the air from mill smokestacks. During
sugar processing and ethanol distilling, mills burn dried excess cane, called bagasse, for
energy. Burning bagasse reduces the use of fossil fuels to power the mill (and reduces
greenhouse gas emissions), but it increases local air pollution. Since the mills are located
in densely populated communities, burning bagasse blankets residential areas with soot
(it is literally called "black rain" by residents) and causes extremely high levels of
particulate matter throughout the province. 7 2 1 Reducing this illegal, and damaging,
pollution requires investment and a combination of technological and managerial controls
on the part of the mills.
Growing and processing citrus fruits is another mainstay of Tucumin's economy,
and is also a major source of water pollution. Argentina is the largest producer of
processed lemons in the world, accounting for half of all lemons produced for processing
worldwide. Nearly all of Argentina's lemon production is in Tucumin.7 22 The most
important products in the sector include fresh fruit and concentrated lemon juice,
essential oils from lemons, and dried lemon peals, which are produced by large industrial
plants that process millions of lemons. Economic power in the industry is also highly
concentrated. Approximately 70% of the total lemon production in Tucumin is
processed by only seven firms (the rest is packed and sold as fresh fruit to international
markets).723
Processing lemons creates large amounts of organic wastes, which overloads the
river systems where the wastes are released. As the industry increased production-it
grew nearly fourfold between the 1992 and 2007-pollution also increased.724 Reducing
these wastes means installing expensive secondary wastewater treatment systems on a
massive scale. Without these systems, potent organic pollutants are dumped straight into
Ibid
To make matters worse, the mills run at concentrated times during the harvest when many farmers burn
the sugar cane in the fields, adding to the extremely high levels of air pollution.
In 2008/9, Argentina produced 1,035 metric tons of lemons for processing. The next largest producers
were the United States with 340 metric tons and Mexico with 307. Source: United States Department of
Agriculture "Citrus: World Markets and Trade, July 2009 Citrus Update to the February Forecast",. 2009.
23 Of the remaining 30%. 25% of the lemons are exported fresh, and 5% are for the internal market.
721 Gobierno de Tucumdn 2006
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streams, making them literally run yellow and causing serious damage to the water
system. Initially, the industry did not adopt any but the most rudimentary wastewater
processing technology, which consisted primarily of removing solids from the
wastewater.
The citrus association, ATC (Asociacion Tucumana del Citrus), did little to help
firms comply. The ATC includes all of the citrus processing plants, growers, and fresh
fruit packaging plants and has been a strong advocate in working with the government to
open up external markets for the industry. Just like CART, ATC did not take large
steps to support the industry in compliance with environmental regulations; instead the
firms have individually searched for technology or worked with the Agro-industrial
Research Station Obispo Colombres.
In addition to these two key sectors, Tucumin is also home to a number of
sources that contribute to contamination problems, particularly organic water
contamination. These include a major paper mill, meat packing firms, bottling plants,
and sewage treatment plants. Together, tackling pollution from these sources poses a
serious technical challenge to regulators. Combined with the political difficulties of
taking on the central economic actors in the province, environmental regulation in
Tucumin provides a particularly tough test for enforcement without-a strong bureaucracy.
Environmental Organizations
While the industry associations in Tucuman are well organized and control key
parts of the local economy, professional environmental organizations are relatively small
and politically weak. There are fewer professional environmental organizations than in
both C6rdoba and Santa Fe. One of the most influential professional environmental
organizations is the Federation of Environmental Non-governmental Organizations (FA,
Federaci6n de Organizaciones Ambientales No Gubernamentales de Tucumdn). The FA
formed in 1987 as a confederation of various environmental organizations and
professional societies.7 26 The FA integrates local societal groups, including the
associations of various professions (e.g. lawyers, architects, agricultural engineers,
biologists, surveyors) and environmental organizations (Pro-Eco, Tucumin Foundation
for Protecting Nature). Compared with the professional environmental organizations in
C6rdoba and Santa Fe-such as CEDAH, FUNAM and Taller Ecologista-the FA has a
smaller staff, no international connections, and a much smaller budget. Despite these
7 Inteiiew: T09, Tucuman Citrus Association, Tucumin, 10/28/2008. The ATC was part of the FET, but
separated from it after the industry became large enough to focus more on its own interests without needing
the support of the FET. Instead, the ATC is associated with the substantially weaker UIT (Union Industria
de Tucuntn), the regional organization of the powerful national industry confederation UIA.
26 Interview: T20, Federation of Environmental Non-governmental Organizations, Yerba Buena, Tucuman,
11/3/2008. During the 1990s when the government of Tucumin was taken over (intervened) by the federal
government, the new government formed a Provincial Council of Environment and Economy. The
Council, which included a wide range of societal organizations, including unions, firm associations, and
NGOs, had wide ranging power to review new construction projects in the province for their environmental
impact. In 2001, the council was re-structured and all of the environmental groups were accorded a single
vote (versus seven from the government) that effectively removed the environmental organizations'
influence in the council. This reorganization led a revival of the FA in late 2001 when it was reformed with
sixteen distinct organizations.
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apparent weaknesses, the FA, however, has been able to take civil action against
polluters.
Another group, Pro-Eco, straddles the divide between an informal community
group and a professional environmental organization. Pro-Eco was formed in 1992 by a
group of human rights activists to advocate for the environment in response to water
infrastructure projects in the cloud forests that hang over the city Tafi Viejo. 7 2 7 Although
very small, with only thirty dues paying members and no paid staff, Pro-Eco has a formal
organizational structure, a budget, and over ten years of inscription as a legal entity.m
The organization has members who have the technical knowledge necessary to engage
with environmental issues and can draw on a variety of networks of environmental
organizations (such as the FA in Tucumin). Another similar organization is Pacto Verde,
which gained legal status in 2000, and also combines elements of professional
environmental associations and elements of a neighborhood associations.7 29
The most vocal neighborhood group in Tucumin is UniVec (Union de Vecinos
del Sur), located in the town of La Trinidad. The group formed in the beginning of 2003
when pollution levels from a sugar mill increased, blanketing the neighborhood with soot.
Two neighbors, both school teachers, started lodging complaints about the increase in
pollution with a wide range of government agencies, including the provincial Department
of Environment, the ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo), and politicians in the provincial
and national senate.730 Eventually, they took their complaints to the street:
"We gathered all of the ashfrom the house of my neighbor... it weighed
forty kilograms... We put it all in a container, put it in a wheelbarrow, and
made a poster that said "There Is No Right To Pollute ". We went, my
neighbor and our wives and kids... this wasn't a big mobilization. We
went through the central streets of the town, calling to eietyone that we
were taking the ash and returning it to the mill. From that moment, it iwras
public, and that allowed neighbors in other places where mills are located
to connect with us.
The incident generated news stories in the local press and made the two neighbors focal
points in the conflict against the pollution from the local mill. The two formed UniVec
and began a campaign in the community of environmental awareness and political action.
UniVec has almost no formal budget and very few members, but does have mobilization
capacity in the town.
In sum, the landscape of environmental organizations in Tucumin has four
important features. First, the number of members in these organizations is very small
certainly not enough to swing any election, especially given the fact that electoral politics
have grown very uncompetitive in Tucumin in the past ten years due to the dominance of
Interview: T29, Pro Eco, Tafi Viejo, Tucumin, 11/1/2008
Having status as personariajuridica gives an organization the ability to act as a legal entity.
7 Interview: T36, Green Pact, Tucuman, 11/4/2008
I La Gaceta de Tucumdn "La Trinidad padece por la contaminaci6n" 08/02/04. Interview: T21
Environmental Activist, Concepcion, Tucumen, I 1/ 15/08 & 04/16/09
Interview: T21, Environmental Activist, Concepcion, Tucuman, 11/15/08 & 04/16/09
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Peronists in gubernatorial and legislative elections.m Second, Tucumin does not have
significantly more, or larger, environmental groups than most other provinces in
Argentina. Therefore, it is unlikely the any enforcement in Tucumin is due to some sort
of exceptional civil society capacity. Third, the landscape of environmental
organizations in Tucumin did not changed dramatically from the late 1990s to the late
2000s when enforcement improved. Some new groups were formed, but they hardly
created a profound shift in the capacity of the entire environmental movement to
mobilize. Finally, compared with the economic power of the polluting industries, in
which divestment could result in the loss of thousands of jobs, the environmental groups
are clearly outmatched. Moreover, any action environmental groups might take that
could threaten jobs would also engender a strong backlash from thousands of workers
and their politically powerful unions.733 In short, from the simple perspective of interest-
group politics, the balance of power in Tucumin was, and remains, on the side of
industry.
Bureaucrats without Backing (1990s - 2001)
From the 1990s until 2001, the government agency responsible for controlling
pollution from industry was located in the Ministry of Health's Provincial Health System
(Sistenia Proincial de Salud, SIPROSA). SIPROSA, as a regulatory agency, had many
of the elements of an internally coherent, Weberian, bureaucracy. SIPROSA's staff had
technical training, civil service protection, and long, sustained careers in government.
The head of the enforcement department, for example, started her career in SIPROSA as
a chemist in 1984, by 1995 she became head of the laboratory that tests samples; and in
2005 she became head of the department.73 4 Although material resources were scarce,
and fluctuated over time with different administrations, many basic needs were met. The
approximately thirteen inspectors had access to cars (which they sometimes borrowed
from other agencies) and a laboratory. In contrast with Santa Fe, Tucumin had more
administrative resources to regulate a smaller, less industrial, province. The
environmental inspectors regularly took samples from the pollution emitted by the largest
firms and identified levels of contaminants (i.e. they did not have the same coverage
problem as in Santa Fe). Although SIPROSA might have been ill-equipped to enforce
regulations on a large number of small firms, it had sufficient staff to monitor the largest
polluters. If SIPROSA regulated only the hundred most polluting firms, there would
have been approximately ten firms for each inspector, which is a reasonable level of
capacity.
The regulatory system was, however, completely ineffective in the sugar mills
and the citrus processing plants. Invariably, the inspectors found that pollutants exceeded
legal limits, yet the inspectors were unable to penalize the responsible firms or enable
firms to comply through instruction. An official with many years of experience in
3 Gervasoni 2010a
m For example, the head of the sugar workers' union (FOTIA) was also a cabinet official in the provincial
government. Interview: T50, Federation of Sugar Industry Workers in Tucuman, TucumAn, 10/28/2008
1 Interview: T 18, Environmental Inspector, Tucumdn Ministry of Health (SIPROSA), Tucuman,
11 /4/2008
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SIPROSA explained the difficulties in following through with enforcement after finding
violations:
What happens is that the system offines hasn't been applied as it should.
...SIPROSA had the faculty to apply the fine, but not determine the exact
amount of the fine... [The process of enacting a] single fine would not be
complete from one year to the next... there would be a delay of at least five
years before the fine was complete. m
Even if the front-level bureaucrats could do their jobs perfectly in investigating
violations, little would come of their inspections once the responsibility for enforcement
moved out of their hands into the broader provincial bureaucracy. The regulatory system
was full of weak points that could be exploited by firms with good lawyers and political
connections to avoid penalties. 736 There was simply not enough political support to
sustain sanctions. For example, a SIPROSA official explains that, it was politically
impossible to take steps to close down firms in the sugar industry that were violating
regulations:
Once the mill is going, it is very hard to close it. Because it is the
economic base of Tucumdn, therefbre, you have to be very careid,
because ifyou aren't, the society is going to come on top of you. For
environmental issues, it isn't just complying with laws, it is achieving an
equilibrium between the laws and what firms are able to do.
That "equilibrium" meant, for many years, allowing sugar mills to violate laws with
impunity, The citrus industry largely followed the same pattern. The firms would be
inspected, SIPROSA would find violations, and then nothing would happen. 738
SIPROSA's attempts at sanctions had little effect on industry because fines were either
not paid, or not significant enough to change behavior.
Environmental inspectors could potentially have used other strategies, beyond
fines, to coax firms into reducing their pollution. 7 3 9 However, they maintained an
inspection regimen that kept firms at arms' length and did not use training as a tool for
increasing compliance.74 0 In some ways, SIPROSA stayed insulated from firms, at least
at the level of the street-level agent. In the organization of work in the bureaucracy,
environmental inspectors maintained very little direct contact with firms. They would
take their samples, leave, and send a report. Moreover, without the possibility of
sanctions, inspectors could do little to initiate conversations about finding solutions.
Efforts to bring incremental reductions in pollution were also frustrated by some of the
> Interview: T 18, Environmental Inspector, Tucumn Ministry of Health (SIPROSA), Tucumsn,
11 /4/2008
3 Officials openly stated in 2003 to the press that the regulatory institutions were full of weaknesses: La
Gaceta de Tucuindn "El PE reconoce que no cuida el medio ambiente" 08/02/03
7 Interview: T18, Environmental Inspector, Tucuman Ministiy of Health (SIPROSA), Tucunmn,
11/4/2008
738 Interview: T02, Environmental Specialist, Citrus Firm, Cevil Pozo, Tucumnn, 4/17/2009
739 Fiorino 2006
7C Interview T18, Environmental Inspector, Tucuindn Ministry of Health (SIPROSA), Tucumtn,
1 /4/2008. this is also supported from evidence from interviews: T07, T03, and others.
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environmental laws. For example, some sugar mills were discharging wastewater with
vinasse that had biological oxygen demand (BOD) levels of 60,000.' With treatment,
they could reduce this level down to 600, but they would still be in violation of the law,
that sets a limit of 50. Therefore, SIPROSA could not offer any incentive for incremental
improvements; with strict standards and no penalties, environmental laws were
742
considered almost irrelevant.
Even after nearly fifteen years of regulation and the passage of various national
and provincial laws, violations continued, and there were very low levels of enforcement.
It was clear from scores of interviews with business leaders, regulators, and
environmental groups that not a single firm complied with regulations during this period.
Some firms took steps to reduce contamination, such as the citrus firms that became
certified with ISO 9001, but these changes were largely driven by external market
demands, not by the actions of the local regulators.743
In sum, while SIPROSA clearly was not a perfect Weberian bureaucracy, the staff
had many of the features that analysts would argue are key, including civil service
protection, expertise, and long tenures. Compared with other regulatory agencies in
Argentina, Tucumin's regulators should have been better able to withstand political
pressure and enforce regulations. Yet, SIPROSA was still politicized. Marginal
advantages in bureaucratic organization were clearly insufficient and there were many
points in which enforcement could be blocked, either by politicians whose priority was
economic growth and not environmental protection, or by the firms themselves. Also, a
key element was missing; the staff in SIPROSA were completely insulated from
environmental groups. Environmental inspectors did not have regular contact with the
FA, Pro-Eco, or neighborhood groups. SIPROSA received complaints, but these were
sporadic and there was little in the way of repeated or prolonged interaction. 74 4
Environmental groups had few allies among courts, prosecutors, or ombudsmen, who
could amplify their concerns and facilitate linkages with SIPROSA. These potential
allies had not yet taken up environmental issues and failed to provide hard constraints on
the bureaucracy.
The Plan for Cleaner Production
Towards the end of the 1990s, the first external shock to state regulators came in
the form of court action from the neighboring province, Santiago del Estero, over
741 BOD is a measure of the amount of oxygen consumed in the biological processes that break down
organic matter in water. The greater the BOD, the greater the degree of pollution. The limit for industrial
effluent according to national law is 50 BOD.
42 Interview: T 14, Environmental Inspector, Tucumin Ministry of Health (SIPROSA), TucumAn,
1 1/6/2008
-13 La Gaceta de Tucumndn "Inspecci6n ambiental a la citricola Citrusvil" 04/30/02; "Citrusvil no detiene
su avance hacia la calidad total" 08/23/02. This is consistent with research in other Latin American
countries and regions on the influence of market standards on certification and environmental upgrading,
which can work in concert with local government Navas-Alemin and Bazan, Luiza 2003; Tewari and Pillai
2005.
-"This was (and still is) typical of many Argentine environmental bureaucracies, that spread the functions
across multiple ministries that overlap with specific environmental problems.
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pollution in the Rio Sali that runs from Tucumain into Santiago del Estero. Officials in
Santiago del Estero began to take the province of Tucumin to federal court to force
Tucuman to enforce its environmental laws.745 As tensions mounted in the middle of
2000, a meeting of officials from the two provinces and national environmental agencies
was held in Buenos Aires. Afterwards, steps were taken to include Tucumin in a
program for managing industrial pollution. 46 At this time, the national government was
just beginning to build a National Program for Clean Production and Consumption
(introduced in Chapter 2). Tucumin became one of the first provinces to have the
opportunity to undertake a large scale public-private partnership to reduce pollution.74 7
With money from the national government and support from the United Nations
Environment Program and the World Bank, the Provincial Plan for Clean Production
(Plan Provincial de Produccion Limpia, or PPL) was created at the end of 2001 and
beginning of 2002 (though it really began only in 2003).748
The PPL created a new regulatory mechanism by which the state negotiated
"voluntary" agreements with firms to reduce pollution. The state had two benefits to
offer the firms. First, the state promised the firms that through participation in the PPL
they would receive assistance in making investments that reduced environmental impacts
and had financial returns. By going as far as claiming that PPL could increase profits and
reduce pollution, a "win-win", the PPL was an attempt to reframe environmental
management in order to engage firms that otherwise had little aptitude or interest in
investing in pollution prevention.74 9 Second, the PPL offered firms a degree of legal
certainty by shielding them from prosecution while they tried to incrementally improve
their performance. A senior official who was involved in the PPL described the informal
exchange:
There was a verbal commitment that while afirm is in the PPL, it iw'ould
not be penalized. This was a commitment absolutely outside of the law,
because the agreements could not modify the law. However, efforts were
made to minimize the infractions and only sanction those that did not
comply with the Plan for Cleaner Production, not those who did not
comply with the law.
Even though there had never really been serious penalties for firms that did not comply,
there was fear among the firms that penalties were coming and an air of uncertainty due
to the new political pressures from Santiago del Estero and the national government.
And the PPL allowed firms to gain protection in the short-term from the possibility of
sanctions. In return, the firms promised reductions in pollution and investment that
would move them closer towards compliance. For example, the Marapa Sugar Mill
committed to installing new filters to reduce cachaza in its wastewater. Other firms
* La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Los planteos judiciales llevan mds de una decada" 09/29/06
7 GonzAlez 2003
. Interview: B28, Federal Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development, Buenos Aires.,
9/22/2008
7 Lta Gaceta de Tucumdn "Tratarin en un foro la contaminaci6n del Sali" 10/6/02
749 La Gaceta de Tucuman : "La Producci6n Limpia aumenta las ganancias" 07/17/02
) Interview: T10, Cleaner Production Center, Tucumen, 11/11/2008
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promised to reduce water usage, energy usage, or better manage their wastes. These
commitments were signed in contracts that included timelines for actions, investments,
and remediation.
In order to undertake the new tasks of assisting the firms with their plans and
auditing their progress, the PPL created a new specialized group of technical staff called
the Center of PPL. The Center was jointly run through a collaboration between the
federal government, provincial government, and the National University of Tucumin
(with the federal government providing the money). They hired a team of twelve young
engineers to oversee implementation of voluntary agreements that the state signed with
the individual firms. Apart from educational requirements-all new staff were
professional engineers-these new staff met none of the criteria of a Weberian
bureaucracy. They all had temporary contracts without civil service protection and they
were not integrated into the career structure of the state apparatus. (After the PPL ended,
only one went on to work for the state; the rest went to the private sector).
The PPL staff audited environmental management in the firms in order to identify
changes that would reduce waste generation, water consumption, and energy use. They
gave free consulting advice to the firms, many of which did not have in-house expertise
in environmental management. The PPL staff began to help the firms diagnose their
environmental problems and look for solutions. And they began to open up the
possibility of firms collaborating with one another and with the state in the search for
better technical solutions to the root causes of pollution in the province. In addition, a
series of meetings were held in which experts outside of the province were brought in to
talk about environmental management. In other words, with a new bureaucratic
structure, agents of the state started forming thick ties with firms that they were
regulating.
But, the program lacked any "teeth" of its own, and there were no
consequences-such as expulsion from the program-for firms that failed to live up their
agreements. Therefore, audits of firm progress were not very meaningful, and the PPL
staff acted primarily as consultants. The PPL staff were divorced from SIPROSA's
enforcement staff, who did not receive information that was gathered by PPL staff.751 An
official involved with PPL describes his strategy: "I always tried to make it so the firms
did not see us as a bridge to a group of disguised inspectors. To try to separate as much
as possible. "752 Also, because of the involvement of the national government (that was in
part paying for the program with funds from international finance organizations), the PPL
staff reported results directly to the national Environmental Secretariat. This way, firms
could be open with PPL about their difficulties in complying and not risk prosecution. In
effect, the new PPL bureaucracy was layered on top of the old SIPROSA command and
control bureaucracy, creating a two systems working in parallel. SIPROSA continued to
be responsible for penalizing firms (and they continued to be ineffective), while PPL
became responsible for assisting firms and overseeing compliance with the agreements.
5 Interview T18, Environmental Inspector, TucumAn Ministry of Health (SIPROSA), TucumAn, 11/4/2008
m- Interview: T 10, Cleaner Production Center, TucumAn, 11/11/2008
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The PPL was an incremental change in the way environmental regulations were
enforced in Tucumin. It shifted the focus from compliance with the standards set in laws
to progressive improvement in overall environmental management with goals set through
negotiations with individual firms. This change was significant, even if it was not backed
up by sanctions, and it resulted in a number of concrete changes. Most importantly, the
PPL shifted the relationship between firms and the state, creating channels for linkages
with groups of firms that went beyond the monitor and (attempt to) sanction approach
used by SIPROSA.
There were also real investments made by firms. In total, 28 firms agreed to
participate in the program, including eight sugar mills and three citrus plants.m For the
firms that participated, the PPL gave them a way to work with the state and begin to
tackle pollution problems. The PPL stimulated investment by firms in reducing
environmental pollution for the first time. Some firms used the program as a vehicle to
begin investing in technologies that would eventually help them comply with statutory
requirements. Other firms found ways to improve efficiency in ways that had little to do
with pollution laws. For example, a beverage bottling firm began a program to recycle
glass and cardboard and sell it rather than dumping it, thereby reducing their waste flows
and creating a $10,000 a year income stream.
Firms took advantage of the fact that they now had a legitimate way to move
progressively towards complying with regulations. A manager at one of the participating
citrus firms recounted:
"They knew no one could comply with the legislation. It wasfor that
reason that they established the PPL, and that is why we were part ofthe
project. We had something with which we could respond each time
[SIPROSA] came with a notice of a fine. We could say 'well, we are
working, we are in the PPL, we are doing things, but we still haven't
gotten to the pollution levels, but we are looking for a better technology'
With this, the PPL helped us, it was a commitment to really find a
solution."5
This particular firm negotiated with regulators and began to construct water treatment
lagoons, which would give the organic materials in the wastewater time to breakdown
before being discharged into the river. This firm also took steps to reduce the use of
chemicals in the lemon washing process. At the same time, one of this firm's main
clients, Coca-Cola, began to ask for better environmental performance from its
suppliers.7 5 The market pressure provided an additional justification for firm owners to
invest in environmental management, helping reinforce the relationship between the state
regulators and the firm.
Ultimately, the PPL was a shift from allowing firms to violate environmental laws
with impunity, to reacting to violations with support for improved performance. This
* Ibid.
Interview: T02, Environmental Specialist, Citrus Firm, Cevil Pozo, Tucuman, 4/17/2009
Interview: T02, Environmental Specialist, Citrus Firm, Cevil Pozo, Tucuman, 4/17/2009
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was a significant change, but there were many limitations to the PPL due to the voluntary
nature of the PPL, lax negotiations with firms over the agreements, and continued lack of
penalties for firms that did not comply. Because the program was voluntary, some firms
"hid, stayed quiet and no one was going to bother them. And no one visited them or
,,756
controlled them. And among those that participated, many firms undertook projects
that increased environmental efficiency without actually tackling the problems that led to
their non-compliance with existing regulations. 757 For example, none of the sugar mills
installed large water treatment systems that would have been necessary to comply with
regulations. There were no consequences for firms that failed to live up to their
agreements-or at least none built into the PPL program. These were serious setbacks
that raised skepticism about the ultimate goals of the PPL among critics.
During this time there were few openings for environmental groups to participate
in the design of the PPL or the contents of the voluntary agreements. 758 Most
environmental groups remained highly skeptical that the PPL would do anything more
than legitimize firms that polluted. For example, a leader in one group said:
"The [Cleaner Production Program] permitted firms and businessmen,
who were committing environmental crimes, to be protected. It also
protected the officials that should have regulated the firms and make them
comply with the law, which they were not doing. The PPL was not good
Jbr any other thing, it was only useful fbr those who had broken the
law. 59
The disbelief of the environmental groups in the effectiveness of the PPL, and the fact
that these groups remained outside the PPL and were not co-opted by it, kept pressure on
the provincial government and the firms.
Changes in Political Pressure on Firms and Regulators
Just when PPL was forming and coming online, conflict over pollution both
outside and within the province increased dramatically. The pressure from Santiago del
Estero did not diminish with the creation of the PPL. Legal action against Tucuman
continued when the Defensor del Pueblo of Santiago del Estero filed a suit against
Tucuman in the Supreme Court.760 The consequences of the contamination on the border
between the two provinces increased in visibility, and the hotel association of the tourist-
dependent border town, Termas de Rio Hondo, estimated that it lost 17 million dollars of
tourism business.761 To make matters worse, there were yearly fish kills in the lake at the
7s6 Interview T10, Cleaner Production Center, Tucumin, 11/1 1/2008
-s5 Interview T15, Industrial Engineer, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucumdn, 10/28/2008 &
1 / /10/2008
* Multiple interviews with environmental groups, officials from the PPL, and firms that participated in the
programl.
7 Interview\: T20, Federation of Environmental Non-govenmental Organizations, Yerba Buena, Tucuman,
1 1 /3/2008
La (aceta de Tucuntn "Grave demanda contra Tucumin" 09/28/02
La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Por la contaminacion, L as Termas pierde $ 50 millones" 10/18/03
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762border between the provinces due to the high levels of contamination. Loosely
organized protests on the border increased, and by October of 2006, for a number of days,
protesters in Santiago del Estero blocked the roads that link Tucumin to the ports in
Buenos Aires and Rosario.71' There were also protests in the main square of Tucumdn by
Santiaguehos, and, in December 2006, 3,000 letters were written to the governor of
Tucumin about the contamination, reaching the front pages of the local newspaper.764
The protests and road blocks were seen by businessmen as a serious threat that could
765disrupt exports of citrus goods and shipments of sugar. One leader of the groups in
Santiago said: "Our intention is to call the attention of the entire countly. We want the
problem to be nationalized Until we have victory, we do not know how long the
blockages will go on."766
These new road blocks occurred at the exact same time that the protests broke out
nearly 600 miles away from Tucumin over the Botnia plant in Uruguay across from
Gualeguaychn, Entre Rios (discussed in Chapter 2). In response to the conflict over this
issue, president Kirchner appointed Romina Picolotti to be Secretary of Environment.
After she came into office, Picolotti increased attention to polluting industries and
publically criticized the PPL in Tucuman, putting pressure on provincial government to
strengthen enforcement.707 In addition, the conflict over Botnia scared industry leaders,
who cautiously observed an environmental protest at a scale never seen before in
Argentina.
In addition to social unrest from outside the province, there were also incidents of
social unrest within '1ucumin. The tiny group, UniVec, mobilized against air pollution
from the mill La Trinidad in 2004. This group of neighbors marched through the streets,
denouncing the air pollution caused by the mill, and took their case to the Defensor del
Pueblo. the courts, Environment Department, and anyone else who would listen. 768 The
protests generated conflict between the firm and its neighbors, which was given attention
in the media and added to the chorus of actors demanding that environmental regulations
be enforced 769 Another mobilization that occurred in this period of time was actually
against an attempt by a citrus plant to reduce contamination. The firm Citromax, located
in the city Tafi Viejo, installed a series of anaerobic treatment lagoons to reduce
wastewater pollution being discharged into canals. This system was crucial for Citromax
7 La (aceta de Tucuman "Hallan una mancha de aceite y peces muertos en El Frontal" 08/10/05 "El
embalse de Rio Hondo se llen6 de algas y peces muertos" 08/17/0663 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Pobladores de Las Termas protestaron cortando la ruta 9" 10/10/06. "Caos en
la ruta 9 por un reclamo en Las Termas" 11/04/06 and "Termenses afianzan su plan de lucha" 11/04/06
76 La Gaceta de Tucumcdn ""Tres mil cartas le enviaron los santiagueios a Alperovich" 12/2/06
7 Interviews: T17, Senior Official, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucuman, 11/3/2008; T49,
Tucumdn Regional Sugar Industry Association (CART), TucumAn, 11/14/2008
La Gaceta de Tucuman "Anuncian cortes de ruta en Las Termas" 02/20/07. "Ambientalistas cortan la
ruta 9 durante 24 horas" 2/1 5/07
La Gaceta dc Tucumin "Evidentemente, el Plan de Producci6n Limpia no es suficiente", opin6
Picolotti" 10/28/06 "La contaminaci6n del Sali inquieta al Gobierno nacional" 10/28/06)68 Interview: T21, Environmental Activist, Concepcion, Tucumin, 11/15/08 & 04/16/09
76) La Gaceta de Tucumann "La Trinidad padece por la contaminaci6n" 08/02/04; Piden que se ponga en
vigencia una ley contra la poluci6n 07/21/05
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to comply with pollution regulations, as an environmental engineer from the firm
described:
We choose this system because, with the amount oJ land we have, this
technology had possibilities ... And the effect of treating the water was
really positive because the pollutants were removed and there was a
reduction in [dissolved oxygen]... From a pollution reduction point of
view, it went well, but the collateral effect was the production of odors.
The "collateral" impact of odors in the densely populated city of Tafi Viejo turned out to
be more than the community could stand. Part of the problem was that there was no
public consultation before the installation of the treatment lagoons; the PPL did not
include community representatives, nor did the Provincial Council of Environment and
Economy. In July of 2006, two hundred people protested against Citromax because of
the odors that were given off by the water treatment plants. A protestor described the
problems to the local newspaper, stating: "The odors that are produced are unbearable.
)iriig the night, there is afog that covers all of the neighborhoods. "77'
The situation became tense, and Pro-Eco, a community environmental NGO,
mobilized as an opponent of the project, and an intermediary between the firm, state, and
the angry neighbors. The conflict escalated to the point where the firm sent workers into
the neighborhood to break up assemblies, people started carrying machetes, and Peronist
party activists (punteros) tried to leverage social unrest.772 Citromax was forced to stop
using the treatment lagoons, and open air lagoons were effectively banned. This meant
that they had to roll back all of the investment in pollution reduction and continue
violating environmental regulations.
This incident demonstrated the vagaries of local mobilization on environmental
conflicts-neighbors pushed against enforcement of regulations in this case. Pro-Eco
kept the conflict from escalating and prevented economic damage from road blockages.
But it also created an opportunity for linkages to form between the Environment
Department and Pro-Eco. By involving themselves in this conflict, leaders of Pro-Eco
established contact with an official who later became Secretary of Environment, Alfredo
Montalvdn.
At the same time, the judiciary became much more active in prosecuting firms
and government officials for environmental contamination. 773 A new federal district
attorney, Antonio Gustavo G6mez, was transferred from the province of Chubut. G6mez
was personally invested in environmental issues and had developed legal theories that
took extremely tough stances on pollution.774 By bringing cases against corrupt
politicians involved in environmental scandals, he gained attention from environmental
groups that began to seek his collaboration. Gomez quickly scaled up his cases to take
Interview: T05, Environmental Specialist, Citrus Firm, Tafi Viejo, Tucumin, 4/17/2009
La Gaceta de Tucumtdn "Protesta vecinal contra una citricola en Tafi Viejo" 07/27/06
Interview: T29, Pro Eco, Tafi Viejo, TucumAn, 11/1/2008
La Gaceta de Tucunidn "La Justicia mejor6 sus puntos de vista con respecto a los temas ambientales"
05/25/03
m Interview: T08, Federal Court of TucumAn, Tucumin, 4/14/2009
181
more powerful groups to court, which led him to the sugar mills, citrus processing plants,
and meat packing industries. By 2006 he had investigated sixty cases of pollution. -
Channeling the interests of societal groups through the prosecutor and the courts
contributed greatly to changing environmental regulation in Tucumin. Whereas
SIPROSA and PPL lacked teeth, G6mez was all teeth. He allied himself with the small
neighborhood associations, amplifying their demands. And he charged the directors of
firms personally with environmental crimes, which scared and embarrassed people of
power. A senior official in the Environment Department described the change:
"For many years, the environmental problems, the fines and the rest, they
were managed politically. There would not be effective fines, or the fines
would be suspended, or they would only collect minimum fines, these kinds
of things. Then the Federal Justice came into the picture, and now
everything is in the hands of the Federal Justice, the things began to get
complicated because they left the borders of Tucuman, they went outside
of Tucumcdn. "176
G6mez also put direct pressure on the bureaucrats in the Environment Department, who
now faced the possibility of prosecution themselves if they did not follow proper
procedures. Senior officials began keeping copious records of all of their actions in
anticipation of having to defend them in court one day. As a federal prosecutor, there
was little locally powerful political actors, such as firms owners, could do to fight back
against G6mez.
Independently, the Federation of Environmental Non-Governmental
Organizations (FA) filed a lawsuit against all of the sugar mills. A law was passed in
2004 that mandated all mills to install filters (scrubbers) in their chimneys to reduce
particulate matter pollution. But the law was not enforced, and the Environment
Department delayed action indefinitely. The FA decided to bypass the Environment
Department, which they believed would only protect firms, and take on the firms directly
through a civil action. The fact that the court agreed to hear the case and forced the
mills to defend themselves was a victory in itself Three of the mills settled with the FA
and agreed to install filters by 2009. For the rest of the mills, there was an extended legal
battle that the FA eventually won in 2008 and the court forced the firms to install filters.
This was a serious victory for the FA, "we undertook a conquestfor the common good It
was David versus Goliath because an organization without a budget or resources
confronted the sugar industry. "78 In combination with the lawsuits of G6mez, the FA's
civil action created resources that regulators could exploit for enforcement.
When all of the legal battles began heating up in 2006, the main business
association, the Economic Federation of Tucumin (FET) met with politicians looking for
La Gacela de Tucumdn "Investigan 60 causas por daho ambiental" 10/23/06
Interview T17, Senior Official, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucuman, 11/3/2008
Interview: T20, Federation of Environmental Non-governmental Organizations, Yerba Buena, Tucunsn,
1 1/3/2008
'1 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "El fallo en contra de los ingenios: "fue una lucha entre David y Goliat""
09/15/08
182
help. They enlisted the national Deputy Beatriz Rojkes de Alperovich (who is also the
governor's wife), to attempt to declare an "environmental emergency" in Tucumin and
suspend the court cases against the firms.77 9 The proposal supported by the industry was
for the government to give firms ninety days to come up with a plan to clean up their
production and five years to comply with legislation. This move failed to gain support in
the legislature, and the legal cases continued. Still, firms hung on while new regulatory
regimes were being constructed. As one firm owner noted, "We have delays in our
* juslice system that has an advantage... .and paradoxically that creates rationality.s7 80
Many of the cases were still pending at the time of this writing, but even without coming
to a final decision, they have had a profound effect on the development of the next phase
of enforcement in the province, the Plan for Industrial Reconversion.
The Plan for Industrial Reconversion
When the Plan for Clean Production (PPL) ended in 2006, there was a strong
desire among government officials and firms to develop a program that continued the
PPL. In the years since the beginning phase of designing the PPL, the political climate
had changed considerably, as did the relationship between the firms and the regulators.
Business leaders were highly interested in maintaining any legal protection that a
continued PPL could provide against the wave of prosecution. Firms also could use a
state program to signal to mobilized environmental groups that they were taking action to
reduce pollution and a vehicle to meet the technical challenges of complying. A senior
official in the Environment Department described the transition to the new program:
" The PPL wl'as very good, but it never met the expectations of society, the
courts, and many other actors, because they never came to the
uinderstaiding that it was a /progressive] tool and the firms used the
program as a reffige fbr protection. In 2006, the PPL was
liquidated... and the firms were desperate to continue to have a refuge.
We had a workshop internally with the state and the firms, in which we
came to a series of conclusions... The firms had understood that apart
from being progressive, the PPL also gave them the ability to introduce
environmental issues in their factories... [But] we knew that the main
problems were the lack of systematic control in the management of the
firms' commitments. Another mistake was the judicial protection not to
sanction thefirms for their lack of compliance with their commitments in
the plan. "'8
In October 2006, the government of Tucuman signed another accord to create the Plan of
Industrial Reconversion (PRI) with the support of the national government. 7 82 The PRI
created a new round of voluntary agreements with firms that specified two-year work
La Gacea de Tucunidn "Proponen que se declare en emergencia la cuenca del rio Sali" 10/24/06, "H-ay
voluntad politica para sanear la Cuenca" 12/19/06
Interview T49, Tucumin Regional Sugar Industry Association (CART), Tucumsn, 11/14/2008
I' lntervie\ T07, Senior Official, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucumsn, 11/4/08 & 1/14/08 &
04/20/09
L a (ice/a de Tucumnuh "La tension no frenaria la firma del acuerdo" and "Tucumin acord6 con la
Nacion sancar la cuenca Sali-Dulce" 10/27/06
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plans for reducing pollution. These agreements had a number of fundamental differences
from the previous program (the PPL). First, the agreements established work plans that
addressed the main issues of non-compliance with environmental policies (as opposed to
programs like recycling). Firms committed to investing large sums of money in pollution
control measures, including air filters and waste water treatment. By committing to
taking steps towards compliance, firms were able to better satisfy judges who were
hearing cases brought by the Federal Prosecutor G6mez that they were indeed moving
towards a solution. Second, the PRI agreements had specific language about monitoring
and consequences for noncompliance, while protecting firms from prosecution as long as
they complied with the provisions in their agreements. Third, the PRI would be managed
by the provincial government's Environment Department, giving regulators more direct
control over the way that the program was implemented (unlike with the PPL). This put
the provincial government in the key locus between the courts and the firms, allowing the
province to shape the extent to which firms would be prosecuted for pollution based upon
their adherence to the PRI agreements.
PRI brought with it another change in the composition of the state bureaucracy.
A new group of sixteen technical staff were hired within the Environment Department to
implement the program. Again, this change was not a move towards a more Weberian
bureaucracy. The PRI team had short-term contracts, no clear career path within public
administration, and there was no exam to ensure that the hiring was meritocratic. There
was, however, a degree of expertise-all were professionals (engineers and a lawyer) and
they were supported by interns who were in engineering school. In addition, the staff had
thick existing ties to the industries that they had to regulate. For example, the coordinator
of the program had been a plant manager at some of the largest mills before becoming an
environmental specialist. Others had a few years of experience working in industry and
then left to work for the state. One senior official described his previous experience with
the firms:
"With the people who manage the firms, there is a relationship of trust,
and with some of/friendship. Everyone knows me because I was
classmates oJa number of them at the university.... This relationship that I
have with the people who manage the firms has been very valuable
because it has opened doorsfor me."8
These relationships were key for building on the existing collaboration between the state
and the private sector that began in the PPL. In order to jointly be involved in problem
solving with the firms, the PRI staff needed access to firms and to have open
conversations about the problems that the firms faced in reducing pollution. Of course,
open relationships would not form with every firm, but there was a clear shift from both
the SIPROSA and PPL approaches to regulation. In sum, the enforcement bureaucracy
expanded its administrative capacity, was decidedly not Weberian, and had developed
strong linkages with the industry that allowed regulators to respond to violations with a
broader range of tools.
7 Interview TI 7, Senior Official, rucumAn Environmental Secretariat, TucumAn. 11/3/2008
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With the creation of the PRI there were also new linkages built between the state
and environmental groups. No formal advisory committees were set up, but there were
informal channels that allowed groups, especially neighborhood groups, direct access to
the Secretary of Environment. By the assessment of regulators involved in the PRI,
societal groups made valuable contributions to the process of implementing the
agreements.
"The NGOs are people... who suffer because of the problems. Therefore,
there is a constant interaction with the Secretary of Environment, because
in a certain way, they help us."7
For example, environmental organizations helped regulators gather information about
firms that failed to follow their plans. As one official stated:
"We are in constant contact with the people (from the NGOs]. Therefore,
[they say] 'this firm is better, this one is worse, 'or 'look, this firm is
dumping this filth into the river, go [inspect them].'"
This expanded role of societal groups goes well beyond what occurred in previous
regulatory programs. Officials favored highly local neighborhood association, such as
UniVec and Pro-Eco, instead of the larger more professional associations, such as the FA.
They gave these groups copies of the agreements so that the groups could support to
monitor progress in the firms.786 According to a senior official:
"As a policy principle this Environment Department goes to where the
neighbors are, to understand the problem from the neighbor, not from the
interpretation of an NGO... Our experience tells us that it is important to
communicate with the NGO, and for that we have working agreements
with various NGOs. ,787
In addition, the societal groups put the Environment Department in a stronger position:
"All ofthe ac/ions of he NGOs I see as opportunities to grow institutionally... to gain
more resources." They not only had more information from the groups, but could
exploit the presence of environmental groups to make demands on firms and other parts
of the state.789 Importantly, regulation in the PRI did not just occur in the places where
environmental groups were most active. Regulators drew on these groups, but also went
beyond their immediate demands.
8 Interview T43, Engineer, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucuman, 10/28/08 & 04/20/08
* Interview T 13, Lawyer, Tucuman Environmental Secretariat, Tucuman, 10/28/2008
S Multiple interviews, including: T21, Environmental Activist, Concepcion, TucumAn, 11/15/08 &
04/16/09; T20, Federation of Environmental Non-governmental Organizations, Yerba Buena, Tucuman,
11/3/2008
i87 Interview: T07, Senior Official, Tucumdn Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/4/08 & 11/14/08 &
04/20/09
8 Ibid.
789 The mechanism by which ties between bureaucracies and civil society groups helps bureaucrats advance
their agendas was identified in Carpenter's work on the U.S. Department of Interior and Postal Service.
The mechanism that occurred in Tucumin is very similar, with the exception that the state never built up
any form of autonomy. See.Carpenter 2001
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This is not to say that the interactions between the state and environmental groups
have been completely harmonious. Neither side has been keen on giving up control to
the other. Environmental groups have been wary about legitimizing regulatory programs
that they do not agree with. For example, the Environment Department invited the group
UniVec to participate during the signing of cooperative agreements (PRI) with industry,
but they refused. A leader from UniVec describes what happened:
They promised, in a public event, that we could also participate, but
participate from outside of the event. We did not want to go in because we
had been invited to officially participate in the signing of the agreement
for the PRL We didn't want to, we stopped... Because we understood that
the firms were going to think that we were endorsing this... But the PRI is
a means for industrialists, with the satisfaction of the government, to avoid
judicial processes. 790
Other groups shared UniVec's appraisal of the PRI, and would not publically support the
PRI. Senior officials tried to establish a balance in the involvement of the environmental
groups, explaining:
"The majority of NGOs have received, from us, all of the information
about the commitments of the firms. Many times, the NGOs that have had
the firms'commitments have been able to, in some way, follow them from
close by. We have asked that the firms have a better relation with their
neighbors, with the NGOs, with the understanding that the firms will
demonstrate their efforts to improve the environment. The problem is that,
because of their lack of trust, many of the NGOs want to transfbrm
themselves into the authority, and this is not possible." -'
Towards the end of the PRI in 2009, there was an open meeting between the Environment
Department and many NGOs. The environmental groups complained about the lack of
systematic participation, and the production focus of the PRI, but recognized that the
Environment Department made significant progress.792 Ultimately, the increase in
protests and the threats from the courts helped regulators establish new linkages that had
never existed with environmental organizations. Not all sides were happy with the
arrangements, but they did increase the ability of bureaucrats to generate the resources
they needed to enforce regulations. The following sections turn to specific industries,
examining the operation of the PRI in more detail.
PRI in Sugar Mills
Regulation in the sugar industry changed substantially with the establishment of
the PRI in 2007. The new PRI staff conducted a baseline analysis of all of the firms in
the program, noting their effluent levels and technology for pollution control. Firms had
to send reports on their progress in making the investments outlined in agreements every
790 Interview: T21, Environmental Activist, Concepcion, Tucumsn, 11/15/08 & 04/16/09
791 Ibid.
9 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Ambientalistas aprueban lo realizado, pero piden que les den participacion"
10/15/09
186
two months. The Environment Department conducted constant inspections of the firms
in the program:
"We do a variety oj types oJinspections. We conduct patrol inspections
constantly...Afper each report, we conduct afbrmal visit and we tell them
beforehand, so that they are waiting jbr us, and we can see how they have
progressed. m9
In total, these actions gave regulators increased information about violations and the
technical barriers to compliance in the industry.
The inspections and the threat of sanctions were combined with efforts to enable
firms to comply. Through the provincial government's agricultural research agency, the
Agro-Industrial Research Station Obispo Colombres that is funded and overseen by the
private sector, joint efforts were made in identifying new technologies to reduce
pollution. The Experimental Station hired an environmental specialist who established a
research program. Representatives from the private sector, with staff from the PRI, took
a joint trip to the University of Valparaiso in Chile to examine new technologies for
treatment of water effluents.794 In meetings between the state and the firms, each firm
explained what it was doing to solve specific pollution problems, diffusing practices
across the industry in a way the sugar firm association largely had not.795
The interactions between the front-line bureaucrats and the mills were supported
by a changed perception in the consequences for failure of firms to comply. For the first
time, in May 2007, a sugar mill was temporarily closed down for not meeting its
commitments in its PRI agreement and for not making investments. Governor Josd
Alperovich stated in the press:
"The investment is the least the sugar mill should do, a mill that throws
the cachaza in the river and contaminates. The mill hasn't done anything
to overcome the problem. Last night, I had dinner with the sugar mill
owners, and I told them that we are going to work hard on environmental
issues, because the pollution that is happening affects health"796
Although the closure was not during the harvest, and it was lifted after a few days, it was
politically very important.797 Mill owners saw the closure as a political move to satisfy
the national Secretar of Environment Picolotti, who was meeting with provincial
officials at the time,798 or as revenge against the mill owners who had supported an
9 lntervie: T15, Industrial Engineer, Tucumnn Environmental Secretariat, Tucuman, 10/28/2008 &
1 0 / I /2008
Interview: T04, Agro-Industrial Research Station Obispo Colombres, Las Talitas, Tucumin, 4/20/2009
I directly observed two of these meetings in which firms discussed problems and talked about ways of
diffusing practices.
7 La (aceia de Tucundn Clausuran el ingenio San Juan por incumplir leyes ambientales" 05/17/07
La Gaceta de Tucuman "La clausura del San Juan podria levantarse el lunes" 05/19/07
798 Interview Anonymous firm owner, and La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Una clausura que genera suspicacia"
05/21/07
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opponent of the governor in internal competitions within the Peronist party.799 The mill
was closed two more times in the following six months.8 00
In January 2008, the Environment Department closed another sugar mill, La
Corona, for failure to install air filters in its smokestacks. 801 This closure was supported
by protests from UniVec that mobilized against the mill and supported the Environment
Department's action. A senior official in the Environment Department described the
intent of these closures as a signal that the state is serious: "The state will close you... it
was a clear message to the businessmen, 'J)on'tfuck with me. ,,802 Another official
described the move as a way of inducing cooperation with the rest of the firms, that
would have strong incentives to work with regulators. 0 3 The closures, although
temporary, were a significant change in environmental regulation in Tucuman. Firm
owners believed that there was actually a possibility that they could be shut down for not
complying.
In addition, social pressure allowed the regulators to have a stronger position with
the mills in their everyday interactions, making them better able to resist efforts by firms
to block enforcement. Now, they could use their linkages with environmental
organizations as a way to get the firms to follow through on their commitments. One
official in the Environment Department recounted:
"1or example, /the agreement says! that on September 21, they have to
have a silencer installed on their boilers. What happens if it isn't there?
We say to them, "fine, there is a delay, in one week you will have it. " The
community is going to go and protest. "804
And neighborhood groups did follow up, sending emails to the Secretary of Environment
and other officials when noise levels from mills were extremely high. Through his
contact with leaders in UniVec, the Secretary of Environment Alfredo Montalvin met
with neighbors of a mill who lived near a polluted stream.805 The information and
support Montalvin gained from his linkages with UniVec enhanced his ability to monitor
pollution In addition, the threat of social unrest allowed Montalvin to take a tough
stance with firms that did not meet the requirements of their agreements. As
communication increased between firms and regulators, officials learned what changes
were possible for leading firms, taking away excuses from firms that dragged their feet.
For example, leading mills found that they could reduce some contaminants, specifically
dumping cachaza into canals, without high costs, thereby demonstrating that compliance
with this regulation was achievable.
-C La Gaceta de Tucuinan "El capitulo local del "affaire Picolotti"" 07/14/07
8 La Gaceta de Tucunan "Por tercera vez en menos de ocho meses clausuran el ingenio San Juan'
01/09/08.
8o1 Lta Gaceta de Tucundn "Clausuran elI ingenio La Corona por contaminaci6n" 01/06/08
8 Interview: Anonymous official, Tucuman, 04//09
8 Interview: T49, Tucuman Regional Sugar Industry Association (CART), Tucuman, I 1/14/2008
lnterv'iew: T43, Engineer, TucumAn Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 10/28/08 & 04/20/08(6 The author was copied on emails after interviewing one of the representative of a neighborhood
association.
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From 2008 to 2009, under the PRI, bureaucrats in the Environment Department
regularly visited all sugar mills to monitor their compliance with their plans. Constant
monitoring was important because even if firms invested in technological fixes to
contamination problems, they would have to maintain these changes. Some of the
contamination problems, such as managing cachaza meant putting into place systems to
ensure that wastes are carried into the fields by trucks and not dumped in rivers and
canals. Large capital investments had to be maintained and used, as a regulator from PRI
explained:
"I 'Il give you an example, there is a mill that has a boiler with a scrubber,
a filter. The scrubber filters the gases and removes them by spraying
water. This mill has a beautiful boiler, new, the latest generation
technology, and managers don't open the water circuit [that enables the
scrubber]... because it costs money to run the water. Thus, the mill emits
black smoke even though they have everything... This is a problem of the
itay they are thinking. "806
As this quote demonstrates, the firms need constant monitoring by regulators-it is not
simply a matter of getting a court order to install equipment. Importantly, neighborhood
groups with which regulators had linkages were helping in this monitoring by reporting
instances of heavy pollution. Some firms, such as the mill La Florida, experimented with
new forms of treatment for water pollution (incinerating the vinasse and using it as a
fuel). 80 7 While they could be highly beneficial, the results of these treatments were
largely unknown and needed thick interaction with the PRI bureaucrats to monitor
implementation.
The combination of strong linkages among the regulators, firms, and
environmental groups together with increased administrative capacity led to significant
increases in enforcement, and there are a number of indicators of concrete changes in
levels of compliance and contamination. Before 2006, only a third of the mills had a
system to manage cachaza and by 2008 nearly all mills had developed cachaza
management systems. Similarly, in 2005 very few mills had installed filters to reduce air
pollution from burning bagasse. The percentage of air emissions that were filtered
increased from 19% in 2006, to 62% in 2007. By August 2009, 96% of emissions were
filtered. 08 Less progress was made in reducing water pollution by treating vinasse,
which has been much more difficult technically and more costly. Still, firms invested in
experimenting with solutions and some used short term methods to reduce vinasse in
rivers. Overall, sugar mills reported that they invested nearly 50 million dollars in
decreasing pollution in 2008 and 2009. There is certainly a long way to go before the
sugar mills will be able to comply with most environmental regulations, but with
increased state action, conditions measurably improved.
"6 Interview: T 15, Industrial Engineer, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 10/28/2008 &
I 1/1l0/20088H lntervicw: T24, Environmental Specialist, Sugar Mill, TucumAn, 11/12/2008
W Data provided by the Environment Secretariat.
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PRI in the Citrus Sector
Enforcement of regulations in the citrus sector also increased substantially with
the PRI. All seven citrus plants signed agreements with the PRI, and the agreements
went much further towards reducing pollution than previous agreements under the PPL.
Regulators continued to have constant interaction with citrus processing plants, working
with them to identify solutions and monitoring compliance with their agreements. Over
time, some of the citrus firms found that they could capture the gases produced in
wastewater treatment as energy for the plants. By using this energy, they were
effectively offsetting greenhouse gas emissions, qualifying them to sell carbon offsets to
the international market, compensating for some of the costs of the treatment.8 09 Some of
the firms began to work with international technology providers, and received support
from the World Bank to undertake projects in capturing biogas from wastewater
treatment. The regulators from PRI learned alongside the firms about the new
technologies, and helped diffuse practices. An environmental manager from one of the
more advanced firms described her relationship with the PRI staff.
The regulators come and do their audits, but more than anything, the
regulators visit us to find out what is going on, to soak it in, because our
processes are applicable to other citrus plants. Our relationship with the
people from the PRI is pretty open. The inspectors don't have the
knowledge and neither do we. We are buying technology from abroad,
and we are learning, and the PRI staif come to learn as well.21'
Not only had regulation in the sector progressed to the point where regulators were
periodically visiting firms and using a variety of tools to induce compliance, but, using
their linkages, the regulators and the firms were building their capacity together.
Improvements in environmental regulation coincided with concrete results in the
citrus sector. In the two year period of the PRI, citrus firms reported that they invested
over ten million dollars in environmental management.811 A number of firms had
installed more advanced pollution treatment systems, and at least two firms had gained
ISO 14,000 certifications. One firm, Citrusvil, successfully installed a biogas system to
power the plant, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, earn carbon offset credits, and treat
wastewater. 8 12 Although the actions of regulators were one of many factors pushing
citrus firms to comply (such as the courts and international market pressure),
environmental regulation was clearly successful in this case in helping induce pollution
reduction and bring firms closer to compliance with the laws.
Conclusion
Tucumin has a long way to go before it gains control over industrial pollution,
and the changes that occurred have been fragile. However, there was a notable shift from
809 La Gaceta de Tucumdn "Buscan aprovechar energia sin da ar el medio ambiente" 04/22/05
Interview T02, Environmental Specialist, Citrus Firm, Cevil Pozo, Tucumsn, 4/17/2009
Data provided by the Environmental Secretariat
La Gaceta ie Tucumdn "Una industria citricola tucumana es pionera en el provecto de convertir
efluentes en biogas" 12/05/08
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firms polluting with near impunity and engendering little reaction from the state, to a
pattern of enforcement contrasted strongly with that of Santa Fe and C6rdoba. In
Tucumin, regulators took a variety of actions that coax firms into complying by giving
them the tools to comply, punishing the worst actors, and resisting efforts by firms to
block enforcement (in some cases). These actions were not limited to places where
linked civil society organizations were active, but also included firms located in places
where local organizations were not particularly active and industries (such as the meat
packing industry) that were not highlighted by the main conflicts. In sum, environmental
enforcement in Tucumin changed radically over a fairly short period of time, from low
levels of enforcement to comparatively high levels of enforcement that were spread
across multiple firms and industries.
If one were to analyze environmental regulation in Tucumin purely from the
perspective of bureaucratic organization, it would be extremely difficult to explain the
changes that took place. First, as new regulatory programs were adopted, the state
bureaucracy grew less insulated from industry and environmental groups. Before the
reforms took place, the only regulator, SIPROSA, had a hands-off approach to
enforcement that involved limited contact with firms and almost no contact with
environmental organizations. 81 Through the changes of PPL and PRI, the regulators and
firms became much more interconnected, to the point where they took joint research trips
together and held regular meetings. This decrease in insulation, under the standard
models, should have increased the likelihood of capture. Instead, it fostered the creation
of linkages that were crucial for increasing the levels of enforcement. Second, the
bureaucracy grew less Weberian as it expanded because new hires did not have civil
service protection or guaranteed long-term career prospects in the state; in fact, most of
the PPL staff went on to work for the private sector. Again, this should have increased
the chances of capture by industry and decreased the likelihood of enforcement. Instead,
enforcement increased.
In addition, if analyzed purely from the perspective of political will or top-down
pressure on the bureaucracy, it is unclear how such a porous bureaucracy could enforce
regulations. The political pressure from the governor, the courts, and from the Federal
government clearly had an effect, and certainly induced some firms to comply, but this
pressure cannot directly explain the actions of regulators without an intermediary
mechanism that can translate those pressures through a bureaucracy that lacks hierarchy
and cohesion. Without an internally coherent bureaucracy, the ability for top-down
political control of the bureaucracy by the governor or courts decisions should have been
very problematic. 1 " No matter what the public outcry over pollution, acting on its own,
the "throughput" of the bureaucracy should have been questionable at best.".'
In contrast, in the case of Tucumin environmental groups became viable allies of
regulators. In episodes of intense conflict, like that in Tafi Viejo, officials got to know
the leaders of environmental organizations and established routinized processes of
This approach is similar that account that Kelman 1981 provides of OSHA, one that limits close
interaction between regulators and firms.
s-lEaton 2003; Huber and McCarty 2004
1 Abers and Keck 2009
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consultation. And when there was a threat of environmental groups working through the
courts, regulators justified contact with those groups in order to keep a "progressive"
approach to enforcement. With these contacts, regulators used the support of civil
society organizations in ways that were not possible beforehand. Linkages with
environmental groups provided information about which firms were particularly bad
actors, thereby extending state capacity for gathering information. And linkages
provided individual bureaucrats cover to resist efforts by firms to block enforcement.
Whereas the Weberian model suggests that only the internal cohesion of the bureaucracy
protects bureaucrats from potentially debilitating outside influence, in this case linkages
with civil society groups helped make enforcement happen. Importantly, the bureaucracy
did not diminish in administrative capacity as it became more linked with environmental
groups. This fact contrasts sharply with some of the cases of society-dependent labor
regulation (Cordoba wage and hour and Tucumin) in the previous chapters, in which
linkages were developed instead of administrative capacity. In contrast to those cases, in
Tucumin enforcement was co-produced and regulators took steps that were much
broader than a simple reaction to the particular demands of mobilized groups. In this
way, Tucumin's environmental enforcement more closely resembled the case of labor
regulatory enforcement in the Federal Capital's garment industry and health and safety
enforcement in C6rdoba's construction industry, which were also cases of co-produced
enforcement.
Pollution continues to be a major problem in Tucumin and the province has a
long, and difficult, path ahead to build a regulatory system that is truly functional.
Measured against the promise of environmental policies, Tucumhn's enforcement
apparatus clearly comes up short. But in comparison with other Argentine provinces,
which are often pointed to as examples of better government, Tucumin has surprisingly
pulled ahead of the pack. While the results are still not cause for celebration, the
mechanisms for change towards enforcement are worthy of close analysis. The next, and
final chapter, will put together the diverse strands analyzed in this dissertation and extract
broader lessons that can be learned from Argentine regulation.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
Intense battles are fought over changes in regulatory laws, but they are hardly the
end of politics. Rather, they are just the beginning. This dissertation analyzed the
politics of enforcing labor and environmental regulations in Argentina, which continually
take place in a separate sphere from policy making. The point of departure for this study
is the problem of institutional weakness, which is a key barrier to using regulatory
policies to balance economic development with social and environmental objectives.
Institutional weaknesses arise from many sources; the central objective of this
dissertation is to explain how states, which lack strong and autonomous bureaucracies,
respond to those weaknesses.
The empirical analysis began with an overview of policy formation at the national
level in Argentina, highlighting problems of compliance and the federal structures that
have made the provinces the locus of the politics of enforcement. The remainder of the
dissertation explored subnational variation in state responses to violations in labor and
environmental law. By analyzing regulation across a variety of industries in four
provinces, this dissertation developed an explanation for enforcement built around the
interaction between linkages and administrative capacity.
This final chapter is organized in three sections that bring the findings of the
dissertation together and place them within a broader context. The first section revisits
cases from labor and environmental regulation, examining where common alternative
approaches fall short in accounting for variation, and how the framework advanced in this
dissertation can explain enforcement. The second section places these cases in
comparative context, showing that the patterns of enforcement identified in this
dissertation are not unique to Argentina. The third section goes beyond regulatory
politics, contrasting dominant theories of state-society relations with the findings of this
study. Finally, the concluding section highlights some of the implications of this study
for regulation in a world with imperfect states.
Putting the Cases Together
Why is regulation enforced in some cases and not others? Using the theory
advanced in this dissertation, we can identify the factors that were behind enforcement in
Argentina. In cases of low levels of regulation, a number of drivers were working against
enforcement. In some cases, the enforcement agency had extremely low levels of
administrative capacity and civil society organizations were either weak, or lacked
linkages with the bureaucracy. This is what occurred in the cases of Cordoba brick-
makers, Tucumin health and safety regulation in construction, Santa Fe's enforcement in
construction before 2007, and in environmental regulation in the industrial corridor of
Rosario. In other cases, regulators had higher levels of administrative capacity, but they
lacked linkages with civil society organizations. As a result, enforcement was either
blocked due to the inability of regulators to withstand resistance from firms or,
alternatively, because the industry was never made a priority in internal planning
processes of the state. The former was the case in Tucumin's environmental regulation
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before 2003, and the latter is the case in garment industry enforcement in the Federal
Capital by the national Ministry of Labor before 2006. In short, there were, not
surprisingly, multiple pathways to low levels of enforcement, all of which involved
failures in capabilities (both to act and to plan) or politicization of the regulatory
bureaucracy.
Many of the cases of medium levels of enforcement could be traced back to a
combination of agencies that had low levels of administrative capacity, but that were also
linked with civil society organizations that could make up for the state's deficiencies.
This was the case for labor regulation in C6rdoba's metal, shoe making, and commercial
laundry industries; labor regulation in Tucumin's citrus industry; environmental
regulation in the leather industry of C6rdoba; and environmental regulation in the cereal
industry of Santa Fe. In these two environmental cases, enforcement was concentrated
only on single firms, moving the overall enforcement level for the industry up from low
to medium, but the narrow scope of state action kept enforcement from reaching high
levels.
The other cases of medium enforcement were due to high levels of administrative
capacity, but no linkages with capable civil society organizations. This was the case in
Santa Fe's construction industry after 2007 when the center-left leaning Binner came into
office, and in the garment industry of the Federal Capital after the center-right leaning
Macri came into office. In Santa Fe, despite the radical reforms, enforcement levels were
lower than in Cordoba's construction industry, in part due to the inadequacies of the
union. In contrast, in the Federal Capital, the enforcement dropped down to a medium
level when there was political change and inspectors could no longer work with the civil
society organization La Alameda due to the lack of linkages. In short, there are also
multiple, but not infinite, combinations of political and bureaucratic arrangements that
can lead to medium levels of enforcement.
All of the cases of high levels of enforcement had two things in common-they
involved regulatory agencies with high levels of administrative capacity, as well as
linkages with at least some civil society organizations that could supplement the state and
provide political support. This was the case in the garment industry in the Federal
Capital from 2006-2008, which reached very high levels of enforcement for a sustained
period of time. In the three additional cases of high levels of enforcement-health and
safety in Cordoba's construction industry, as well as environmental regulation in
Tucumin's citrus and sugar industries-regulators not only had relatively high levels of
administrative capacity and linkages to pro-enforcement groups, but they also had ties to
industry, which enabled them to use enforcement strategies that employed both penalties
and pedagogy.
How does the theory advanced in this dissertation compare with other approaches
that are often invoked to explain enforcement? Could these cases just as easily been
explained using more conventional theories? This dissertation has been framed in
response to theories of state capacity to implement any policy, including enforcing
regulations, that depend on a depoliticized bureaucracy.8 16 According to these theories,
,11 For example: Geddes 1990; Evans 1995; Grzymala-Busse 2003; McAllister 2008
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the most important factor that separates places that can enforce regulations from those
that cannot is the approximation of the regulatory bureaucracy to an ideal-typical
autonomous bureaucracy. Implicit in many arguments is a set of assumptions about the
ways in which bureaucracies mobilize political and operational resources. Namely, that
the autonomous features of bureaucracies give them corporate coherence and enable them
to withstand outside pressure to implement policies.
How well would such an argument explain variation in Argentina? Only one of
the many cases analyzed in this dissertation-the increase in labor enforcement in Santa
Fe after 2007-could be accounted for using the lens of bureaucratic autonomy. In every
other case, levels of enforcement (and changes in enforcement) could not be explained
with reference to bureaucratic autonomy. No bureaucracy met even the minimum criteria
for autonomy, and most cases of enforcement involved mobilizing resources, especially
political ones, from outside of the state apparatus (or formal lines of authority to the
executive). In some cases, the organizational features associated with autonomy were
decreased while enforcement increased, as occurred in environmental regulation in
Tucumin. In other cases, the state developed comparatively high levels of administrative
capacity without moving towards autonomy, as in the case of the garment industry of the
Federal Capital. Important differences among regulatory agencies existed, but these were
best analyzed in terms of administrative capacity, rather than approximations to
autonomy. In short, there was enforcement without autonomy.
Another essential question for those interested in whether or not states can, or do,
enforce regulation involves the role of civil society organizations. Unions, environmental
organizations, and industry associations are the protagonists in studies of policy
development, and their actions to hold government agencies accountable are often
pointed out as the drivers of enforcement. How well could differences in civil society
organization alone explain the cases of enforcement in Argentina? In some places, such
as labor regulation in Tucumin, an analysis based primarily on the capabilities of civil
society organizations would do fairly well-the difference between industries with some
enforcement and those with no enforcement came down to the strength of the unions.
However, as we go further through the cases, an analysis that focuses primarily on civil
society organizations would begin to come up short for at least three reasons.
First, such an approach would find it difficult to account for why some civil
society organizations are able to influence enforcement, while others are not. One of the
striking features of the role of civil society is that political mobilization often fails to
elicit action from a politicized state. For instance, there were many episodes in which
pro-enforcement activists denounced the lack of state action to the press. Despite
resulting in literally hundreds of media reports about the failures of the state, such actions
did not reliably translate into enforcement. Instead, they were blocked politically or,
even if there was political support, the demands placed on the state were beyond its
capability. Similarly, some professional environmental organizations took very elaborate
steps to conduct scientific and legal studies of contamination, but again, on their own,
these efforts did not generate a response. In addition, at times there were no substantial
changes in civil society organizations themselves, but large changes in their efficacy. For
example, internal attributes of La Alameda did not change radically, but enforcement
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cycled from low to high, and then down to medium in the garment industry.
Consequently, any explanation that focuses on civil society needs to account for why
there is such a variable effect of civil society organizations. The crucial, but often
missing, theoretical architecture that is needed is an account of the structures that
determine which civil society organizations can work with regulators, what I call
linkages.
Second, even among cases in which the resources of civil society organizations
were accessible to the state, the results of their interaction with the state varied
tremendously, ranging from confined bursts of enforcement to broad, systematic
enforcement. In other words, the key interaction between civil society and state
administrative capacity, which makes the difference between society-dependent and co-
produced enforcement, needs to be taken into account. The problem with much of the
literature that focuses on civil society was highlighted in Abers and Keck's recent study
of water management in Brazil; they argue that researchers have not been attentive to the
capability of the state in following through on demands made by civil society
organizations. Thus, studies need to identify how civil society organizations go beyond
demand making to become involved in aiding "throughput" of implementation. 817
Third, and related, an analysis that focused mainly on the political power of pro-
enforcement organizations would not be able to account for the varied influence that they
have on the development of administrative capacity. Under some conditions, the state
reacted to mobilization by putting out fires and keeping down conflict. The result was
enforcement, but not investment in administrative capacity that could lead to broader
state action in the future. This was not, however, always the case. Without an account of
the ways linkages can sometimes substitute for capacity, any analysis would fall short of
providing a full explanation of the politics of enforcement.
This leads to a third approach that is often invoked in analyses of enforcement:
top-down political will. How well would an analysis that focused on the governors being
pro-labor vs. pro-business, or pro-environment vs. pro-business, explain variation in these
cases? In many cases, variation in political party simply could not account for the
differences in enforcement across industries or over time. For example, Tucumin, Santa
Fe, and C6rdoba all had governors from the PJ until 2007, yet environmental
enforcement in Tucumin took a completely different form than in Santa Fe and C6rdoba.
In addition, there was widespread variation in enforcement within provinces, which was
clearly not linked to any particular political agenda of elected officials.
In some cases, of course, the political party in power made a difference. For
example, in the Federal Capital, the replacement of Telerman by Macri resulted in shifts
in enforcement in the garment industry. And when Binner was elected in Santa Fe, the
change in governor lead to increased health and safety enforcement (it would be difficult,
however, to say that the PS was any more pro-labor than the PJ). A top-down approach
to explaining enforcement would, however, obscure the key mechanisms of how
enforcement changed in these cases. What mattered in many cases was not the direct
hierarchical control by the governors through some sort of principal-agent relationship
1 Abers and Keck 2009
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with the bureaucracy, but rather the indirect effect that elected officials had on linkages.
In addition, some of the decisions that governors do make, such as whether to invest in
administrative capacity or who to appoint to top positions, could not be fully understood
without an account of the trade-offs between control and capacity. In short, the political
commitments of elected officials clearly matter, but they are neither determinant nor do
they provide a complete explanation for variation in enforcement.
Argentina in Comparative Context
How do the Argentine cases fit into a broader comparative context of cross-
national cases of regulation? Are the cases analyzed in this dissertation artifacts of an
exceptional Argentine case? Or are there similar patterns enforcement in other countries?
Comparative cases illustrate the similarities in the triggers of enforcement that scholars
have found in other countries. First, there are many examples of societal groups making
up for the weaknesses of the state. For example, O'Rourke's (2004) study of
environmental regulation in Vietnam reveals the existence of society-dependent
enforcement in a very different context than Argentina.818 The combination of a legacy
of heavily polluting industries, an influx of footloose foreign investment, the lack of
professional environmental organizations, and extremely weak state agencies made
Vietnam in the late 1990s challenging terrain to implement environmental regulations.
O'Rourke finds that there was still enforcement in a number of instances. For example,
in one heavily industrial city, community mobilization helped make enforcement of
regulations on a chemical factory possible and the factory invested in pollution
prevention strategies for the first time.
Enforcement, however, was completely contingent on societal action; O'Rourke
finds that "the vast majority of regulatory actions in Vietnam today occur only qfter
comiunity pressures have been applied."'19 Moreover, although O'Rourke does not use
this language, his study highlights that community pressure is only successful when
groups mobilize outside of the domestic regulatory arena and develop linkages with the
state and extra-local actors that provide political support. The case of Vietnam, which is
very similar to that of environmental regulation in Santa Fe and C6rdoba, lends support
to the findings that enforcement can, and does, occur even under constrained conditions
in radically different contexts than Argentina.
Society-dependent enforcement is not, however, the only possibility for
environmental regulation in developing and middle-income countries. Co-produced
enforcement has also been identified in the case of the Cubatio in Brazil.820 In the early
1980s, regulators began enforcing environmental laws in this city, which was highly
polluted due to a concentration of heavy industry including an oil refinery and chemical
plants. The effort to clean up the Cubatio was considerable-regulators identified
O'Rourke labels the pattern he identifies in Vietnam "community-driven regulation." I chose a society-
dependent because relevant civil society organizations are not always based in a community, but sometimes
are industry -wide (e g. unions) or national (e.g. professional environmental organizations). The primary
question is not the type of organization (community or not), but what resources the organization has and
whether it can establish linkages.
O'Rourke 2004
This section draws on Lemos 1998b; Lemos 1998a; Lemos and Looye 2003.
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hundreds of pollution sources, made each source create a plan to reduce pollution,
monitored compliance with the plans, and applied pressure to ensure that reluctant
industries complied. According to Lemos (2003), this success was helped by alliances
between regulators and popular movements that supported enforcement (i.e. linkages).
But in contrast with Vietnam, enforcement was not dependent on direct mobilization
against a particular source. The Brazilian regulatory bureaucracy had significant levels
of administrative capacity and could leverage the support of the community to
systematically enforce regulations. In many ways, enforcement in the Cubatio mirrored,
at a much larger scale, the case of environmental enforcement in Tucumin.
Similarly, accounts of labor regulation have pointed to the important role of the
interaction between regulators and pro-enforcement elements in society, in a variety of
combinations. In places in which civil society organizations are robust, researchers
identified their role in supporting the actions of labor inspectors. 821 For example, in Los
Angeles, one program "deputized" representatives of a union to conduct checks of labor
law compliance.822 These "deputies" collaborated with labor inspectors, augmenting the
state's ability to collect information about violations. Similarly, the New York State
Department of Labor collaborated with worker centers and other civil society
organizations to improve information gathering about violations in the low wage
workforce. These programs in the United States, which have been identified as models,
but still are not widely diffused, involve mechanisms that are similar to common
practices in Argentina.
Instances of labor law enforcement through leveraging society are not, however,
limited to places with strong civil society organizations. For instance, a recent study of
labor regulation in China found that after the strengthening of laws on the books in 2007,
a form of "bottom-up enforcement" emerged "in which legal action by workers reinforces
central government's attempts to improve local implementation of central laws. 823
Consistent with the findings in this dissertation, the authors of the study argue that there
can be enforcement of labor laws through this bottom-up mechanism even in China,
which has a series of deficiencies in its enforcement apparatus. 824 Moreover, the study
finds that enforcement is unequally distributed. In this case, the unevenness of state
action is not due to powerful unions monopolizing access to the state (as in some
Argentine provinces), but instead due to the lack of effective worker organizations. Still,
the mechanisms triggering enforcement in China's labor regulation are somewhat similar
to those identified in this dissertation.
These examples from outside Argentina provide ample evidence that state
bureaucracies do leverage resources from society to enforce regulations in a number of
countries. Moreover, they suggest that the mechanisms identified in this dissertation
travel to a broad range of contexts. The frameworks used by the authors cited above all
include some dimension of state-society interactions, which they hold as the central
821 On Latin America, see: Wiarda 1978; Tendler 2006; Anner 2008. On Sweden, see: Kelman 198 1. On
Australia, see- Hardy and Howe 2009. On the United States, see. Weil 1991.
2 Fine and Gordon 2010
3 Gallagher, Jing, and Trieu 2010
su On the limitations of enforcement, see: Cooney 2007
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factor for explaining enforcement. What is missing in many analyses, however, are two
key theoretical shortcomings that stem from the limitations of dominant ideas about state-
society relations. One is that, while authors recognize the value of linkages, they have
yet to develop systematic accounts of why they should occur in some places and not
others. Another is that focusing on instances in which state-society interaction leads to
enforcement isolates these moments from the long-term development of the state. To
address these points, it is helpful to go beyond regulation and turn to theories of state
capacity and state-society relations.
Beyond Regulation
The theoretical point of departure for this dissertation was the dominant approach
of studies of the state that give primacy to bureaucratic autonomy. One of the leading
theories of state-society relations comes from Evans (1995), who makes a strong
argument for the necessity of bureaucratic autonomy. Based on a study of the
development of computer industries in Korea, Brazil, and India, Evans argues that
internal bureaucratic coherence should be seen as an essential precondition for the
state's effective participation in external networks."8 25 In short, states needed to be both
"embedded" and "autonomous" to be effective. If states are not embedded, they will lack
the ability to act in a way that is sensitive to the challenges of development, and if they
are not autonomous, they will fall prey to rent seeking and particularistic demands.
Evans' work has been joined by numerous other studies of the state that have assumed
the need for autonomy and searched for the possible drivers of reduced politicization.8 26
Behind this research agenda is the view that the path to good government is moving
towards the creation of bureaucratic autonomy.
Evans' argument, despite its influence, falls short in two key ways. First, the
theory treats autonomy as a necessary condition, which creates a substantial theoretical
limitation because it excludes a host of mechanisms that might enable states to act in
ways that are consistent with policy goals. In fact, the bureaucracies that Evans studied
were far from autonomous. Some were, by his own admission, "intermediate" states.
But even the Korean bureaucracy that Evans identifies as the most autonomous in his
sample had widespread politicization: appointments in the bureaucracy prioritized
political loyalty, officials relied heavily on informal ties, and politicians used the
provision of particularistic benefits to regional interests in order to maintain political
support for the regime.827
These bureaucratic imperfections are problematic because, in arguments built
around autonomy, the internal coherence of the bureaucracy does nearly all of the work
leading to positive outcomes (it is a necessary condition). The flip side is that once there
is politics, all behavior devolves into rent-seeking and there are no other mechanisms by
Evans 1995 emphasis added, p. 50
8S6 See, for example: Geddes 1990; Geddes 1994; Grzymala-Busse 2003; Chavez 2004; O'Dwyer 2004
H' Ba and Kang 2011. The lack of autonomy was admitted in Evans' own account. For example, he
argues that the Korean state under Park became autonomous, but the portion of bureaucrats hired through
civil service exams (a key indicator for Evans) only reached 25% and many officials who held key
positions came to them through the military coup (1995, pp. 52-53).
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which the state can act in a way that is consistent with policy mandates. In short, theories
that depend on autonomy tell us nothing about how politics might lead to the varying
outcomes that we actually observe in most countries (that are far from the autonomous
ideal). While moving towards more coherent bureaucracies makes for a good policy
prescription and was an effective argument against dismantling the state in an era of
neoliberal dominance (that characterized all states as havens of rent seeking
inefficiencies), theories that lean on autonomy obscure, rather than illuminate, the key
factors that determine how most states act.
Second, and related, without including politics in the state, it is very difficult to
account for linkage formation. Researchers studying state capacity have identified the
importance of state-society interactions in a variety of policy areas, ranging from water
irrigation in Taiwan, to policing in Pakistan, to the development of sewage systems in
Brazil.828 Scholars have found that, across these diverse contexts, the ability of the state
to successfully deliver on the promises of policies is determined, to a large degree, by ties
between state and society. One limitation of these studies has been that they give no
account for why such linkages are strong in some places and not others. In Evans'
theory, for example, linkages (or embeddedness, as he calls it) are an accident of history
that are left unexplained and, to some degree, immutable.8 29 The problem of explaining
linkage formation derives from the centrality of autonomy; without admitting politics, it
becomes extremely difficult to account for linkage formation. As shown in this and other
studies, politics plays a tremendous role in determining which groups gain access to the
state. Yet, it would be incoherent to build a theory around autonomy and then admit that
politics influences state-society relations Again, leaning on the concept of autonomy
conceals more than it reveals.
This dissertation has attempted to construct an account of state action that does
not rely on autonomy. In doing so, it joins company with other studies of state-society
relations that have not followed the dominant trend. For example, in Tsai's study of
public goods provision in Chinese villages, there is no presumption of autonomy.
Instead, variation in public goods provision is explained by differences among societal
groups-more encompassing and coherent civil society organizations lead to a greater
provision of public goods. 3 Tsai, however, is careful to note that local politics do not
determine which groups embed state officials. Instead, embeddedness is due to a
particular match between civil society organizations (which themselves are the product of
particular village histories) and the constraints on officials imposed by the central
government.
Analyzing a completely different type of problem, Brinks' study of judicial
responses to police killings in Argentine and Brazilian cities also develops an argument
about state action that does not depend on autonomy.83' Brinks explains the widespread
variation in prosecution of police officers who have been accused of extrajudicial
killings. Two main problems occur in judicial systems that prevent judges from
" Lam 1996, Ostrom 1996; Joshi and Moore 2004
" Schneider 1998; Wang 1999
8r Tsai 2007
"' Brinks 2008
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prosecuting police: judges use the wrong criteria (i.e. they do not apply the law, but
instead employ an informal norm that allows police to kill certain members of society
without due process); or judges lack information on which to make their decision and
they incorrectly find police not guilty even if they use the right decision rules (i.e. the
police obstruct the investigation process). The argument finds that sometimes states
perform better in upholding the right not to be killed by the police, and it does not rely on
autonomy. In fact, the judiciary is explicitly treated as highly politicized to reveal the key
factors at play. Brinks' finding is that prosecution does occur when two conditions are
met: the judge has to be using the right rules and the judge has to get the right
information. The former depends on norms inside the state, and the latter depends to a
large degree on the ability of victim advocates to gain access to the court, often through
protesting, so that alternative evidence can be considered. In other words, a positive
result depends on linkage formation, but it is not determined by linkages on their own-
rather, a combination of linkages and a specific attribute of the state is necessary.
Congruent with these studies, the argument advanced in this dissertation suggests
that a line of inquiry that unpacks state-society interactions and includes political
contestation may be a route to developing better theories of state capacity. Analyses of
the state need to take into account both administrative and political challenges, which are
entangled with one another. As we get past autonomy, further theoretical development
can illuminate the inner workings of states, especially those for which formal rules are
weak, resources are in short supply, and state capacity is a product of resources within the
bureaucracy and society.
Conclusion
How can we use the experiences of Argentine regulation to advance policies that
balance the goal of economic development with the goals of social and environmental
protection? The first lesson, and perhaps most basic, is that the range of contexts within
which the state can enforce regulations is much broader than is commonly assumed.
There is a widespread pessimism about the possibilities for most states in the academic
literature and policy debates. This view is, in part, due to the theory of state capacity that
emphasizes features of the state that are absent in most places. Where the prospects for
radical bureaucratic reform appear dim, policy makers, as well as advocates for workers
and the environment, often conclude that little can be done to improve enforcement.
Consequently, regulatory institutions appear condemned to remain weak. In light of the
apparent limitations of the state, the dominant policy debate about ways to improve labor
and environmental standards shifted in the late 1990s away from focusing on states and
towards non-state, private, regulatory approaches. 83 2 After over ten years of experience
with private regulations, researchers have concluded that states must play a large role in
the regulatory landscape, but without more nuanced theories of state action, how state
regulation can be revitalized is still largely unknown.
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This dissertation has suggested that the prevailing theory of what constitutes state
capacity to enforce regulations is at best incomplete.833 The cases in Argentina, as well
as others found by researchers in quite different contexts, show that even when there are
flaws in the state apparatus there are opportunitiesfor enforcement. Limited resources
and organizational flaws inside state bureaucracies are problematic, but they do not
completely prevent the state from enforcing regulations, rather they constrain only the
range of possible enforcement. The Argentine provinces studied in this dissertation had
poorly trained staffs with few resources and low salaries-exactly the characteristics that
the conventional wisdom predicts should lead to failure. Yet even these constrained
regulators can, and did, take far-reaching steps to enforce regulations when they had
linkages with civil society organizations. Therefore, statements regarding the
impossibility of protecting workers or prevent environmental damage through regulation
due to limited budgets are false excuses. With this view, we can begin to see
implementing regulations as a political problem that involves choices among different
pathways to enforcement. When the state is weak, a political choice can be made to build
linkages and essentially delegate some state authority to civil society organizations.
Distribution of enforcement may be imperfect, but enforcement will occur in a way that
would otherwise be impossible.
With opportunities, however, come many challenges. Enforcement that relies
heavily on organizations outside of the state can have serious limitations. First, when the
state is very dependent on society for enforcement, inequalities in social organization
become exacerbated. Responses to social demands can crowd out strategic state action,
leaving some of the most vulnerable workers and communities unprotected. Second,
when linkages are used as a substitute for investments in the bureaucracy, the political
support for reforms that can broaden enforcement becomes undermined. In short,
society-dependent enforcement, while better than total state absence, has many risks.
These limitations are not, however, intractable. Linkages are not always viable
political substitutes for resources inside the state, and moving from society-dependent
enforcement to co-produced enforcement is possible. The cases explored in this
dissertation suggest that some sequences of action, in which administrative capacity is
developed and then linkages are formed, may be more likely to lead to co-production
than others. Fostering transition between patterns of state action is perhaps the most
pressing challenge for policy makers. As future research develops more complete
analyses of the politics of state-society relations, state capacity, and enforcement, we will
be better able to craft strategies that enable states to strengthen regulatory institutions that
harmonize economic development with social and environmental protection.
8 This argument aligns with a theoretical tradition of studying the state that still remains submerged in
much the dominant discourse. See: Mann 1993; Soifer 2008
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Appendix
Table A. 1: Detailed Comparison of Labor Inspectorates (2009)
Medium: 63
(52,000 people
/inspector)
High: 85
(31,000 people/
inspector)
Low: 36
(90,000 province/
inspector)
Low: 18
(81,000 province
/inspector)
Specializa- Two groups: wages and Four groups: Wages & Two groups: Wage & Two groups, ver
lion hours, health and hours, health and hour and health and loosely separated. 15
safety. safety, construction, safety. Health & safety wage and hour
home-based industries has approximately 12 of inspectors and 3 health
(garment). the total. The two and safety inspectors
divisions are managed
out of separate
buildings
Trans- Wage & hour: Very Limited Wage & hour: Limited Very Limited
portation Limited Health & safety:(using slate Health and safety: Medium (three trucks
resources) Limited for 12 inspectors)
Information Wages & hour: Very High: Advanced Wage & hour: Medium Very Low: inspectors
Technology low records are kept database that allows have limited access to
manually on typewriters management to typewriters
centrally monitor High. Inspectors have 7Health & safety: High . lap tops that they bring
computer database ietor aity an to issue reports and
view the history of cletdt
inspections in particular
firms
Planning Wage & hour: Low, no High: Advanced system Wage & hour: Medium Low: No planning
Capahilities ability to make plans of planning inspections Health &Safety: High. capabilities at all
bevond short-term by industry, firm, or cobntnofhg
campaigns geographic area tchmbntoogy, ig
Health & safety: High, organizational routines
routinized planning to that revisit problematic
conduct preventative areas and adjust active
inspections inspection targets
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Measure
Number of
inspectors
Wages & hour:
Medium (elementary
4%, high school 32%,
technical 14%,
incomplete university
39%, university 10%).
Health & safety: High
(33% technical, 33%
incomplete university,
11% university, 22%
postgraduate)
High (64o have
university degrees, and
36% have postgraduate
training)
Wage & hour: Low
(50% high school, 30%
technical degrees, 30%
elementary school)
Health & safety: Very
high (64% have
postgraduate degrees,
18% technical degrees,
9% university degrees,
and 9% incomplete
university)
Tucuman
Very Low: Elementary
(28%), High School
(33%), Incomplete
University ([7%),
Technical (17%),
Postgraduate (6%)
Training Medium: inspectors Medium: Inspectors Wage & hour: Medium, Very little: Inspectors
received little training received training upon most received some went untrained for
for a number of years, being hired, and 35% training in the past year many years, and only
but 90% report received some training 34% of inspectors
receiving some training during 2008. report receiving training
in 2008. high, one year course in20inupon hiring
Professions Wages & hour: All professionals: Wage & hour: No Vast majority not
Majority are not Lawyer (47%), professionals professionals. The
professionals. Some are Accountant (21%), health and safety
lawyers (8%). Architect (14%) Health & se A
Enginer (7%)professionals. Health & inspiectr ave tonheat
Health & safety: All E rfety technician architeta twhalt
professionals. Health (36%), engineer (36%),
and safety technician doctor (18%). architect
(56%) & architects (9%)
(22%).
Salary Low compared with the Low compared with Wage & hour: Low Low compared with the
private sector (Wages private sector ($720 to compared with private private sector: $528
and hours inspectors $780 dollars a month) sector ($400 a month) dollars per month
$600 dollars a month) Health & safety: High
(approximately $1,450
dollars per month)
Civil Service High: civil servant Low levels of civil Wage & hour: High. High: 100% of
Protection (84%), staff (temporary service protection: civil All have civil service inspectors have civil
without protection, servant (1%), Staff protection service protection
3%), fixed term (temporary without Health & safety: High.
contract (11%), Intern protection, 57%), Fixed All have one year
(3%). term contract (25%), probationary contracts
Other (17%). that convert into
permanent contracts
with civil service
protection
204
Levels of
educcation
Measure Cordoba Federal Capital
Exclusivitv Not exclusive. Not exclusive. Wage & hour: No Not exclusive.
Inspectors regularly Tolerated work outside exclusive Inspectors regularly
hold other jobs the bureaucracy. Health & safety: hold other jobs
Exclusive, other jobs
are not tolerated
Hiring Hiring is patronage Mixture of meritocratic Wage & hour: Hiring is patronage
system based, not meritocratic and patronage, with Patronage hires based, not meritocratic
minimum criteria in Health & safety:
training. Meritocratic,
competitive and
transparent examination
Tenure I I years 3 years Wage & hour: 22 years 12 years
(median) Health & safety: 1 year
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List of Interviews
Identification Code, Position (if available), Organization, Location of Interview, Date
BO1, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), Buenos Aires, 10/7/2008
B02, Environment and Natural Resources Foundation, Buenos Aires, 4/7/2009
B03, Technical Evaluation, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency, Buenos
Aires, 9/18/2008
B04, Operations, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency, Buenos Aires,
9/25/2008
B05, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/7/2008
B06, Senior Official, Department of Labor Inspection, Ministry of Labor, Employment
and Social Security, Buenos Aires, 3/13/08 & 2/26/09
B07, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/1/2008
B08, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 9/23/2008
B09, Enforcement Department, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency,
Buenos Aires, 10/17/2008
B 10, Enforcement Department, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency,
Buenos Aires, 10/6/2008
B 11, Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 02/12/09 &
02/17/09
B 12, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
5/26/2009
B 13, Defensor del Pueblo, Buenos Aires, 2/26/2009
B14, Argentine Sausage Industry Association, Buenos Aires, 9/30/2008
B 15, Inspector, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/14/2008
B16, Inspector, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/14/2008
B 17, Metal Plating Association of Argentina (ASADAM), Buenos Aires, 10/8/2008
B18, Federal Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development, Buenos Aires,
10/1/2008
B19, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), Buenos Aires, 2/12/2009
B20, Lawyer, Argentine Human Rights League, Buenos Aires, 3/25/2009
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B2 1, Legal Department, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency, Buenos
Aires, 9/22/2008
B22, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 9/15/2008
B23, Inspector, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/14/2008
B24, La Boca Neighborhood Association, Buenos Aires, 10/4/2008
B25, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency, Buenos Aires, 10/20/2008
B26, Federal Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development, Buenos Aires,
9/18/2008
B27, Argentine Sustainable Business Council, Buenos Aires, 10/15/2008
B28, Federal Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development, Buenos Aires,
9/22/2008
B29, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 6/30/2008
B30, Legal Department, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency, Buenos
Aires, 9/23/2008
B3 1, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/1/2008
B32, Environmental Specialist, Metal Industry Association of Argentina (ADMIRA),
Buenos Aires, 2/18/2009
B33, City Foundation, Buenos Aires, 10/16/2008
B34, Metal Plating Association of Argentina (ASADAM), Buenos Aires, 10/8/2008
B35, Argentine Meat Industrial Union (UNICA), Buenos Aires, 10/17/2008
B36, Inspector, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/21/2008
B37, Inspector, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency, Buenos Aires,
9/29/2008
B38, Metal Plating Association of Argentina (ASADAM), Buenos Aires, 10/8/2008
B39, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires,
2/6/2009
B40, Enforcement Department, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency,
Buenos Aires, 10/1/2008
B4 1, Lawyer, Metal Industry Association of Argentina (ADMIRA), Buenos Aires,
2/18/2009
B42, Environmental Commission, Federal Capital Legislature, Buenos Aires, 9/24/2008
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B43, Public Relations, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency, Buenos Aires,
2/18/2009
B44, Green Party, Buenos Aires, 10/9/2008
B45, Department of Planning, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security,
Buenos Aires, 9/17/2008
B46, La Alameda Foundation, Buenos Aires, 2/23/2009
B47, Inspector, Federal Capital Environmental Protection Agency, Buenos Aires,
9/19/2008
B47, Tannery Workers' Union, Avellaneda, Province of Buenos Aires, 2/18/2009
B48, Superintendent of Workplace Risks, Buenos Aires, 3/13/2008
B49, Laundry Workers' Union (UOETSYLRA), Buenos Aires, 6/30/08 & 10/20/08
B50, Inspector, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 10/14/2008
B5 1, Senior Official Department of Labor Inspection, Ministry of Labor, Employment
and Social Security, Buenos Aires, 4/8/2008
B52, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
4/23/2008
B53, Senior Official, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
9/4/2008
B54, Institute of Economic and Social Development, Buenos Aires, 3/19/2008
B55, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
5/5/2009
B56, Environment and Natural Resources Foundation, Buenos Aires, 3/6/2008
B57, Complaints Department, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security,
Buenos Aires, 4/29/2008
B58, Political and Social Department, Argentine Industrial Union, Buenos Aires,
4/9/2008
B59, Labor Lawyer, Buenos Aires, 4/4/2008
B60, Director of a Regional Office, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security,
Buenos Aires, 6/17/2008
B6 1, Superintendent of Workplace Risks, Buenos Aires, 4/23/2008
B62, Former Secretary of Labor, Federal Ministry of Labor, Buenos Aires, 2/28/2008
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B63, Department of Human Resources, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social
Security, Buenos Aires, 4/22/2009
B64, Department of Labor Inspection, Province of Buenos Aires Ministry of Labor,
Buenos Aires, 3/4/2008
B65, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires, 7/4/2008
B66, Former Senior Official, Federal Capital Labor Subsecretariat, Buenos Aires,
2/24/2009
B67, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
4/23/2008
B68, Superintendent of Workplace Risks, Buenos Aires, 3/18/2008
B69, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
4/23/2008
B70, Department of Planning, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security,
Buenos Aires, 4/23/2008
B7 1, Research Department, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos
Aires, 3/18/2008
B72, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
5/5/2008
B73, Research Department, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos
Aires, 2/27/2008
B74, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Buenos Aires, 10/16/2008
B75, Federation of Energy Workers and CTA, Buenos Aires, 7/2/2008
B76, Minister of Labor, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
3/15/2008
B77, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Buenos Aires,
4/8/08 & 4/25/08
B78, Department of Planning, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security,
Buenos Aires, 4/11/2008
B79, Superintendent of Workplace Risks, Buenos Aires, 4/3/2008
B80, Auto Workers' Union (SMATA), Buenos Aires, 2/16/2009
B8 1, Public Workers Union Delegate, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social
Security, Buenos Aires, 7/29/2008
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B82, Senior Official Department of Labor Inspection, Ministry of Labor, Employment
and Social Security, Buenos Aires, 7/4/2008
B83, Labor Lawyer, Buenos Aires, 6/30/2008
B84, Federation of Pastry, Pizza, Ice-cream, and Alfajor Unions, Buenos Aires,
9/24/2008
B85, Commercial Workers' Union, Buenos Aires, 9/16/2008
B86, Department of Special Activities, Federal Capital Environmental Protection
Agency. Buenos Aires, 10/1/2008
CO 1, Former Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 06/18/08 & 03/10/09
C02, Industrial Union of C6rdoba, C6rdoba, 3/17/2009
C03, Union of Pastry, Pizza, and Alfajor Workers, C6rdoba, 7/16/2008
C03, Union of Pastry, Pizza, and Alfajor Workers, C6rdoba, 7/16/2008
C04, Former Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 3/1 1/2009
CO5, Tourism, Hotel, and Restaurant Workers' Union (UTHGRA), C6rdoba, 7/15/2008
C06, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, C6rdoba, 3/12/2009
C07, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009
C08, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, C6rdoba, 6/18/2008
C09, Provincial Legislator (PJ), C6rdoba, C6rdoba, 3/4/2009
C 10, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, C6rdoba, 7/17/2008
C1 I, Senior Official, Regional Office of Cordoba, Ministry of Labor, Employment and
Social Security, C6rdoba, 6/18/2008
C 12, C6rdoba Leather Industry Association, C6rdoba, 3/5/2009
C1 3, Industrial Union of C6rdoba, C6rdoba, 6/19/2008
C14, Shoe Workers' Union, C6rdoba, 7/16/2008
CI5, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), C6rdoba, 3/3/2009
C16, Enforcement Department, C6rdoba Environmental Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/18/2009
C1 7, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Cordoba, 7/15/2008
C 18, Meat Packing Association, C6rdoba, 3/6/2009
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C 19, Hazardous Waste Department, C6rdoba Environmental Secretariat, C6rdoba,
3/12/2009
C20, Cordoba Environmental Forum, C6rdoba, 3/2/2009
C2 1, Center for Human Rights and the Environmental (CEDAH), C6rdoba, 3/20/2009
C2 1, Senior Official, City of C6rdoba Environmental Department, C6rdoba, 3/12/2009
C22, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 06/23/08 & 03/05/09 &
03/07/09
C23, Former Official, C6rdoba Environmental Protection Agency, C6rdoba, 6/3/2009
C24, Environmental Defense Foundation, C6rdoba, 3/5/2009
C25, Senior Official, City of Cordoba Environmental Department, C6rdoba, 3/12/2009
C26, Inspectors, C6rdoba Environmental Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/17/2009
C27, Center for Human Rights and the Environmental (CEDAH), C6rdoba, 3/16/2009
C28, Enforcement Department, C6rdoba Environmental Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/19/2009
C29, Enforcement Department, C6rdoba Environmental Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/19/2009
C30, Auto Workers' Union (SMATA), C6rdoba, 7/16/2008
C3 1, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, Cordoba, 7/17/2008
C32, Health and Safety Specialist, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA),
C6rdoba, 06/20/08 & 03/09/09
C33, Garment Workers' Union (SOIVA), C6rdoba, 6/25/2008
C34, Shoe Workers' Union, C6rdoba, 7/16/2008
C35, Health and Safety Inspector, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/24/2008
C36, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 7/14/2008
C37, C6rdoba Metal Components Industry Association, C6rdoba, 7/15/2008
C38, Inspector, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 7/18/2008
C39, Provincial Legislator (Opposition), Cordoba, C6rdoba, 7/14/2008
C40, Health and Safety Inspector, Cordoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/24/2008
C41, Union of Agricultural and Rural Workers (UATRE), C6rdoba, 6/26/2008
C42, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 3/9/2009
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C43, Inspector, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/25/2008
C44, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/26/2008
C45, Senior Official, C6rdoba Labor Secretariat, C6rdoba, 6/19/2008
C46, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), C6rdoba, 3/18/2009
C47, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), C6rdoba, 6/26/2008
CHO], Inspector, Chaco Labor Subsecretariat, Resistencia, Chaco, 9/10/2008
CH02, Inspector, Chaco Labor Subsecretariat, Resistencia, Chaco, 9/10/2008
CH03, Chaco Labor Subsecretariat, Resistencia, Chaco, 9/10/2008
CHO4, Chaco Labor Subsecretariat, Chaco, 9/10/2008
CH05, Chaco Labor Subsecretariat, Resistencia, Chaco, 9/10/2008
CRO1, Corrientes Labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/8/2008
CR02, Senior Official, Corrientes labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/11/2008
CR10, Inspector, Corrientes Labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/9/2008
CR10, Corrientes Labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/12/2008
CR2, Tourism, Hotel, and Restaurant Workers' Union (UTHGRA), Corrientes, 9/12/2008
CR3, Inspector, Corrientes Labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/9/2008
CR4, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Corrientes, 9/8/2008
CR5, Inspector, Corrientes Labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/8/2008
CR6, Corrientes Labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/11/2008
CR7, Inspector, Corrientes Labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/8/2008
CR8, Corrientes Water and Environmental Agency, Corrientes, 9/12/2008
CR9, Senior Official, Corrientes labor Subsecretariat, Corrientes, 9/11/2008
SOl, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
S02, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario, 5/5/2009
SO3, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
Rosario, 5/12/2009
S04, Taller Ecologista, Rosario, 6/3/2009
S05, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/11/2008
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S06, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe,
12/10/2008
S07, Metal Plating Association of Rosario, Firm Owner, Rosario, 5/14/2009
S08, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), Rosario, 4/29/2009
S09, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
Rosario, 5/12/2009
S10, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/15/2008
S1, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Reconquista, Santa Fe,
12/16/2008
S12, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe,
12/12/2008
S1 3, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
S4, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/9/2008
S15, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/11/2008
S16, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe,
12/15/2008
S17, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
S18, Taller Ecologista, Rosario, 5/14/2009
S19, Senior Official, Inspection Department, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social
Security, Rosario, 5/7/2009
S20, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
Rosario, 5/12/2009
S21, Metal Industry Association of Rosario, Firm Owner, Rosario, 5/7/2009
S22, Technological Center Jose Censabella, Alvear, Santa Fe, 4/30/2009
S23, Manos a la Obra, Rosario, 5/7/2009
S24, Industrial Federation of Santa Fe, Rosario, 5/13/2009
S25, Vecinal Santa Teresita, Rosario, 5/8/2009
S26, Health and Safety Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
Rosario, 5/13/2009
S27, Labor Lawyer and advisor to CGT, Rosario, 5/13/2009
S28, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
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S29, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
S30, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
S31, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe, 12/9/2008
S32, Former Senior Official, Santa Fe Labor Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/15/2008
S33, Senior Official, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Santa Fe,
12/11/2008
S34, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario, 5/5/2009
S35, CGT Rosario, Rosario, 5/4/2009
S36, Manager, Cereal Industry Firm, Rosario, 5/13/2009
S37, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), Rosario, 6/1/2009
S38, Labor Lawyer and advisor to CGT, Rosario, 5/5/2009
S39, Deputy, Santa Fe Chamber of Deputies, Rosario, 5/6/2009
S40, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), Rosario, 6/1/2009
S41, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Rosario, 5/13/2009
S42, Inspector, Santa Fe Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Rosario, 5/5/2009
S43, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Rosario, 5/13/2009
S44, Laundry Workers' Union (UOETSYLRA), Rosario, 5/8/2009
S45, Senior Official, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/9/2008
S46, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Rosario, 4/30/2009
S47, Vecinal Santa Teresita, Rosario, 5/8/2009
S48, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
S49, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
S50, Inspector, Santa Fe Environmental Secretariat, Santa Fe, 12/10/2008
TO 1, Meat Packing Association of Tucumin and Firm Owner, Alderetes, Tucumin,
4/20/2009
T02, Environmental Specialist, Citrus Firm, Cevil Pozo, Tucumin, 4/17/2009
T03, Environmental Specialist, Sugar Mill, La Banda del Rio Sali, Tucuman, 4/21/2009
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T04, Agro-Industrial Research Station Obispo Colombres, Las Talitas, Tucumin,
4/20/2009
T05, Environmental Specialist, Citrus Firm, Tafi Viejo, Tucumin, 4/17/2009
T06, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Tucumin, 4/14/2009
T07, Senior Official, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/4/08 & 11/14/08
& 04/20/09
T08, Federal Court of Tucumin, Tucumin, 4/14/2009
T09, Tucuman Citrus Association, Tucumin, 10/28/2008
T10, Cleaner Production Center, Tucumin, 11/11/2008
TI 1, Province of Tucumin Tax Department, Tucumin, 4/17/2009
T12, Senior Official, Tucuman Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 10/27/2008 & 11/12/2008
T13, Lawyer, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 10/28/2008
T14, Environmental Inspector, Tucumin Ministry of Health (SIPROSA), Tucuman,
11/6/2008
TI 5, Industrial Engineer, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 10/28/2008 &
11/10/2008
T16, Industrial Union of Tucumin, Tucumin, 4/15/2009
TI 7, Senior Official, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/3/2008
T18, Environmental Inspector, Tucumin Ministry of Health (SIPROSA), Tucumin,
11/4/2008
T20, Federation of Environmental Non-governmental Organizations, Yerba Buena,
Tucumin, 11/3/2008
T21, Environmental Activist, Concepcion, Tucumin, 11/15/08 & 04/16/09
T23, Environmental Specialist, Sugar Mill, Tucumin, 11/12/2008
T24, Environmental Specialist, Sugar Mill, Tucuman, 11/12/2008
T25, Pro Eco, Tafi Viejo, Tucumin, 11/1/2008
T29, Pro Eco, Tafi Viejo, Tucumin, 11/1/2008
T30, Pro Eco, Tafi Viejo, Tucumin, 11/1/2008
T3 1, Pro Eco, Tafi Viejo, Tucumin, 11/1/2008
T32, Inspector, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 4/16/2009
215
T33, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Tucumin,
11/12/2008
T34, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Tucumin,
11/12/2008
T35, Deputy, Province of Tucumin, Tucumin, 10/29/2008
T36, Green Pact, Tucumin, 11/4/2008
T37, Former Senior Official, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 4/14/2009
T38, Senior Official, Regional Office of Tucumin, Ministry of Labor, Employment and
Social Security, Tucumin, 11/5/2008
T39, Senior Official, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 4/17/2009
T40, Inspector, Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Tucumin,
11/12/2008
T41, Industrial Union of Tucumin, Tucumin, 4/15/2009
T42, Senior Official, Regional Office of Tucumin, Ministry of Labor, Employment and
Social Security, Tucumin, 11/5/2008
T43, Engineer, Tucuman Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 10/28/08 & 04/20/08
T44, Senior Official, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/6/2008
T45, Inspector, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 10/31/2008
T46, Senior Official, Tucumin Environmental Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/6/2008
T47, Tucumin Regional Sugar Industry Association (CART), Tucumin, 11/14/2008
T48, Argentine Construction Association (CAC), Tucumin, 10/29/2008
T49, Tucumin Regional Sugar Industry Association (CART), Tucumin, 11/14/2008
T50, Federation of Sugar Industry Workers in Tucumin, Tucumin, 10/28/2008
T5 1, Union of Agricultural and Rural Workers (UATRE), Tucumin, 4/15/2009
T52, Construction Workers' Union of Argentina (UOCRA), Tucumin, 10/31/2008
T53, Tucuman Construction Association, Tucuman, 11/4/2008
T54, Inspector, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/11/2008
T55, Inspector, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/11/2008
T56, Inspector, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/6/2008
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T57, Metal Workers' Union (UOM), Tucumin, 4/21/2009
T58, Inspector, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/11/2008
T59, Tucumin Labor Secretariat, Tucumin, 11/6/2008
T60, Tucuman Regional Sugar Industry Association (CART), Tucuman, 11/14/2008
T61, Federation of Sugar Industry Workers in Tucuman, Tucumin, 10/28/2008
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